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
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
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GOVERNMENT
OR
HUMAN EVOLUTION

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INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

GOVERNMENT
OR
HUMAN EVOLUTION

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INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

BY

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LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1901

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53,694

University Press
JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A.

PREFACE

IN attempting to apply to the problem of Government the definition of Justice proposed at the close of the first volume, we find ourselves confronted by two theories, known under the names Individualism and Collectivism respectively. In this volume we shall endeavour to define these theories and determine their respective use and consequence. But before doing so, there is a double meaning to the word "collectivism" which it is important very carefully to distinguish; for it is used to mean not only the *method* by which justice may be promoted, but also the *condition of society* in which justice might be ultimately attained. Now with collectivism in the latter of these two meanings this work has comparatively little to do; for it has already been explained that we have no reason for believing that justice ever will be attained in the perfection proposed by the ideal collectivist State. Our definition of justice describes it as the "effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of nature upon the happiness and advancement of man," and it has been explained that there are certain inequalities of nature the effects of which no political scheme can ever eliminate.¹ If, therefore, an examination into the nature of justice has led to the conclusion that justice can never be perfectly attained, it is clearly not incum-

¹ Vol. i. book iii. chap. iii. sec. 10, p. 307. The previous volume, entitled "Government or Human Evolution * Justice," will be quoted herein as vol. i.

bent upon us to present a political scheme that undertakes to attain it. Collectivism, then, as an ideally *perfect* state of society, forms no essential part of the collectivist programme studied in this volume. It is true that the challenge thrown down by individualists to show how collectivism can ever result in permanent improvement has in part been taken up; that is to say, an effort has been made to show that a slow adoption of collectivist methods can be reasonably expected to put an end to the economic causes of poverty, prostitution, and crime. And in the explanation of what collectivism is, it has been necessary to explain the ideal collectivist State in the practicability of which some believe. But the demonstration of the practicability of ideal collectivism has not been attempted.

Upon this point it is impossible to be too emphatic. Many people regard collectivism as an unattainable Utopia with which practical men have nothing to do. So far from being Utopian and unpractical, collectivism has within certain limits already become an accomplished fact in the best-governed cities in the world, and is rapidly becoming the programme of the rest. In other words, by collectivism is not meant the paradise of angels described in "Looking Backward," but the theory of government which has partially been adopted in almost all the civilised countries of the world. There are pernicious extremes of both individualism and collectivism. Few political students any longer entertain the opinions of Herbert Spencer as regards the one, and still fewer those of the author of "Looking Backward," as regards the other. Nevertheless, there remain afloat in the minds of men some of the errors that result from Spencerian philosophy, and some of the hopes inspired by the romances of Edward Bellamy. It becomes, then, the duty of the political student to

study these two theories free from the pessimism of one school or the optimism of the other, profiting by the light science has thrown on evolution to escape from the law of necessity in which determinism sought to hold us bound, and by the experience which some decades of quasi-collectivism have furnished us during the closing years of last century. It is perfectly possible to believe that collectivism offers a higher ideal of government than individualism, without for that reason believing in the possibility of a purely collectivist State. Collectivism can be applied in small doses as well as large; it can come by imperceptible steps as well as by revolutionary cataclysms; there is such a thing as conservative as well as radical collectivism.

The greatest disadvantage against which collectivism labours is the extravagant hopes which it has raised. So extravagant are they that every man who seems to favour collectivism is set down by the practical element of the community as a demagogue, a dreamer, or a fool. Against this extravagance on the part of both collectivists and their critics too earnest a protest cannot be made; and to make the protest effectual collectivism as a method must be distinguished from collectivism as an end. In the latter capacity it is open to the criticism which is never wanting to any Utopian scheme; but as a method it is more practical than individualism, if by practical is meant the securing of the maximum of result in return for the minimum of toil. But collectivism, without being recommended as an end, is more than a method: it can become a creed; it can also serve as a programme.

It is the privilege of man to be able to see a little way into the future; but it is the privilege of no man to see all the way into it. With collectivism as an end, therefore, — as a Utopia, — this book has little to do; but

in three far more useful aspects collectivism is worthy of our attention: for in economics it presents a method; in politics, a programme; and in religion, a creed.

In the preface to the first volume a strong bias in favour of Individualism was admitted to have influenced the initial study of the subject. Under the stimulus of this bias, the Social Reform Club was organised in New York for the purpose of bringing into social contact men who worked with their hands and men who worked with their heads, and of rescuing the leaders of Trade Unions from what then seemed to be the manifest errors of Collectivism. A very few months of this social contact, however, persuaded some of us that we had caught a Tartar. The effort to escape from the Tartar involved a careful revision of the scientific grounds of Herbert Spencer's Individualism on the one hand, and of the economic fallacies of socialism on the other. The following pages are the result of this revision. They record an effort to glean the truth from both philosophies; to preserve the care for the individual which distinguishes human from pre-human evolution on the one hand, and to recover the care for the race—for the community—which man in departing from Nature seems unwisely to have neglected. The progress of man is not likely to lie in the direction of either one extreme or the other; by leaning over too much in the direction of Individualism we have moved in a circle rather than in advance; were we now to lean too much on the side of Collectivism we should make a similar mistake. What we need is equilibrium, and, as Aristotle told us many years ago, the essential of all virtue, moderation.

I have again to thank the same friends whose kindness and help were acknowledged in the Preface to the first volume, and to add a word of apology for the

absence of both bibliography and references, of which one of these friends has very justly complained. Circumstances have made it impossible for me either to supplement or confirm the references in my original manuscript. Inasmuch, however, as I have dealt for the most part with undisputed facts, the absence of references will not much be felt; in most cases, when I have had occasion to refer to facts that are unfamiliar or been lately established, I have inserted a reference. I wish, however, to express my special indebtedness to Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb for the help given me by their work on *Industrial Democracy*, from which I have largely drawn in all matters connected with trade unions, and without which I should have felt greatly at a loss for material upon a subject concerning which there were so few accessible data until the publication of their book. I also feel particularly indebted to the numerous works of Richard T. Ely and Carroll D. Wright, as, indeed, to the *Labour Bulletin* published by the Labour Bureau of which Mr. Wright is the Superintendent. Since this volume has been written my attention has been directed to the testimony taken before the Industrial Commission in 1899, and I have added an Appendix on Trusts, for most of the material of which I am indebted to Professor J. W. Jenks, whose book on this subject, and whose contributions as Expert of the Commission, cannot be too highly appreciated.

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INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

BOOK I. INDIVIDUALISM

CHAPTER 'I

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

EUROPE is moving towards collectivism with a rapidity of which she is herself hardly conscious. The eagerness of some cities in England to extend the scope of municipal enterprise has in some cases resulted in extravagance and discontent. And, like yachts which capsize and lose a race in which they already lead, by injudiciousness in spreading more sail than they can carry, some cities are already being pointed to as a warning.

America, on the contrary, is far behind Europe in municipal collectivism; but, on the other hand, she seems to be ahead of Europe in industrial and commercial preparedness for it. For intelligence in the United States tends to turn away from the doubtful prizes offered in the political arena in order to seek the more substantial rewards furnished by business careers; and consequently the wasteful method of competition is being abandoned by our shrewdest business men through

large combinations of allied industries known under the name of Trusts.

It would seem, then, that Europe is politically better prepared for collectivism than the United States, but that commercially the United States is riper for collectivism than Europe.

Europe is probably in the more wholesome condition of the two; for the obstacle to municipal ownership in the United States is bad government; and the combination of allied industries into powerful trusts introduces a new motive for corruption in politics which tends to make bad government worse. Now one of the greatest objections not only to municipal ownership, but to all extension of the powers of the State, is that government tends to be bad, and that the more government is given to do, the worse it tends to become. On the other hand, if it can be shown that the present commercial system, which leaves the production of the necessities of life to individual effort, and thereby sets the effort of one group to compete with that of other groups, is merciless and wasteful, the question arises whether in the first place competition can be eliminated from production or to any extent reduced; and in the second place, whether this elimination can best be undertaken politically by the State, as in Europe, or commercially by trusts, as in the United States.

These two questions are believed to be the most burning questions of the day, because upon the solution of them will be seen to depend the issue whether we are to continue subject to political corruption; whether we are to continue to tolerate pauperism, prostitution, and crime; whether we are to continue to preach the gospel and practise hypocrisy; whether, in fine, we are to move towards a high standard of morality and justice, under the deliberate guidance of wisdom and conscience, with

the greatest speed consistent with safety and with least cost of human despair, or whether we are to stagger towards it under the blind and conflicting impulse of selfishness and fear and at the price of agony levied during interminable centuries by the process of natural evolution which some of our teachers devoutly present to us as the only path of human salvation.

The importance of this issue has led to the examination of the foundations of individualist philosophy in a previous volume which closed with a definition of justice. The present volume attempts to apply the scientific conclusions and political definitions there arrived at to the practical problems of the day, and in so doing to weigh against one another the respective theories of government known under the name of Individualism and Collectivism, respectively.

Before entering upon this study it may be well to state briefly what is understood by these two terms.

In the first place, they are both essentially economic. Many of our social problems seem insoluble because they are regarded as social, when as a matter of fact they are economic. Prostitution may be cited as an example.¹ Less conspicuously but none the less essentially is this true of pauperism and for the most part of crime. From economic conditions result political and social consequences of stupendous import to human happiness. But the effect must not be confounded with the cause. Individualism and collectivism will be contrasted in this volume primarily as rival economic theories; that is to say, rival theories as to the best way of producing the necessities and comforts of life, and in these words are included all those things necessary to a high standard of refinement and happiness. But although individualism and collectivism are in their

¹ Book ii. chap. iv. § 2.

nature economic, they are essentially political also; for they involve the question whether production and distribution are to be left as they are to-day, for the most part in the hands of individual enterprise, or whether they are to be to any extent undertaken by the State. From this point of view individualism and collectivism become rival theories of government, and as such come within the scope of the inquiry entered upon in the preceding volume.

In the second place, collectivism and individualism are not regarded as at present inconsistent with one another. On the contrary, it is believed that for many generations man will have alternately to adopt now one, now the other theory; for in pushing forward the one he will fall into the evils that now beset some of the English municipalities above referred to, and will have to fall back upon the other until these evils are slowly festered out.

These preliminaries having been laid down, we may now venture upon definitions.

Individualism is the theory that the production, transportation, and distribution of the necessities of life can best be left to individual enterprise stimulated by self-interest and competition, under the protection and subject to the control of the State.

Collectivism is the theory that the production, transportation, and distribution of the necessities of life can to a certain degree to-day, slowly to a larger degree, and perhaps eventually altogether, be best undertaken by the collective action of the city or State, through the substitution of co-operation for competition and social for self interest.

The fact that pauperism, prostitution, and crime are the necessary attendants and products of individualism is a sufficient reason for questioning its claims; and the

arguments presented by collectivism for believing that it furnishes the only way for diminishing these horrors and ultimately perhaps in great part eliminating them, furnish a motive not only for studying collectivism, but also, if the study justifies it, for straining every nerve to see that the proper steps be taken in the direction to which it points, with audacity enough to face the difficulties that can be surmounted, and, above all, with patience enough to mark time at those crises when further progress is impossible, remembering that "they also serve who only stand and wait."

§ 1. THE DEFINITION OF JUSTICE

The task of justice was defined at the close of the first volume as "the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of nature upon the happiness and advancement of man, and particularly to create an artificial environment which shall serve the individual as well as the race, and tend to perpetuate noble types rather than those which are base."¹

The obvious objection to this definition is that it is not new. This criticism was anticipated in the introductory chapter,² but has nevertheless been much insisted upon by some of the reviewers of the first volume. It may be useful, therefore, to point out at once that, however trite and innocuous the definition may seem, it is equivalent to a repudiation of Spencerian philosophy in so far as this philosophy seeks to apply the Spencerian notion of human evolution to problems of government. For whereas Herbert Spencer considers justice attained only on the condition that the man who deserves much shall get much, and the man who deserves little shall get little, the definition pro-

¹ Vol. I. p. 360.

² Vol. I. p. 11.

posed disregards this so-called "inequality of benefits," but on the contrary insists on the elimination from our social conditions of the inequalities of nature to the utmost possible, and on the elimination of the effects of these inequalities upon the happiness and advancement of man. In a word, Herbert Spencer asks that the curse of inferiority put by nature upon the majority of men be increased by the administration of justice, so that the majority shall not only suffer by the inferiority imposed by nature, but that it shall also suffer by a further inferiority imposed by man;¹ whereas the proposed definition asks that on the contrary justice should mitigate the consequences of natural inferiority wherever this is possible; and the extent to which this is possible is set forth in the words which follow; that is to say, the task of justice is to eliminate the effects of inequalities of nature upon the *happiness and advancement of man*; not the happiness of some men, but the happiness *and advancement of all men*. Nor is the individual forgotten in the proposed definition. On the contrary, the task of justice is further described as the creation of an artificial environment which shall serve the individual as well as the race, and tend to perpetuate noble types rather than those which are base.

This definition then proposes two notable departures from nature and one possible departure from existing conditions; that is to say, instead of conforming to the scheme of nature which on the one hand favours the gifted and disfavours the ungifted, and on the other hand sacrifices the individual to the race, the proposed definition asks that the individual be no longer sacrificed to the race, and that the inequalities of nature be

¹ It has been elsewhere explained that the naturally gifted man already enjoys the exercise of his gifts. Wealth adds to this enjoyment the additional luxuries that attend it.

eliminated in so far as they can be eliminated consistently with the happiness and advancement of all. And it further asks that an effort should be made so to readjust social conditions that they may tend to perpetuate noble types rather than those which are base. It may here be added for the benefit of a few other reviewers that nothing already written justifies the notion that this last desideratum is to be obtained by treating men in the same way that men treat stallions and brood mares, but, as the definition carefully states, by creating an artificial environment the tendency of which upon the race will be to eliminate low and set up high moral standards, so that marriage may become a sacrament rather than a surrender, and from the cradle to the grave men and women may be actuated by relatively unselfish rather than by primarily selfish motives.

All these things have been fully explained in the preceding volume, and the conclusion arrived at will be briefly summarized in a subsequent chapter.¹ They will not, therefore, be further developed here.

Having, therefore, shown the difference between the proposed definition of the task of justice with which the first volume closed, and that adopted by Herbert Spencer, let us now consider summarily the relation which this definition bears to government and to the conflicting theories regarding government known under the names Individualism and Collectivism respectively.

§ 2. JUSTICE AND GOVERNMENT

The task of justice, under our proposed definition, aims at securing the happiness and advancement of man *by the creation of an artificial environment*. Now government is the name given to the artificial environ-

¹ Book ii. chap. vi.

ment created by man in so far as it concerns the task of justice. It may be objected that the word "government" applies strictly to the political element in this environment and not to the social and economic elements therein. But inasmuch as our social and economic conditions are in part the result of our laws, and are protected by them, and inasmuch as our laws are essentially within the province of government, it seems permissible to use the word "government" to cover the whole field of human interference with nature, so far as the task of justice is concerned. We must, however, carefully keep in mind that this human interference is exerted in three very different arenas: the political, the social, and the economic; and that it is sometimes as much engaged in defeating legislation as in enacting it. For outside of the field of legislation there are constantly at work the force of reaction, the force of sympathy, and the force of discontent; and these forces, when they find themselves united in opposition to existing laws, nullify these laws, either by paralysing the enforcement of them or by dictating new laws even to unwilling legislatures. We must also keep in mind that government may not always be engaged in increasing human interference with nature; it may, on the contrary, be usefully occupied in decreasing it, as, for example, when Louis XVI. abolished the highly artificial conditions created by guilds in France and restored the liberty of contract which approached more nearly to the scheme of nature. It is important, then, more carefully to define the word "government" in two directions: government constitutes, it is true, the artificial environment created by man in so far as it concerns the task of justice, but it does not include that part of the artificial environment which grows up by the side of our deliberate legislative enactments, nor does it necessarily in its

development—as the definition might seem to suggest—become more and more artificial, but may—and certainly at times doubtless should—become less and less so.

Government would seem, then, in view of the foregoing limitations, to constitute that part of the artificial environment created by man to promote justice, which is expressed in our laws or in social and economic institutions protected by our laws. As such, it constitutes altogether the larger part of this artificial environment, and fails to include only that part which is in process of modification or actively engaged therein; as, for example, the institution of Free Masonry, believed by many to be a powerful factor in determining to-day the political fortunes of France, or the civil service reform and ballot reform associations so instrumental in improving our own political conditions in America.

The foregoing expresses approximately the physiological view of government.¹ Morphologically, government is the machinery through which the rules of the political, social, and economic life of a people are determined and made known. And here again government does not and cannot include all these rules; for example, it does not include the rules of the Stock Exchange, notwithstanding the fact that these rules determine the conditions under which an enormous amount of wealth is daily transferred. In every community possessing the vitality and intelligence necessary to constitute a civilized State there will always be growing up, by the side of the rules enacted and enforced by the government, other rules acknowledged and enforced by public opinion,—sometimes through a self-constituted body like the Stock Exchange, sometimes through the slow growth of custom. When these rules become

¹ See vol. i. p. 53.

adopted by the government, as, for example, the common law of England and of most of our United States, they become a part of the government. Until they become so adopted they remain outside of government, though as regards which of these rules are and which are not a part of government it may often be difficult to decide.

It is of great importance to distinguish between the human interference that comes within the definition of government from that which does not come within the definition, because upon this distinction rests to a considerable extent the difference of opinion which divides individualism from collectivism, and it is the rival claims of these two theories of government that this volume proposes to study. At the close of the first volume it was stated that individualism proceeds upon the assumption that egotism is the only motive which can be depended upon to keep man in the way of advancement. Now that we are to study individualism a little more closely, our first task must be to point out the grounds of this assumption, and when these grounds are explained it may turn out that the assumption itself is not as immoral as it at first sight appears. To this end let us consider briefly what the theory of individualism is and upon what arguments it is founded.

§ 3. INDIVIDUALISM DESCRIBED

Individualism rests its foundations in natural science, and particularly that part of it known under the name of Evolution. The scheme of nature—the scheme through which the protozoon has developed into man—permits the survival of only those individuals best fitted to survive. In the earliest forms of life the process of improvement is in no way accelerated or retarded by the individual itself; but as development

advances, individuals seem to contribute more and more to their own survival, so that when we reach man we find in him a conscious effort to improve his own conditions, and as between men we observe great differences of capacity and disposition for such improvement. Some savage races seem to have little capacity or disposition for it; other races, such as the Chinese, seem to have capacity, but little disposition; others, on the contrary, have both capacity and disposition developed to a remarkable degree; and in these last it is notably the genius of a few individuals sustained by the capacity and disposition of the rest that makes the largest strides toward improvement. Now it seems obvious that, *ceteris paribus*, the best government will be that which furnishes to gifted individuals the fullest liberty of action through which to benefit the race. Every limitation imposed by government upon individual action will from this point of view be destructive of the common good; and from this point of view, therefore, we find individualism—that is, the promotion of the public good by the greatest liberty of individual action—supported both by the law of evolution and by the highest principles of statesmanship.

This point of view gives rise to several political doctrines: for example, it dwells upon the organic character of human society; upon its slow *natural* development as opposed to the effort to hurry its development by human interference; it points out that jurists have always recognised the superiority of the law of nature over the law of man, so that natural law became identical with moral or ideal law, and that as such it was contrasted with the bungling and unjust laws enacted by man; hence has grown up the notion of so-called natural rights, which are defined to include the most precious of them all, as, for example, the right to

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And in defence of these so-called natural rights it demands that government be the least possible; that is to say, that it be confined to defence from the foe abroad and to preservation of order at home.

Individualism, too, is founded upon moral considerations of the highest importance. Morality has developed through the natural evolution of sympathy,—from sexual love to parental love, from parental love to tribal affection, from tribal affection to love of country or patriotism,—and love of country or patriotism is destined ultimately to extend beyond national boundaries until we are at last all united in a common brotherhood. Let nature then take its course, says the individualist; keep to nature to the utmost possible; though man can do but little, let him be content to do that little, and not by ill-judged interference with nature retard development rather than promote it.

In the more special problems of government the individualist points out that laws enacted to improve human conditions have continually been found to have the opposite effect; that by the side of institutional government there is a public opinion more powerful than it, and that the unwritten law is often more effectual than the written. So that whether we build up for ourselves a complicated fabric of government, or whether we leave government to organise itself upon simple and natural lines, we must always fall back upon the vitality and resource of individual initiative, which is more likely to be crushed by governmental interference than promoted by it.

Individualism therefore marshals on her side science, evolution, nature, morality, and statesmanship, and presents a front that cannot easily be assailed. It is only by attacking the theory in its very foundations

that its conclusions can be discredited, and this is the task which has been attempted in the first volume. The effort has been made to show that Nature is not what individualists represent her to be; that the law of nature is not a moral but a non-moral law; that there are no natural rights; that the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is purely an invention of man; that human evolution is not only different from natural evolution, but in great part diametrically the reverse of it; that society is a construction rather than an organism, and human interference with nature has been bad only when it has been unwise or insufficient; that civilisation has advanced, not by yielding to the principle of survival of the fittest, but by resisting it, and, in a word, that justice is the highest expression of human protest against it.

At this point the first volume came to a close. In the course of it the operation of human evolution as contrasted with natural evolution was described during the periods that cast most light upon evolution prior to the adoption of Christianity by Constantine. We shall now resume the story with a view to tracing in subsequent history the tendency of individualism, for Christ was the great adversary of individualism, and when His teaching was eliminated from the Church by its unholy alliance with the Roman Empire, the rein put by Him upon selfishness was loosened, and individualism once more became the dominant law of human civilisation.

Before, however, we embark upon this study, a word of warning and explanation must be said: individualism resembles natural evolution — of which it is the theoretical offspring — in that it is not wholly bad; indeed, it is so much the reverse of bad that during the dominion of individualism humanity has obviously advanced; men and women are to-day believed and admitted to be

better in mind, body, and estate than in the days of the Roman Empire. The issue between individualism and collectivism is not which of the two is wholly bad, but which of the two is the better; nay, more, which of the two should at different periods of human development be resorted to. In other words, individualism and collectivism are not necessarily destructive of one another. On the contrary, they may be found to come in aid of one another. In the first volume¹ the chapter devoted to the element of time in human evolution pointed out that living organisms cannot be subjected to changes of environment except with extreme slowness and with occasional periods of rest and even reaction. Should it, therefore, be demonstrated in these pages that collectivism presents not only the higher ideal of government, but also to a limited degree an eventually practical one, this would by no means necessarily involve the conclusion that individualism must for that reason never be resorted to. On the contrary, a contingency will be shown to be likely to happen under which a return to individualism would furnish a salutary reaction.²

Again, the study of human history and human institutions upon which we are about to embark would become extended beyond legitimate proportions were it to be interrupted at every moment by an intimate examination of all the forces at work in the field through an over-scrupulous desire not to exaggerate the case. Suffice it to say now that the tendency of evolution, even under the individualist régime, seems on the whole, in spite of appalling obstacles, to be generally in the direction of improvement; the method of natural evo-

¹ Vol. i. p. 157. The Element of Time in Natural and in Human Evolution.

² Vol. ii. book ii. chap. v. § 4 (c).

lution is, however, a dangerous one; it is extremely slow, and its crises are attended by anguish of body and of mind. If we look back at the history of humanity we see the dangers of evolution illustrated by the decay of the civilisations of Assyria, India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, by the long period of arrested mental development known as the Dark Ages, and by the bloodshed which has attended and is still attending the conflict of opposite social ideas. The issue presented for study in this volume is whether individualism, following closely one of the schemes presented by nature and attended by the horrors of violence, disease, and want, is the best theory of human government, or whether there is not another social scheme also presented by nature which, improved by man under the name of collectivism, may not in its proper turn contribute to work out his emancipation at a smaller cost of agony and time.

CHAPTER II

INDIVIDUALISM IN HISTORY

It is customary to ascribe the fall of the Roman Empire to the incursions of the Goths; and undoubtedly it was the Goths who at the death divided the Roman Estate; but to attribute the death to them would be like arguing a man's children to be his murderers because they shared his inheritance.

Rome perished because the forces both within and without which had contributed to her maintenance were no longer strong enough to resist the forces that were hostile to it. The main force which had lifted ancient Rome above all the other cities of Latium was a sentiment, — the sentiment of patriotism; and this sentiment in ultimate analysis was built upon a kind of self-sacrifice. So long as there remained in the Empire a sufficient number of citizens animated by the willingness to sacrifice self to the State and possessed of the courage and strength to make this sentiment effectual, so long there was a force which, unless it encountered the same order of sentiment more pure and better organised than itself, could be counted on to triumph over external foes.

But when this sentiment was devoured by the self-indulgence that follows like a shark in the wake of wealth, the fate of Rome depended no longer on herself, but on the wheel of Fortune.

And it must be admitted that for centuries Fortune was very kind to Rome; it is impossible to read her

history during the years which followed the reign of Constantine without wondering that so rotten a carcass could so long hang together.

Rome was never conquered. There was during the period of her decay no organised community capable of conquering at all. She was never conquered: she fell to pieces; and a "concourse of most politic worms" nibbled away her once so shapely limbs.

We must look at the barbarians who poured over the frontiers of the Roman Empire during the fifth and sixth centuries, not as the conquerors of Rome, but as the scavengers which rid the world of her corruption. Man had by his very refinements sunk so low that Nature with all her cruelty and barbarism was an improvement upon him; she rendered a service to the race by using the savage tribes of the north as a broom to sweep the earth of a nation which could no longer do aught but corrupt it.

And the instruments she used were strangely conscious of their mission. Attila proclaimed himself the Scourge of God. He knew that he could but destroy, and that he was powerless to construct.

We cannot derive much advantage from pursuing the devious course of the barbarians who at this time divided the inheritance of Rome, unless it be to arrive at a realising sense of what is in store for man when he abandons the conduct of life in order to surrender himself to his natural propensities. And it is perhaps a sad and instructive lesson to compare the teaching of the wisest and best of Rome with the consequences of that teaching: "*Vivere secundum naturam*," — Live according to nature, — said the Stoic Cato; "Live according to nature," echoed the Epicurean Horace; "Live according to nature," repeated the sage Marcus Aurelius; and live according to nature with a ven-

geance did the pleasure-sated patrician and the pleasure-seeking populace. In very truth they have had their reward.¹

Nature brings to the sybarite a long and miserable decrepitude; to the barbarian a violent but often glorious death; and whether we linger by the decaying remains of the one or are carried headlong over the battlefields of the other, we can but record the inevitable lesson that Nature unsubdued is a cruel god-mother. The history of man living according to Nature seems a bewildering and pointless tragedy, with a great deal of blood and misery in it; the hell of human passions let loose; whole armies destroyed at one time to serve the ambition of a Clovis, at another to wreak the hatred of a Fredegonde. But out of it all, to one who seeks, not the hand that wields the sword, but the spirit that in the end overcomes it, there loom out of this confusion two great centres of order,—one in the papal chair at Rome; the other in a mosque at Mecca. For the battles in which Clovis overcame Syagrius at Soissons, the Suabians at Zulpich, and Alaric near Poitiers would have shared the obscurity of the countless other unrecorded battles of that period were it not for the alliance which Clovis made with the bishops in communion with the See of Rome.

Christianity may have lost by her alliance with the Roman State, but even the corruption of that day could not take from the Church of Christ the saving seed that still germinated and bore fruit in the byways and hedges, far from the pomp and jealousies of the Papal Court. It is difficult to believe that in all the violence and horror of this period there was much room for the humility and

¹ It ought not to be necessary to explain that it is not the doctrine of the Stoic which is here criticised, but the false formula in which the doctrine was expressed.

non-resistance preached to the fishermen of Galilee; and yet throughout it all, such is the overwhelming power of a moral force to hold its own against mere physical brutality, that when we look for a clue to guide us through the world-spread and tottering ruins of the Roman Empire, we find it in religion, — whether it be a true religion corrupted by the State at Rome, or a false religion creating a state by the Red Sea. During the centuries that follow we shall find two waves of civilisation starting from these two centuries: the Christian with a high ideal of morality, but degenerating towards a low standard of intelligence, strangely at variance with the violence which, by compromise after compromise, it was at last destined to overcome; the Mohammedan with a low ideal of morality, but sustained by a high standard of intelligence, presenting two definite objects for the attainment of men, — conquest in this world and a paradise of houris in the next. If we compare the ignorant monk of mediæval Europe with the wise men who thronged the court of Haroun al Raschid, it is of no small interest to note that the one was sowing the seed of our Western Empires, while the other was destined to degenerate into the unspeakable Turk.

To those who, like Niebuhr, think it possible to write history without reference to religion, it may seem fanciful to reduce that of the Middle Ages to the varying fortunes of two religious ideas; and yet it is impossible to scan the centuries which separate Constantine from Cromwell without recognising the preponderating rôle which Mohammedanism played in one continent and Christianity in the other. Indeed, until prosperity had emasculated the Mussulman, it may be said that there were very few, if any, events in the civilised world which were not intimately connected with one of these two religions or with the conflict between them.

§ 1. THE RELIGIOUS IDEA. — CHRISTIANITY AND MOHAMMEDANISM

The contrary currents which traverse an estuary hopelessly perplex a mariner until he discovers what gives rise to them; but the moment he recognises them all to result from the flow of the sea up the river-bed during one tide and the flow of the river to the sea during the other, they not only cease to perplex him, but he can count upon and utilise them. It is probable that similar currents can be traced in history, though they are numerous and subtle. We cannot, then, do better than point them out whenever we can recognise them, without dogmatising too much as to their constancy or as to their strength.

But though it may be unwise to be over-positive as to the influence of religion in the world, it cannot be denied that there have been times and places in which the power of a religious idea has proved itself to be overwhelming. Nor is it necessary that the idea commend itself to us to-day for its wisdom or morality; it is not likely that any man educated in our western civilisation would approve the peculiar tenets of Moslem faith; and yet, as a force, this very Moslem faith has never been surpassed; and in its origin it can hardly be distinguished from Christianity. "Do unto another as thou wouldst he should do unto you," says the Koran; and again: "Deal not unjustly with others, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. If there be any debtor under a difficulty of paying his debt, let his creditor wait until it be easy for him to do it; but if he remit it in alms, it will be better for him;" and again: "Take not advantage of the necessities of another to buy things at a sacrifice; rather relieve his indigence." "Look not scornfully upon thy fellow-man; neither

walk the earth with insolence, for God loveth not the arrogant and vainglorious." The very name Islam means submission. All the essentials of Christianity are here, — love substituted for greed; humility for arrogance.

(a) *The Mohammedan Idea*

Notwithstanding the similarity between the teaching of Christ and that of Mohammed, neither Saint Paul nor his successors succeeded in making an impression upon the wandering tribes of Arabia.¹ It would have been difficult to find any corner of the earth in which there was less promise of religious regeneration or social coherence than among the Bedouins, to whom the first gospel of Mohammed was preached. Mohammed's city was Mecca; and here the Banú Kinána had formed a settlement around the Ka'ba, — the sanctuary of a number of loosely confederated tribes (Ahabish) belonging to that district. What prosperity Mecca enjoyed was mostly due to the fact that here was held the yearly fair at which the Meccans sold to the Bedouins the goods they imported from Syria. It enjoyed no municipal government, no magistracy, but was composed of numerous so-called "septs," occupying each its own quarter, worshipping each its own gods, and united only by a common interest in observing the sacred month, during which merchants were safe from the brigandage that prevailed during the rest of the year. Here, as in ancient Greece and Rome, religion was in one of its phases an anti-social rather than a social force; there was indeed behind the multiplicity of Arabian gods a shadowy notion of Allah; but because of the very

¹ Saint Paul himself preached the gospel in Arabia. — *Epistle to Galatians*, i. 17.

unity and universality of Allah, the Arab was out of touch with Him. For the Arab was a true son of Ishmael: "He will be a wild man; his hand will be against every man, and every man's hand against him."¹ In the language of modern philosophy he was an individualist: he wanted a camel of his own; a God of his own; the desert to range in; and an occasional caravan to plunder.²

This was the ground in which the seed of Christ's gospel had taken no root, but which responded with savage enthusiasm to the same doctrine when it was driven home by the personality of Mohammed.

It would be unwise in such a work as this to enter at too great length into speculation regarding the secret of Mohammed's success; we are more concerned with the fact of his success than with the reason of it; nevertheless it may not be out of place to suggest that men's hearts are very much like men's minds in the dense carapace of dulness that envelops them, and that the personality of the teacher has perhaps more to do with his success than the soundness of his doctrine; the word of a good woman will often reach the heart of a criminal upon whom the eloquence of a Chrysostom would have been wasted. But upon one point we must not allow ourselves to be deceived; it was not the virtues preached by Mohammed that secured him the allegiance of his Bedouin disciples; it can hardly be conceived that Mohammed was enjoining upon them the Christian doctrine of humility and love when Ali, in offering to become his vizier, exclaimed: "O prophet, I am the man; whoever rises against thee, I will dash out his

¹ Genesis xvi. 12.

² There seems in this respect to be considerable analogy between the Boer and the Bedouin ideal of government. The Boer does not set out to plunder, but his system of government ends in something very like it.

teeth, tear out his eyes, break his legs, rip up his belly. O prophet, I will be thy vizier over them!"¹

And yet too much importance must not be attached to the mere personality of Mohammed; just as in carpentry every effort at penetration needs a sharp tool forward and a blunt one behind, and it is by the application of the hammer to the tack that penetration is effected; so in the moral and intellectual world there are needed two instruments to penetrate the crust of habit within which the instinctive life of man is lived; and these two instruments are, first, an idea, and, secondly, the personal force of the Prophet to drive the idea home. Now the fundamental idea of Mohammedanism was probably not the practice of virtue; it was an idea that lies at the foundation of the highest form of government, and for this reason demands our very particular attention.

(b) *The Power of the Idea in Religion*

Selfishness, unenlightened by civilisation or corrupted by it, tends to distract the energies of an individual rather than to concentrate them. In some cases it may animate a temperament peculiarly gifted with the power of concentration so as to make of such a temperament a social scourge; it accomplishes this work in such a life as that of Bonaparte, Jay Gould, or William Tweed; but this is comparatively rare; in most men it distracts and dissipates their force, so as to make them incapable of very great accomplishment. This dissipating tendency of selfishness is illustrated in the man who, though vindictive enough to wish revenge, is too cowardly to attempt it; or in the man who is greedy enough for wealth to commit crime for the purpose of attaining it, and yet not rash enough to take the risks which

¹ Gibbon, ix. p. 284.

crime involves; or in the man who would be glad enough to surrender to the allurements of another man's wife, and is yet restrained by the discomforts which await him from the jealousy of his own. Now it is upon this distracting tendency of human selfishness that our political and social institutions in great part rest. Selfish men stand like the fabled ass, irresolute and inactive because equally distant from equally attractive bunches of hay, and, through the paralysing effect of opposing selfishnesses, abstain from sin, except within limits that can be deemed safe. This is the kind of morality which practically keeps our civilisation together. It is, of course, very different from the morality we profess; but this last has now become so obsolete that Mr. Fitz-James Stephen,¹ in a book written for the purpose of demonstrating the necessity of maintaining Christianity as the bulwark of government, laughs at the idea of attempting to conform ourselves to the precepts taught in the Sermon on the Mount. This inconsistency will be treated at greater length when we come to study our existing institutions. For the present it is not necessary to insist on more than this: that men and women who are not animated by religious motives are for the most part kept from infractions of social and other law either by affection or by the fear of consequences.

Now this distracting effect of selfishness, although extremely useful as a socialising force in creating a state, is a source of weakness once the socialising force has created it; for the more we have at stake in our lives, the less are we willing to expose them. Again the habits of self-indulgence which result from prosperity increase unwillingness to suffer pain and hardship, and this unwillingness unfits men to face the dangers of war;

¹ Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

they therefore give up fighting themselves and pay others to fight for them, and this is the beginning of the end.

The operation of selfishness tends, then, inevitably to the decay of every civilisation that is built upon it alone.

The distraction produced by selfishness is particularly dangerous in the soldier; a man who is concerned about his safety or unwilling to suffer pain is thereby unfitted to lead a charge, or to stand a charge, or to endure any of the hardships inseparable from a campaign; whereas the soldier whose every fibre is animated by a single purpose unweakened by any conflicting consideration will hurl himself upon the enemy with irresistible momentum or stand to receive him with irresistible obstinacy.

This distraction occasioned by selfishness¹ is inconsistent with good government so long as our political insti-

¹ It ought to be obvious that the word "selfishness" is used here in its popular sense, and that no attempt is made to adopt or take into consideration the philosophical doctrine that all human motive must in its last analysis be selfish, and that therefore a careful and correct vocabulary will distinguish one kind of selfishness from another and not contrast selfishness with motives which are not philosophically distinguishable from them. It must be admitted that patriotism is a form of selfishness; but it is a form in which it is so diluted by unselfishness that more confusion is likely to arise in non-philosophical minds by the attempt to be accurate than by adopting popular though slightly incorrect verbiage. The essential difference between the selfishness which is concerned with one's self only and that in which considerations of self yield to considerations for one's country is that in the one case the selfishness is of a distracting character, and in the other case it is not. This is the distinction which it is here sought to establish; and it can be established for the unsophisticated reader better by using the word in its popular sense than by preceding the argument with philosophical disquisition, which in a treatise on politics it is wise as much as possible to avoid. I permit myself therefore to use the word selfishness to mean selfishness which disregards the interest of others; and unselfishness to mean that which regards them. So many people have an unreasonable objection to the word "altruism" that it has been deemed prudent to use it as sparingly as possible.

tutions reward those willing to take risks of political brigandage by surrounding them, where successful, with the protection of the law. The citizens who are called law-abiding because they are timid become the natural prey of those who because they are not timid seize the law-making power in order to turn it against the law-abiders. The attempt to move forward civilisation by relying on selfishness is like the attempt to move forward on a treadmill; the wheel sinks under us every time we lean upon it; we remain at a standstill, losing strength at every effort, until at last exhaustion comes upon us; we fall in our tracks, only to leave the eternal mill to grind the lives of those that come after us in recurring despair.

And yet this is not a true picture of what has happened in the history of man; because man has not at all times depended upon selfishness as a sufficient motive for action. That selfishness is a sufficient motive is a modern doctrine of political economy which is already yielding to less inhuman argument. So far from depending upon selfishness, it may be said that no nation ever became very great that did depend upon it. Whenever we see one tribe sweeping other tribes before it, we almost always find behind it a force which, because it is *not* distracted by selfishness, is overwhelming.

This force is generally an idea which removes from the mind the considerations which distract it, concentrating energy instead of dissipating it. Such, for example, is the force of patriotism. Patriotism obliterates self; it is not an effectual patriotism unless it does obliterate self; and by obliterating self it obliterates the distractions which result from self-consideration. Another such force is love; that is to say, the love that obliterates self and not that which is servile to it. Another such force is religion; that is to say, the religion

which succeeds in lifting the hearts of men above things worldly and substitutes for them things spiritual.

Religion, however, operates upon men in different methods; and its faculty for rousing enthusiasm depends much upon the particular method it adopts. It operates, for example, by cold appeal to reason, as in the religion of Confucius; by passionate devotion to a cause, as in the case of the Crusades; by substituting the love of the neighbour for the love of one's self, as in the case of the early Christians; but above all, and perhaps behind all, by the conception of an omnipotent force of which each and every one of us is the manifestation and every one of us the invincible instrument, as in the creed of Islam.

It would be an interesting inquiry to examine every movement that has succeeded, and trace it to its psychological source; for it seems possible that success in almost every case could be traced to self-effacement. For example, the secret of successful leadership seems to be in the ability of a leader so to command the loyalty of his adherents that they will make any sacrifice for him; self in such case is forgotten in devotion to the leader. Again, although religion is behind the training which goes to make the Sister of Charity, there is in the training itself a carefully devised system for destroying self-consideration. No one is permanently admitted to the sisterhood who has not during a period of probation shown an ability to efface self, and during this period no effort is spared to effect this purpose; pride is shattered by the habit of servile obedience; refinement is discouraged; even personal cleanliness is tabooed in order that no bodily consideration should stand between the soul and God. It is perhaps the absence of this somewhat brutal treatment of the body that explains why Episcopal sisterhoods keep so far

behind those of the Roman Church. Rome crushes self-consideration; Protestantism tends rather to keep it alive.

This discussion must not be understood to favour one system or the other; nor need it be regarded as written in the interest of religion: "Je n'oppose rien, je ne propose rien; j'expose." The great historical fact looms out of the confusion of the Middle Ages, that so long as men were urged only by selfish motives they destroyed much but constructed nothing; but as soon as the energies which were distracted by selfishness became concentrated by the controlling force of a single idea they destroyed less and constructed more. In other words, the great constructive force in humanity is not selfishness, but unselfishness.

Unselfishness, however, is a negative word and serves only to strike a contrast; the real force which creates unselfishness is the force of a concentrating idea. This was the force which Mohammed had the genius to communicate to the sons of Ishmael. Whether we regard it as a religious idea, as, for example, the omnipotence of Allah, or an irreligious idea, as that of fatalism, or whether we attribute it to personal loyalty, there was accomplished among the Bedouins during the life of Mohammed a change of heart which drew together the wandering tribes of Arabia as a magnet does a field of iron filings, and converted them for the first time in their history into one invincible host.

It hardly seems necessary to follow closely the course of the army which, starting from Medina and effecting the conquest of Mecca, set forth upon the conversion of the world. Almost without a check it spread over the whole Arabian peninsula, crossed into Egypt, mastered the whole northern coast of Africa, and established the Moorish Empire in Spain. Eastward and northward

its progress was less rapid but no less certain; as it came into contact with higher civilisations it borrowed and enhanced the splendour of every conquered race. Constantinople, the capital of the world, became necessarily the object of its effort; and in the direction of Constantinople therefore moved the capital of the Moslem Empire. Damascus, Bagdad, Broussa, were all steps towards the conquest of the city which was to make it master of the world. Nowhere did it encounter an effectual resistance until it came against a population animated by a similar force and organised by a still higher religion.

The history of the Middle Ages is the history of the growth and conflict of two religious ideas, — the one represented by the Cross, the other by the Crescent. Out of this conflict the Cross came victorious not only in the field of war, but also in that of politics; and just as in ancient history that of monogamous and patriarchal tribes, because they laid down the basis of our existing civilisation, interests us more than that of the metronymic hordes which left behind them no useful political institutions, so the development of Christian States, upon which are laid the foundations of our existing un-Christian governments, interests us more than that of the Mohammedan hosts which still, owing to the so-called European Concert, oppresses and massacres our Christian people in the East.

(c) *The Power of the Idea in Disease*

There is a rejuvenescence of the Mohammedan idea now taking place amongst us which it is possible that many of us have failed to recognise. It is known and for the most part despised under the names Mental Science, Christian Science, Menticulture, etc.; it is the modern

form of miracle, and differs from the old only in the professions made by the healer. The miracles alleged to have been performed in ancient times are professedly witnesses to the divine mission of the miracle-worker; those alleged to be performed to-day have no special relation to the healer whatever; on the contrary, he is kept in the background. He claims no special qualifications, assumes no divine mission; he even disclaims miraculous power, but on the contrary attributes the power he exercises to the influence of the mind, which he regards as the highest power in nature, and in fact as the manifestation of divine omnipotence in the world. He is the legitimate successor of the Stoic who denied the existence of evil, and of the Christian who proclaimed the omnipotence of God, — one being the negative, the other the affirmative form of the same idea; but he is particularly the exponent of the Mohammedan doctrine that every man is the expression of divine omnipotence, if he will not himself stand in the way of that expression.

Now there are certain diseases, such as those that arise from mental and nervous disorders, which derive their strength in great part from the domination of a fixed idea. There is perhaps no essential difference between the hysterical patient who believes himself to be paralysed, and the balking horse which refuses to advance because he thinks he sees an insurmountable obstacle in his path; both are the slaves of an idea, and the duty of the healer in such case is not to treat the body, but to remove the idea. It is practically useless to beat a balking horse, but if he is turned round once or twice, so as to dissipate the obstructing idea, he will often pass the balking spot without the necessity of a single blow; so if a hysterical patient who believes himself incapable of speech is etherised and suddenly questioned before

he is quite awake, so as to appeal to his instincts before the fixed idea can resume control, he will find tongue and answer, and in answering discover the error under which he has been labouring; he will be temporarily cured by the removal of the controlling idea.¹

Now the idea which can paralyse one man can develop every conceivable disease in others; for example, in some cases it produces hemorrhage in lungs that are perfectly sound. To treat for consumption a hysterical patient who has hemorrhage is to confirm the idea and thereby increase the disorder; he must be treated like a balking horse; he must be rescued from the domination of the false idea.

But false ideas occasion not only acute symptoms such as those described, but also conditions of body which, because they are not attended by acute symptoms, are for that reason all the more baffling; such, for example, is the condition that prevails so extensively to-day under the name nervous prostration. It originates doubtless in a real physical breakdown, due to overwork or some other physical or mental strain; but this breakdown creates in the patient an idea of weakness which maintains and enhances it. He learns to believe himself incapable of sleep, of work, of effort; he loses courage; and after his body has recovered its vigour the domination of a false idea maintains in him a sense of weakness which is itself as false as the paralysis and hemorrhage in the hysterical patients above described.

It is upon this class of patients that Mental Science performs its most astonishing results, for it substitutes for this false idea of discouragement a healing idea of strength; and this healing idea is for the most part a sense of oneness with God that dissipates the distracting considerations of human weakness. There is nothing

¹ See the "Medical Journal" for August, 1898.

metaphysical about this; it is practical to the highest degree. If a man's body is capable of doing a certain amount of work, but he is possessed by the idea that he is not able to do it, the idea will paralyse him; if, on the contrary, he is possessed with the idea that he is able to do it, this enabling idea will remove the paralysis and restore his efficiency. This is the acknowledged conclusion of the medical profession in cases which do not admit of question; it is the explanation of the healing miracles of Lourdes, Schlatter, and mental scientists; it is the secret of Mohammedan success, and it is part of the gospel of Christ: "For verily I say unto you, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you."

(d) *The Power of the Idea in Politics*

The force of habit has been insisted upon as explaining by far the largest part of human action, and as constituting a part of the strength and a part of the weakness of government. The force of an idea must now be insisted upon as similarly constituting a large and sometimes a determining rôle in the character of human institutions; and just as unconscious habit was contrasted with conscious effort in the framing of government, so must the force of an idea be contrasted with it; for a man possessed by an idea is just as irresponsible as a runaway horse; in the latter the idea of flight replaces the idea of submission, and, his habits of movement taking up the idea of flight, he is hurled on his way as uncontrollably as a driverless engine thundering along a railroad track.

It is of extreme importance to keep in mind the true character of the idea in framing political institutions

when the idea is uncontrolled by judgment. It does not seem unreasonable to imagine that political movements that are determined by ideas ought to be classed among the conscious forces of society, and yet this would surely be a profound mistake. The balking horse is not a voluntary agent, nor was the conquering Mohammedan or the inspired Crusader. In ultimate analysis all are found to be slaves of an idea. The difference between the savage who roams the forest in search of food and the savage who, associated with others like him, marched to the conquest of Constantinople, is that in the one case he is controlled by an individualistic idea, in the other case the individualistic idea is replaced by a socialising one; in the one his energy is distracted by opposing selfishness, in the other it is concentrated by a monopolising thought; in the one he is as feeble and helpless as a flake of snow, in the other he is as overwhelming as the avalanche.

But in both cases, so long as he is an automaton worked by a force which is not under his control, he is equally undeliberate, equally unpurposive, equally involuntary; the difference is one of effect, not one of method. The solitary savage accomplishes nothing; the inspired horde accomplishes a great deal; but neither advance civilisation very much; they differ in the unconscious socialising force which distinguishes the bumble-bee from the hive-bee; but this in its nature is not very different from the two phases through which the *myxomycetes* passes, — the individual cell and the compound plasmodium. It is surely not to the unconscious socialising force that unites the cells of a sponge that we are to look for characteristic human progress; human progress differs essentially from that of the lower animals in the exercise of judgment and self-restraint, or in that combination of the two which is called wisdom.

Now the wisdom which started and guided the Moslem Empire must be sought in Mohammed rather than in the Mohammedans; in Omar rather than in the conquering ranks of Amron.

Let us then be careful to distinguish the three forces which were at work in this amazing history.

HABIT, which contributes the mechanism of all *animal* action.

IDEA, which, when religious, by concentration contributes the strongest motive for *human* action.

INTELLIGENCE, which deliberately guides the human machine thus constituted and set at work.

HABIT, animated by selfishness alone and distracted by it, has produced the ape, the tiger, the savage, and the Ishmaelite.

IDEA, eliminating the distraction of many selfishnesses, produced the Mussulman.

INTELLIGENCE, in the persons of Mohammed and Omar, used the Mussulman to conquer all the neighbouring nations less highly socialised, and to create the Moslem Empire.

The history of this empire has still an important lesson for us. Prosperity brought to the Moslem Empire its accustomed fruits: wealth, literature, art, science, music, rendered the Khalifs of Bagdad illustrious beyond all other rulers in the world; and these, the best results of civilisation unenlightened by wisdom, emasculated not only the court, but the people. No longer willing or able to face the dangers and hardships of battle themselves, they enlisted in their service the uncivilised Tartars of Turkestan. This new and necessary force did for the Khalifate what the Prætorian guard had done for Rome; succession to it was determined no longer by inheritance, but by assassination; those who had been called in to defend the empire stayed to divide

it; its weakness and its wealth tempted a less peaceable invasion by the same race, and the Turks, snatching the Mohammedan idea from the expiring Mohammedans, once more undertook the original scheme of conquest. The successive conversion of the Tartars of Turkestan first; the Moguls of Genghis Khan afterwards; and those of Timur last of all, insured a continuous renewal of the stock which the prosperity of conquest was continuously corrupting, and by the time that the Ottomans, who may be regarded as the final result of all these forces, appeared under the walls of Constantinople, the Christian idea which had theretofore resisted the Mohammedan had itself become divided; so that the last of the Cæsars, no longer propped by western civilisation, fell at last before the second Mohammed almost without a blow.

The individualistic Bedouin, socialised by the genius of Mohammed, corrupted by the wealth of Bagdad, but, before expiring, handing on the central Mohammedan idea to his despoiler, — the Tartar first and the Mogul afterwards, — furnishes a pathetic story of high purposes prostituted to ignoble ends. It is one already rendered familiar to us in ancient history, but in a somewhat less startling degree; for it cannot be said that the religion of Athens, Sparta, and the other Grecian States, in its relation to politics, did more than build up a heroic sort of patriotism; and the patriotism was narrow; it hardly transcended the city walls, and never conceived of a wider horizon than the City-State. That of Rome was of much the same order, but larger in its scope, and, as it set Rome upon the conquest of city after city, developed into the Nation and eventually into a world-embracing Empire. The Mohammedan idea, on the contrary, was lofty beyond all that went before it, and boundless in its reach. Allah, the omnipotent, confined

to no city, as with the Greeks, to no race, as with the Hebrews; Himself eternal and manifesting Himself in no one man, but in all men, who became united in Him, and if obedient to His will, invincible; Allah, unlimited in space as in time, embracing all humanity in one concentrated and overwhelming force, constituted a socialising force such as the world had not in recorded history previously to that time known.

It seems probable that this was the conception which fired the enthusiasm of Mohammed in the wilderness; it lifted him high above the considerations of this world, so that when Abu Talib urged him to abandon his attacks upon the idolatry of Mecca, he answered: "Though they gave me the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left, to bring me back from my undertaking, yet will I not pause till the Lord carry my cause to victory or till I die." But no mighty effort was ever made to socialise men without encountering the opposition of the individualistic instincts we share with the tiger and the ape. Mohammed and his few disciples were obliged to escape from Mecca; and when Medina opened her gates to them, Mecca regarded this act of hospitality as a signal for hostilities. Thus immediately was a great religious idea thrown into the hazard of military tactics; and thus Mohammed, who had started upon a purely religious mission, found himself involved in a religious war. There is doubtless an inconsistency of startling repugnance between religion and war; but this inconsistency did not shake the faith of the Prophet or weaken the arm of his disciples. It is not the man of action who is checked by inconsistency; it is the man of thought; and the career of Mohammedan conquest knew no retiring ebb, but kept due on from the Propontic to the Hellespont until the splendour of a Mohammedan court afforded the leisure to think.

And here we come upon another of the great forces which have been at work in making and unmaking government. Reason, which so often palsies action, is the great enemy of religious enthusiasm, because it opens the door to the spirit that doubts; and there is probably no religious idea so difficult to reconcile with reason as that of an all-good as well as an all-powerful God. Nor is reason helped to accept this dogma by the luxury of an imperial court. Self-indulgence very soon suggests to reason that the obvious mission of man is the pursuit of happiness; and happiness, to one who has all the facilities for self-indulgence, at once becomes synonymous with surrender to animal propensity. Culture, which in its first stages lifts man above the vulgar needs of the body, learns at last to minister to those needs with a refinement that transfigures vice into an art; and then the inconsistency between a religion that teaches self-restraint and institutions that make for self-indulgence works out its necessary result. The pause in Moslem conquest during the illustrious Khalifate of Bagdad; the renewal of these conquests when the corrupted Mussulman was replaced by the uncorrupted Turk; the spur given to Moslem arms every time they were reinforced by new barbaric blood, as by the hosts of Genghis Khan and the Mongols of Timur; and the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire ever since the day it ceased to receive these reinforcements, — are convincing witnesses to the hopelessness of permanently building institutions of selfishness upon an unselfish religious idea. The moment the inconsistency of such an effort is given the opportunity to bear its legitimate results, these results are manifested in decay. War, luxury, and licentiousness are inconsistent with the highest religion; religion must either destroy them, or they will destroy religion. Man has not yet seriously undertaken

to make his institutions consistent with his religion; until he does he is doomed to the vicious circle so clearly marked out by the course of Mohammedanism; the unselfish religious idea destroying selfish irreligious communities, only itself to perish at the very hands of those by whom its victories were accomplished.

A fundamental problem of government is to frame institutions which will be consistent with morality. It may be immaterial whether we take our morality from Confucius or Buddha, Plato or Mohammed, provided only our institutions be consistent with it. Then, and then only, will practice conform to precept, and hypocrisy cease to worship at the altar of the Golden Calf.

§ 2. THE CHRISTIAN IDEA

If now we turn from the Crescent to the Cross, we shall be struck with the likeness of their respective histories notwithstanding the profound differences which distinguish them; and as the differences may be summed up briefly, whereas the history will have to be told at greater length, it may be well to point out the differences first.

In the first place stands the obvious contrast between the personality of Christ and that of Mohammed, — the one spotless and inspiring love, the other self-indulgent and suggesting criticism. Christianity is essentially the following of Christ; Mohammedanism is essentially the pursuit of conquest. The life of Christ is a pattern; that of Mohammed a warning. Could we all but live the life of Christ, the world would be a heaven; were we all to live the life of Mohammed, the world would perhaps be still worse than it is.

In the second place the teaching of Christ is submission, — not to God only, but to the ungodly also; that

of Mohammed is, like that of Christ, submission to God, but to the ungodly, death.

In the third place Christ bore witness to his doctrine of non-resistance on the cross; Mohammed bore witness to his doctrine of resistance on the field of battle.

In the fourth place Christianity was built upon the family: "Honour thy father and thy mother." Christendom is but the extension of the family so as to embrace all mankind; "men became brothers because they acknowledged a common Father"; and the unit of Christendom was not the individual but the family, indissolubly bound together by the sanctity of marriage. Mohammedanism ignored the family; discredited the indissolubility of the marriage vow; set up only one fountain of authority, — the Caliph, or representative of the Prophet. If that fountain were troubled, — as it sometimes must be, and ultimately always was, — there was no other source of salvation or of strength.

The necessary consequence of these essential differences is seen in the early history of these two religions. We have seen that the result of one was a conquering army; let us now consider the result of the other in the language of one of its earliest apologists: —

"We who formerly delighted in fornication, but now embrace chastity alone; we who formerly used magical arts, dedicate ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who valued, above all things, the acquisition of wealth and possessions, now bring what we have into a common stock, and communicate to every one in need; we who hated and destroyed one another, and on account of their different manners would not live with men of a different tribe, now, since the coming of Christ, live familiarly with them, and pray for our enemies, and endeavour to persuade those who hate us unjustly to live conformably to the good precepts

of Christ, to the end that they may become partakers with us of the same joyful hope of a reward from God, the Ruler of all."¹

It must be regretfully admitted that the description given by Justin, while probably true as regards a considerable fraction of the Christian Church, was lamentably untrue as regards the remainder. There can be no church without organisation, and there can be no organisation without rank. The hierarchy to which organisation necessarily gave rise set the deacon above the congregation, the priest above the deacon, and the bishop above the priest; and wherever in congregations of men one is set above another, there immediately is room given for the play of passion, jealousy, and vindictiveness. Every church that has ever existed must, so long as man has a vestige of human passion in him, suffer from this necessary feature of church organisation.

Nor are the conflicts which arise in a church confined to desire for office and consideration; men will conscientiously differ regarding matters of belief, and it is just these differences of belief that the ambitious will seize upon as an excuse for ousting those who stand in their way. In this way ambition for ecclesiastical preferment exaggerates differences of faith, encourages heresy, and fans heresy into sedition.

The distracted condition of the Christian Church upon matters of dogma, the shameful scramble for ecclesiastical office, and the baseness of some of those who occupied episcopal chairs even before the prosperous era of Constantine, demonstrate the fact that wealth is not the only cause for unhappiness to mankind, and disparages the arguments of those who think that the elimination of wealth will suffice to make men happy.

¹ The First Apology of Justin Martyr, chap. xiv.

Long before the adoption of Christianity by Constantine, Novatus (if we are to believe Eusebius), having aspired to the bishopric of Rome and been disappointed, secured a "shadowy and empty imposition of hands" from a collection of bishops whom he had recruited from the provinces, shut up, and "heated with wine and surfeiting;" and yet it is Novatus who was the founder of the sect which, on account of the boasted purity of their morals, assumed the name of Cathari. Before Constantine a hundred heresies had served the purpose of intrigue and ambition, and Arius had already begun his war upon the *ὁμοούσιον*, which was for centuries to serve as a battle-cry for political as well as ecclesiastical faction.

Nevertheless, although the Church was distracted by heresy and often disgraced by corruption, there were doubtless, prior to its adoption by Constantine, districts where the precepts of Christ were practised even to the extent of holding property in common; and wherever the grossest abuses are found, they can generally be traced to exceptional prosperity.

As soon as the Church began to receive imperial favours, Christianity became a profession, and was made to serve the purposes of ambition and avarice. The wealthy first and the poor afterwards joined the Church for no other object than to enjoy the patronage which she now had to distribute; it is even stated that twelve thousand men were baptised at Rome, besides a proportional number of women and children, upon the promise to each convert of a white garment and twenty pieces of gold.¹ Cities which voluntarily destroyed their heathen temples were rewarded with municipal privileges. The property of which Christians had been stripped by Diocletian was restored to them. The Edict of Milan

¹ Gibbon, vol. iii. p. 24.

permitted churches to hold landed property, and subsequently Constantine specifically authorised bequests to the Catholic Church. The Emperor presented large sums of money for the relief of churches in Africa, Numidia, and Mauritania; he ordered a regular allowance of corn for the support of monastic institutions; he built temples and adorned them with gold and silver, silk and gems. Imperfect rent-rolls bear witness to the large property held by some of the churches during his reign; and the Church very soon acquired a power the ultimate extent of which Constantine probably did not foresee. He did not appreciate that the right of parishioners to elect their own priests and bishops took the appointment of thousands of magistrates out of his hands; nor that the so-called ecclesiastical courts, the right of the bishop to act as censor of the morals of his people, and the opportunities afforded by freedom of public preaching were to create a power in the State destined eventually to supersede that of the Emperor himself.

The Church, however, was still in tutelage to the State; for it was the ratification of the Nicene Creed by the Emperor that banished Arius to Illyricum and gave a sanction to the orthodox faith by punishing with death all persons found in possession of heretical writings. From this moment religious faith became irretrievably committed to the varying fortunes of politics, and to the intrigues of eunuchs in the Emperor's palace.

When the Pagan Julian assumed the purple, he swept all Christians out of public office with as little mercy and as systematic method as Tammany employs when she replaces a Republican administration. On the other hand, as soon as Julian was replaced by a Christian emperor the reverse process took place; and under Theodosius the Church had become so strong that a

bishop was able to humiliate the Emperor himself by stopping him on the porch of the church and refusing him entrance to the sanctuary. "You have imitated David in his crime," said the audacious Ambrose; "imitate him also in his repentance." Nor did the Church hesitate to avail herself of her influence; she secured the confiscation of the property of the ancient faith, appropriated the revenues of its priests and vestals, and was not content till she secured the destruction of heathen temples in the provinces and their consecration to the worship of Christ in Rome.

But the Church was doomed speedily to suffer the consequences of her own aggression. She borrowed from the religion she destroyed much of its luxurious ritual and many of its most foolish superstitions. The idolatry of the ancient city became revived in the Christian Church under the guise of the worship of Christian martyrs; miracles were performed upon their relics, and the bones of malefactors fraudulently represented to be those of deceased saints were used to replenish her always emptying coffers.

It has already been pointed out that the victories of Clovis were rendered permanent by the support he received from the bishops in his conquered territory. The conversion of Clovis, however, was not an isolated fact during this troubled period; on the contrary, whenever the barbarians came into contact with the Christian Church the latter led captivity captive by subduing her conquerors.

So long as the barbarians refused communion with the See of Rome, so long they failed to found a State or attain civilisation; but when, adopting Christianity, they acquired the socialising force which at that period seemed to radiate from the Papal chair, then, and then only, did they acquire the permanent settlement by

which alone was a record secured in history. And it seems immaterial whether the gospel was imposed upon them by the sword, or whether by the sword they conquered it. The victorious Normans under Rollo, and the Tartar hordes subjugated by Henry the Fowler, were equally ungoverned and ungovernable until, the one by adopting Christianity and the others by submitting to it, imprinted the names of Normandy and Hungary permanently upon the map of Europe. When Pepin, restive under the feeble yoke of the Merovingian Dynasty, asked whether he who maintained the crown should not also wear it, it was to Rome that he applied for an answer, and it was from Rome that the answer came. When later Charlemagne looked for a symbol under which he could extend his empire and consolidate it, it was to Rome he looked, and it was from Rome once more that the symbol came. And when the German kings sought the succession to the Carolingian Empire, it was in Rome that they seized and assumed the imperial crown.

But the power of the Christian idea must not be exaggerated or misunderstood. Success did not always attend upon Christian arms. Far from it. Not one of all the Christian peoples successfully resisted the Pagan pirates of Scandinavia; on the contrary, they were the terror of all Christian kings; and Charlemagne is said to have shed tears when he saw their galleys in the Mediterranean. And yet, when they wrested the fairest province of France from the simple Charles, Christianity converted a race of adventurers into the future founders of the British Empire. The claim of the miraculous for the Roman Church must be left to those who write history in her interests; to political students her strength must be confined to, and may be explained by, a less mystical origin.

And yet, if we compare the conception of the Church entertained by Christ with the place occupied by the Church under her most illustrious prelates, it will be found that one is a wonderful and almost miraculous realisation of the other.

The prayer which Christ dictated to his disciples is perhaps the finest expression of the Christian creed: "Our Father which art in Heaven; hallowed be Thy name; *Thy kingdom come*; Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven." A universal Father; a universal kingdom; a universal worship; a universal peace, — these are the aims of Christianity. Nor is the word "kingdom" altogether figurative; it is a kingdom not of this world, but nevertheless a kingdom; and a kingdom that was spiritually to bind all the kingdoms of the earth, — *Gens Sancta*, a holy nation according to Saint Peter, and according to Saint Augustine, *Civitas Dei*, the kingdom of God.

Now, whatever opinions we may entertain regarding the inconsistencies which disfigured the Christian faith and the crimes by which this faith was imposed upon the world; whatever may have been the deficiencies of the men through whom the *Civitas Dei* was founded; whatever may have been the varying fortunes of Papal arms in the struggle of the Church against the German Empire, it can hardly be contested that in the period which not long ago it was usual to characterise as the Dark Ages, but which to-day we have learned to regard as in one respect the most human of all the periods through which humanity has passed, there was established in Europe a moral power to which the kings of the earth submitted, and before which they laid down their arms. And this moral power governed not only rulers and princes, but it governed the mass of the people also, and entered into the lives of the men as

well as of the women of that time. And this is the testimony of lay historians as well as of the clergy. In his Twelfth Lecture¹ Guizot says:—

“I must call your attention to a fact which stands at the head of all others, and characterises the Christian Church in general, —a fact which, so to speak, has decided its destiny. This fact is the unity of the Church, the unity of the Christian society, irrespectively of all diversities of time, of place, of power, of language, of origin. Wonderful phenomenon! It is just at the moment when the Roman Empire is breaking up and disappearing that the Christian Church gathers itself up and takes its definite form. Political unity perishes, religious unity emerges. Populations endlessly different in origin, habits, speech, destiny, rush upon the scene; all becomes local and particular; every enlarged idea, every general institution, every great social arrangement, is lost sight of; and in this moment the Christian Church proclaims most loudly the unity of its teaching, the universality of its law. And from the bosom of the most frightful disorder the world has ever seen has arisen the largest and purest idea, perhaps, which ever drew men together, —the idea of a spiritual society.”

Bryce, again, points out that men “do not, cannot, understand the intense fascination which the idea of one all-pervading Church exercised upon their mediæval forefathers.”²

There is not an institution of the period but is founded upon a religious idea. When the Italian cities undertook to organise their own defence, their standards bore the image of Christ, and a priest said daily Mass at an altar placed in front of the sacred car; when the grocers of England united to protect their trade, their first care was to fix the stipend of a priest who was to conduct their religious services and pray for their dead; when

¹ Page 230.

² Holy Roman Empire, 8th ed. pp. 373, 374.

brigandage and blood revenge were devastating the land, it was the Church which secured the Truce of God, out of which began the effort to render war less constant and less inhumane. The guild was religious; the municipality which grew out of the guild was religious; and it was from religion that the King derived his title. Often and for many years together the Pope dictated the policy of nations, and as late as the fourteenth century, when the Papacy had already lost much of its power, we see Clement VI. imposing peace on Philip of France and the victorious Edward of England.

This was the Age of Faith, — the age which erected all over Europe cathedrals instinct with the same idea; which filled their Gothic arches with stained glass; which preached the Crusades, and, before expiring, guided the brush of Botticelli.

And such was the power of this faith and such the unquestioning servility to it of the human mind, that it remained the dominant factor in the lives of men, although its ministers were in great part corrupt, violent, and unchaste. It is not necessary in this century to dwell on the dark side of the picture; for the dark side is doubtless more familiar than the bright. Our task must be rather to seek the causes of the decay which in undermining the Church of Rome undermined also the faith which had so long upheld her.

The forces at work in Europe during the Middle Ages were strikingly similar to those already pointed out as operating in the Moslem Empire. There was the force of habit which constituted the *animal* machine; there was the force of the Christian Idea, which nevertheless influenced the *human* machine; and there was behind this idea the organisation of the Church, guided by such men as the first and seventh Gregories. The idea

practised as well as taught by Christ and His apostles was an infinitely higher one than that which was ever effectually practised by the Mohammedans; but by the time it had been corrupted by compromise with the Pagan worship of Rome on the one hand, and with the barbaric superstitions of the Goths on the other, it would be difficult to say whether it was an improvement as a social force on the Moslem faith. Two essential characteristics, however, served to distinguish it: it remained monogamous in the first place, and in the second it was preserved in its purity and handed down from one generation to another through the lives of a few holy men and women in communities similar if not identical with that founded by Saint Vincent of Paul.

We should go far astray, however, if we attributed to the mass of the people the holy lives and motives which as a matter of fact were confined to a very few individuals and associations. The vast majority was governed by religious ideas as unholy and as inconsistent as those which governed their Ottoman invaders. Ignorant people, whose lives are determined by habit, are like well-broken steeds; it is immaterial who the rider is so long as he can sit the saddle and handle the reins. The horse, whose habit has become one of submission, will obey the rider, whether he be a son of Belial or an angel of light. So will ignorant people remain subservient to the idea which possesses them, differing, however, from the lower animal in this vital point, — that whereas the latter is controlled only by physical force, the former is amenable also to a spiritual idea. To what extent he is amenable to it; how far the idea can become corrupt and still command his obedience; at what point he will grow restive under it and throw it off, — is written in clearest characters in the history of the Age of Faith.

At war with this force of a religious idea were the selfish motives which set men upon the satisfaction of their animal propensities in spite of it; and these selfish motives not only set men upon using the Church to serve their purposes, but set the Church upon using them to maintain her power. One of the most fatal of the legacies which the Roman Empire left the Roman Church was temporal power; for temporal power could only be maintained by the use of the same methods as were adopted by the temporal powers about her. Another, equally fatal, of these legacies was the habit of using methods which were irreconcilably inconsistent with the teaching of Christ.

Our whole understanding of the Middle Ages is apt to be warped by the mistake of supposing that Constantine was converted by Christianity. Constantine was *not* converted by Christianity, but Christianity was corrupted by Constantine. It is not necessary to go so far as the French poet, who put into the mouth of Constantine, —

“ Mais tous mes soins pour sa grandeur suprême
N’eurent jamais d’autre objet que moi-même ;
Les saints autels n’étaient à mes regards
Qu’un marchepied du trône des Césars.
L’or des chrétiens, leurs intrigues, leur sang,
Ont cimenté ma fortune et mon rang ; ”

nor is it necessary to point to the fact that after his alleged conversion he murdered his own son, and postponed his baptism till the hour of his death. These facts go to prove that Constantine did not practise the precepts he preached; but this must also be said of some of the most distinguished prelates of the Church. And even to-day the man who stands for all the evils against which Christ preached is maintained upon his throne by the so-called Christian Powers of Europe. We are

every one of us in our own time so inconsistent in every hour of our lives that mere inconsistency or an occasional crime furnishes no argument against a man's sincerity as the word is in practice understood amongst us. But the political student is concerned with facts more than with motives; and however pure or impure may have been the motives of Constantine, the fact remains that Justin Martyr's account of a Christian community is conformable with the teaching of Christ, whereas the change which came over the Christian Church through its adoption by Constantine was one which made such a community from that time forth impossible.

It is not so much the fact that such communities disappeared subsequently to Constantine's adoption of Christianity as the fact that they must necessarily have disappeared, which is of interest to the political student. The mere fact of disappearance might be attributed to some other cause; but the intrinsic inconsistency between the conditions necessary for the existence of such communities and the conditions which prevailed under the patronage of Constantine cannot be explained away.

As soon as the Church became a political machine, in the same sense as Tammany Hall is a political machine, because only through the favour of such a machine could public office be attained, that moment the Christian in the Church became swamped by the horde of office-seekers which invaded her; that moment she became one of the instrumentalities through which greed and ambition could secure their aim; and that moment human passions were let loose upon her which made short work of charity and poverty of spirit.

Singularly enough, although Christian virtues have been and are still practised by individuals all over the civilised world, it is difficult to find them practised

consistently and persistently by permanent groups, except in associations of men and women who are committed by the rules of their order to a community life, *and are thereby separated from the outside world*. It is in convents and monasteries, among Sisters of Charity, among Shakers and Little Sisters of the Poor, that we find practised the precepts taught in the Sermon on the Mount: within these communities it seems possible to practise them; outside of them men smile at the idea of attempting it.

It ought not to be necessary to add to the foregoing arguments the obvious one to be drawn from the life of Constantine himself. No one familiar with the events of his reign can for a moment believe that his so-called conversion exercised much, if any, influence upon his conduct so far as the practice of virtue is concerned. All that can be said is that had he remained Pagan he might have been worse; but in that case he would have to be ranked amongst the most infamous of an infamous line. If, on the other hand, we compare the life of the Imperial Court with that of the community described by Justin Martyr, the contrast becomes so striking as to provoke inquiry.

Constantine led a Christian life no more than any of his successors; and this for a very simple reason. The virtues preached by Christ are essentially inconsistent with those necessary under existing conditions to maintain a throne; the art of ruling a Christian kingdom consists in professing Christianity and practising Paganism; the one is needed to secure Christian submission from Christian subjects, and the other indispensable to protect the kingdom from wolfish kings. And so it may be said that the art of government has by the profession of Christian faith become the art of hypoc-

ris. Indeed, it may be said that hypocrisy, in the splendid career which it has made for itself throughout our modern civilisation, is peculiarly a product of Christianity, or rather of that compromise between Christianity and Paganism which dates from the reign of Constantine. We have heard so much of soi-disant Christian virtues and grown so restive under them, that it is with a sense of relief that we open our eyes to what may be called a characteristically Christian vice. In Greece and Rome there was no profession of universal love, of humility, of poverty of spirit; on the contrary, morality there consisted of courage, sacrifice of self to the city, patriotism, chastity, and in fact those virtues which are necessary to a fierce and aggressive worship and defence of the home. Now all these virtues they not only preached, but practised. There were doubtless hypocrites in those days also, and religion was used and abused then as now to serve the ambition of a priest or tyrant. But the mass of the people were not daily, hourly, corrupted by pretending to virtues which they in secret despised. How much did the haughty Hildebrand, in his triumph over the barefooted and prostrate Henry, practise humility? How much poverty of spirit can we discover in the fighting prelates who succeeded one another during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the See of Rome? How much universal love is to be traced in the aggressive Christian nations which are now quarrelling over the still living limbs of China; or in the prayer of our own congressional chaplain, who asks the Almighty to make us, through our Saviour Christ, "quick to resent"? With what secret derision does the business man of our own city and every other city in the world trample on these so-called Christian virtues in his daily struggle to increase his own wealth at the expense of his neighbour! And yet with what unctuous-

ness does this same citizen perform his duties as a vestryman on the so-called Lord's Day! Now in Greece and Rome there was but little of this kind of hypocrisy because there was but little need of it; there was no pretence of loving one's enemies; on the contrary, there was a bold profession of hating them. There was no pretence of turning the other cheek; on the contrary, there was a wholesome respect for the blow which returned a blow. Above all, there was no pretence of humility. And this virtue, which is in one sense the highest because the most non-natural, would have excited in the Greek and Roman only aversion and contempt. If their ideal was low, it was at any rate one not inconsistent with their daily life and their deliberately constructed institutions; and if it encouraged ferocity and war, it at any rate rendered unnecessary the most contemptible of all vices, — because the most cowardly and the most refined, — hypocrisy.

Were we to disregard this patent and indisputable fact, we should lose sight of one of the most powerful factors that have been at work in framing our mental constitution; we are every one of us to-day the product of the practice of hypocrisy during countless generations; it has become as much a part of our mental habit as the taking of regular meals is a part of our bodily habit; and it has created in us a capacity for inconsistency of which we are ourselves for the most part unconscious. We have to break through this crust of mental obliquity if we are to judge of political institutions justly; and if we fail to judge of them justly we are apt to have our crust broken for us by titanic forces which we have not had the sight to see or the understanding properly to appreciate. If we can rid ourselves of the blindness which the long practice of egotism and hypocrisy have fastened upon us, we may see things as they are and not as we want

to see them; and a good test of our ability to do this is presented by our willingness to recognise the incontrovertible fact that Christianity has been used to bolster government and scouted in the administration of it.

This fact is not stated here by way of reproach, — far from it; nothing in the world is more inconceivably impossible than a Roman emperor practising Christianity. It would be as mad to reproach the sea for her wrecks as Constantine for his perversion.

All we are concerned with here is the fact; and if it is insisted upon at wearisome length it is because the fact is one which we have for centuries been persistently refusing to admit; we still talk of our governments as Christian governments, and we have actually got to think of them as Christian governments. So long as this mental obliquity persists in us, we might as well give up the attempt usefully to study politics. As well ask a blind man to use a microscope. If, on the other hand, we are able to recognise that from the day Constantine prostituted a holy idea to prop up an unholy empire, although the Pagan Empire remained Pagan, the Christian Church ceased to be Christian, then we see things as they really were, and not as they are presented to us by a misleading vocabulary.

The history of the Middle Ages will from this point of view turn out to be a struggle of humanity with inconsistencies of which it was but dimly conscious; and the habits of thought and action which this struggle created constitute an essential factor in the political problems of to-day. The difference between the civilisation of to-day and that of the Middle Ages is mainly this: until the Reformation faith was the controlling force among the masses; since the Reformation faith as a force has diminished more and more. The influence

of faith upon political institutions before the Reformation and the effect of its disappearance upon institutions since that time are matters of paramount importance to political students.

The power of faith¹ — that is to say, of a controlling religious idea — has already been referred to in the brief account given of Mohammedanism. The force which built up the western civilisation of the Middle Ages out of the ruins of the Roman Empire was of the same nature. In both cases the power of the religious idea to secure submission from, and arouse enthusiasm in, the masses of the people, has been used and abused with remorseless disregard for the effect of such abuse upon both religion and the people; it was used by kings at one time, and by the Church at others, to push the interests of the crown and tiara respectively. Thus we find Pepin appealing to the Bishop of Rome for moral sanction of the usurpation of the French crown; and we find the Pope in turn demanding his price for the sanction by an appeal to Pepin for succour in his contest with the Longobardi. Pepin rewarded the Pope by wresting from the Lombards the ex-archate of Ravenna and by bestowing this ex-archate on the Pope, thereby laying the first substantial foundations of his temporal power. But the power which a religious idea exerted on the masses of the people was too essential to the crown for kings to leave it where it belonged, — in the Christian Church; and the Christian Church was too ambitious to leave temporal power where it belonged, — to so-called Christian kings. We find, therefore, political power moving from the secular crown to the ecclesiastical tiara, and back again from the ecclesiastical tiara to the secular crown, according to the genius of those who respectively

¹ For an explanation of the word "faith" as here used, see *post*, book ii. chap. vi. § 3.

wore them. Thus Charlemagne, who consented to receive from the Church the moral sanction conferred by his coronation at Rome, did not hesitate to maintain his authority over the Church which gave that sanction; for most of his capitularies relate to the discipline of the Church. There is no attempt in his laws to distinguish between those which are of a secular and those which are of an ecclesiastical order; nor were these capitularies and ecclesiastical laws submitted to the bishop or the Pope; Charlemagne took his authority on ecclesiastical as well as secular matters for granted. Nevertheless, no king or emperor was more lavish in the privileges he allowed to the Church than he. Secure in the strength of his sword, he was at all times willing to strengthen his own hold upon his people by strengthening the Church, through whom that hold was in part secured. This policy, however admirable in such a monarch as Charlemagne, proved disastrous to his feebler successors. Louis the Debonair was deposed by ecclesiastical authority; it was an assembly of bishops that divided the dominions of Lothair between Charles the Bald and Louis of Bavaria; and it was another assembly of bishops that handed over to Louis of Bavaria the kingdom of Charles the Bald. The ninth century has been called the Age of the Bishops, as the twelfth was that of the Popes. In England, as on the Continent, the bishops assumed control of secular affairs. It was the bishop of Winchester presiding as Papal Legate, at an assembly of the clergy in 1141, who arrogated to himself the right to put Matilda on the throne; and the submission of King Edwy to Archbishop Otho and Saint Dunstan sufficiently testifies to the power of the bishop in his day.

The rise of the Papal power has been too often and too well described to make it necessary to repeat it here.

The gift to the Holy See of the ex-archate of Ravenna, taken in connection with the so-called False Decretals of Isidore; the removal of the seat of the Roman Empire to Constantinople; the recognition of the Pope by Charlemagne as the power from which the imperial crown was derived; the frequent and successful interference of the Bishop of Rome in the determination of succession to the crown; the exorbitant power of censorship which ultimately grew into that of excommunication and interdict; the successful use of these in such cases as that of Robert of France, — could not but lift the Bishop of Rome above the other bishops of the world.

But such power as that exercised by him inevitably resulted in abuse; the conditions which raised the Bishop of Rome above that of all the princes of the earth could not fail to produce their results throughout the whole ecclesiastical system.

It would be indeed amazing if a condition of things which within a hundred and fifty years deposed six popes, murdered two and mutilated one, should fail to demoralise those who derived their authority and example from the See of Rome; the papal authority must have been weakened by the fact that often there were at the same time two and sometimes three popes in the field; and the example offered by popes who filled their coffers by the sale of episcopal confirmations and of exemptions to monasteries could not but encourage a similar traffic throughout the whole hierarchy. The crozier was no longer conferred by the votes of the laity, but became an occasion of perpetual conflict between temporal rulers and the Pope; it fell to him who had most men-at-arms at his back or most money in his pocket; a child of five years old sat in the episcopal chair of Rheims; that of Narbonne was purchased for

another child of ten; vows of celibacy were habitually broken, and unchastity became the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, the corruption during this period became so rank and universal that it seems difficult to understand how the Church retained its hold upon the faith of men. But in this respect the condition of the Church in the Middle Ages resembles that of politics in our own; wherever we look to-day over our political field we seem to see vice triumphant, and yet, as has been said elsewhere, it is astonishing to have to recognise that the worst of legislatures often enact the best of laws, and that the best of laws are in turn handed over to the administration of the worst of public officers. The reason of this will be discussed in its proper place, but it may be pointed out here that in view of the inherent vice of man it is astonishing how virtuous he is; that, in other words, although, since the beginning of things, he has been surrounded by conditions which tend to make him more and more evil, he has as a matter of fact been becoming more and more good. And just as in our own day government seems to be in the hands of purely self-seeking politicians, and just as in the Middle Ages the Church seems to have been in the hands of a purely self-seeking hierarchy, so now, as then, there has been a saving force in the community which has preserved the wholesomeness of both Church and State throughout every corrupting environment; this saving force is the salt which keeps the sea wholesome, though the sea is the reservoir into which is poured all that is corrupt in the world; it is the vital spark which keeps our heart beating, though without us and within us teem everywhere the seeds of death. Now, this view of the plain facts which confront us everywhere seems clearly to indicate the direction our studies should take: is there salt enough to take care of the corruption that prevails in the world? Is

there vital force enough to save the soul which is still struggling for the mastery in the lives of our institutions and ourselves?

These questions resolve themselves into two: what is the strength of the soul in us and what is the strength of the corrupting environment? And if it is true that the environment is in great part the work of our own hands, then the inquiry whether this work is of a character to keep alive the soul in us or to lay it low becomes altogether the most important inquiry about which we can at all be engaged. But if we allow ourselves to be hypnotised by the power of mere words; if, because we have been so long accustomed to regard the words "Christian Church" as involving the idea that the Church has remained Christian, we are unable to recognise the undoubted fact that the Church ceased to be Christian¹ as soon as it became converted into a political machine, we are unfitted to estimate the work of our own hands, and therefore incapable of correcting it.

And the importance of keeping the unchristian character of the Christian Church well in view is felt the moment we inquire into the reasons why a vigorous and in great part successful effort of the people towards self-government marked the eleventh and succeeding centuries throughout the whole of Europe.

¹ It must not be imagined that this conception of the Church is inconsistent with a devoted loyalty to it. We cannot be held responsible for incidents which occurred fifteen hundred years ago; but we can be held responsible for refusing to see things to-day as they are, because it is inconvenient to do so. If, as a matter of fact, the Church is to-day a party to a scheme of society and government which is inconsistent with the doctrine of Christ, it becomes our duty, not to abandon the Church, but to use all the power of the Church to restore society and government to compliance with the doctrine we profess. There is no organised power in existence to-day so potent for social and political reform as the Church, provided only those in control over it will open their eyes to the truth and courageously act in conformity to it.

§ 3. DECAY OF THE RELIGIOUS IDEA AND GROWTH OF THE IDEA OF INDIVIDUALIST GOVERNMENT

Nothing could exceed the patience and submissiveness of the people prior to the eleventh century: the habit of submission made them equally responsive to the call to arms of their feudal lord, or to the call to church of their ecclesiastical superiors; but the perplexity and injustice to which they were submitted by the soldier turned churchman at one moment and the churchman turned soldier at another, coupled with an awakening sense of injury at the hands of both alternately, found an opportunity of expression in the eleventh century of which those who furnished the opportunity were destined to be the dupes. There is probably no fact in history more amazing in its nature or more powerful in its results than the sudden inoculation of Europe by a religious frenzy that snatched alike the baron from his castle and the peasant from his hut, and dashed them against the walls of Jerusalem. It is an illustration of the power of the religious idea to which sufficient reference has already been made, and upon which it is unnecessary again to expatiate. But it is also a still more striking illustration of how the religious enthusiasm of one portion of the people can be made to serve the selfish interests of another. The extent to which the Church profited materially from the Crusades has often been pointed out; as, for example, through the strength she gained by the drawing away from Europe of the turbulent nobility that contested with her the control of manorial fiefs; through the property she acquired from this very nobility, who in borrowing money upon their estates in order to obey the exhortations of the Church, permitted the Church to buy in these estates during their absence in the Holy Land. But these are of small importance to the political

student by the side of the larger fact that by drafting away from Europe at the same time the religious enthusiasts who made the people subservient to the Church and the rascally barons who kept the people in terrified subservience to their manorial lords, the Crusades left behind them a population that, because it was not easily excited, was for that reason more capable of deliberate purpose, and because it was no longer overawed by the force of arms was for that reason capable of successful efforts towards self-government. The Crusades furnish startling evidence of the power of the Church from one point of view, and from another mark the period of her decline; for, in the first place, they killed off many of her devoutest followers, and in the second place they furnished an opportunity for society to organise upon purely individualist lines; and this kind of organisation is not consistent with blind subservience to a religious idea. The development of the city republics in Italy, of the communes in France, of the German towns in the Hanseatic League, and of the boroughs in England during the eleventh and succeeding centuries is worthy of a moment's thought.

As soon as the strong arm of Charlemagne was removed by death from the control of the Empire, the people became a prey to the conflict between rival lords, — sometimes both of them lay lords, — sometimes one lay and the other ecclesiastical; it would be difficult to say which was the more oppressive of the two; for while the lay domination was generally the more violent, the ecclesiastical was the more persistent; and in England at any rate it is clear that the boroughs found it more difficult to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of church communities than from those of lay lords; because whereas the latter were apt at some time to weaken through the weakness of one of their line, the former,

like all clerical corporations, had behind them the never-dying traditions and organisation of the Church. Now it is a remarkable fact that as soon as the first Crusades had drafted off to Palestine a population of nearly a million, very few of which ever returned, we find efforts at self-government in France becoming successful; the date of the first crusade is 1096 to 1099; and it is between 1100 and 1112 that the *communes jurées* were formed at Noyon, Beauvais, St. Quentin, and Laon. The struggle had indeed begun before: the burghers of Amiens, for example, had allied themselves with those of Corbie as early as 1025 with a view to putting an end to the perpetual private wars which by dividing them kept them under the yoke of their manorial lords; but the very terms of this alliance show how subject to their lords spiritual as well as temporal they at the time were. The alliance was essentially a religious one; it provided for an annual meeting of the inhabitants of both towns at one of the great feasts of the Church; for a procession in which were to be carried the relics of their saints; for solemn oaths taken under the sanction of the Church; and for a hearing of all matters of dispute in front of the cathedral and "in the presence of the bishop and the count." The whole story of the struggle of Amiens for self-government is typical and interesting: the town is divided as to matters of jurisdiction between the bishop and the count, — the one having jurisdiction over the cathedral and its neighbourhood and the other having jurisdiction over the rest; nor is the authority of the king unrepresented; the "castillon," a veritable citadel built out of the ruins of a Roman palace and succeeding to its traditions, is the domain of the king and tenanted by his "chatelain," who enjoys the title of "Prince de la Cité;" the people have lost their rights; they no longer elect their bishops, as they did in the seventh

century, or their judges (*scabini*), as in the eighth; on the contrary, the right to judge the people is the source of perpetual quarrels between the bishop and the count; and the reason why this privilege is prized may be gathered from the first charter which an alliance between the people and the bishop wrung from the count, for this charter provides that a burgher accused of theft shall have the right to be confronted by his accuser and his witnesses, and shall not, after having been fined by one of the judges of the count, be rearrested and fined once more by another judge. It seemed to be taken for granted as a manorial right which it was impossible to abolish, that the burghers should, whenever the "*vidame*" was in need of money, be arrested upon a trumped-up charge of theft and fined without trial; but the charter conceded that the same burgher should not be arrested and fined without at least being confronted by an accuser, and that he should not be tried for the same offence by as many *vidames* as the count chose to appoint in Amiens! Such were the abuses and such the pitiful measure of relief which at the close of the eleventh century the people were able to secure.

But as soon as the Crusades had drawn away much of the strength of the nobility and some of the weakness of the people, we see Laon engaged in a furious campaign against the bishop and the king, which ended after three years in the triumph of the people; and Amiens, the scene of a no less bloody conflict, in which at one time the town, having by the payment of a large sum of money purchased a charter from Louis le Gros, is supported by both the king's chatelain and the bishop against the count; and at another, deserted by the chatelain, is holding its own against both count and king. We see the town securing against the count the alliance of his own son, the famous or rather infamous

Thomas de Marle ; we see this same Thomas using his alliance with the town in order to secure terms with his father at one time, and at another deserting the town and joining the ranks of the count ; we see the king, fearing the strength of this alliance, joining once more the town and the bishop ; and after a struggle of four years deposing the count (1117) and putting in his place a rival claimant in the person of Raoul I. This last count granted to Amiens its first veritable charter.

It was out of such struggles as these that the people gained their rights, — struggles in which it is difficult to trace any consistent action among the abusing powers ; for if in one town we find, as in Amiens, the bishop supporting the people, in another, as in Laon, it is the bishop who is fighting the people ; and if in one the king is on the side of the oppressed, as in Amiens, in another, as in Laon, he is on the side of the oppressor. There is no notion of justice or right ; it is a struggle of selfishness operating sometimes through intrigue, sometimes through treachery, and always with violence and the shedding of blood.

It is not surprising that under these conditions the influence of faith should at last cease to be paramount : we can see it dwindle away in the history of this very town ; the religious character of the alliance between Amiens and Corbie slowly disappears ; the relics and the clergy no longer play a part in the procession ; and prayer is replaced by dancing and kindred diversions. Faith could not long survive under a régime as destructive to it as that which prevailed when the weakness of the successors of Charlemagne tempted the Church to join in the general scramble for political power and wealth. The bishops can be heard saying, in the words of one of our own contemporaneous states-

men, "Why should not we too play for our legitimate share of the great stake?"¹—and share they did, not only in the "great stake," but also in the degrading, the bloody, and the anti-Christian scramble for it.

The influence of the Crusades, however, in bringing this result must not be exaggerated; for there was another factor at work more positive in its action and more powerful in its effect. Whenever a devastating force such as that of the barbarians, during the years which ushered in the Middle Ages, sweeps over history, we observe after a brief spell of discouragement a rejuvenescence of the constructive force which originally created the civilisation just destroyed; this rejuvenescence does not need explanation; and if it did, no explanation could be given; it is a fact, it is the fact of life, as to the cause of which we know nothing, and our ignorance regarding which we all often illogically ignore. Just as the more — within certain limits — we cut a hedge, the more it grows; the more we trim a tree, the more it blossoms; the more we destroy life, the more life teems, — so within similar limits the more we destroy institutions, the more vigorously new institutions spring up to take their place. But this rejuvenescence can only occur within certain limits, and it is the art of the statesman as of the gardener to know what these limits are. Let us give to this question a moment's consideration.

§ 4. FORCES AT WORK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF INDIVIDUALIST GOVERNMENT

The crafty minority which is for ever seeking to plunder the uncrafty multitude has an interest in

¹ N. Y. "Times," January 28, 1898. Plea of Charles Emory Smith for the annexation of Hawaii by the United States.

the prosperity of its prey; and it is generally when the governing minority fails to understand this that it is overthrown. The Indian tribes were as careful to preserve the herds of buffalo upon which they respectively depended for food as we have been reckless in destroying them; Tammany remains in power in New York city so long as in the shearing of us it does not cut to the bone; and the Church preserved her authority over her flock until her oppression and exactions made it less intolerable to resist than to submit to her. What are the forces at work in this singular relation between the robber and the robbed?

The food of the buffalo is grass; the food of the Indian is not grass, but buffalo; in this case the robber and the robbed do not compete for the same food; on the contrary, the robber has an interest in securing the finest pasture for his prey. If the herd be left to its natural increase, it will tend to grow too large for its food supply; and until the effect of the insufficient supply shall either have occasioned migration to other pastures or killed off the weakest members of the herd, the herd will suffer. The intelligent killing of the members of the herd with which it can most easily dispense, such as the conquered bulls and the barren cows, will feed the Indian and improve the herd; the unintelligent massacre of the best-producing bulls and the fertile cows will not furnish better food to the Indian, but will end by impoverishing his supply.

Here we have in its inception the application of intelligence to the predatory system; and this new principle is beneficent to both the predator and his prey; it secures the best food to both.

The forces at work are threefold, — two that belong to nature and one that belongs to art; the two that belong to nature are, first, the reproductive force of the

herd which, *ceteris paribus*, can be counted upon within certain limits to replace those that are consumed by the carnivore ; and, secondly, the predatory instinct of the carnivore. The force that belongs to art is the intelligence which understands the limits within which the reproductive force of nature can be counted on and the individuals in the herd upon which the predatory selection can most advantageously be exercised. In other words, we see three forces confronting one another : the reproductive force of nature unexplained and inexplicable ; the *natural* or unintelligent destruction exercised by the carnivore, which is wasteful and injurious ; the *artistic* or intelligent selection exercised by man and involving some self-restraint, which is economical and beneficent to both.

Government, unenlightened by religion, tends to be an application to human society of the art which the Indian applies to the herd of buffaloes ; it is the alliance of selfish intelligence, or craft, with the natural predatory instincts of man in the intelligent minority, for the purpose of preying, to the greatest advantage to themselves, upon the majority, which does not possess this intelligence to the same degree.

Another new element introduced by man into society is a certain conscious and more or less deliberate consent in the unintelligent majority to the beneficent government of the minority. This brings into play and into contrast two elements in the unintelligent minority : the predominating one, which is natural, and is common to the buffalo herd, — namely, the habit of submission ; and the other, which is non-natural, and only inchoate in the herd, — namely, deliberate consent.

Let us now set down graphically the forces here in operation.

UNCONSCIOUS
FORCES THAT BELONG TO
NATURE.

CONSCIOUS
FORCES THAT RESULT IN
ART.

In the Predator.

Predatory instinct.

Force of intelligent recognition of advantages that result from self-restraint in government.

In the Prey.

Force of reproduction and life.

Force of instinct of submission.

Force of intelligent recognition of advantages that result from submission to intelligent government.

With the forces on the left of the page — that is to say, the unconscious forces that belong to nature — we have become familiar in our study of the predatory system as it prevails in the lower animals. On the other hand, the forces on the right of the page — that is to say, the conscious forces that result in art — characterise *human* society, and constitute a large part of the characteristics which differentiate societies of men from societies of lower animals. We cannot too much insist upon the fact that the forces on the right of the page — that is to say, the conscious forces that result in art — do not *replace* those on the left of the page, or the unconscious forces that belong to nature. On the contrary, the former are added to the latter, and in different periods of history they are found to be operating in different proportions; for example, in every period in which civilisation is advancing, the conscious forces that result in art prevail over the unconscious forces that belong to nature; whereas during the periods in which civilisation is in decay the unconscious

forces that belong to nature prevail over the conscious forces that result in art. Thus, in the periods which we have already briefly studied,¹ during which Lycurgus was establishing a quasi-community in Sparta, or Solon was imposing a constitution on Athens, or Servius Tullius was creating a municipal religion in Rome, there were operating both of the conscious forces on the right of the page. There was on the part of those who governed a recognition that only by self-restraint could government be conducted for the benefit of the governing as well as the governed classes; and there was amongst those who were governed an intelligent apprehension of the benefits which intelligent government could secure from their submission; but the play of these forces in no way prevented the operation at the same time of the unconscious forces that belong to nature; for although there was doubtless an intelligent apprehension of the advantages that result from submission in the multitude, it is probable that the natural habit of submission was by far the greater force; and although a few such men as the law-makers above referred to undoubtedly entertained an intelligent apprehension of the necessity of self-restraint in the governing classes, there can hardly be a doubt but that a vast majority of the governing classes was animated by the same predatory instinct which in the otter destroys far more fish than it can consume.

Now, the predominance of the conscious forces over the unconscious forces in society, or that of the unconscious forces over the conscious forces, is not a matter of mere accident, but, on the contrary, is the necessary result of conditions which succeed one another as certainly as night succeeds the day, or day succeeds the night again; and the operation of this law of succession

¹ Vol. i. book ii. ch. iv.

is due to the fact just observed that the unconscious forces that belong to nature, and the conscious forces that result in art, are always operating at the same time in human society, though in different degrees, for as soon as the governing classes grow prosperous, through the operation of self-restraint on their part and submission on the part of the governed, they tend to be rendered by this prosperity unfit for self-restraint; then the predatory instinct seizes the reins of government, and the withdrawing from the governed of the advantages which result from intelligent government incites the governed majority to rebellion, and incapacitates the governing minority for the task of holding their own. If, in the struggle that ensues, the governed majority does not produce intelligence capable of understanding and applying the doctrine of self-restraint, the result is anarchy. Now, anarchy means the absolute domination of the unconscious forces that belong to nature;¹ and it lasts until, out of the anguish that results from it, there is restored to the community the willingness to exert self-restraint on the part of the intelligent minority, and the willingness to submit on the part of the unintelligent majority. Then the game of government begins again only to repeat the story of tyranny and its punishment.

This is a well-worn theme, and is illustrated by innumerable instances in the histories of all the towns of Ancient Greece, of Mediæval Italy, and of our own cities in the United States; it has been referred to here for the purpose of pointing out the essential characteristics which distinguish the career of human society from that of the lower animals. With these last the

¹ It may be contended that the domination of conscious forces will also in a perfect state result in anarchy. This may be, but the possibility of such a consummation is too remote to require consideration here.

forces at work are all automatic and indeliberate; whereas in human societies there is the added element of deliberate self-restraint on the part of the governing classes and deliberate submission on the part of the governed.

But we have here considered only the operation of deliberate purpose unenlightened or uninspired by a religious idea. The political effect of a religious idea has already been discussed, and the effort has been made to show that by eliminating the distracting effect of selfishness it can concentrate the otherwise dissipated forces of individuals and create a socialising force of unexampled power. It has been intimated that if the religious idea be as enlightened as that taught by Christ and be not inconsistent with social institutions, it might serve to break up the vicious circle in which the mere play of selfishness seems to keep us. We are not yet sufficiently advanced in our historical résumé to proceed with this part of our inquiry, but we are sufficiently advanced in it to recognise just where religion is to be classed in the scheme of forces at work in society; clearly, to the extent to which it is unperturbed by selfishness, it belongs to the right of our page — that is to say, to the conscious forces that result in art; and clearly it serves to enhance the tendency of the governing classes to govern for the benefit of the governed, and of the governed classes to submit to the powers that be.

Unfortunately, however, the force of religion can be abused, and tends always to be abused by the crafty minority who are pushed by selfishness to the employment of every weapon useful for the attainment of their end. And so religion tends to operate in the vicious circle very much as intelligence does; that is to say, at one period they both induce the governing minority to govern for the benefit of the governed and induce the

governed majority to submit to a government from which they benefit; while at a subsequent period, when the governing minority have been corrupted by the enjoyment of power, and rendered unfit thereby for the exercise of it, the spark of religion left burning in the hearts of the multitude arouses its latent intelligence and serves to kindle the torch of Reformation and Revolt.

It might seem as though the conclusion to be drawn from this view would be that religion offers no escape from the dreary treadmill of democracy and despotism; but upon this point it may be well to suspend judgment until we have brought our historical résumé down to the present date.

The analysis of the forces at work in human society has been introduced here, because it seems important to distinguish, by the aid of it, the development of local government in France from its development in the rest of the world.

The length of time that it takes a kettle to boil depends upon two things: the amount of heat under the kettle and the weight of air above it. Just in the same way the length of time that it takes a community to organise out of a condition of anarchy depends upon two things: the vital force within it, and the hostile forces without. Organisation then can be encouraged in two ways: either by increase of the force within or diminution of the obstacles without. In France organisation was helped by the diminution of both kinds of obstacles,— the internal obstacle, arising from the superstitious submission of the people; and the external obstacle, arising from the strength of the oppressing manorial lords. Both of these obstacles were diminished by the Crusades; but it must not be concluded that because the Crusades, in diminishing these obstacles, per-

mitted the organisation of the communes, therefore the communes would not have come into existence but for the Crusades. This is neither philosophically probable nor historically true, for the burghers of Mans, profiting by the absence in England of William the Bastard, revolted before the close of the tenth century, and, although reconquered by William, in 1073 secured from him their municipal franchises ; and those of Cambrai profited by the absence of their bishop at the imperial court as early as 957, and in spite of perpetual defeats, in one of which the Christian prelate cut off the hands and feet of his prisoners and branded them upon the forehead, they maintained the struggle until a charter was conceded to them in 1076. So also it is impossible to explain by the direct action of the Crusades the rise of city republics in Italy, the prosperity of the Hanseatic towns in the north, and the growth of local government in England. These seem all of them due to the division and struggle for political power of the Crown, the Noble, and the Church, during the course of which the burghers secured the liberties which otherwise would longer have been denied them. But the conditions of the struggle are by no means the same, and in their variety is much instruction. In Italy the conflict of the German Emperor with the Pope was doubtless the occasion which permitted the burghers first to drive the nobles out of their cities, and later to compel their residing within them ; but the Italian cities would hardly have maintained their struggle with the nobility as long and as successfully as they did, were it not for the re-entrance upon the scenes of the familiar but for some centuries eclipsed factor,— the factor of wealth. And here we come once more upon the influence of the Crusades, indirect in this instance, but none the less potent ; for it was the Crusades that opened up the trade with the East ; it was

the trade of the East that poured wealth into Italy and raised within its cities a class of rich merchants capable not only of successfully resisting but actually of conquering their old manorial lords; it was this wealth which, seeking new markets, crept along the valley of the Rhine, and, feeling the need of protection from the robber barons who occupied its banks and levied prohibitory tariffs on its traffic, grouped together the cities interested in this trade into a league that for some centuries was one of the most important political factors in Europe. The Hanseatic League maintained its power until the general use of the mariner's compass, by permitting trade to pass through and beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, transferred political power from the forces of the land to those of the sea; created great maritime nations, such as Holland, Spain, and Great Britain, and set the soldier below the merchant by making the one the servant of the other. From this moment the history of Europe becomes the history of its trade; violence yields more and more to diplomacy; and men fight less for honour and more for wealth. This is the period during which militarism yields to industrialism; and in view of the eulogy of industrialism which has for the last hundred years served as the constant theme of political economists and political philosophers, it is a matter of no small moment for us to pause awhile and consider just what this conversion is and what it has effected.

But in order to make the comparison a sufficient one it may be well to close our study of the age of militarism by describing one of its more characteristic manifestations, — one which brought the profession of the soldier to its loftiest ideal, and degraded it at last to its basest purpose, — the so-called institution of chivalry.

§ 5. THE IDEA OF CHIVALRY

If there is any one quality which distinguishes the military spirit from the commercial it is — generosity. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there is room for generosity in warfare, but there is little room for it in commerce. Assuredly, we have seen it but little exercised in the one, whereas we have often seen it animating and restraining the other. The successful Lanark manufacturer who endeavoured to introduce it into his business died poor and discouraged; and those manufacturers who have succeeded along the lines of benevolence have done so only because they knew the limits within which it paid. When it ceases to pay, it has to be abandoned; and the essential feature of the competitive system is that in the end competition will at last reduce benevolence to a point where it will no longer pay. Then it has to go to the wall.

Now, although warfare is the condition of brutes rather than of men, it has the advantage over industrialism that it encourages two virtues which are conspicuous by their absence from the latter, — generosity and courage; and it is the enemy of one vice which we have already described as the peculiar fruit of perverted Christianity, — hypocrisy.

Generosity particularly characterises the mythology of the north; with Norman pirates it was a matter of honour not to fight with weapons that could destroy at a distance and not to attack an enemy inferior in numbers to themselves; it was consistent with this barbaric sense of self-respect that they refrained for twenty-four hours from dressing their wounds, and never would lower a sail because of a storm. This is the spirit that underlies chivalry and finds expression in the maxim *noblesse oblige*; and this is the spirit which developed the four cardinal

virtues of chivalry, — generosity and gentleness, loyalty and courage. One of the first historical characters in whom we find these qualities conspicuously united was William of the Iron Arm, the Norman count of Apulia, and succeeding him came Richard Cœur de Lion, the Black Prince, Guesclin, and Bayard. If we go to literature for an account of chivalry, we shall find its ideal personated in Arthur, Lancelot, Amadis of Gaul, and Palmerin of England; and whether in history or in literature we shall be struck by conflicting inconsistencies which make it difficult to decide whether chivalry was a very good thing or a very bad. How divided our modern authors are upon this point may be gathered from the very opposite accounts of it which we owe to Edmund Burke and Professor Freeman. Burke says: —

“Never, never more shall we behold the generous loyalty of rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart which kept alive even in servitude itself the spirit of an exalted freedom;” and, he adds, “that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness.”

Freeman says: —

“The chivalrous spirit is above all things a class spirit. The good knight is bound to endless fantastic courtesies towards men, and still more towards women of a certain rank; he may treat all below that rank with any degree of scorn and cruelty. The spirit of chivalry implies the arbitrary choice of one or two virtues to be practised in such an exaggerated degree as to become vices, while the ordinary laws of right and wrong are forgotten. The false code of honour supplants the laws of the Commonwealth, the law

of God, and the eternal principles of right. Chivalry again in its military aspect not only encourages the love of war for its own sake without regard to the cause for which war is waged, it encourages also an extravagant regard for a fantastic show of personal daring which cannot in any way advance the objects of the siege or campaign which is going on. Chivalry, in short, is in morals very much what feudalism is in law: each substitutes purely personal obligations—obligations devised in the interests of an exclusive class—for the more homely duties of an honest man and a good citizen."

The divergence of opinion of two such authorities stimulates the inquiry which of these two men is right, and how, if at all, can they be reconciled; and if we follow out the line of argument which has been already followed in tracing the relation of the Church to the State, we shall, I think, find the explanation of this divergence and perhaps its reconciliation in a similar relation between the Church and knighthood.

Just as there was and is still an irreconcilable inconsistency between the Church and the institutions of the ancient and modern State, so there was and must always be an irreconcilable inconsistency between the gospel of peace and the profession of violence; the Church may bolster the State for a time, but in the end the State will drag the Church down; the Church may mitigate the horrors of war, but in countenancing them she is to herself untrue; and if she raises the ideal of the soldier she does so at the fatal price of her own sincerity. Let us look at the facts, and see how far they support this argument.

If we are to believe Sybel, the period which immediately preceded the Crusades was as wretched as any recorded in history. It was in a desperate effort to put an end to this barbarism that there was instituted about

1041 the Truce of God, by virtue of which private war was subjected to limitations of time and place, and every church was converted into a sanctuary, into which it was sacrilege for private war to penetrate. But it is doubtful whether even the solemn censure pronounced against the license of private war by the council of Clermont in 1095 would have proved effectual in arresting it had the turbulent element in which it flourished not been drawn off to Palestine by the Crusades and educated there in a new school animated by something of a Christian spirit. In preaching the Crusades, although the Church undertook the impossible task of inspiring the soldier with the spirit of Christ, she accomplished the very practical result of reviving in the soldier of the eleventh century something of the generosity which characterised the pirate of the eighth. The conception of knighthood which resulted from this undertaking can best be understood by referring to the accounts given of it by contemporaneous poets and to the system of education by which it was inculcated. Chaucer describes a knight in this fashion:—

“ And ever more he had a sovereign prize,¹
And though that he was worthy he was wise,
And of his port as meek as is a maid,
He never yet no villany ne said
In all his life unto no manner wight.
He was a very perfect gentle knight.”

And Sir Thomas Malory puts into the mouth of Sir Ector this eulogy of him who was betrayed by love into treachery to his friend and king:—

“ ‘ Ah, Launcelot,’ he said, ‘ thou were head of all Christian knights! And now, I dare say,’ said Sir Ector, ‘ thou, Sir Launcelot, there thou liest, that thou were never matched of earthly knight’s hands; and thou were the courtliest

¹ Praise.

knight that ever bare shield; and thou were the truest friend to thy lover that ever bestrode horse; and thou were the truest lover, of a sinful man, that ever loved woman; and thou were the kindest man that ever strake with sword; and thou were the goodliest person ever came among press of knights; and thou were the meekest man and the gentlest that ever ate in hall among ladies; and thou were the sternest knight to thy mortal foe that ever put spear in the rest.'"

The generosity and the gentleness Chivalry borrowed from Christ; but the loyalty has across it a bar sinister.

And yet chastity was one of the virtues demanded of the true knight.

"To love one maiden and to cleave to her" is the law of the Round Table; and Milton, in writing of the lofty "fables and romances" of knighthood, says: "I learned what a noble virtue chastity sure must be, to the defence of which so many worthies, by such a dear adventure of themselves, had sworn." And assuredly the story of Amadis Nicolæ and Nicoletth are in this respect jewels of the purest water, and justify the lines of Spenser, —

"For unto knight there is no greater shame
Than lightness and inconstancy in love."

So also in the education of youth during those days, to borrow the words of Ben Jonson, —

"Every house became an academy of honour."

At the age of seven or eight years the boy or *damoiseau* becomes the constant attendant of his master and his mistress. He accompanies the one to the chase, and serves the other in her chamber. From the one he learns the use of weapons in the hunt, from the other the rudiments of religion, of rectitude, and of love. At the age of fifteen or sixteen he becomes a squire, but

generally remains the personal attendant of the same master and the same mistress. He is gradually accustomed, however, to military exercises and sports involving hardship. He is expected to choose his lady love, to worship her with reverence and in secret. Gradually his duties in his lady's chamber diminish and those in the field increase; he becomes the *armiger* of his lord, and learns loyalty and courage in the defence of him against the enemy. After six or seven years of such service in the field he becomes a candidate for knighthood. This knighthood is conferred by *accolade*, after the performance of some knightly deed by virtue of which he becomes "chevalier au nom de Dieu et de mon seigneur St. George pour la foy et justice loyale-ment garder et l'église, femmes, vesves, et orphelins défendre;" or he is knighted with the religious ceremonies that are beautifully pictured in the frescoes of the Boston Library. Placed under the care of two "esquires of honour, grave and well seen in courtship and nurture, and also in the feats of chivalry," he is, after due instruction, placed in the bath, — a ceremony which reminds us of the lustrations of Ancient Rome and of the baptism of the Christian Church. Before he withdraws from the bath the sign of the cross is imprinted upon his shoulder; he is then clothed in a white shirt, and over it is placed a "robe of russet, like unto that of an hermit." He is escorted by two "ancient and grave knights" and preceded by the sporting and dancing of minstrels making melody. But he does not yet share in the festival. He has still before him the vigil of arms until sunrise. After a night of prayer he confesses to the priest, hears matins, takes the holy sacrament, and consecrates a taper "to the honour of God and to the person that makes him a knight." He is then dressed in the garments of a knight, and his future squire rides

in front of him bearing his sword by the point in its scabbard and his spurs hanging from its hilt. When he reaches the baronial hall the most noble and gentle knight present fastens the right spur to his right heel, signing the candidate's knee with the sign of the cross; in like manner another noble and gentle knight fastens the left spur to his left heel; then he who is to create the knight girds the sword about the youth, who, laying his right hand on the altar, promises to support and defend the Church, and, ungirding his sword, offers it to God. Then are pronounced the solemn words, "If you do anything contrary to the order of Chivalry (which God forbid), I shall hack the spurs from your heels."

So much had this ceremony become one of the functions of the Church, that the form for the presenting or consecration of new knights is included in the Pontificale Romanum and the Manual of Common Prayer in use in England before the Reformation.

It has been already pointed out that this education attempted to wed the virtues of the man of peace to those of a man of war; it has still to be pointed out that it substituted for the love of God the love of woman.

Both of these attempts had their good and their evil consequences: they introduced humanity into warfare; but by making warfare humane they made it meritorious; they raised the ideal of womanhood; but in lifting woman upon the altar they withdrew from it the worship of God. One thing, however, they did in some measure accomplish: they diminished the practice of hypocrisy by eliminating the temptation to it. The knight could boldly and without insincerity practise what he preached; not so the Church, however, which became the sanction for violence as well as poverty of

spirit, and in preaching the virtue of one to the feudal lord it enjoined the necessity of the other on the unregenerate Turk. And the love of Christ, which had ceased any longer to animate the Christian heart, was replaced by that for a woman, whose chastity it became a privilege for the knight to warrant and defend. It was the comparative sincerity of this new religion which in great part made its strength; and it is impossible to read ancient chronicles without glowing with sympathy for men who court danger rather than avoid it and without reverence for the women whose lofty standards inspired such "dear adventure."

§ 6. DECAY OF THE IDEA OF CHIVALRY

But it is the doom of man to suffer the necessary consequence of every inconsistency; and this futile attempt to square religion with institutions instead of squaring institutions with religion resulted in two codes to which we cannot attach too much importance: the code of honour and the code of love.

(a) *The Code of Love*

This code is a digest of the decisions of the *Cours d'Amour*, or courts held by ladies of noble birth, before whom subtle questions of gallantry were argued from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. It is sometimes stated that these courts were confined to Provence; but this is a mistake, for the royal chaplain, André, who lived about 1170, cites amongst the *cours d'amour* that existed at his day that of the ladies of Gascony, that of Ermengarde, Vicomtesse de Narbonne, that of Queen Eleanor, of the Countess of Flanders, of the Countess of Champagne; and Jean de Nostradamus speaks also of those which sat at Signe, Pigne, Pierre-

fen, Romanin, and Avignon. The decisions of these courts are rendered in the form customary in courts of law, and amongst the most important of the principles laid down by them may be quoted the following:

"He knows not how to love who knows not how to conceal it.

"It is not lawful to yield to more than to one love.

"What a lover takes from his love by force is worthless.

"No lover bereaved of his love by death may love again during the period of two years.

"None may love except there be hope of being loved.

"Love divulged is brief.

"Too easy conquest robs love of its charm; obstacles enhance it.

"Love grows with suspicion and jealousy.

"Excess of pleasure prevents the birth of love.

"It is not lawful that one woman be loved by two men or one man by two women.

"Love cannot exist between husband and wife."

This code needs no comment; we are doubtless accustomed to see the principles therein laid down practised in the lives of those about us and preached in almost every page of our contemporaneous romantic literature; but we are likely to regard this fact as the price we have to pay for perhaps the best of our institutions, — marriage; and we may find it difficult to believe that they could be to-day, or could ever have been, set down deliberately as rules of morality and action. Those who still think that there is any limit to the inconsistency of mankind may well compare this code with the virtues of loyalty and courage that were professed by those who drew it up, and may well seek to reconcile these virtues with the treachery, adultery, and intrigue which it encourages and even enjoins.

The fact is that we tend to take out of our environ-

ment what our temperaments find therein suited to us, — the courageous its courage, the chaste its chastity, the loyal its truth; and at different periods in our lives we respond to virtue or to vice according as conditions have tuned us to one or the other. So long, therefore, as the environment suggests to us vice as well as virtue, hypocrisy as well as truth, unchastity as well as chastity, we shall be a great deal at the mercy of accident in our choice between them. The great question for the political student is to consider how far, if at all, our social and political institutions may be made to suggest noble qualities rather than ignoble ones; and how far, if at all, man may be still capable not only of framing institutions that will ennoble him, but of living up to them when framed.

In chivalry we see an effort on the part of the Church to ennoble the soldier by bringing religion down to his level; and we find the soldier dragging religion down with him inevitably, though not without much grace and picturesqueness, to the abyss. No wonder, then, that by some this effort, in spite of its momentary success, is condemned rather than justified; for it may be better to keep war savage and barbaric than, by mitigating its cruelty, contribute to the enthronement of wantonness and falsehood. Chivalry cannot be justified by the occasional examples of courage and mercy which it has produced; undoubtedly the lofty ideals set up by chivalry did stimulate the development of a noble type of courage: when the Black Prince, hard pressed at Crécy, was told that his father the king refused him reinforcements, — “for if God be pleased, I will this day’s work be his and the honour thereof,” — the chronicle tells us he was “greatly encouraged” by these words, with what consequence we know; undoubtedly, too, the rôle of the woman was enhanced by chivalry; Edward III. turned

a deaf ear to the entreaties of his own officers for the burghers of Calais ; in vain did Sir Walter of Marmy protest, " For God's sake refrain your courage ; ye have the name of sovereign noblesse ; therefore now do not a thing that should blemish your renown, nor give cause to some to speak villainy ; every man will say it is a great cruelty to put to death such honest persons, who by their own wills put themselves at your grace to save their company." In answer to Sir Walter the king sent for the hangman ; but when his Queen Philippa pleaded, he spared them, saying : " Ah, dame, I would you had been as now in some other place ; ye make such request to me that I cannot deny you."

But these shining exceptions cannot counterbalance the general demoralisation which deserved the strictures of Professor Freeman ; and a state of society for which marriage was but a screen for adultery must, under the application of a law already laid down, either perish or yield to one in which marriage became once more the consummation of love, and not its tomb. This was the stride taken by civilisation in moving from Malory to Shakespeare.

(b) The Code of Honour

The Code of Honour — that other fruit of chivalry — is as pregnant with inconsistency as the Code of Love which we have just been considering. Without entering into the phases through which it passed, it is sufficient for our purposes to point out two of its most characteristic features.

In the first place, it introduced the notion of class into morality, so that conduct which was permissible on the part of a member of one class to a member of another became a crime between members of the same class. For example, a gentleman who failed to pay a debt

to another gentleman would be *déclassé*; whereas a gentleman who failed to pay his tailor's bill was regarded as rather a dashing fellow. The Code of Honour was binding only upon gentlemen; and in the age of chivalry gentlemen included only those entitled to armorial bearings.

In the second place, it referred questions of morality to the sword; so that while, on the one hand, the slightest error of politeness, if committed by an unskilful swordsman, was punishable by death, no crime was too base for condonation provided it was defended by a skilful foil.

Such are a few of the amazing contradictions into which man has been led by the surrender of his institutions to haphazard and the law of nature. Throughout them all we see Religion, like an "ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain." The omnipotence of Allah, the love of Christ, the enthusiasm of the Crusades, the lofty ideal of Chivalry, — all become at last harnessed to the service of private ambition and private greed. Nor can it be otherwise so long as these last preside at the framing of human institutions; for whatever be the environment, to that environment type must either perish or conform.

CHAPTER III

THE INSTRUMENT OF INDIVIDUALISM.—
PRIVATE PROPERTY

WE have seen the Christian Church, bred and beautiful in poverty, suddenly lifted into wealth by a sort of morganatic marriage with the Roman Emperor; we have seen her, perverted by her riches, dispose of her imperial consort and usurp his throne; we have seen her draw the sword and join the general scramble and carnage in the struggle for political power, and rule the rich by superstition, as she once did the poor by faith. But in spite of her betrayal of Christ, we have seen His spirit kept alive in communities and individuals who were either removed from competition by their calling or too holy to be perverted by it. Amongst the former we have distinguished such communities as those of Saint Vincent of Paul, which, pledged to the ancient vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, devoted the lives of its votaries to doing good; and we have pointed out that womankind was to a great measure protected from the degrading tendency of the competitive system. It is not astonishing, then, that chivalry should set her up on the altar from which the true Christ had been driven; nor is it astonishing that this new cult should have resulted in licentiousness. When, however, we see the yearning for virtue driven from the Church, seeking its expression in such an institution as that of chivalry, only to result there in immorality and crime, we should

have reason to be discouraged were it not for one patent and altogether comforting fact. Ever since the perversion of the Church by Constantine man has been endeavouring to reconcile Christianity with his institutions instead of endeavouring to reconcile his institutions with Christianity. This fundamental inconsistency is at the bottom of all our failures in the years that are past; and so long as it remains unrecognised it must continue to involve us in failure in the years to come. But if it be recognised, and if our institutions are capable of being slowly transformed so as to make them consistent with the doctrine of Christ, then the necessary evils which result from the artificial environment that we have created for ourselves may be eliminated, and we shall be called upon to endure only those which nature will continue to impose upon us.

For we cannot bear too constantly before us the fact that there are evils in nature with which no wisdom that we have as yet attained can cope. We cannot, for example, hope by any study of political institutions to find a way for making all men and women equally beautiful as well as equally good; but we can study them with a view to finding a way of reducing the injustice of nature to a minimum; and, above all, we can hope to eliminate those evils which Man in his struggle with nature has by defect of wisdom created for himself. Now, one of the principal products of human ingenuity is private property; and while private property is undoubtedly from one point of view a blessing, it is no less surely from another a curse.

The study of this questionable gift is one of paramount importance, not only in its effect upon our institutions, but in its effect upon our character; for upon character does the consequence of our institutions for the most part depend.

It is so much the fashion for socialists to rail against private property, and particularly that form of it which is called capital, that it may be as well to clear our skirts of all confusion on this subject by recognising at once the extent to which civilisation depends on private property for its existence in the first place, and for its survival in the second.

§ 1. THE CIVILISING FORCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY BY PROMOTING SELF-CONTROL

The struggle for life is for the most part a struggle for food. If the supply of food were sufficient, attainable, and constant, there would be no struggle; but inasmuch as it tends to be insufficient, unattainable, and inconstant, the struggle for it is perpetual. The inconstancy of the supply of food is the principal element in the struggle which gives rise to the instinct of accumulation.

Instinctive accumulation is more developed in social than in unsocial animals. The unsocial carnivora do bury their prey and return to it; they have a fierce sense of individual property in it, as is evident by the savageness with which they will fight for it. But their providence never goes to the point of laying in during the summer a supply of food for the winter, for the reason that the character of their food is such that it cannot be preserved by any device at their disposal during the necessary period; but even though their food were capable of preservation, solitary life does not furnish the possibility of co-operation necessary to large accumulation. Social animals, on the contrary, — that is to say, those which live in communities, — have the instinct of accumulation very strongly developed; and it is a matter of no small interest to notice that the process of accumulation *seems* to involve two qualities,

both of which are conspicuous by their high development in man. These qualities are prudence and self-control.

It will doubtless be claimed by those who regard animals as mere automata, that prudence and self-control as such are not to be found in them; that their movements are purely the result of reflex action, and that those communities survive in which the reflex action engaged in gathering food supply is in excess of that needed for immediate purposes. How far ants and bees are pure automata need not be discussed. It is only necessary here to contrast the habits of social with unsocial animals, — habits which, when we find them associated with consciousness and the moral sense in man, become recognised as virtues and their respective opposites. In this connection it may be usefully noted that if there is in ants any volitional power which could interfere with their apparently altruistic devotion to the community, it is embryonic; for as a matter of fact we see these insects uninterruptedly doing the work of the community without apparently the possibility of doing otherwise; they seem for the most part to be undistracted by selfishness. We may set it down, then, as certain that the habits of carnivora tend to promote a fierce sense of private property in the products of the chase; whereas the habits formed in communities seem to be such as to obliterate all sense of private property and to substitute therefor a sense of ownership in common.

The fierce sense of property in the female, or sexual jealousy, which characterises the carnivora, has already been pointed out; and this has been contrasted with the singular and savage system by means of which the sexual jealousy arising therefrom has been eliminated in such communities as those of ants or bees.

The contrast, therefore, between the social and the unsocial animal can be briefly stated as follows: the social animal, by the destruction of one sex, destroys the possibility of sexual jealousy and kills in embryo the sense of property in the female; and the sense of private property in the results of labour seems to be entirely replaced by a sense of ownership in common. The unsocial animals, on the other hand, are characterised by a fierce sense of property in the female, and of individual property in the products of the chase.

When we now turn our attention from lower animals to man, we cannot but be struck by the fact that they have solved both the problem of property in the female and the problem of property in the product of toil in very much the same way; that is to say, by the exercise of self-control. Nor must we fail to take account also of the fact that the exercise of self-control permits of their retaining the individualistic sense of private property with the social sense of State property also.

The sense of property, which has been already pointed out as the very foundation of human institutions, involves a sense of obligation; for example, it involves the obligation to respect the property of others, the obligation to contribute something in the shape of property to the State, and the obligation to contribute a great deal in the shape of personal service and personal labour to the State.

Now, if the power to exercise the self-control involved in these respective obligations, and if the willingness to exercise this self-control were equal in all men, there would be little necessity for government; and this is the point where men seem to differ most from ants and bees. In these last every individual and every class seem equally willing to do the work for which each is particularly fitted, and in the absence of any power to

choose an alternative course there is apparently nowhere in the community a necessity for the exercise of self-control. The result of this is that we have in every community of ants and bees what seems to be an automatic machine; every part of which, though possessed of apparent individuality, can be counted upon to do the work which by survival it has been fitted to do. Communities of ants and bees, therefore, are characterised by uniformity of individuals in each class. Now, the uniformity which characterises communities of the lower animals is conspicuous by its absence in those of man; and very little consideration will show how far-reaching this absence of uniformity is.

Men are unequal not only in their power of self-control, but in the productiveness of their efforts, and in their ability to command the submission of others. They also differ in willingness to exercise self-control, in willingness to labour, and in willingness to submit to others.

The consequence of these inequalities must be that those who have great power of self-control, great power of productive toil, and great power of commanding the submission of others will become the masters of those who are willing to labour and willing to submit.

This is the process by which the individualistic temperament developed by the possession of these powers is set upon subjugating the socialistic temperament and appropriating the benefits of society to its own use. But this process, on the other hand, tends to correct itself. The unresisted exercise of power takes away the necessity for self-control; and abuse of power destroys the willingness to submit to it. As self-control tends to disappear under such conditions, society is left to the struggle between opposing selfishnesses. But the disappearance of self-control makes the governing class cruel

and weak, while abuse of power tends to make the governed class fierce and rebellious; so that the condition at last becomes one of unstable equilibrium. The governed class becomes strong enough to revolt; the governing class too weak to govern; the result is a *culbute générale* and a tendency to return to anarchy.

Now, a condition of anarchy is just the one which is likely to require once more the exercise of self-control; for under such conditions the tyrants and the slaves tend mutually to destroy one another, and thereby to permit those who are neither tyrants nor slaves (wherever these may be found) to re-establish social conditions in which some measure of self-control will be found not only in those who are willing to serve, but also in those who are able to govern.

By these elements in the population centres of industry are formed; and round them political institutions are likely to be restored, government is likely to be wisely administered, and wealth is likely to accumulate; for political power and wealth serve only to strengthen those who exercise self-control in the use of them, and emasculate only those incapable of exercising self-control in such use. Unfortunately, however, the mere possession of power and wealth, by eliminating the necessity of self-control, tends again to destroy it; and the abuse of power and wealth tends again to restore pre-existing conditions. Hence, the same process tends to be repeated over and over again.

We have already seen this process in operation at Athens, Sparta, and Rome. The civilisation of Greece and Rome differs from that of Assyria and Egypt in the character of its religion, for that of the former gave a peculiar sacredness to private property. Greek and Roman religion was essentially domestic; it consecrated the property of a man in the fidelity of his

wife by the institution of marriage, and the property of a family in its home by converting every hearth into a temple. Out of this religious sense of private property arose the individualism which characterises Greek republics, and the fierce jealousy between these republics which prevented their ever becoming federated into a nation. If Rome, though built up on similar institutions, became a nation, it was by conquest, not by federation. Individualism continued to characterise Roman civilisation, as it did that of Greece; and individualism is at once the cause of private property and its result. For while the individualistic temperament tends to create the sense of private property, the last reacts upon the individualistic temperament and reinforces it. It is not surprising, then, that the more powerful grew the Roman Empire, the more powerful grew its individualistic and property instincts, so that Rome presented in her latter days the tyranny of wealth in its most revolting aspect.

This necessary result, however, of the unbridled development of individualism and wealth must not blind us to the indispensable rôle which both have played in the development of the race; for in this development two inherited instincts had to be eliminated, — the ferocity of the solitary carnivora and the automatic servility of the ant. Out of these two instincts, each of them in a measure indispensable and both of them together inconsistent, there had to be developed an intelligent exercise of self-control; and this could be accomplished in only one way. The tiger in man had to curb his selfishness, and the ant in him had to acquire it. Now, the ferocity of the one was due to the failure of rivals to recognise rights of private property; while the servility of the other was due to instinctive respect for the property of the State. The one is in a perpetual

rage lest his individual property be attacked; the other in a dull ignorance that individual property can ever be enjoyed. Now, it is possible to educate these opposite instincts so as to develop an intelligent recognition of the use and abuse of the good things of this world, and to make this recognition serviceable in developing the higher nature of man; and the instrumentality through which these invaluable results were attained was the institution of private property. For when ferocity discovered that its rights in the product of labour were respected, it tended by disuse to disappear; and when the servile automaton recognised that the more it laboured, the more it enjoyed, there grew up in it a nascent selfishness which was to substitute for the unconscious altruism of the ant the latter-day individualism of the workingman. The struggle for life went on very much as before; but instead of tending towards opposite results in different races, — towards ferocity in the carnivore and towards servility in the ant, — it operated in the same species to diminish ferocity on the one hand and servility on the other; and to develop the social mind which conceives of society not as an end in itself to which the individual should be sacrificed, but as a means towards the development of the individual into a "man and master of his fate."

To denounce property under these circumstances is to denounce the scaffolding which conceals and perhaps disgraces an uncompleted temple. When the temple is completed, the scaffolding may be torn down; until it is completed, the scaffolding must remain. The question for socialists, who rail against capital, to decide is whether our human temple is sufficiently completed to dispense with the scaffolding through which it has been thus far built. We should totally fail to appreciate the rôle of wealth or private property if we studied it only

from the point of view of its effect upon the rich. It has had quite as important an effect upon the poor; for while it has permitted the rich to acquire knowledge, it has also permitted the poor to break through the husk of servility from which the servile element in humanity had to be emancipated; and so, while the rich were acquiring the arts of civilisation, the poor were learning how to extend those arts to themselves, so that to-day the question is no longer how to accumulate wealth, but rather how to distribute it. The rôle of the institution of private property in accomplishing this result is often forgotten in view of the more striking rôle it has played in creating the injustice of distribution of which socialists to-day so bitterly complain. Let us endeavour briefly to trace the part property has played in history without partiality either to the rich or to the poor.

§ 2. THE DEMOCRATIC FORCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY BY OVERTHROWING ARISTOCRACY OF BIRTH

It has already been pointed out that religion created in Ancient Greece and Rome a patriarchal cast which was separated from those who had no domestic gods by an impassable abyss. In both countries, therefore, the families which held their own in the struggle for wealth and political influence became an oppressing aristocracy; and those families which failed to hold their own in the struggle lost not only their property, but with it their religion and their caste. The ranks of these last were swelled by strangers and the offspring of strangers; by natural children; by emancipated slaves; and by all who could not claim direct descent from the ruling aristocracy. This rabble, which had its use in case of war, was for this reason not discouraged, but allowed, on

the contrary, to increase; and thus a class was formed that stood midway between the patrician and the slave. The tendency of patrician selfishness was necessarily to diminish the number of the patrician class; for by diminishing its numbers the larger was the share of wealth and power enjoyed by each. But this tendency defeated its own aim; for the patrician, in spite of his religious ascendancy, became at last unable to resist the growing power of the plebs; and we find, therefore, the conflict resulting in a breaking down of the religious barrier in Rome as well as in Greece, and rank by kinship giving way in both countries to rank by wealth. The classification introduced by Solon at Athens, and by Servius Tullius in Rome, was in both instances a classification of wealth; and this classification differs from that of kinship in the essentially democratic fact that whereas rank determined by kinship makes it impossible for a man not to the manner born ever to lift himself into a higher social scale, rank determined by wealth opens this possibility to every man fitted by intelligence to do so.

Wealth, therefore, was the great democratising factor in both Greece and Rome: it furnished the ladder up the rungs of which men of ability could improve their social and political as well as their financial positions; it lifted into the highest offices of the State such "new" men as Cato, Marius, and Cicero, and in Athens it created a democracy so complete that every citizen became in turn an office-holder and a judge. Nor was it in ancient times alone that wealth proved the ally of democracy; on the contrary, all through the Middle Ages wealth was the lever through which the people gradually acquired their political rights. For it was when the royal exchequer was empty that the Dauphin called together the États Généraux in 1355, and Louis XVI. in 1789,

that Charles I. endeavoured to levy ship money, and George III. the tax on tea. It was owing to the institution of private property that the people held the strings of the money bags and were able to wrest from the throne a share in the government; and it is to the exercise of this power that England, though in name still an empire, is in fact a republic.

While, however, we are bound to recognise that wealth did open the door to ability, we must at the same time admit that it was not ability alone that could profit by its opportunities. The ability had to be of a particular character: it had generally to be selfish, unscrupulous, even sometimes inhuman; it succeeded best if it profited ungenerously by the generosity of others, and ruthlessly refused generosity to those who had already bestowed it. The ladder offered by wealth is too often made, as it were, of human hearts; all of them, whether willingly animated by love or unwillingly coerced by superior ability, are trampled upon alike by those who would soonest attain their ends. The advantage to the race, therefore, of this democratisation by wealth, is questionable. But private property must not for that reason be regarded as an institution which human sagacity could have dispensed with, but rather as a phase through which humanity had to pass; it was one of the shells of the human chrysalis, and humanity has had to pay the price of the struggle to break through it. The essential fact for us to recognise is that it may be only a phase, and that by wisely directed effort man may eventually escape from it.

It should not be necessary to repeat the story of this struggle at any length, nor to emphasize how little progress has been made; for it has been already pointed out that if men are actuated in the main by selfishness,

progress is subject to so frequent check as to be discouragingly slow. Selfishness, by putting government at Athens into the hands of the many, proved the inability of the many, if actuated only by selfish motives, to govern; and, by putting government at Rome into the hands of the few, demonstrated the inability of the few, if actuated only by selfish motives, to govern. But after the demonstrated failure of both aristocracy and democracy in these two countries had prepared the way for the anarchy which characterised the Middle Ages, a new power came upon the stage in the shape of a new religion. We have shown how Greek and Roman religion degenerated into superstition, and how Christianity and Mohammedanism both followed the same disheartening example under the daily reiterated conflict between religion and selfishness due to the competitive system. But Christianity had in it the miraculous vitality of truth, and we find it, therefore, re-expressing itself over and over again in the varying fortunes of man. The crusader was one of its most vigorous expressions; and the demoralisation of the crusade by wealth startlingly illustrates the operation of this pernicious influence. The great orders organised by religious enthusiasm to rescue the sepulchre from the Turk ended in the same way. Thus the Order of Templars, vowed to chastity, obedience, and *poverty*, acquired property with the prosperity of their cause; became the owners of the most formidable fortresses in Palestine which the world has ever seen; occupied whole quarters in the city of Paris; and became at last engaged in banking, — then, as now, the most profitable branch of trade. Their enormous wealth, their enclosure of sixty thousand square metres in the heart of Paris, their incomparable donjon, at last aroused the cupidity of the king; and the Templars expiated their degeneracy at the stake. This was the

first signal victory of the commercialism of the soldier over that of the Church.

The triumph of Philip of France over Boniface found its echo in England, and ended in the confiscation of monastic property by Henry VIII. If these acts of spoliation arouse indignation to-day, it must not be forgotten that they were committed in a conflict with an institution which, while it professed to be purely religious, had under Boniface acquired title to about one-third of European soil, — all of which claimed exemption from taxation by the State.

While, however, the Church was corrupting itself by the pursuit of wealth and being crushed by its acquisition, and while the battles between feudal lords, ecclesiastical and lay, were devastating the land, in a few protected places the indomitable industry of the people was engaged in building up little centres of order and of industry. Otho was the first of mediæval monarchs to understand the utility to the Crown of favouring municipal prosperity as a counterpoise to a factious nobility; and so, under his protection, the towns of Italy, picking up the threads of corporate activity which still bound them to the *collegia opificum* of ancient Rome, laid the foundation of a new democracy through combination of workingmen, known under the name of the Major and the Minor arts.¹ The Crusades at this propitious crisis opened to Italy the commerce of the East, and the prosperity which attended this commerce soon built up the city republics of Florence and Milan, Genoa and Venice. Nor did it stop at the borders of Italy; it found a passage over the Alps and swept through Germany along the valley of the Rhine. With the need for protection against the robber barons who levied tribute upon the

¹ There seems to be no break between the mediæval guilds of Ravenna and the ancient corporations of that town.

traffic of the stream, there grew not only cities to protect this traffic, but a confederation of these cities in the Hanseatic League. And so the wealth of Asia, pouring over the wilderness of Europe, dotted its course with prosperous towns, every one of which was a school of practical politics for the peaceful burgher and the industrious artisan.

For if France owes its municipal franchises to what the Crusades took away from her, Italy and Germany owe them to what the Crusades brought back. And when the use of the mariner's compass permitted trade to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, it bestowed the same gifts upon England and the Netherlands as it had already lavished on the valley of the Rhine. Moreover, corrupt as was the Church, it must not be imagined for that reason that religion was dead in the land. The religious spirit which animated the burghers of Italy has already been referred to; how religious was the spirit which engaged in commerce in those days may be gathered from the laws which governed the Esterlings in London, "who lived in a strongly built enclosure, called the Steel Yard, the site of which is now occupied by the City station of the Southeastern Railway Company, and were much the same as those under which the English traders lived in Bruges and other cities. The foreign merchant had, in Caxton's time, to brave a large amount of popular dislike, and to put up with great restraint on his liberty. Not only did he trade under harassing restrictions, but he resigned all hopes of domestic ties and family life. As in a monastery, each member had his own dormitory, whilst at meal-times there was a common table. Marriage was out of the question, and concubinage was followed by expulsion. Every member was bound to sleep in the house and to be indoors by a fixed time in the evening, and for the

sake of good order no woman of any description was allowed within the walls."¹

But the religious light thus cast upon the growth of municipal life in the Middle Ages would be grossly misleading were we for a moment to lose sight of the desperate struggle and bloodshed through which municipal privileges were secured. The short sketch already given of the conflict between Amiens and her feudal lords represents practically what took place in almost every town in Europe. Nor must we imagine that the triumph of the people meant an era of peace; on the contrary, it was a new signal for war; not war against a feudal lord, but war of one fraction of the people with another.

The history of this war is the history of mediæval guilds, to which it may be well now to turn our attention. So much has been written on the subject of mediæval guilds that it should not be necessary to do more than sketch with the utmost brevity the story of their rise and fall, in order to point out that the history of these guilds illustrates the inevitable and devastating consequence of selfishness.

§ 3. THE SOCIALISING FORCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. — BY ASSOCIATION IN GUILDS

Nothing could be more admirable than the original purpose of these guilds; nothing more wise than the system adopted for carrying out their respective purposes. The guild was originally a combination of all persons engaged in the same trade, for the purpose of protecting the interests of that trade, not only from the point of view of those employed in it, but also from the

¹ The Biography and Topography of William Caxton, England's First Printer, by William Blades. 8vo, 1877, p. 22.

point of view of the public welfare. It has been already pointed out how large a part religion played in the organisation and functions of the guild; none but Catholics were admitted; the performance of religious duties was strictly enjoined; every guild was under the protection of a saint whose feast-day was celebrated with pomp; every guild had its own chapel or its own altar in the parish church; and every religious ceremony the guilds, grouped each around its own banner, attended.

Brotherly charity was the virtue practised as well as preached by the guild; a small contribution insured relief to any member of the guild who stood in need thereof; and at every great crisis in the lives of its members the guild stood ready to comfort and to cheer.

Strictly democratic in their form of government, they were subject to the manorial lord or king only through the payment of a yearly tribute and a formal supervision of their rules; but the moment the rights of the guilds, or of that larger guild to which they all belonged, — the town, — were attacked, that moment these guilds assumed not only a political but a military rôle. As has been already pointed out, it was these guilds that secured the independence of the free towns of Germany, and it was the burghers gathered round their guild banners that saved France from John of England at the Battle of Bovine; it was the burghers of Liège that hewed in pieces the noblesse of Brabazon, and it was the Flemish *pietraille* which, in the Battle of the Golden Spurs, crushed the chivalry of France.

Nor must we neglect to mention the dignity which guild life gave to the labour of the artisan. The implements which figured on their banners were the tools of their trade; and it is the tools of their trade which we

see in the stained glass windows that still adorn the Gothic cathedrals of the Middle Age.¹

This was the spirit which converted every artisan into an artist, and which can find to-day no better form for conveying the irreproachable character of a piece of workmanship than to say of it that it is *de main d'ouvrier*.

The system adopted by the guilds for securing the highest class of work could be summed up in the words education and surveillance. No man was allowed to become a master in any trade unless he had served his apprenticeship first, and had passed the examination which justified his graduation into the class known under the name "journeyman," and had, after a second examination, justified both in theory and practice his right to be admitted to the highest rank of all. Nor was he at any time free from the surveillance of a committee of his guild, especially elected to exercise it; and the rules laid down by the guilds for the purpose of securing the highest class of work singularly anticipate the rules laid down to-day by the factory laws on the one hand and by the trade unions on the other. For the workingman was not then, as now, in opposition to his employer; on the contrary, both formed part of the same guild, and the interests of one were thereby made the interests of the other.² Thus it was not necessary to curb the greed of the employer by hostile legislation; nor was it necessary to limit, by the organisation of trade unions, the competition of workingmen with one another. Competition was eliminated by the fact that

¹ The most beautiful of the famous windows in the apse of the Cathedral of Bourges are the gifts of guilds.

² There were in Germany so-called "Gesellenvereine," or journeyman guilds in which employers had no share; but these were social rather than industrial in their character, and constituted an exception rather than the rule. These journeyman guilds were also found in England.

no man could engage in a trade unless he belonged to the guild organised to defend and protect the trade; and as the guild itself was master of the question who was to be admitted thereto, undue competition was impossible. Moreover, another aim of the guild was to protect the public in the purchase of its wares, and to prevent the fabrication of articles of poor quality; the guilds, therefore, themselves put limitations on the conditions of manufacture which competition uncontrolled by the guild system would not permit.

It would seem as though the early years of guild life were the halcyon days of the workingman; but it is the painful duty of the historian to record that, notwithstanding the high standards raised in its inception by the guild, human selfishness did for the guild what it had already done for the knight-errant; the privilege possessed by the guild of limiting the number of its own members it ruthlessly exercised, so as to make the number of persons at liberty to engage in a given trade inadequate. For example, the whole business of killing and selling meat was at one time in Paris confined to twenty persons. Needless to say, these persons did not themselves engage in the business; they sublet their respective monopolies to other corporations and guilds organised for the purpose of taking the contracts, and they became, therefore, a commercial but idle aristocracy. Again, in order to prevent competition within the guild, it became necessary to determine prices, and in the effort to determine prices it became necessary to determine quality; and this double necessity gave rise to rules so stringent as to become intolerable and unjust.

So great became the tyranny of the guilds that we find the king himself, in 1776, proclaiming the "inalienable right to work," which has to-day become the shibboleth of a certain school of socialists. In the year

in which we in America were setting forth our political rights in the Declaration of Independence, Louis XVI. took the workingman under his protection in these remarkable words:—

“Nous devons à nos sujets de leur assurer la jouissance pleine et entière de leurs droits, nous devons surtout notre protection à cette classe d’hommes qui n’ont de propriété que leur travail et leur industrie.”

“Dieu, en donnant à l’homme des besoins, en rendant nécessaire la ressource du travail, a fait du droit de travailler la propriété de tout homme, et cette propriété est la première, la plus sacrée, et la plus imprescriptible de toutes.

“Nous regardons comme un des premiers devoirs de notre justice, et comme un des actes les plus dignes de notre bienfaisance, d’affranchir nos sujets de toutes les atteintes portées à ce droit inaliénable de l’humanité.”

It is true that the hand is the hand of Louis, but the voice was the voice of Turgot; and that voice was destined not to be hushed until it had received the weighty support of Adam Smith and the consecration of the Manchester School.

But neither Turgot nor Louis himself were able to crush the power of the guilds; these last had behind them the traditions of five centuries, and the Parliament of Paris refused to register the edict. The king, however, disregarded the refusal of the Paris Parliament, and the edict was executed in the city of Paris, although it was found impossible of execution in the provinces. Meanwhile, attempts to execute it gave rise to such disorder that in the same year the edict was abrogated; and it was not until the French Revolution that the guilds received their final blow.¹

¹ The Corporation was by no means supreme in the eighteenth century. In France, as in England, the development of new industries in such towns as Bordeaux, Marseilles, Liverpool, and Manchester menaced the power of

The history of the guild is so familiar to political students that it would not have been recapitulated here were it not that such recapitulation was necessary in order to draw from this history its necessary conclusion. Just as chivalry sought to introduce high ideals into the life of the soldier, so the guild sought to bring high ideals into the life of the artisan. Both failed for the same reason; they both ended in a direct appeal to his self-interest, and in so doing they strengthened the very motive which is destructive to his higher nature. It would be sheer waste of time to trace the operation of self-interest in the abuse of power by the guild; for it ought by this time to be obvious not only that power stimulated by selfishness was abused by the guilds, but that it *must have been so abused*. The evil did not rest with the guilds; it rested with the competition to which the guilds were exposed. On the one side was the growth of population, which, in spite of apprenticeships, tended always to increase the ranks of the artisans; on the other side was the struggle of competing guilds for purchasers in the market. The former tended to keep wages down; the latter tended to keep prices down. Nothing but regulation of price, regulation of wages, and regulation of admission of members to the guild could prevent wages from going down to the starvation level. But regulation meant putting into the hands of a few men to whom the task of regulation was intrusted the power to determine who were to be members of the guild, and the conditions under which these members were to be admitted and to work. Now, the exercise of this power involved the exclusion of men from admission to the guild, or, in other words, from permission

the guilds; and doubtless the guild would have perished in France, as it did in England, without legislative interference, had the matter been left to the automatic ebb and tide of action and reaction.

to work, who by such exclusion were doomed to pauperism and to crime. It does not seem conceivable that such a deliberate condemnation of the innocent to misery could be continuously practised without blunting sympathy for those condemned; nor does it seem conceivable that this sympathy could long be blunted without opening the door to private greed; for it is sympathy which for the most part keeps the door closed to greed. The guild, then, could not but eventually become the instrument of the very evil it was instituted to suppress; in rescuing the artisan from the tyranny of the baron it became itself a tyrant. With this important difference, however, that whereas the tyranny of the baron corrupted only the baron, that of the guild corrupted all the members of the guild. So that whereas the baronial rule demoralised only a small minority, that of the guild demoralised almost the entire population; for it pampered one portion of it into a perversion of the sense of justice, and it relegated a large part of the remainder to vagabondage.

How far the moral sense of those who profited by the guild system was demoralised by it may be judged by the laws passed in the early part of the sixteenth century to deal with the wretches for whose misery the exclusiveness of the guild was in large part responsible. Able-bodied men found begging were upon a first conviction whipped and sent home; upon a second conviction their ears were cropped; and upon a third they were put to death.¹

But not even the death penalty could put an end to a vagabondage which was a necessary consequence of

¹ Statute of 1536, 27 Henry VIII. c. 25. The weakness of the State and the absence of a properly organised police system is doubtless responsible in part for the harshness of these laws; but the existence of the unemployed is doubtless responsible for it also.

existing industrial conditions. These conditions had to break up, and in breaking up they gave rise to new conditions more demoralising, perhaps, than those which preceded them; for although the poor-laws of Queen Elizabeth did diminish the violence theretofore practised upon vagabonds, they created a condition of pauperism which in many parishes reduced the majority to dependence upon the poor-rates, put an end to industry, and condemned the land to idleness. In the parish of Cholesbury, in 1833, out of a total population of 139, only 35 supported themselves; the remaining 104 received relief from the parish. The cultivation of all lands except sixteen acres was abandoned, the rates having more than swallowed the rent.¹

The only encouraging fact in this pitiful story is that such evils as these tend to their own destruction. Tyranny, so long as there is a saving grace anywhere in the population, tends to destroy the tyrant; and so the towns in which labour was regulated decayed, and there arose in their place "villages" in which no such regulation existed. The villages of that century are the cities of our own; they are Manchester, Birmingham, and Sheffield.

But whether social conditions in these great municipalities are more or less demoralising than those which prevailed in the sixteenth century remains to be seen.

Reference has already been made² to the tyranny of the corporation and the reaction towards individualism, to which these tyrannies gave rise. And with the character of this tyranny fresh in mind it is not difficult to understand why the political philosophers of the eighteenth century attributed the economic evils of that time to over-regulation; and as the over-regulation

¹ Maltbie, "English Local Government of To-day," p. 53.

² See vol. i. book i. chap. i. pp. 26, 27.

complained of was essentially artificial or non-natural in its character, it was likely that the evil should appear to them as an infringement of natural conditions or so-called natural law. This is doubtless the reason why we read so much about Nature and Natural Law in the writings of Rousseau and Quesnay, and why these men should have prepared the way for the political economy of Adam Smith. The doctrine of *Laissez faire* having been much criticised already in the first volume, the impression has doubtless been conveyed that it is deemed essentially unsound and bad. But this impression would be a mistake; it may be bad to-day, and yet have been inevitable at that time; for the more familiar we become with the political conditions that prevailed at different periods of history, the more we have to recognise that the political theories of these periods bear a necessary relation to these conditions. The natural way of dealing with an evil is to direct against it a frontal attack; but if the evil attacked turns out to be a Quaker gun, such a system only exposes the attacking party to demolition from the mouth of the real though concealed battery on the flank, which he has not had the wit to discover. The misery which existed between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries was obviously due in part, at any rate, to the tyranny and exclusiveness of the guilds or corporations; and these again exercised their tyranny through the process of regulation. The most obvious remedy, then, was to suppress the guild, suppress regulation, and open the way to freedom. Sentiment took up the theme, and freedom became the topic of philosophy and literature as well as legislation. It intoxicated France, and cannily laid the foundation of the British Empire; for to-day it is under the banner of free trade that England is justifying her conquest

of the East; and it is behind the mask of free contract that we can distinguish the ominous countenance of the Sweater and the Absentee. For there is no more freedom of contract between unorganised labour and a capitalist than between unorganised labour and a guild; in both cases the labourer is at the mercy of the employer, for the one is not free to refuse work, and the other is comparatively free to withhold it.

This, of course, is an old story, and is only recalled here to connect the tyranny of capital with that of the corporation, for the purpose of showing, not that capital is oppressive, but that it *must* be so.

And here, at the risk of wearying with repetition, it may be well to point out that the demonstration of the evils attending capital is not an attack upon the capitalist. He is in one sense as great a victim of the competitive system as the unemployed; he is no more responsible for the misery he occasions than he is for the pauperism to which he unconsciously and unwillingly contributes. There are doubtless employers who are little, if at all, affected by the unhappiness of the workingman; but again there are employers who are keenly sensitive to it and eagerly looking for a remedy. We shall never find the remedy or even an enduring palliative until we understand the disease; and we cannot understand the disease so long as we are bent upon putting the responsibility on the employers. Let us look for the disease with the impartiality of a physician, and we shall then escape the delusions of the partisan.

§ 4. THE TYRANNY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.

— THE MARKET

It is not necessary — nor would it be wise — to repeat here the argument against capital which, since the day of Karl Marx, has been kindling the rage of the work-

ingman; for we are not so much concerned with the injustice which capital has caused, or does cause, as we are with the question how capital can be reconciled with justice, if at all. In other words, is capital good or bad? If bad, is it necessary? If necessary to-day, will it be necessary always?

I cannot but think that Karl Marx made his first mistake in the selection of his title; for, as has been already suggested, capital *per se* is a blessing; it is the product of labour and self-restraint; it is the result of applying intelligence and effort to the solution of those problems which the destructive forces in nature are for ever presenting to us. It is not from the accumulation of wealth — called capital — that the evil results, but in its distribution; and the problem we have to solve is, how the distribution of capital or income can be modified so as to occasion less injustice in the world; and in the course of the discussion how such a modification can result in improving the human type instead of — as has already been indicated — degrading it.

When, in the eighteenth century, it became clear that pauperism in France was in great part due to the tyranny of the corporation, it was not a difficult matter to lay the corporation low; it was accomplished by a stroke of the pen. But when we endeavour to-day to run the evil to earth under the existing capitalistic system we are confronted with a totally different state of things. It is easy enough to point to the employer and put the blame on him; but the blame will not rest there, for the employer will pass it on to the Market — and it is to the Market that it legitimately belongs. Now, the Market cannot be disposed of as easily as the corporation, for the Market represents in one sense the whole community. We all want to buy cloth and corn cheap; and so long as these are cheap, the labour that contributes to produce

them must be cheap.¹ It is not, then, the employer who keeps wages low; it is you, and I, and every one of us. If low wages are a crime, we are all *participes criminis*; and if we adopt the language of sentiment and apply it to ourselves, we shall have to admit that every time we avail ourselves of the low prices of a department store we are helping a "giant monopoly" to "crush out" the self-respecting retailer, and every time we undertake what should seem to be the legitimate task of buying our garments as cheaply as we can, we are engaged in "grinding the faces of the poor."

This must not be understood as an attempt to shield those employers who consciously and deliberately extort large profits out of the necessities of the workingman; such employers have existed and doubtless still exist. But the question before us is not what is, but what must be; in other words, assuming that all employers were angels of light, would it be possible for them, under our existing industrial system, very much to improve the conditions of the workingman? And if the fault be not in the employer but in ourselves, who constitute the

¹ Although competition, by tending to lower prices, tends to lower wages, wages can nevertheless be raised without necessarily compelling a rise in prices. This important fact is fully recognised later on. It is not dwelt on here because it does not affect the argument here. Within limits increase of wages, by rendering service more effectual, does not necessitate a rise in prices; indeed, under certain favourable conditions it permits of lower prices. This does not prevent, however, the application of the general law that, by and large, competition in lowering prices tends to lower wages; that this tendency is, under certain conditions, the cause of sweating; and that, if the tendency has been partially counteracted by labour organisation, there is a limit to the beneficial action of such organisation. Indeed, it is probable that in some industries this limit has already been reached. It is because the limit has been reached in them that workingmen are endeavouring to prevent foreign competition by international organisation. But even if such an international organisation can be rendered effectual, how will it remain so when we shall have taught the Mongol to compete with us?

Market or the Demand, let us assume that we, too, are angels of light, and let us see whether under the existing conditions we could very much improve the conditions of the workingman. And of these two social criminals let us begin with ourselves. Are we wrong in trying to buy cheaply?

Let us suppose, for example, that you, reader, are a public-school teacher; you and your parents have made great sacrifices in order to secure the certificate which will qualify you to enter into the honourable career of educating your fellow-creatures; no career can be more pregnant of good or bad results than this. If you are a fit person by your knowledge, your character, and your example, to make good citizens of the children put under your care, you will be accomplishing as great a work as any man or woman in the world. Let us assume that you are perfectly conscious of the magnitude of your task and are bent on performing your duty in conformity with its highest ideals. For years you have striven hourly to attain those qualifications which will entitle you to your teacher's certificate; nothing in the world has seemed to you of as much importance as this; the desire for it has made every sacrifice easy; and the fear of missing it has cost you hours of sleepless anxiety. At last your toils have been rewarded; you have passed the ordeal, and the certificate is yours. Many of those who have worked by your side have fallen by the way; you have seen them drop off one by one. Illness has stood in the way of some; the necessity of earning bread in that of others; and the same high hopes that have animated you, you have seen in others sink into discouragement. You have been sorry for your less successful competitors, but the necessities of your own case have forced you on the road too strenuously to permit of your devoting much time to consol-

ing those less prosperous than yourself. And now the goal of your long race has been attained; you have your certificate, and you may at last get at your work.

But here you meet with your first check. Of those who started in the race with you, some hundreds, it is true, have already fallen by the way; but there still remain thousands in the field. You are not the only one who has secured a certificate, and for the first time you are confronted with a fact of which up to this you have been only dimly conscious, — namely, that although there is a very strict limit to the number of teachers' places to fill, there is practically no limit to the number of teachers able and eager to fill them. You now pass through a long and weary period of waiting. Singular phenomenon! Here you are, fully equipped, you and some thousands of others, to perform the highest task that it can be given to a man or woman to do; confronted with still more countless thousands of children who are growing up into bad citizens for lack of the very teaching you are so peculiarly and laboriously fitted to give them; and neither may you teach nor they be taught!

With a sense of the injustice of these conditions rankling in you, slowly the high hopes you once entertained dwindle, peak, and pine; the expectations you once entertained of a permanent position somewhere near your family, a fixed income, and an eager class, give way to a willingness to accept any place, however temporary, however underpaid, by which you can relieve your parents of the now intolerable burden of your support. At last your patience is rewarded; you are offered a position in a summer school during the summer months at five dollars a week. This remuneration will hardly pay your board, but it will be a beginning and will relieve your parents for a time. There is still, however, a

difficulty to overcome; now that you have secured a place, you must be respectably garmented; you must present an object-lesson of neatness and refinement; in other words, you must buy clothes. Once more you must make an inroad into your parents' ever-diminishing hoard; you make your list of the things you need; anxiously you price the articles on your list; anxiously you figure up the total; it is more than you can afford. Then begins the task of cutting down the list and of comparing prices. In a few days' shopping you learn just where you can make most saving on every item; and between the limits imposed upon you by a crushing necessity, between the total hoard which your parents can scrape together on the one side and your duty to your class on the other, there is but one solution, — the low prices of the department store. Are you free?

And what is true of you is true of every man, woman, and child who is striving to emerge or keep out of the ranks of pauperism and of crime? Are they free?

But now let us suppose that good fortune comes to you. A rich uncle has died and left you a hundred thousand dollars; you have suddenly become a capitalist; you have a hundred thousand dollars to invest. What are you going to do with it?

Your experience has taught you that the supply of teachers is far in excess of the demand; if you continue to teach, you are taking the bread out of the mouth of some one in the desperate position out of which you have just emerged. This you will not consent any longer to do; you abandon teaching for the time, and you conceive the idea of investing your money in such a way as to produce more income than you need, so that you can have some surplus to devote to the comfort of your parents and to the well-being of those about you.

Just as you have come to this conclusion a favourable opportunity for investing occurs. You are introduced to a firm engaged in the manufacture of Key West cigars; and you are told that they need the sum of one hundred thousand dollars in order to avail themselves of a singularly advantageous opportunity. Their cigars are now made at a factory which they lease in Key West, the rent of which forms a considerable item in the cost of their goods. The lease is about to expire, and they have received a proposition from certain owners of real estate at Tampa, which, if accepted, will greatly diminish the cost of manufacture and indeed add to profits in no small degree. The proposition is as follows: —

A group of property-owners in Tampa, being anxious to bring industries to that town in order thereby to enhance the value of their real estate, offer to build a factory for A. B. & Co. as big as the one they now occupy at Key West, and to deed this factory to A. B. & Co., together with fifty acres of land, provided A. B. & Co. will move their industry from Key West to Tampa. It is expected that A. B. & Co. will build on the fifty acres deeded to them for this purpose cottages for their workmen; and it is calculated that they could at once rent three hundred cottages to their workmen at \$12 a month each, or \$360 a year. The cottages will cost \$300 each; a sum of \$90,000, therefore, is needed for this purpose, and a margin of \$10,000 is recommended. A. B. & Co. cannot take such a sum out of their business without crippling it. But if you will invest this sum of \$100,000 in their business, they will take you into partnership with them, and thereby avail themselves of the offer made by the Tampa citizens. The advantages of this proposition are obvious; they would be relieved of the necessity of paying a high rent

for their factory, and they will receive, on the contrary, high rent from their employees, upon whom propinquity to the factory and the difficulty of securing accommodations elsewhere in Tampa will practically impose the necessity of occupying the cottages built for them.

After carefully examining the situation you are convinced that A. B. & Co. are doing a thriving business; that they stand high in commercial circles, and that you cannot better invest your funds.

You consult your lawyers, and are advised (for reasons which seem sound, but which you are not altogether able to understand) that it is wise to convert the firm into a stock company, under the laws of West Virginia; and after the necessary formalities have been complied with you become a stockholder to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars in the A. B. Company. The offer of the Tampa citizens has been accepted, and the construction of the buildings is at once entered upon.

It has also been explained to you that the move to Tampa will be attended by another incidental, but no less for that reason important, advantage. There is considerable discussion as to the appraisal of Havana tobacco. You are told that certain tobacco known as "fillers" pays a duty of only thirty-five cents a pound, whereas another grade of tobacco known as "wrappers" pays one dollar and eighty-five cents a pound; and there is great discussion as to just what tobacco shall be entered as "fillers" and what as "wrappers." On this subject you are informed that the appraiser at Tampa is much more liberal to importers than the appraiser at Key West, and it is obviously an economy to pay one dollar and eighty-five cents a pound upon as little tobacco as possible.

It is estimated that constructing the buildings at

Tampa will take about six months; but before a month has elapsed you are confronted by the wages problem in the shape of a strike at the Key West factory. Upon inquiry you find that the employees are for the most part Cubans who live in a state of degradation and filth. The wages they receive are not sufficient to permit of any better conditions; but when you calculate how much you can afford to raise wages, you will be surprised to find that any rise which could materially benefit or sensibly improve the condition of the cigar-makers would not only eat up the margin of profit, but even impair capital. A close examination of the prices obtainable on the one side, and the necessary expenses on the other, presents the following condition of things.

The price that can be obtained for cigars is screwed down by competition to one which barely leaves a profit upon the goods manufactured on average years; and it is only on the condition of making and selling an enormous quantity of goods that a remunerative profit can be assured. For example, the average profit made on a single cigar is less than one cent, or about .975 of a cent; that on a hundred cigars is $97\frac{1}{2}$ cents; that on a thousand, \$9.75; that on a million is \$9,750. Obviously, then, no manufacturer can earn a living who only sells hundreds; in order to get rich he must sell millions. This may seem a big profit; but unfortunately it is subject to the accident of crops. When the tobacco crop is productive, these figures, and even better, are obtained; but when the crop is poor, not only is this profit diminished, but it even sometimes disappears. In 1879 the crop was so bad that many manufacturers were ruined. Indeed, this has happened often; and the element of risk involved is one against which manufacturers must provide by securing an extra profit on prosperous years.

In any case a large manufacturer has every advantage ; because he buys large quantities of tobacco, he commands a better quality of tobacco at a lower price ; because he deals with large sums of money his credit is well known and proportionally high ; he can thus secure good terms, or, in other words, by the value of his credit his capital is increased tenfold. On the other hand, in the sale of his goods he has a corresponding advantage. He deals with the largest firms, who give the largest orders ; and, having a large amount at his disposal, he can spend large sums in advertising and salesmen's commissions.

When, however, appalled by the enormous sums spent in advertising and salesmen's commissions, you propose to diminish this expenditure and apply the amount thereby saved in increasing the wages of the workmen, you are met by the positive assurance that experience has demonstrated the necessity of large expenditures of this kind. It is only by covering immense wall spaces with the names of your brands, and by impressing these names upon the imagination and memory of the public through every conceivable device, however costly, that you can secure and maintain the demand for your goods which permits you to sell on the large scale necessary to pay the expense of manufacture. Once more, then, you are confronted with the fact that it is not the capitalists that are masters of the subject of wages ; but, on the contrary, you stand between the necessary cost of manufacture on the one hand, and the prices determined by competition on the other.

If you are concerned with the fate of the Cuban workman, you will be told that he is accustomed to the life he leads and would be no happier with a higher wage ; that the strike cannot last longer than a few weeks, as there is an unlimited supply of other cigar-

makers to draw from; and you learn that the question of wage is not a matter of humanity, but one of compulsion.

A few weeks, during which you try to harden your heart to the suffering which the strike is occasioning in Key West, suffice to confirm the opinion of your partners that the strike cannot last long. The importation of a few hands eventually brings back such of the other employees as you are willing to receive, and the manufacture proceeds upon the old wage; but it has left dissatisfaction, and the next news from Key West is that the factory has burned down. This, of course, should not involve any loss, for your partners have taken the precaution to insure; but there are losses which insurance cannot cover; such, for example, as the loss arising from the inability to fill orders, and from the fact that the proceeds from the sale of goods ordered are no longer available to meet the notes which have been issued for raw material, etc. Moreover, the insurance company is persuaded that the fire comes at a specially opportune moment for your firm; it is impossible, they say, to move goods from Key West to Tampa and to interrupt the business for the time necessary for this process without considerable loss of time, of interest, and of actual money. It would be a much easier plan to burn down the factory and collect immediately insurance on the whole amount of material stored therein, especially if a little careful book-keeping can make the amount of stock burned appear more than it really was; and so the insurance companies decline to pay insurance until they investigate. The very temper on the part of the striking workmen which set fire to the factory is at the disposal of the insurance company to fabricate evidence to your disadvantage. The outcome, therefore, is that instead of receiving the amount of your loss you

are left with a heavy indebtedness, no prospect of sales to meet the same, and an expensive and exasperating litigation.

It becomes necessary, notwithstanding, to purchase new tobacco; and the resources and credit of the firm are strained to the utmost in order to enable this necessary purchase. The new tobacco is to be delivered no longer at Key West, but at Tampa, and you will at any rate profit now from the more favourable conditions which prevail at Tampa, owing to the liberality of the appraiser. On this subject, however, you find your partners unwilling to speak with much freedom, and you are for the first time made acquainted with a doubt as to whether the appraiser will continue to entertain the liberal views once entertained on the subject. Upon further investigation, you learn that the appraiser in Tampa owes his position to the influence of the real-estate men to whom you owe the land upon which you are building your new factory. If the suspicion crosses your mind that the appraiser is in the pay of these real-estate owners, you put it aside as one unworthy of yourself and them; until one day your partners find it necessary to convey to you the fact that, the appraiser having struck for a higher rate of remuneration, the real-estate men have called upon your firm to pay a contribution thereto. This demand you of course refuse to comply with, and you then become acquainted with the fact that such a refusal is regarded by your partners as quixotic and unbusinesslike. The question is dropped, and it is not until you examine the accounts at the end of the year that you find you have been unwillingly made a party to the corruption of a United States official.

Meanwhile a Spanish governor-general in Cuba has issued an edict forbidding the exportation of tobacco,

and the very material which you need for the conduct of your business is thereby refused you. On the other hand, owing to the fact that the resources of your firm have been crippled by the refusal of the insurance companies to pay the loss on the burning of the factory, you have only in stock just enough to supply your existing needs; whereas your competitors, who have been anticipating some such move on the part of the Spanish governor-general in Cuba, have supplied themselves with tobacco in sufficient quantity to run their factory for another year. In this critical condition of things there is only one compensating hope; namely, that this prohibition of the exportation of tobacco in Havana will raise the price of cigars in which this tobacco enters. But again this hope is disappointed; the few firms who have sufficient tobacco in stock, being able to continue manufacturing notwithstanding this order, discern in this advantage an opportunity for crushing out yourselves and all other less wealthy or less favoured competitors. They keep their prices where they stood before; you can therefore get no higher prices for your goods, and the moment soon arrives when you can no longer fill the orders which you at so great an expense of advertising and salesmen's commissions secured. Then ruin stares you in the face; the hundred thousand dollars subscribed by you for the purpose of building the factory and workmen's houses has been in part employed in purchasing tobacco. The workmen's houses, therefore, are not built, no income is derived therefrom, and the closing of the factory is imminent, owing to your inability to obtain tobacco. Your attention is thus called to the iniquity of Spanish misgovernment in Cuba; to the ignoring of the rights of American commerce by the edict against the exportation of tobacco; to the fact that all nations have proceeded upon

the plan of protecting their commerce, if necessary, by war; to the facility with which the United States might at any time put an end to Spanish misrule, and to the conditions which are now threatening you with ruin. It is not unlikely that under these circumstances you will be driven by the necessities of your position to become an advocate of war.

Within the space of a few months, therefore, the mere possession of capital has forced you to refuse to improve the admittedly degraded condition of your employees, to become a silent partner in the corruption of a United States official, and to advocate the shedding of human blood for the purpose of protecting the interests of trade.

§ 5. THE INDUSTRIAL RESULTS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. — IRREGULARITY OF EMPLOYMENT, COLONISATION, AND WAR

It may seem as though the conditions which brought about the failure of the A. B. Co., are exceptional; but it must be borne in mind that out of every hundred men who start a new business an average of ninety are known by experience to fail;¹ and there is not one of this ninety who fail, who is not prepared to prove that his failure was due to conditions that were exceptional. The fact is that commercial competition is very much like that of nature, in that we have before us only the ten per cent of those business ventures that succeed, and are therefore likely to lose sight of the ninety per cent that fail. In other respects, too, commercial competition resembles the scheme of nature. The compe-

¹ United States commercial agencies, such as Bradstreet and Dun & Co., which publish records of insolvencies, seem to prove that out of one hundred new business ventures about ninety per cent result either in bankruptcy or unprofitable liquidation.

tition of nature is indifferent, cruel, and unjust; and it cannot be said that commerce is in any way less indifferent, less cruel, or less unjust. Nor could it be otherwise; for it is the very element of competition in nature which man started out in his struggle with nature by political and social institutions to correct; and when we observe that in so far as man has failed by his social and political institutions to eliminate competition, so far he has maintained the injustice and cruelty of nature; whereas in so far as he has by his institutions succeeded in replacing competition by co-operation, he has effected an improvement in general conditions, — the question naturally suggests itself whether a great part of the unhappiness which attends our social system may not be due to the fact that man has not completed the work that he began.

But if, reader, there remains any lingering notion in your mind that the case I have imagined is an exceptional one, let me ask you how you can invest your hundred thousand dollars without becoming a partner in the industrial system and to that extent responsible for the injustice which it unconsciously involves. If your money is invested in real estate, you become a partner in the fortunes of your tenants; so long as they prosper your rent is paid; but the moment one of them, however innocent, ceases to prosper, you, by evicting him, will be giving him the push down hill which tends eventually to land him in the poorhouse. If your money is invested in railroad securities, you become a partner in the fortunes of the road in the securities of which you invest; when it has to crush competition by cutting rates, your money helps to pay the cost of the process, and your money therefore contributes to the ruin of the bondholders of the competing road; when it has to secure a franchise and to corrupt a legislature to this

end, your money goes to pay the bribe ; you are yourself, therefore, unconsciously guilty of the very degradation against which you daily protest. If your money is invested in industry of any kind you are made thereby the instrument through which the Market — the irresponsible but none the less merciless Market — keeps down the wages of the workingman ; you cannot escape this necessary law so long as competition remains the motive-power of the industrial machine. If you are to keep your capital, you must sell your goods at a profit ; you must lose your capital if you sell at a loss ; competition between capitalists, egged on by the perpetual effort of the purchaser to buy cheap, keeps prices down to a minimum, and thus the needs of the purchasing poor keep down the wages of the working poor, one part of the community being, under this system, engaged in crushing other parts of it.

There is another feature of the competitive system to which attention cannot be too closely directed ; namely, the tendency to partial ¹ over-production and the evils which follow in its wake, — irregularity of employment, colonisation, imperialism, and war.

When, for any reason, an industry becomes highly profitable, capital tends to flow to this industry and, by competition, to lower profits. If the profits were unduly high before this flow of capital set in, the lowering of profits would be a good thing ; but the flow of capital

¹ The word "partial" is used in connection with over-production in order to avoid the appearance of approving the theory of recurring periods of general over-production, which Edward Bellamy has popularised in "Equality," and has lately received the more weighty support of J. A. Hobson. This theory does not seem to be proven, and must be carefully distinguished from the partial over-production here explained. The extent to which competition is attended by over-production is illustrated in the history of our principal Trusts. See Appendix.

to this industry generally means that it has abandoned some other industry, and this means that those who worked at the abandoned industry have lost their employment. It is true that the capital which has swelled the profitable business will employ more labour in the business, but the labour employed will in most cases be different from that thrown out of employment, and a considerable period is likely to elapse before those thrown out of one employment can fit themselves for another.

But the flow of capital to the profitable business will by competition lower profits; every manufacturer, therefore, in the business will have an interest to increase the scope of his business so as to make up by an increased number of transactions for diminished profits upon each transaction; and as he increases his business he will become alive to the economies which attend large as compared with small business, economy in purchase of raw material, economy through utilisation of waste products, facility for employment of improved machinery, economy of distribution, rebates allowed to large shippers, low interest charged on large transactions, etc.; and so every dollar of profit not required for expenditure remains to swell the business; capital is increased by transformation into joint-stock companies; money is borrowed by issues of bonds; and so production tends to increase until the demand ceases to keep pace with it, and prices go down.

Now, if we want to be accurate we must say, not demand, but effectual demand. Demand in political economy does not mean mere desire to possess a thing, but desire to possess it coupled with ability to pay for it a price at least equal to the cost of manufacture. Let us suppose, for example, that there has been over-production of stockings; more stockings have been made than there is effectual demand for. There may be thou-

sands who are prevented by poverty from wearing stockings; but these thousands in political economy do not count for anything. Unless they have money enough to spare for the purchase of stockings at cost price, their desire to wear stockings is not effectual; it cannot take the stockings off the hands of the manufacturer; and in spite of a real need for stockings in the community, because this need is not coupled with ability to purchase, the manufacturer of stockings has to shut down his factory. There is no effectual demand; there is a real demand, but because it is not effectual — that is to say, because it is not coupled with ability to purchase — thousands may be condemned to dispense with an article of clothing important in our climate to comfort and to health.

One of the treacherous features of this tendency of production to outstrip effectual demand is that it is expressed only in diminution of profits, and one of the methods for fighting diminished profits is, as just shown, still larger production. Manufacturers tend, therefore, to continue a suicidal extension of their industries at the very time when, if wisely informed, they would on the contrary restrict them.

At last prices fall below cost. At such periods the most prosperous mills are driven to discharge a part of their employees; those which are less prosperous shut down temporarily; and others shut down never to open again. Thus there are cast upon the community deserving workmen anxious to work and unable to do so.

Recurring periods of depression in each industry give way in time to new periods of prosperity through the operation of several causes. In the first place, the closing of factories which they necessitate reduces the production until the stock of goods is brought into proper relation with effectual demand. In the second place,

gluts sometimes give rise to legislation in the shape of protecting tariffs and export bounties, which by shutting out the competition of the foreigner increases the demand for home-made goods; and, in the third place, they stimulate the search for foreign markets; for, there being no demand at home, manufacturers who are carrying unsalable stock are willing to sell at a loss abroad, and are therefore able to undersell competitors in foreign markets.¹

The tendency of gluts to stimulate foreign trade must not be overlooked; for over-production drives nations to extend their market by forcing goods into foreign lands. The morality of forcing trade upon a foreign people at the cannon's mouth is justified by necessity; for either English mills must shut down and English workingmen starve, or China must consent to buy England's goods.

The necessity, however, under which industry stands to create new markets for its goods, owing to the law that production perpetually tends to outstrip effectual demand, has a result which has not yet been acutely felt; but it must eventually produce serious consequences. For it is this necessity which is hastening the work of colonisation all over the world, at a feverish rate of speed. The manufacturer must sell his goods; as fast as his production outstrips the capacity of his fellow-citizens to buy his goods he seeks to create new markets, and so he sends out the missionary first, the trader next, and the soldier eventually after him.² The prosperity of the colony thus planted by ruse, or violence, or both, becomes a matter of vital importance

¹ Some excellent illustrations of this tendency are to be found in the testimony taken in 1899 by the Industrial Commission. They have been collected in a footnote to the Appendix on Trusts at the end of this volume.

² This point is somewhat more fully treated under section 7 of this chapter, sub (b) Militarism.

to English trade; it stimulates the increase of population not only there, but in England, for no parent need hesitate to bring a large family into the world so long as there is a livelihood for children in the colonies; and so the interests of manufacturers are continually urging the Anglo-Saxon race to breed and multiply in every corner of the habitable world. Instead of the self-restraint which Malthus piously urged upon his fellow-countrymen, the industrial system stimulates an incontinence which, were it not for the vast unoccupied spaces still in the world, would be reckless in the extreme.

And yet this process cannot go on much longer without fatal consequences. Most of the fertile land in our own continent of America is occupied; it is by no means sure that there is very much land in Africa which can be occupied by white men until they have slowly become acclimated thereto; and at the rate at which population is now increasing under the perpetual stimulus of the competitive system it cannot be long before all the habitable vacant spaces in the world will be taken up. When that time comes, where will the competitive system, which upon the profit plan tends to produce more than the community can pay for, find new markets? For there will then be neither foreign markets to conquer nor colonies to plant; nor indeed will there be any outlet by emigration for the unemployed. Indeed, when, in our eagerness to secure Chinese trade, we shall have taught the Chinaman how to compete with us, China, instead of furnishing us with a new market, will constitute the most dangerous and relentless of our competitors; for the Chinaman can work effectually on food which will not support life in the Anglo-Saxon; and of Chinamen there are believed to be over three hundred millions. The disaster which will then bring the starving workman face to face with

a glutted market can lead to but one result. For some years to come there will doubtless remain room for emigration in Australia, America, and Africa; and the most dangerous, because the most active, can be drafted away from the swelling and threatening masses of the unemployed. But when this resource is no longer open, and the unemployed, eager to work and hungry, find themselves confronted with a market overflowing with the food and clothing they need but cannot buy, can there be any result but one?

These, then, are the inevitable consequences of the present competitive system:

First. The competitive system tends to produce partial over-production.

Second. Over-production produces irregularity of employment.

Third. Over-production stimulates colonisation.

Fourth. Colonisation stimulates population.

Fifth. Over-production stimulates conquest of foreign markets, and, —

Sixth, consequently promotes war.

Seventh. When there are neither lands to colonise nor markets to conquer, over-production is likely to result in violence and revolt.

We have been asking ourselves of late whether we shall take the Philippines or not, unconscious of the relentless goads that are compelling us to take the Philippines whether we will or not.¹ The demand for expansion is for the most part the need for new markets, which is being felt for the first time in the United States by the large number of voters who are engaged in industry. It clothes itself in patriotism, but it is probably for the most part self-interest, or, rather, self-preservation.

¹ Written in 1898.

It has been pointed out that over-production, when not relieved by extending foreign trade, is mainly checked by the tendency of capital to withdraw from unprofitable manufactures. Now, every time such withdrawal takes place a corresponding number of workmen are thrown out of employment, — that is to say, are subjected to want and the anguish of anxiety. The evil of this system cannot be explained away by pointing out that the capital withdrawn from one manufacture will soon be reinvested in another. A cotton-spinner cannot in a week or a month become a boiler-maker. The commercial system which makes it easy for a capitalist to maintain income at the cost of agony to the working-man does not recommend itself to the political student who is seeking for the establishment of Justice in economic conditions.

Those who approve of the existing competitive system point with admiration to the natural adjustment which takes place every time economic conditions are thrown out of prosperous equilibrium. If too much capital flows into one industry, they say the fact is promptly revealed by diminished profits; capital then promptly flows away from that industry into industries which by the high profits realised indicate their need of more capital; and so capital is always tending by its fluidity to maintain a "natural," "static," or normal rate of profit. Rate of profit, then, is the barometric signal for movement of capital to and from the industries respectively; the system moves with meteorologic accuracy. Even the disturbances produced by invention of machinery are more apparent than real. Capital flows from the old industry into the manufacture of machinery, and, so invested, employs labour; machinery diminishes cost of production, conferring thereby a benefit on the consumer. This increases purchasing power; every increase of

purchasing power means increase of demand ; every increase of demand means encouragement to greater production ; capital, therefore, is rendered more productive by every new machine, and ultimately is enabled, by increased production and increased demand, to employ more labour. All this is perfectly true. The fluidity of capital makes it possible for the capitalist for the most part to keep his money invested at remunerative rates of interest and concomitantly to remain engaged in the employment of labour. The working of the system is that of a beautifully devised machine, and as such is worthy of the admiration bestowed upon it, provided we only look at it from the capitalist's point of view. Unfortunately labour is not as "fluid" or insensible as capital. The workingman is a human being with the capacity for pain and for anxiety that characterises our race ; and every time that capital profits by its fluidity to flow from one industry to another, the lives of men, women, and children are threatened by want and their hearts wrung by fear. If the competitive system were the only possible economic system, then we should have to resign ourselves to these pitiable conditions ; but if it is not the only possible economic system, — if another system can be proposed which is free from these conditions, — is it not well that we should study this last with the utmost care ?

The present industrial system has in one sense the disadvantage of being highly artificial, — for it is the creation of man, not of nature ; and in another, the additional disadvantage of resembling a natural method observable in the human body which is peculiarly open to criticism for the systematic pain which it involves : if a cinder falls into the eye, the sensory nerves are stimulated by the pain occasioned to such a point as to produce tears of anguish, through which the cinder

is washed out of the eye. The process is as automatic as the flow of capital from one industry to another; but it is not one that we would, if we had the choice, deliberately adopt. We have tolerated the competitive plan in great part because the pain involved in temporary loss of profit is to a capitalist comparatively small, and capitalists have had up to the present time the making of our laws and economic institutions. But a change has of late come over our political conditions. The workingman, upon whom the torment of the process really falls, is learning to use his political power. It is not reasonable to suppose that he will long consent to endure conditions which necessarily impose the burden of every economic strain upon himself. Is it?

We must not leave the subject of industrialism without pointing out a few other attending circumstances.

As production tends to outstrip consumption, every manufacturer is driven to the necessity of pushing the sale of his goods and endeavouring to secure as large a share of the diminishing market as possible for himself at the expense of his competitors. The effort to sell goods necessitates the employment of commercial travellers, whose business it is to bring home to the public the superiority of the goods they have to sell over similar goods in the same market. The commercial traveller is remunerated by a commission on the sales he effects, and is given thereby a direct interest in appreciating the goods he is selling and depreciating the goods of competing manufacturers; the lies which he is by this system induced to tell are sanctioned by a maxim of our law,—the admittedly immoral maxim, “caveat emptor;” and the lies which the commercial traveller tells are spread in still more glaring charac-

ters over wall spaces and the advertising columns of our daily papers.

It is true that the practice of lying has become so universal in trade that the deception is in extent much discounted; but there is another character of falsehood that does deceive, — that is to say, the falsehood of fact implied in adulteration and scamped work. Thus in 1864 the inspectors of factories reported that export shirtings weighing eight pounds consisted only of five and a quarter pounds of cotton, whereas they contained two and three quarter pounds of size; another weighing five and a quarter pounds contained two pounds of size; cloths of other descriptions contained as much as fifty per cent of size.¹

The third effect of competition to which attention has already been directed is to reduce wages. At every period of depression not only are workmen thrown out of employment in vast numbers, but the employees that remain are obliged to submit to reduced wages; and the effect of the reduction of wages upon women is sufficiently set forth in a similar report for 1865 in the following words: "Unfortunate females, in consequence of the cotton famine, were at its commencement thrown out of employment, and have thereby become outcasts of society, and now, though trade has revived and work is plentiful, continue members of that unfortunate class and are likely to continue so. There are also in the borough more youthful prostitutes than I have known for the last twenty-five years."² And so it turns out that the great maxim

¹ Report of Inspectors of Factories of 1864, p. 27.

² From a letter of Mr. Harris, Chief Constable of Bolton, in Rep. of Insp. of Fact., Oct. 31, 1865, pp. 61, 62. It is true that, notwithstanding this tendency, prostitution seems to be actually on the decline; but this is doubtless due to the fact that opportunities to women for earning money are largely on the increase. Prostitution is essentially a question of economics. *Vide* book ii. chap. iv. § 2.

of trade, "Buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest," means in a word this,—that the necessity of buying cheap brings all the markets in the world into competition with one another, giving the greatest advantage to those markets in which the lowest wages rule;¹ and that it is upon the workman, therefore, that the burden of competition for the most part falls. Obviously the labourer alone is unable to hold up the rate of wages, in view of the unlimited store of workmen upon which the capitalist can draw; and workingmen would to-day be living on starvation wages were it not for the intelligence with which they have combined for the purpose of holding their own against the capitalist. These combinations of workingmen, however, which are familiar to us under the name of Trade Unions, stand between two fires: in the first place, their efforts to raise wages are limited by foreign competition; that is to say, if the English manufacturer, yielding to the demands of the trade unions, raises wages beyond a certain limit, he will be unable to hold his foreign trade against foreign competitors

¹ It may be objected that the recent success of American goods manufactured at a high rate of wages disproves the truth of this assertion. The objection, however, is not well founded: American experience shows that within certain limits labour can be made more effectual by raising wages. This, however, depends upon the personal equation of every race. It is none the less true that the day the Chinaman is taught American methods, his undoubted superiority on the score of cheapness of living will enable him to manufacture more cheaply than the American. The day this happens—and it is not far distant—shall we allow the American workman to be starved out of existence? Or shall we seek by the adoption of a less wasteful method of production to preserve the American workman from the Yellow Peril? Exclusion of the Chinese will not save the American workman; nor will protection; for Chinese goods will shut out American goods from foreign markets, and it is on foreign markets that the American workman is already beginning to depend. We need a less wasteful system of production. See book ii. chap. i., on Collectivism.

who do not pay equivalent rates for equivalent service; and the inability of the English manufacturer to compete with his foreign competitors in foreign markets means not only his ruin, but the ruin of his working-men. In the second place, the trade union can only operate effectually on the condition of absolute obedience on the part of its members; and to the necessity of this obedience and the results of it, it may be well next to direct our attention.

§ 6. THE PROLETARIAN COMBINATION AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY. — TRADE UNIONS

Trade unions have undoubtedly rendered great service: they have proved the error which underlies the wages fund theory; they have stripped the Malthusian menace of most of its terrors; they have demonstrated that wages can be raised and the condition of the workman vastly improved without diminishing the cost of his work, so much do these improvements increase his efficiency; and, last of all, they have furnished to the workman a school of political experience and self-control which is destined eventually to be of inestimable value to the community. Nevertheless it must be recognised that at every step they have encountered problems that they have failed to solve, and the effect of this failure is of no small importance in demonstrating the radical evils of the competitive system.

Let us consider some of these unsolved problems one by one.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF TRADE UNIONS

(a) Restriction on Trade

First in order comes restriction on trade; such, for example, as apprenticeship and the attempted exclusion of boys and women.

Apprenticeship in the guilds of old not only educated youths for the trade, but also restricted admission to it. This prevented competition amongst workmen by only allowing the number of workmen to be engaged in every craft which the craft could support, and rigidly excluding all the rest. Trade unions, the main object of which is to maintain a standard rate of wages, were confronted by the same problem, and originally adopted the same method. They soon found, however, that in most trades the limitation of entrance to the trade by apprenticeship was impossible; this was mainly due to the fact that membership in trade unions was not compulsory for all persons engaged in the craft, as was membership in the guild. Trade unions have for the most part to depend upon the consent of the workman to belong thereto, and have no power to prevent groups of men engaged in the same trade outside of one trade union from organising separate trade unions of their own. Moreover the intimate relation of markets in different parts of the country which exist under modern conditions makes it indispensable that a trade union, in order to maintain rates of wages, should at least cover the entire district in which competition between workmen can effectually take place; instead, therefore, of being in a position to exclude all but those they choose to admit, they are, on the contrary, driven to every kind of persuasion, and sometimes even compulsion, in order to induce all the workmen in the

trade to belong to the same trade union. When, therefore, the compositors found that men were able to enter the trade in districts outside of their organisation, such as small towns where no organisation could be maintained, they found it necessary to waive their principle of apprenticeship and admit "illegal men" in order to prevent their competition. Engineers, too, found that, owing to the simplicity resulting from improvements in machinery, men could enter the trade without apprenticeship, and they were driven to relax their rules in consequence.

Nevertheless, of the 1,400,000 organised workmen in England, 500,000 belong to trade unions which still insist upon apprenticeship.

It might seem at first sight that the remaining 900,000, because they did not insist upon apprenticeship, could properly be called "open trades;" that is to say, trades in which there was no restriction of membership. But this would be a great mistake: it would be mistaking form for fact; for those who do not limit entries into a trade by a system of apprenticeship restrict it in an equally effective manner by maintaining a high standard of wages; for no employer can afford to pay this high rate of wages to any but the best workmen; and the trade is therefore always recruited from the flower of those who apply for entrance to it. This principle is perfectly in accordance with the principles of the competitive system; but it is injurious to general welfare, for it throws all but the best workmen upon the community and swells the ranks of sweated industries to which reference will be made later. In effect, therefore, the numbers in every trade are almost as severely restricted as those of the ancient guild, with the advantage, however, that while admission to the guild was a matter of favour, admission to a trade union is a matter

of ability. It may seem at first sight that this distinction is an unadulterated improvement; but if we look at the question from the point of view of general welfare, it will be seen to contain an element of serious danger; for whereas under the guild's system some of those excluded were capable of earning their livelihood elsewhere if opportunity to do so presented itself, under the trade-union system the weakest are excluded, and therefore those least able to earn their livelihood elsewhere. Obviously, therefore, this system not only furnishes the material which supplies the sweated trades with cheap labour, but also helps to fill our roads with tramps and our institutions with paupers and criminals.

The repeated attempts made to exclude boys from work which, before the institution of machinery, was performed by men, present another problem that still remains unsolved, nor does it seem capable of solution under the competitive system; for example, in the numerous efforts made by the boot and shoe trade in England to exclude boys, the workmen have been obliged to consent to their being used in "nursery goods;" for the reason that if they endeavoured to prevent it, capitalists engaged in the business would separate into two classes,—those who could profitably employ men, and those who could more profitably, because they only manufactured nursery goods, use boys only; these last would then entirely escape all pressure from the trade unions.

The attempt to exclude women, though for a long time persisted in, has practically failed; in some trades work naturally divides itself into such as can best be done by men, and such as can best be done by women,

as, for example, the cotton trade; in this trade the work requiring most strength is more highly paid and is distributed to men, and the work requiring less strength is paid at a lower rate and distributed to women. But whenever this cannot take place, as in the making of garments, the fact that women are often partially supported from sources other than their own work, and that they do not demand the same standard of living, makes their competition destructive to all collective bargaining, and is largely responsible, therefore, for the so-called sweated industries.

If now we pass to the so-called right to a trade, — that is to say, the claims which shipwrights, for example, have to a certain class of work in the building of ships, and the claims of joiners to some of the same work as that claimed by shipwrights, — we shall see that trade unions are involved in altercations which, as the authors of "Industrial Democracy" say, present an "apparently incomprehensible problem;" and the conflicts which rise from these sources are of no small dimensions. In the industries of the Tyneside from 1890 to 1893, they put one or other of the four most important sections of workmen in the district out of work for thirty-five weeks in the space of thirty-five months. How subtle are the distinctions which these conflicting claims raise may be judged from the fact that, although shipwrights admit that joiners may line with wood all telegraphic connections throughout the upper part of the ship, they deny them the right to do this through cargo spaces, coal bunkers, and the hold; so that "in a job of only a few hours, if a joiner passes this magic line, the whole of the shipwrights will drop their tools." Nor does it seem possible to find any basis upon which the claims of these rival trades can be settled. They cannot be

settled upon the basis of custom, because each party interprets custom in a different way; they cannot be based upon the tools used, for whereas fifty years ago shipwrights were distinguished by the fact that they used the adze and the mallet, and joiners the hammer and the plane, to-day all four tools are used, together with others borrowed from the glazier and cabinet-maker, on the deck of a ship; they cannot be based upon the material used, because shipwrights, joiners, and cabinet-makers all work in wood, shipwrights, boiler-makers, engineers, and plumbers all work in iron. As a matter of fact, they generally resort to distinctions of thickness and size; engineers being allowed to use iron pipes of two and a half inches, and plumbers iron pipe of three inches; joiners being allowed to work in wood of one and a half inches thick, and work in greater thickness of wood being reserved for shipwrights, and so on. These distinctions may seem trivial; but upon them depend the bread of the various trades engaged therein; and unfortunately the arrangements to which these conflicting trades come can never be permanent. The conflicts which have given rise to them all result from the continual change produced by modern improvements; these changes are bound to go on, and every time a change occurs it affects these trades, and the same conflict is likely to recur.

Again, the main object of trade unions is to secure what is called a common rule; that is to say, a universally applied rate of wages for every variety of work in each trade. Their success in obtaining this common rule is in some trades remarkable, as may be seen by glancing over the piecework lists of the cotton industry; but the establishment of the common rule involves the necessity of limiting the work; in other words, in the

place of the freedom with which, under the freedom of contract plan, every workman was entitled to compete with other workmen not only in the amount of wages he was to receive, but in the amount of work he furnished for that wage, it has been found necessary by the trade-union plan, in order to maintain the rate of wages, to limit the amount of work which is to be done for these wages. I think the authors of "Industrial Democracy" have a little undervalued the extent to which this has been found indispensable, although they have been very frank in their admission of it. Some of the rules attributed by them to the folly and perversity of trade unions are worth quoting (pages 304, 305).

The fifth by-law of the Bradford Lodge of the Labourers' Union of 1867 runs as follows: "You are strictly cautioned not to outstep good rules by doing double the work you are required, and causing others to do the same, in order to gain a smile from the master." And the following rule of the Leeds Lodge of the Bricklayers Labourers' Union provides: "Any brother in the Union professing to carry any more than the common number, which is eight bricks, shall be fined one shilling, to be paid within one month, or remain out of the benefit until such fine be paid."

Nor were such rules entirely confined to unskilled labourers. The Manchester Bricklayers' Association was stated in 1869 to have a rule providing that "any man found running or working beyond a regular speed shall be fined 2s. 6d. for the first offence, 5s. for the second, 10s. for the third, and, if still persisting, shall be dealt with as the Committee think proper." The Friendly Society of Operative Stone-masons adopted in 1865 the following rule: "In localities where that most obnoxious and destructive system generally known as 'chasing' is persisted in, lodges should use every

effort to put it down. Not to take less time than that taken by an average mason in the execution of the first portion of each description of work is the practice that should be adopted among us as much as possible; and where it is plainly visible that any member or other individual is striving to overwork or 'chase' his fellow-workmen, thereby acting in a manner calculated to lead to the discharge of members or a reduction of their wages, the party so acting shall be summoned before the lodge, and, if the charge be satisfactorily proved, a fine shall be inflicted."

Our authors admit that one workman can underbid another by offering more work for the same wage as well as by offering a normal amount of work for a lower wage; and if this be the case it is clearly as necessary, they say, to limit the maximum of the work to be furnished as the minimum of the wage to be received. This is done in every trade, for even the piecework trades have found it necessary to limit the hours and to prohibit overtime.

The success of trade unions has not prevented strikes. The published list shows that these continue to a number of from 700 to 800 a year; the Royal Commission of Labour describes the change which has taken place in the character of the strikes in the following words (page 221):—

"When both sides in a trade are strongly organised and in possession of considerable financial resources, a trade conflict, when it does occur, may be on a very large scale, very protracted, and very costly. But just as a modern war between two great European States, costly though it is, seems to represent a higher state of civilisation than the incessant local fights and border raids which occur in times or places where governments

are less strong and centralised, so, on the whole, an occasional great trade conflict, breaking in upon years of peace, seems to be preferable to continual local bickerings, stoppages of work, and petty conflicts."

It may be a comfort to the Royal Commission to think that the "very protracted and very costly" strikes should have been substituted for "local bickerings," but they are none the less the disastrous, wasteful, and plainly necessary result of the competitive system.

(b) *Sweating*

Bad as they are, however, they represent nothing in the shape of continuous human misery which can compare with the so-called sweated parasitic trades. It has been already pointed out that the system which recruits workmen in well-organised trades only from the very best who present themselves for admission to them, throws upon less organised trades a less qualified class; and it has been pointed out that women, by the fact that they have a lower standard of living than men, and are often partially supported by other sources, are more willing to work at low wages than men, present an element of weakness, wherever they are, to the maintenance of a high standard of wages. Now, it is a necessary result of the competitive system that wherever cheap labour can be obtained, a trade will be found to profit by that labour; in other words, because this cheap labour is available for certain trades, competition compels these trades to use this cheapest labour. Mr. Charles Booth bears witness to this in the following passage:—

The facility of obtaining "large supplies of low-paid labour," says Mr. Booth, "may be regarded as the proximate cause of the expansion of some of the

most distinctive manufacturing industries of East and South London,—furniture, boots and shoes, caps, clothing, paper bags, and cardboard boxes, matches, jam, etc. They are found in the neighbourhood of districts largely occupied by unskilled or semi-skilled workmen, or by those whose employment is most discontinuous, since it is chiefly the daughters, wives, and widows of these men who turn to labour of this kind.”¹

The select committee of the House of Lords describes the condition of sweated workmen as follows (I. D. p. 771):—

“Earnings barely sufficient to sustain existence; hours of labour such as to make the lives of the workers periods of almost ceaseless toil, hard and unlovely to the last degree; sanitary conditions injurious to the health of the persons employed and dangerous to the public.”²

In these two quotations we see the cause of the sweating system and its effect. On the one side, a population reduced to such a condition that it cannot exact high wages, attracting to itself on the other side trades that can only live on the condition of low wages, both resulting in misery, sickness, and destitution.

There is a feature about this condition of things to which attention has not been sufficiently called. It has been so much the custom to use sentimental language in order to arouse sympathy for the victims of this system, that we have ceased to give to this language of sentiment the value it deserves; for example, we take it for granted when we read a popular book on the sweating system that there will be a great deal in it about “white

¹ “Life and Labour of the People.” (London) vol. ix. p. 193. Quoted “Industrial Democracy,” p. 757.

² Final report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the sweating system, 1890.

slaves" and "grinding the faces of the poor." We discount this language in advance; it has been used so often that it ceases any longer to reach us. This is a pity, because, as a matter of fact, the condition of sweated workers is not only as bad as that of slaves, but in one respect much worse. A slave-owner has an interest in maintaining the health and vigour of his slaves, and will not, therefore, overwork them. Just as cab-owners in Paris have discovered that it is more profitable to feed up their horses than to overwork them, slave-owners, except in rare cases, have found it profitable to see to the health and even the comfort of their slaves. This motive does not exist with employers of sweated workmen; on the contrary, they are perpetually driven by competition to reduce wages to the lowest figure possible, and are therefore prevented by the necessities of the situation from having any concern for the well-being of their employees, even if they would. It is not a matter of financial importance to them how soon the sweated workers are worn out: there are always plenty of others to take an empty place; they are thus driven to employ no workers but those who are on the verge of starvation and therefore most willing to work at any price; and they are also driven to work these wretches to death because, at the rate of wages that they can afford to pay, the workers can earn only enough to keep alive on the condition of working more hours of the day than any human frame can stand.

This condition of things, upon which I shall not trust myself to enlarge, is not a matter as regards which any individual is responsible. It is the inevitable, necessary, and fatal result of the competitive system; and the well-being secured by a favoured class of workmen through highly organised trade unions tends to increase the sweated population rather than to diminish it.

(c) The Unemployed

Closely connected with the problem of the sweating system, and indeed a necessary part of it, is that of the unemployed, — the final dregs of the population which not even the sweater can usefully employ. As the authors of "Industrial Democracy" admit (page 591), "the doctrine of a living wage does not profess to solve the problem of the unemployed or the unemployable."

To pretend that a community which professes to frame its institutions with a view to justice can sincerely put up with a system that must necessarily result in such misery as this, looks a great deal like hypocrisy. But there is a more serious indictment against the whole trade-union system than this.

The authors of "Industrial Democracy" admit that a point is reached in every trade at which the standard of wages can no longer be raised.

"To put it concretely," they say (page 739), "when- ever the percentage of the unemployed in a particular industry begins to rise from the three to five per cent characteristic of 'good trade,' to the ten, fifteen, or even twenty-five per cent experienced in 'bad trade,' there must be a pause in the operatives' advance movement."

And again (page 450), "The trade unionists, in short, like the majority of English employers, have hitherto stood helpless before the inscrutable ebb and flow of demand, and have accepted as inevitable the corresponding fluctuations of work."

(d) The Limitations of Trade Unions

The ebb and flow of demand is not "inscrutable." It obeys a law as certain as the ebb and flow of the tide.

England is engaged in competing with the whole civilised world as to the cost at which she can produce the goods she manufactures; and as she produces a great deal more goods than her own people have money to buy, she is driven to fight the rest of the world in order to force her goods upon new markets.

"What you want," says a London comic paper, representing John Bull holding up before a Chinaman a garment made by sweated workers, "is something with pockets." Up to the present time and during the last three hundred years the expansion of England has been continuous. To many it has seemed as though her trade merely kept up with her conquests. To a more careful observer it becomes obvious that she is driven to conquest by her trade. I think it cannot be denied that it is only upon the condition of continuous expansion and continuous conquest that trade unions have succeeded in securing the terms they now enjoy. Let that expansion stop, and the trade unions will immediately find themselves confronted by the "inscrutable ebb and flow of demand" which has already bid them pause; but instead of being an ebb and flow as heretofore, the movement will all be in the same direction. Already American factories compete successfully with those of England in many of her most lucrative branches of trade; and in those of which England still keeps control the difference in cost is almost inappreciable. Under these circumstances English trade seems threatened in both directions through diminished markets on the one hand and underbidding on the other. When that time comes, what will become of this vast organisation of trade unions?

But American competition is by no means all that Great Britain has to fear: she is already beaten out of many markets by the Germans and the Japanese; and

it is certain that when the Chinese are driven to learn our arts, as at the cannon's mouth we are now compelling them to do, they will not only manufacture at a lower cost for themselves, but will underbid both England and the United States; for of all the races in the world there is none that can do more work upon less food than the Chinaman. The trade-union system, therefore, is a successful device for improving the condition of the workingman during periods of expanding trade, but the moment contraction sets in, the whole system seems doomed to fall to the ground.

One more point must be briefly referred to here before we leave the unsolved problems of trade unions. It is dealt with more at length in the chapter on Liberty.¹ The guilds were broken up because they constituted exclusive and tyrannical industrial rings. They differed from our present industrial system mainly in the fact that the guild included the whole industrial class, — managers as well as managed, employers as well as employees. This combination maintained prices for both; it kept up high wages for a few workmen at the cost of misery to the mass; and it kept up high prices at the cost of the consumer. This double-headed result was deemed so evil for the community that guilds came to an end, by legislation in France, by wholesome competition in England. Since their disappearance the industrial world has slowly gone round the same weary cycle that marks the movement of man in other fields. The destruction of the guilds opened the era of freedom of contract, or in other words it gave free rein to the competitive system. Labour was driven in self-protection to organise trade unions, for the purpose of raising wages; capital was driven by

¹ See book i. chap. v.

these labour organisations to protect itself in similar associations to keep wages down. But to-day we find these two hostile ranks coming together again in Birmingham in so-called "alliances" which reproduce the essential feature of the guild. Employer and employee are reunited to maintain wages for the few at the expense of the many, and to keep up prices for the benefit of a handful of employers at the expense of the consumer; that is to say, of all the rest. Are we to move round this dreary treadmill for ever?

And so we remain the dupes of selfishness. Christ sought to rescue us from it, but the Church He instituted to do this was submerged in the cesspool of the decaying Roman Empire. Mohammed began a new effort against it, but was himself and all his followers betrayed into a career of conquest; the lofty ideals of chivalry were dragged down by it into the *cours d'amour*; the Crusades lapsed into commercialism, and while commercialism rescued us from the avarice of the crown, it delivered us over to the tyranny of the guild; and in our effort to escape from the guild we have swept around the circle of every form of tyranny till we have got back to the guild again in the guise of a Birmingham alliance. We are like a log in a whirlpool: a fortunate accident may at any time throw it out of the whirl; but, on the other hand, it may remain there until it is ground to powder. And yet over and over again, as it rises to the surface and sweeps slowly around the outer curve, the lightest touch would throw it out of the whirl into the placid stream beyond. But there is no one to give it this slight touch at the right time. Now, the effort necessary at these moments to escape from the centripetal force — this effort of which the log is incapable, — is exactly the effort of which man is capable,

and a high capacity for which distinguishes him from all the lower animals. We have seen with what dreary monotony man has swept round and round the vicious circle, — a monotony that is relieved only when, drawn towards the centre, he has been sucked down among the rocks below; we have seen that we are still sweeping slowly around the outer curve. The question for us is whether we shall make the effort necessary, by resisting selfishness, to emerge upon the placid stream towards improvement; or, because our movement is still slow and to appearances innocent, we fail to make this effort, closing our eyes to the sucking vortex which remains close to us, and towards which we are by selfishness being drawn. We are moving slowly now; we may move faster by and by.

§ 7. THE SOCIAL RESULTS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

From the foregoing statement of the working of industrialism it seems to be difficult to decide that it is in any sense of the word less immoral than war; indeed, it is in many respects far more immoral; for in war there is little pretence at virtue, whereas commerce glows with hypocrisy.

Such, indeed, is the inconsistency of man that war is generally opened with prayer and the language of Israel borrowed by each warring power to put the Almighty on his side. But few reasoning creatures are deceived by this device, and the better part of the public mind is gradually revolting more and more at the obvious cruelty of bloodshed. Unfortunately the cruelty of industrialism, being less obvious, has not yet reached the moral sense of the community; not because it is in itself less revolting, but because the criminality

of it has not been made clear. Political economists have dwelt so fondly on the laws which automatically govern the relation of supply to demand that people have not yet become alive to the fact that the operation of these automatic laws is in its effect identical with the predatory law of nature. In both the law of competition is allowed to operate regardless of cost in life and happiness; in both the majority suffer for the benefit of a few. The scheme of Nature, however, differs from that of man in the important fact that, whereas the one results in benefit for the race, the latter tends towards its degeneration; and whereas the one conceals its victims in a common grave, the other rescues them, as it were, from the brink of the grave in order to prolong their wretched existence, perpetuate the type, and flood the almshouses, the lunatic asylum, and the State prison. The contrast between Nature's plan and ours has been already sufficiently drawn; there is, however, one point in connection with the result of industrialism to which too careful attention cannot be given, for there is, I think, a widespread error regarding it.

It is commonly believed, and indeed it is constantly preached, that if every man did his duty according to the gospel of Christ, there would be neither pauperism nor crime; and in connection with the doctrine it is frequently maintained that increase of human happiness does not depend on reform of political or social institutions, but rather on the universal practice of charity and sacrifice.

Now, I think there are bound together in this view a great truth and a great error: doubtless if all men were perfect there would be no poor; but in that case neither would there be a competitive system; so that although perfection of character would doubtless result in the disappearance of pauperism, a necessary phase through

which the process of perfection would take place must be the slow but entire demolition of the competitive system. Now, the question whether perfection of character can precede the destruction of the competitive system, or whether, on the contrary, the destruction of the competitive system must precede perfection of character, must be kept for a subsequent chapter; suffice it here to point out, that so long as the competitive system exists, pauperism must exist, and so long as pauperism exists, crime must exist; for pauperism is the hot-bed of crime.

Quite apart, then, from all religious discussion of this question, it is above all important that we should note and remember that industrialism not only does result in pauperism, but that it *must* do so.

And if we want to be sure whether this statement be true or not, we must be careful to satisfy ourselves that we know just what pauperism is. To the consideration of this question it may be well next to direct our attention.

(a) *Poverty*

Human life is supported by the consumption of other lives, — animal and vegetable. The living things fitted for our food are for ever streaming to our markets, there to be distributed, devoured, and digested. In this process there is a twofold production of waste which results from those parts of animal and vegetable life that are either unfit for food or have become so during the process of distribution; the part which is not eaten is called garbage; the other part results from the process of digestion; that is to say, that which after digestion is excreted; this part is called sewage. The problem of how to dispose of these two waste products has not yet been satisfactorily solved; for although we are rapidly adopting sanitary measures for disposing of them in

such a way as not to breed disease, there is one element in the problem which can hardly be said to have been seriously attacked; for all animal and vegetable life draws from the soil certain mineral products, such as phosphorus, potash, and nitrates, which are not restored to it under our system. Under natural conditions they *are* restored to it, owing to the fact that lower animals, not being congregated by millions as human beings are, deposit their excreta at large, thereby returning to the soil the mineral products which animals assimilate only in microscopic proportions, and the decay attending which, if in sufficiently small quantities, the soil is sufficiently antiseptic to take care of. When, however, this waste is accumulated in such vast quantities as in our larger cities,¹ it not only tends to breed disease, but, if not returned to the land, represents a perpetual drain of its most valuable ingredients. In New York State, for example, may be witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of a soil daily robbed of its essential elements; these essential elements hurried by human industry to the sea, and restored in part to the land through the importation of guano from South America, where the excreta of birds are quarried and transported over thousands of miles by water and by land under a system which combines incomparable cost with lamentable prodigality.

This treatment of the waste that results from food products seems to betray a singular lack of intelligence, but it does not compare in this respect with the folly and cruelty with which we treat the waste of population.

For just as the animal and vegetable life which is fit for human consumption moves from the country to the town, so the human lives that are fit for industrial con-

¹ The garbage of New York City is nearly three thousand tons a day; the sewage escaping through the sewers it is impossible to measure.

sumption move from the country to the town, under the impulse of laws as certain as the law of gravitation. Every farmer in New York State who, toiling with his hands, has to pay high rent for a few acres, is brought by steam into competition with industrial institutions in the prairies of the West, where steam replaces hand labour and where far lower prices are proportionally paid for rent and transportation. Thus New York land becomes less and less able to yield profit and at last will not even yield a living to an increasing population; the increase then must seek a living elsewhere; it hesitates to travel West where steam has replaced human labour; and so the hope of a living wage draws them inevitably to the town. Moreover, the town needs them and silently beckons to them; for experience shows that it is not the countryman who swells the ranks of the city poor; it takes several generations to convert a healthy countryman into a pauper; and as this process of conversion goes on, the pauper's place has to be filled up from the healthy population out of town. Again, experience shows that one-fifth of the entire population ends its existence in the poorhouse or the penitentiary. So here we have the picture complete: the flow of the healthy country population to the urban mill; and from the urban mill the flow of a pauper population to a pauper grave.

The fact is, that the urban mill devours and digests the country product just as the human stomach does; and just as sewage and garbage are the waste of food, so the pauper and the criminal are the waste of population.

To expect the industrial mill to grind and not produce paupers would be as inconsistent as to expect a threshing-machine to thresh and not produce chaff. The admitted purpose of the industrial mill is by the application of the principle of competition to use the

material that comes to it, sifting out that which it cannot or can no longer use. But the evil of the system is that it does not merely use the material: it uses the material up; in the human mill there is little or no chaff in what comes to the mill; the chaff is created in the milling. Competition brings good material to the mill; and the mill turns out bad material; it is competition that makes the good material bad. And as the mill must work, it for ever asks for more population, and is for ever converting that population into waste.

This is the process which is going on before our eyes; it is the process with which we have become familiar in the realm of nature, and which under human conditions is expressed in the words, "every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." If only the devil did take the hindmost! but the devil does not take him; the devil leaves him for us to wring our hands over.

It has been already intimated that our treatment of the waste of population is even more unintelligent than our treatment of the waste of food; and indeed, although we allow the latter to carry off to sea the most precious ingredients of our soil, we do at any rate get rid of its corruption for the most part; but the former — this waste of population which consists of men and women like ourselves — we collect in vast reservoirs which we call institutions, and which, because they never can be large enough permanently to hold the ever-increasing accumulations of urban waste, are for ever overflowing and pouring back upon our already teeming cities the poison that for the most part leaves its prison more poisonous than before.

(b) *Militarism*

It is difficult to say in what the industrial type is an improvement upon the military: militarism at any rate

does promote courage and sincerity; or, to put it more carefully, there is nothing in a soldier's life essentially inconsistent with courage and with truth; whereas trade tends to conduct its wars by declarations of peace and do its iniquities under the sanction of law. It manufactures paupers with protestations of hypocrisy, and, while withholding sufficient wages with one hand, offers insufficient charity with the other.

And all of us, good and bad, are victims of this system, — not only those who themselves suffer in hunger and in want, but those who suffer for the hunger and want of others. We are as helpless as they: if we strive to help them, they vindictively refuse our offer, or if they accept it, do so without gratitude or thanks; and they are not altogether wrong, for we are all partners in the system that drags them down.

Nor is it possible to contend that war is more cruel than industrialism: the bodies of the dead that strew a battlefield are out of pain; but what shall be said of the bodies of those who struggle in daily misery against the crushing tyranny of the Market; or of those that are reduced to the silence and discipline of the almshouse; or of those who with no hope of better things expiate their offences in the penitentiary?

But the industrial system has its battlefields as well as war; witness the report of the British Governor-General, "The bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India."

Nor can it be any longer disputed that not only is industrialism a war under cover, but it inevitably leads to war in the open. If we have not been driven by it to war in the United States, it is because we have heretofore enjoyed a sufficient market for our manufactures in the Western States; in England, however, where the industrial system has reached its most perfect develop-

ment, production outstrips purchasing power so rapidly that it is only by conquest that she can keep her factories open, and we therefore find Great Britain driven by an irresistible force to the conquest and colonisation of all those parts of the world where she can force her goods on the people or edge the people out. But although we have not as yet been driven by over-production to war, the day has at last come when the same conditions which have driven England to aggression are urging us also. Mr. John R. Proctor writes: "Mulhall estimates that the United States possess almost as much energy in foot tons as Great Britain, France, and Germany combined. *Already our capacity for production, both in agricultural and manufactured products, far exceeds our capacity for consumption, so that we must seek foreign markets for the disposition of our increasing supplies.*"¹ And in a subsequent article he argues in favour of retaining the Philippines and uniting with England to resist Russia in order to protect our trade. Indeed, it is this question of trade that is at the bottom of the present demand for imperialism, the money-maker dangling the rag of glory to set the soldier in movement and inflaming the hearts of the people with an interested cry of patriotism. This must not be understood as a denunciation of expansion, of the retention of the Philippines, or of a defensive and if need be offensive alliance with England. So long as we are part of the competitive system, we may have to fight or go under. What is criticised is not the policy of expansion, but the competitive system, which makes this expansion necessary.

Nor is it intended as a reproach; in many respects, as

¹ "Forum," September, 1897, — Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World. See also another article in the "Forum" for September, 1898, entitled, "Isolation or Imperialism."

has been already intimated, Anglo-Saxon aggression brings blessings of prosperity to a heretofore oppressed people. Nor, again, is the disparagement of the industrial system intended as a disparagement of those engaged in it; on the contrary, the most careful effort has been made to point out that all of us, good and bad, are victims of the system. We can no more resist it than we can resist the force of gravitation; for like gravitation it does not suggest resistance, but docility. All gravitation asks is that we should refrain from ignoring it; but, alas! while gravitation hurts no one save those who refuse to comply with her laws, industrialism holds a few harmless only on the condition of keeping the majority in a torment of anxiety and consigning a fifth to a disgraceful death.

(c) Corruption

In no respect does the competitive system work more detriment to the community than in its influence on politics; for a very little consideration will suffice to show that under existing conditions political corruption must result from it.

It has been sufficiently demonstrated that what with the competition between employers on the one hand, and what with the high rate of wages maintained by trade unions on the other, profits derivable from normal industries are reduced to such a degree as to make these industries unattractive. Even when they are run on a sufficiently large scale to make small profits result in a large income for the employer, they are exposed to unavoidable risks; witness the effect of the competition of Southern mills upon the New England cotton industry, owing to the more profitable conditions under which the former can manufacture,—conditions which have only developed within the last few years.

For this reason astute men avoid ordinary channels of industry where competition is allowed free scope. They seek the larger profits which can be secured only from some form of monopoly; they resort to different expedients to this end. Patents constitute a monopoly in which some fortunes are made; manufacturers create what are called proprietary articles by extensive advertisements, whereby they induce the public to believe that the article manufactured by them under a name made familiar by being posted on all our wall spaces and our most picturesque views is superior to all other articles of the same character. The latest device to which money-makers have resorted in order to escape from competition is the combination of all factories engaged in the same industry in so-called trusts, thereby creating a capital so large that they can crush out any person venturing to enter into the trade and can thus remain in a condition to maintain prices. These trusts and the Birmingham alliance already explained are each in their respective lines a demonstration of the folly of the so-called free-contract theory; for they show how the necessary tendency of freedom of contract is to lead to combination for the purpose of making this very freedom impossible.

But the principal agency through which men contrive to escape the pressure of competition is the agency of government. This agency is appealed to by manufacturers for protection in order to cut down competition from abroad; for bounties in order to "foster infant industries" at home and for government concessions of all sorts, — concessions for railroads, gas companies, water companies, tramways, and the like.

Not that protection and bounties are in themselves bad; there has been considerable reaction of late amongst our authorities on political economy against

the ultra free-trade doctrine of Cobden and of Bright. It seems to be admitted to-day that if our government were in the hands of an all-wise and all-powerful Deity, interested only in the public weal, such a Deity would find it wise to fight the tariff and bounty legislations of other countries by tariff and bounty legislations of our own. But whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the degree to which the protection and bounty system may be economically wise, there is no difference of opinion as to the fact that they are both deplorable in their effects, not only upon the government that grants them, but upon those who seek their aid. In other words, the measures through which bounty and protection are obtained, and through which they are granted, necessarily tend to become measures of corruption.

The same is true of all franchises and concessions granted by the government to private enterprise. And the still more deplorable fact connected with this alliance between business and politics is that it not only corrupts legislators, manufacturers, and all persons engaged in securing franchises, but it also spreads corruption throughout the people. Never was a more profound mistake uttered than in the words that the people is incorruptible. It was when the Roman people became corrupt that the Roman Empire fell. The evils of political corruption from which we suffer in the United States to-day would not last a week if they did not include the people or what is equivalent in practice, that part of the people that controls the political machine. The story of how this happens has lately been picturesquely told by Mr. John Jay Chapman in the "Atlantic Monthly." I shall therefore refer to it here only with the utmost brevity.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the politics

of New York State are practically run by the New York Central Railroad, with the assistance of all the other corporations which have interest in controlling the sources of their supplies and the machinery of their taxation. Chicago has long been in the hands of those who own its tramways; a similar ring, which owns the tramways and the waterworks of Philadelphia, has long controlled its city politics, and Greater New York has lately passed under a similar control through the alliance of the Metropolitan Traction Company with Tammany Hall.

With these facts we have long been familiar, but there is an element connected with these facts and underlying them of which we are not all of us aware; and this fact is that the reason why reform movements so often fail, and even when they succeed do not result in permanent improvement, is that they always run up at last against some private interest. In the campaign of 1897 in New York the Citizens' Union which represented the reform element adopted a platform which included the ownership by the city of its own franchises. While this campaign was in progress it was discovered that opportunity had arisen which permitted the city to repurchase one of the franchises which had been granted many years ago for an insufficient consideration. Proceedings in court were instituted to this end; and the Citizens' Union was amazed there to find the most distinguished reformers in New York City appear as counsel for the defendant company, thereby opposing the movement fathered by the very reform organisation of which these distinguished counsel were supposed to be the principal props. When asked how they reconciled their attitude as counsel, they answered that litigation was business, not politics.

In another case, a young man, fired with indignation at the villainy which was daily practised in the field of municipal politics, secured large subscriptions from his personal friends with a view to conducting a vigorous campaign against it. After the fund was raised, he discovered that the ring he had to fight drew all its resources from a gas company; he found a flaw in the franchise of the gas company, and instituted an attack upon it. The shares of the gas company went down three points. This fall of three points deluged him with letters from those who had subscribed to his political fund, protesting that while they were with him in his fight against bad politics, he must not ruin them by attacking the gas company in which they had shares. "Some distinction," said they, "must be made between business and politics."

Unfortunately there is no difference between them. It is business interests which make bad politics; and so long as under the competitive system business continues to make bad politics, so long our politics will be bad, and nothing can permanently make them otherwise. This fact received an interesting illustration in the fate of the City Club. Organised in New York in 1892, it was composed for the most part of the richest and most distinguished men in the city. Its purpose was to secure good municipal government. It was started by a group of men comparatively young, as to whose sincerity of purpose no one has ever entertained a doubt. This little group, with pathetic unconsciousness of the conditions which were destined to make all their efforts fruitless, formulated plan after plan for beginning the attack on the enemy. For some inscrutable reason none of these plans was ever approved by the Board of Trustees; none of them ever came before the Club; and when at last a Republican

legislature sent down the Lexow Committee to investigate the city departments, the City Club, though possessed of convincing testimony of the corruption of the police department, collected by some of its members for its use, refused to bring this evidence before the Committee of Investigation. Fortunately, outside the Club, Dr. Parkhurst had used his pulpit as a political rostrum from which to hurl attack after attack against Tammany Hall; meeting after meeting was organised in order to extend the scope of his work beyond the limits of his congregation; and when the time came for action, — that is to say, when the Lexow Committee of Investigation appeared in New York, — the work which the City Club was constituted to do, and was specially prepared to do, was abandoned by the Club, and taken up by Dr. Parkhurst, who, single-handed, accomplished what the City Club had not dared to undertake.

Unfortunately the kind of popular enthusiasm which can be roused by such preaching as that of Dr. Parkhurst turns out not to be one upon which a political organisation can easily be built or a political programme systematically worked out; for the moment that anything like a permanent organisation is attempted, the distinguished men who naturally present themselves to the minds of the people as best fitted to lead the movement, and who are willing enough to undertake the leadership, turn out to be the very men who are counted upon for protection by those most responsible for the evil. Let every man who doubts this take pencil in hand and undertake to draw up a list of the names of men who in his opinion are best calculated to create confidence in the minds of the community to which he belongs, and therefore best fitted to be put upon a reform committee; if he is familiar with the

business conditions of his city he will know as soon as his list is made up that nine men out of every ten on that list are committed by some connection or some business interest, whether as counsel or shareholder, to an extent which makes sincere co-operation in the reform movement difficult if not impossible.

The reformer is thus left between two alternatives ; if he makes up his committee of men sufficiently well known to attract the confidence of the community, they will be men upon whose sincerity he cannot count ; if, on the other hand, he endeavours to secure men upon whose sincerity he can count, it will be because they are not rich enough or distinguished enough to have any weight with the community. It is between these two alternatives that the reformer who dreams of permanent¹ reform organisation under existing industrial conditions stands paralysed.

But it must not be imagined that the corruption caused by business interests is confined to the wealthy and the distinguished : it extends throughout the entire community, from the retail trader to the owner of a

¹ Importance is attached to the word "permanent." The splendid work done by many municipalities in England and Europe may be cited to show that the argument in these pages is not well founded. An attempt to enter into the reasons why the better element obtains control of government at sundry times and places would involve considerable digression from the main issue. It has been already explained that when engaged in showing the evil action of our economico-social system, it is not necessary at every step to show that, notwithstanding this evil action, there are good impulses also at work. In the United States the evil prevails ; this argument is an effort to show why it prevails. If we had in the United States an aristocracy, pledged by the principle *noblesse oblige*, to counteract this evil, we might have less municipal corruption ; but we should then be exposed to the aristocratic evil ; and government run hypocritically in the interests of an aristocracy of culture may be as bad as government run openly in the interests of Tammany Hall. The attempt made in these pages is to show that there is a *tendency* towards corruption inherent in the competitive system. It does not attempt to show that it can never be counteracted.

peanut stand ; for every law which is enacted, whether good or bad, with a view of maintaining order, health, and safety in the community, can be turned by an unscrupulous political organisation into an instrument for exacting blackmail or compelling political support ; and the opportunities for accomplishing this are so numerous that it would be impossible to exhaust them. A few illustrations must suffice to show the extent to which they reach.

New York City has been defectively constructed in the absence of back alleys, so that there is no way of delivering goods from the wagon to the store except over the sidewalk ; it is difficult, therefore, to deliver goods of any size without occasionally obstructing the sidewalk. Now, the city ordinances prohibit this. There are only two ways, therefore, in which a storekeeper can, notwithstanding this ordinance, conduct his business : one is by corruption, and the other is by joining the political organisation which is in control of the city. One of the minor political organisations which has figured constantly during the last few years in New York was organised by the abuse of this city ordinance ; the leader of the organisation was appointed corporation attorney, the corporation attorney being the officer whose specific duty it was to see to the execution of this ordinance. The system he adopted was as follows : The citizen who obstructed the sidewalk was sued ; when he came to court to answer the summons the case was adjourned. Every time he came to court the case was adjourned ; the first time he failed to appear, he was heavily fined. He was then summoned once more for a new offence ; again the case was adjourned every time he appeared, and resulted in a fine when he failed to do so. This process was continued until the storekeeper either subscribed to the corruption fund or

joined the "organisation." In this manner nearly all city ordinances can be used for the purpose of securing political support; the ordinance, for example, prohibiting push-carts from remaining standing in the street, is regularly employed by district leaders to secure the political support of all the men who use push-carts; the same system is adopted as has been described; the push-cart man is arrested and brought to court, where he finds himself between the prosecuting officer and the district leader. If he joins the organisation, the case is dismissed; if he does not, he is fined, whether guilty or not guilty, the whole court being sometimes party to the conspiracy.

The building laws formed for the purpose of securing the safety and sanitation of our buildings are continually used in the same way. Under this law every builder has to submit plans of buildings and alterations of buildings to the building department; if he belongs to the organisation, his plans are passed promptly; if he does not belong to the organisation, his plans are delayed in a manner to make the conduct of business difficult if not impossible. Owners of buildings are subjected to the same kind of persecution; health inspectors are instructed to compel alterations whether they are exacted by the law or not; with the consequence that the property-owner generally finds it cheaper to contribute to the corruption fund or join the organisation than to enter into litigation with the health department on the question raised. It should be pointed out that it is not the men who violate the law alone who are subjected to this political pressure; on the contrary, builders and property-owners who comply with the law are the very ones most marked for persecution. It does not cost a political organisation which is in control of the city anything to litigate; litigation

is paid for by the city ; but it costs a citizen more than he can spare, in time as well as money, to fight an organisation which is better equipped at every point for such a fight than he.

The control of the liquor department has, however, probably been the most potent of all the devices by which political organisations have controlled votes. The liquor saloon has been called the poor man's club, and is such in effect. The influence of the liquor saloon, therefore, in politics is incalculable. Sunday is the most profitable day in the week for the transaction of liquor business, and upon the permission clandestinely to keep open on Sunday depends the prosperity of every liquor-dealer. Not only does this permission secure to the organisation the support of the liquor-dealer, but his saloon becomes a centre of political propaganda. It is without doubt the old affiliation between Tammany Hall and the liquor-dealers which constitutes its particular political strength.

Perhaps one of the worst features of this system is that it involves the corruption of the police, — that is to say, of the very men upon whom the order of the community practically depends ; and the corruption of the police is not confined to misdemeanours, but sometimes extends to crime. It is well known that every house of prostitution in New York remains open only under the protection of the police ; and on numerous occasions it has become clear that the police have an understanding with receivers of stolen goods. Whether, under these circumstances, person or property can long be deemed safe is a question which every citizen has to think out seriously for himself.

§ 8. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CHURCH

There occasionally arises in England an opposition to the relation which exists there between the government and the established Church. Doubtless the evils which attend a state-endowed church are great; but it is submitted that those which attend a church subjected to the pressure of the competitive system are just as great, if not greater. And here we have an illustration of the fact that the competitive system keeps us for ever between two equally unfortunate alternatives; it is the source of practically all our unsolved and unsolvable political problems. Indeed, it is for this reason that the time seems to have come for us to decide whether or not it is worth while attempting to solve problems that are insoluble, if it is true that the competitive system keeps them so; or whether the only alternative left to us is not at once to study how, if at all, this root of all our political evils can be attacked.

We have seen the system of unendowed churches at work in the United States now sufficiently long to permit of our coming to some conclusions about it; let us consider for a moment what these conclusions are.

A church cannot under existing conditions live without money; if unendowed, the main source upon which it has to depend for this money is its parishioners; but every church has much to gain or lose from its relations with the government. It can secure grants of land from the government, as the Roman Catholic Church did the land upon which was built its cathedral in New York and the adjacent asylums; it can secure freedom from taxation; it can secure per capita contributions for its institutions, and chapels in the institutions of the State.

Every church, therefore, has, in order to succeed, to

propitiate three personalities, — that of the congregation, that of the municipality, and that of the State. It can live only on the condition of propitiating the first of them, and it can hardly prosper without winning over all three.

The Church, therefore, instead of directing, is itself directed; instead of denouncing evil, it has to propitiate it, and, although its mission is to preach virtue, it is sometimes sorely tempted to practise iniquity.

An illustration will serve to show the working of this system. The government from which the Roman Catholic Church secured the land above mentioned was the most avowedly corrupt government the country had ever seen: it was the government of which its chief, Tweed, said, "We have our hands deep in the pockets of the people, and we mean to take them out full;" and when asked what the people would say to this, answered, "What are you going to do about it?" Was the Church for this reason to refuse to accept a gift of land from Mr. Tweed? Many would answer: Clearly not. It was the robber barons who built most of the cathedrals of Europe. It is a part of the scheme of Nature — and the most beneficent part of it — that out of evil often comes good. Pious people profit by this principle when they can; build temples out of the spoils of war, and cathedrals out of the plunder of Tammany Hall. Unfortunately, however, if good sometimes springs from evil, evil has a way of returning the compliment; for the dignitaries of the Church have doubtless experienced some embarrassment when they found themselves under the duty to preach the gospel to a congregation the most prominent members of which were the very men who, after having endowed the Church, were engaged in reimbursing their endowments from the pockets of the people.

And it is not easy to say what course the Church could in such a case successfully adopt. She has seldom since the fifteenth century interfered in politics without discomfiture. Even in the most bigoted of all the nations of the world, when the Pope put an interdict on Segovia, Avila, and the other cities which were defending their privileges against Charles V., the interdict was contemptuously disregarded, and Charles V. himself entreated the Pope to remove it; and only a few years ago in Ireland, the last refuge of Romanism amongst English-speaking countries, the voice of the Pope exhorting submission was disregarded with scorn. If the Church, even when endowed and independent, has to follow rather than lead the political intrigues of her devotees, what shall be said of the Church which is neither endowed nor independent?

Nor are these insurmountable difficulties peculiar to the Roman Church: they present themselves not only to all the churches, but to all our charitable societies, and have dictated the clause in their statutes that forbids their interfering in matters political. This clause of tolerance, while necessary to their existence, represents the attitude of the best citizen towards his government; it is an attitude of tolerance; and the tolerance is unfortunately a tolerance of evil: not a tolerance of good. It is the kind of tolerance which makes the President of the Society for the Protection of Children openly vote for Tammany Hall because it subscribes \$30,000 a year to his charity; it is the kind of tolerance that regards it as wiser to co-operate with bad government than resist it; it is a kind of tolerance, in a word, which is responsible for the misgovernment under which we groan.

§ 9. CONCLUSION

Whether, therefore, we look at the effect of industrialism upon our social conditions, upon our foreign relations, or upon our internal administration, we find it everywhere necessarily resulting in evil. Its natural and necessary fruits are pauperism, misgovernment, and war.

Such is the machinery which man has invented for the administration of justice in the world; for securing, as Herbert Spencer puts it, that the "superior shall have the good of his superiority and the inferior the evil of his inferiority,"¹ regardless of the fact that this is the very scheme through which Nature has brought the injustice into the world which man has undertaken, in so far as in him lies, to resist and overcome.

Any scheme which secures "to the superior the good of his superiority, and to the inferior the evil of his inferiority," is built upon selfishness; and this book has been written in vain if it has not demonstrated that selfishness can bring happiness neither to those who are themselves selfish nor to those who are the victims of selfishness, but that selfishness must bring misery on man and lead to his degeneration.

The conclusion which it has been sought to draw from this aspect of human history and particularly from that part of it which pertains to industry and commerce, is not only that our existing institutions do work injustice, but that they *must* do so; and that whether we be angels of light or instruments of the devil, we are all alike consciously or unconsciously partners in the human misery which inevitably results from them.

Commercialism is a Moloch which has almost without resistance obtained ascendancy over us. To this un-

¹ Principles of Sociology, p. 567.

clean god, with equal indifference, we hourly sacrifice guilty men and innocent children; and of the cruelty this cult involves we are essential factors; for it is a part of the competitive scheme that all of us — even those who have the tenderest hearts — should, innocently and unconsciously, in silent submission to its laws, be strangling one another.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESULT OF INDIVIDUALISM.—THE
SO-CALLED SOCIAL MIND

IN the first volume the attempt has been made to contrast the selection which takes place in nature with the selection that takes place under the artificial conditions created by man. Herbert Spencer and his school assume that the selection that takes place in nature is still taking place, and must continue to take place in the evolution of man. The result of our inquiry has been to show that not only is the process of human development very different from the process that preceded man, but that it is in many respects diametrically opposed to it.

In the course of the inquiry it became necessary to dwell at some length upon the cruelty of Nature's plan, under which millions perished in order that the few most favoured by the environment survive; and to point out that the more or less unconscious object of human institutions is to put an end, in so far as we can, to the cruelty of Nature. And from this point of view it was concluded that justice, regarded objectively, consisted in the effort of humanity to repair the inequality of Nature, and particularly in the effort of man to create conditions which will make the community prosper for the benefit of the individual rather than at his expense. In this connection it was shown that the artificial plan created by man for the benefit of the individual is diametrically opposed to the natural plan which, on the

contrary, sacrificed the individual to the community, in such communities as those of ants and bees.

After having endeavoured to lay down as nearly as possible in what respects man was at liberty to improve his condition in his conflict with Nature, and, on the other hand, to what extent man was powerless to improve his condition in his conflict with Nature, we next directed our attention to a short study of the history of human effort; with the view of determining, if possible, how far the efforts of man in his conflict with Nature had affected the human machine; with the view of coming to some conclusion as to which of his efforts had been well directed, and which, on the contrary, had tended towards evil.

Throughout the history of man we are struck by the fact that he has been, at different periods, actuated by different motives. Most of the time the predominating motive has been the natural motive of selfishness; but occasionally the dominating motive has been a non-natural motive, which, for the lack of a better name, we must call "religion;" and although we find that the institutions which have been brought into existence by the religious spirit have been for the most part captured by craft in the interests of selfishness, we have nevertheless recognised that at all times and in all places there has remained some spark of the non-natural or religious motive, ready upon any favourable change of conditions to burst into a flame.

No attempt has been made to explain this non-natural motive; on the contrary, it has been treated simply as one of the facts which no political student can afford to disregard in his study of social forces. Nor have we been seduced by religious bias into believing that this non-natural religious force has always acted in a direction favourable to social progress; on the con-

trary, we have had to admit that it often added another motive to the natural selfish motive for war, and that in many times and in many places it served to prevent the development of the family into the tribe, and the tribe into the State. Nevertheless, we had to recognise that it was the force best capable of concentrating human effort so as to rescue it from the distracting consequences of selfishness; and that when so acting it was a power of irresistible strength. On the other hand, we have had also to admit that so far the fate of every religion has been at last to become the instrument of the very selfishness it started to destroy.

Having, then, on the one side endeavoured to make clear what was the natural environment, the favourable elements of which man has undertaken to use in order to overcome those elements in it which are not favourable to him, and, on the other hand, endeavoured to show some of the actual phases through which man has passed in the struggle, it now becomes our business to endeavour to come to some conclusion as to what is the constitution of man himself, and how far this constitution is fitted to carry on the struggle in the future; all these inquiries being preliminary to the last and greatest inquiry of all, — namely, what are the conditions which, taking into consideration, on the one hand, the forces of nature that are friendly to man, and the forces of nature that are hostile to man, and taking into consideration the constitution of man on the other, will tend most to help man to use the friendly forces in order to subdue those that are hostile.

The human constitution in its relation to society may be given the specific term of the social mind. I understand the words "social mind" to include all that part of the human constitution which, when developed, fits man for social life, and, when imperfectly developed, unfits

man for it.¹ Thus in such tribes as those of the Arabs — prior to the Hegira — the social mind was intensely individualistic, and therefore unfitted for social life; whereas that of our great Western nations, on the contrary, has become less individualistic, and therefore more fitted to social life. It will be found, on making a study of the social mind, that it is an extremely complicated thing; for the words "social mind" must be deemed to include not only mind, but temperament also, and character. In other words, the social mind is not confined to the intelligence of man, but also to his emotions; not only to his reason, but to his instincts, his passions, and his capacity of self-control.

In order thoroughly to understand the constitution of the social mind, we have to study it from three different points of view: —

In the first place, we have to study its development in lower animals, under the influence of a purely natural environment.

In the second place, we have to study its development in man under the influence of an artificial human environment.

And in the third place, we have to study its structure through physiology, psychology, and pathology; that is to say, through the actual structure of the brain, through its operation under normal conditions, and through its operation under abnormal conditions.

The evolution of the mind in a purely natural environment, and the development of the mind under the influence of an artificial or human environment, has already been studied in some detail. For the purpose of this chapter, therefore, we shall only have to recapit-

¹ Some sociologists use the words "social mind" to mean the mind of the social organism taken as a whole. This is *not* the sense in which the words are used in this book.

ulate the conclusions to which we have already come under these two heads, filling in, however, a few important details. The study of the social mind by actual analysis — that is to say, by the help of physiology, psychology, and pathology — has been only slightly attempted in previous pages; nor will it be attempted in any great detail here. We should lose the thread of the argument were we to attempt to deal with these questions at length; we shall, however, adopt on this subject, as on previous subjects, the policy of avoiding matters of controversy and proceeding to the utmost possible along lines of admitted fact.

We shall, then, in its natural order, begin by recapitulating the conclusions to which we have already come, regarding the social mind in the lower animals.

§ 1. SOCIAL MIND IN THE LOWER ANIMALS

Natural selection primarily creates two types, — the hunter, which is fierce, and the more fierce he is the more he tends to be solitary; and the hunted, which is timid and tends to herd. The two extremes of these two types are to be found in the purely pursuing and butchering machine, with which we are familiar in the lion and tiger, and the purely fleeing machine, with which we are familiar in the hare.

Midway between these two extreme types, however, is to be found the large majority of the animal kingdom, which tends by co-operation to make up for lack of fitness, whether fitness to hunt or fitness to escape. For example, we find wolves driven by cold to hunt in packs, in order by co-operation to pull down quarry which individually they would be unable to subdue; and we find horses congregate in herds for the purpose of jointly defending their young against carnivora, to which other-

wise the young must fall a prey. The principle of co-operation is found in nature in almost every conceivable degree, from the purely temporary combination of wolves in packs to the permanent community of ants already described.

What is the character of the force which brings together animals for the purpose of co-operation and mutual defence, it does not seem necessary to discuss. In the sponge, the young are freely moving animals, and unite only at a period approaching maturity. Here is a force acting upon individual animals, which at a certain stage in their growth brings them together with an irresistible power and unites them in a mass so homogeneous that the individuals of which it is composed lose all distinctiveness and become merged into a new individuality. Indeed, if the myxomycetes is properly classed under the Fungi, we should have to recognise the existence of this force in the vegetable kingdom. This power seems to be no other than what Professor Giddings calls a consciousness of kind, which he regards as the beginning of socialisation. He does not, however, trace it as far back as the vegetable kingdom; and it is probable that if he had done so he would not have given it the name of consciousness.

Attention is directed to this strange force which brings together the individual larvæ of the sponge and welds them into a unit, because the character of it has so far entirely baffled scientific explanation, and tends to prove that the socialising force that brings together animals for a common purpose can hardly be attributed to any conscious sense of advantage therefrom, in the individuals thus brought together. In other words, the inexplicable force which brings together the freely moving larvæ of the sponge into a single immovable mass may be the same force which brings together horses into

herds, bees into hives, and ants into their still more perfect communities, respectively.

Purely temporary associations, such as those of wolves in packs, involve little in the way of tacit agreement to tacit government. They are all united in the common purpose of securing food; the food is devoured as soon as killed, and the combination is maintained so long as the cold, by keeping the smaller game out of sight, puts them under the necessity of killing large game or dying of starvation. As soon as the cold disappears, the necessity for this association disappears and the pack disbands. A totally different state of things, however, is to be found when the relation is a more permanent one. For example, when horses and deer unite in herds for the permanent purpose of defence against carnivora, there arises, as has been explained, the necessity of solving the first problem of property; that is to say, property in the female, which gives rise to sexual jealousy. It has been already explained that Nature's scheme for solving this problem is the usual scheme of battle; and this scheme has the incidental advantage of allowing only the strongest bucks and stallions to perpetuate the race.

When, however, we proceed to the next step in community life, — that is to say, the step involved in the accumulating of food, — there arises a second problem, — that is to say, the problem of property in things. Now, the problem of property in things not only presents a new problem of its own, but it enhances the difficulty of the problem of property in the female; because accumulation of food, such as honey, creates a permanent bond which is inconsistent with the splitting up of the herd that takes place in the herbivora during the breeding season. In other words, the community has to live together all the year round. This makes the prob-

lem of sexual jealousy so acute that, as has been already pointed out, Nature solves it by the arbitrary and cruel measure of destroying one entire sex, and leaving the work of the community to be done and the benefits of it to be enjoyed practically by the other sex alone. Moreover, not only is sexual jealousy eliminated by the disappearance of the male sex, but the competition which characterises the struggle for existence of animals who do not live in communities is eliminated by the apparent disappearance of selfishness altogether. The habit or instinct of sacrifice that results from the disappearance of selfishness is evidenced by the fact that all ants work for the community with apparently the same industry; all seem prepared at any time to defend and die for it. There is apparently no one that has more greed than another, so that no internal quarrel seems to disturb the harmony of the ant-hill. In other words, there seems to be absolute uniformity of temperament, automatic willingness to work, and a total absence of all those qualities which characterise the solitary carnivora; and when found in man, are grouped in the word "vice."

It is a matter of no small importance to bear clearly in mind the fact that Nature, proceeding through the principle of the survival of the fittest, has produced types so opposite as that represented by the selfish automaton in the tiger and the unselfish automaton in the ant; the process employed by Nature in the one case being competition, and the process in the other case being co-operation. At this point, however, a careful distinction has to be made; for Nature nowhere works by co-operation alone. Co-operation in the ant-hill is confined to the ant-hill; outside the ant-hill there is the same competition as characterises the general scheme of Nature. In other words, every ant-hill is brought into

competition with every other ant-hill, and although occasionally many ant-hills are found grouped so as to form one large community, there is found between communities a savage war.

It is the competition between different communities of ants which has caused those communities to survive in which co-operation is most advantageous and most complete. Every individual that was unfitted for community life by unwillingness to work or desire to appropriate to his own advantage the property of the community or the work of another, or individuals, in a word, who were lazy or selfish, have been mercilessly destroyed, whether by the process of survival of the fittest or by the direct action of the other ants in the community.¹ Communities of ants, therefore, are characterised by competition without and co-operation within; the result of this competition being to produce an automaton free from selfishness.

If, now, the result of co-operation within, acting subject to the principle of competition without, be compared with the result of competition alone, we cannot but be struck by the fact that, while competition alone produces the most bloodthirsty of all living creatures, co-operation produces a living automaton which within the community seems to be free from all those vices which charac-

¹ It is undesirable to introduce here speculation as to the method by which such individuals were disposed of. It is interesting to observe however, that in communities of bees (which are far less perfect from the collectivist point of view than those of ants) some bees are found to rob one another of the honey they have collected; these robber bees are punished by the other bees in the hive. In the same way it has been observed that when flocks of birds return to their old nesting-place, the birds return each to her own nest, and any attempt of one bird to appropriate the nest of another immediately brings upon her the resentment of the whole flock. Individual sparrows, too, who attempt to rob one nest of straw to make their own are immediately set upon by the other sparrows in the flock.

terise communities of men. This, however, does not prevent the same unselfish automaton waging vigorous warfare upon all individuals belonging to other communities; and thus we have the same automaton under two different conditions acting with the self-sacrifice of a saint in the one case, and the ferocity of a soldier in the other.

Such are the results of Nature acting through natural laws without interference at the hands of men. Let us now turn to the study of how this process has been modified by the conscious effort of man.

§ 2. THE SOCIAL MIND OF MAN

Under this heading it will not be necessary to do more than recapitulate what has been already pointed out in the previous volume. The striking and essential difference which characterises man and differentiates him from the lower animals is his large capacity for self-control. The points, therefore, which will interest us most in studying the development of human society, are the two questions how self-control solved, or attempted to solve, the problem arising out of property in the female, or sexual jealousy, and how self-control attempted to solve the problem of property in things.

We have already seen that the races which solved the question of sexual relations in the manner which exacted most self-control — that is to say, by permanent monogamy — were the nations which in the struggle for existence have survived; and we have also seen that self-control rests at the foundation of the notion of private property; that the idea of property involves not only the right of every individual to the product of his own labour, but also involves the obligation to respect a similar right in others. As the family grew into the

State, the notion of private property gave rise to the obligation to support the State, and also the obligation to contribute some fraction of personal liberty to the State; even to the extent, under certain conditions, of laying down one's life for the State. But men differ from ants not only in the possession of the faculty of self-control, but also in the fact that the higher up in the animal scale we go, the greater is the diversity of function we find, and the greater the difference between one individual and another.

So far as we can judge, there is less difference between individuals in as simply organised an insect as an ant than in as highly a differentiated animal as man; and not only do we observe great differences between men in those qualities which men possess more or less in common with other animals, but perhaps there is no quality in which men differ from one another more than in the quality of self-control, which men alone to any degree possess. Again, not only do men differ in power of self-control, but they differ in willingness to use this power for the benefit of the community or for the benefit of themselves. Not only do they differ in power of productive toil, but they differ in willingness to give the benefit of this power of production to the community; and, last but not least, not only do they differ greatly in the power of commanding the submission of one another, but they differ also in willingness to use this power for the benefit of all, or only for the benefit of themselves.

Again, the development of human intelligence could not but make it clear to men who possess any one of these three powers — that is to say, the power of self-control, the power of productiveness, and the power of commanding submission — to any remarkable degree that such a man could exercise these powers with infi-

nately more advantage to himself if, instead of putting them at the disposal of the community, he used them to improve his own position at the expense of those about him. And not only did some men possess these three powers to a very great extent, but others were wanting in these powers in a corresponding degree. We have, therefore, by the side of the few who possess these powers in a large degree, many who, on the contrary, were influenced by corresponding willingness to submit, willingness to toil, and willingness to exercise self-control for the benefit of the community rather than for that of themselves.

It became inevitable, therefore, that those who had most power became the masters of those who had most willingness; and as the faculty of power coupled with selfishness inevitably goes to make up the lowest type of individualist, so the faculty of power coupled with unselfishness goes to make up the highest type of socialist. We have thus within the same community two kinds of social mind, one of which is by nature equipped to enslave the other.

The effect of this inequality in man has been, therefore, to create a society presenting a marked contrast to that of the ants; for whereas the latter have eliminated all individuals possessing selfish or anti-social qualities, human society has delivered over all that part of humanity which possesses social qualities into the hands of the few who possess the anti-social. The docility and unselfishness of the many have delivered them over to the imperiousness and egotism of the few.¹

Another process has been at work, singularly enough, to produce the same result. The law of nature tends

¹ Obviously there are exceptions. The contention is not that unselfish men never come to the front, but that the main tendency is to put government in the hands of the selfish.

to make the muscularly strong prevail over the muscularly weak; but the mental development of man has set up intelligence to fight muscular strength. Now, religion is the natural ally of intelligence in its warfare with physical strength; but the same tendency which makes intelligence the instrument of selfishness tends to make religion also the instrument of both. The result of this is that selfishness has used religion as well as intelligence to make the muscularly strong but intellectually weak the servants of the muscularly weak but intellectually strong.

The result of the operation of these forces has been that, whereas under the law of nature the individual is sacrificed to the interests of the community, under the law of man the community is made to serve the interests of the individual; and inasmuch as the alliance between selfishness, intelligence, and religion has contributed to subject the many to the few, the final result has been to make the community serve the interests of the few rather than that of the many.

And so it has happened that the intelligence of a few men using and abusing the docility and strength of the many has created an artificial environment, the consequences of which have been already pointed out.¹

They may be recapitulated as follows: whereas under the system of nature the struggle is a struggle for life, under that of man it is a struggle for wealth, power, and consideration; whereas under the system of nature the struggle favours bulk and muscle, under that of man it favours brain and nerve; whereas under the system of nature the struggle favours the strong, under that of man the struggle favours the rich; and perhaps the most serious consequence of this artificial environment is that whereas under the system of nature the types

¹ Vol. I. pp. 330 *et seq.*

most favoured by the environment are the most fertile, and the types least favoured by the environment least fertile, under the system of man the types most favoured by the environment are least fertile, and the types least favoured by the environment are the most fertile. So that whereas man has set up for himself intelligence and morality as the types to which he admittedly would tend, it is not the intelligent and moral type which tends to perpetuate itself, but that which is least intelligent and often for that reason the least moral also; because the human environment, by showering its blessings upon the few rich, has reduced the multitude to a condition of poverty which tends to promote neither a high standard of intelligence nor a high standard of morality.

But the tendency of the rich to die childless, while the poor breed more children than they can provide for, is by no means the worst feature of the artificial conditions created by men. For although it has been shown that man's conscious efforts towards the improvement of the race have always been directed towards diminishing the inequality and injustice of Nature, a study of its history demonstrates that these conscious efforts have been allowed to operate at only rare and fitful intervals; whereas selfishness has operated all the time, and the study of its history shows that so powerful has been the selfishness of the few in subjugating the docility of the many, that even the noblest impulses of men have in the end invariably been appropriated by human selfishness to its own ends.

Thus we have seen the religion of Mohammed serve only to corrupt the court at Bagdad, and that of Christ to bolster the thrones of kings in Europe and the splendour of a papal court at Rome. We have seen the religious enthusiasm which inspired the Crusades used by Venice to conquer Constantinople, and by the Church

to acquire one-third of the whole property of Europe. We have seen municipalities created for the purpose of protecting the interests of honest toil become pawns in the game between the Emperor and the Pope. We have seen them used by the nobles to defeat the king and used by the king to defeat the nobles. We have seen industry, organised in the shape of guilds to defend the artisan against both the king and noble, create a new tyranny equal to that of either. We have seen the cry of liberty raised against the tyranny of the guild, only to hand over the workingman to the merciless tyranny of the Market; and in his efforts to free himself from that of the Market, we have seen him once more subjected to that of the Trade Union. So that whether we look *a priori* at the conditions under which man is placed by the environment which he himself has created, or *a posteriori* to the history of his actual struggle with this environment, we find ourselves inevitably confronted by the fact that this human environment has for its necessary effect to subject the many to the selfishness of the few, and to perpetuate the lowest types in the race rather than the best.

The degenerating consequences of such a system could not but have resulted fatally for the race, were it not for the fact that under it degeneration tends to take place chiefly at the top and bottom, — that is to say, amongst the most successful and the least successful, leaving the moderately successful to maintain the race. So that in spite of the misery of the very poor and the enervation of the very rich, the race has not only maintained itself, but even obviously improved; and out of the conflicts, or rather revolutions, in consequence of which the selfish minority has over and over again been deposed, only to find its place taken by another minority equally selfish, the human mind is gradually awakening

to a more intelligent and more moral apprehension of its social duties. This development is taking place in a manner which ought to command our careful attention; for if we return to the extreme types presented by nature, — that is to say, to the unselfish automaton observed in the ant and the selfish automaton observed in the tiger, — we shall find that while the governing class in mankind finds it necessary to give up some of the selfishness which characterises the tiger, the unselfish automaton in the governed, whose docility has rendered easy the control of the governing class, is gradually becoming less docile, less unselfish, and more clear in the understanding of what the governed call their rights.

And so throughout the history of man the development has been always from the extreme type towards a medium type, in which there is retained some of the docility of the ant with some of the selfishness of the carnivora.

We may now pass to the consideration of what light is thrown upon this medium type by the study of the actual constitution of the human mind, and the method in which it works under normal and abnormal conditions.

§ 3. PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND

Psychologists have long been familiar with the fact that the human mind is more complex than it appears to be; that consciousness cannot be depended upon to give us a complete account of its own workings, but that, on the contrary, the mind seems to work as much outside of consciousness as within it. They had, for example, to account for the capacity of the mind to keep track of time during sleep, as is shown by the fact that

many men can wake at whatever hour they decide to awake. Again, the mind can be set working at the effort to recall a name, and, though consciously occupied with other things, the search is continued until suddenly the name appears in consciousness and the recognition of it actually interrupts consciousness engaged in other things. Psychologists have called this unconscious operation of the mind sub-consciousness.

Psychologists have also been long familiar with the fact that there was within the conscious mind, as it were, and generally subject to it, an automaton that seemed capable of transacting most of the business of life without the assistance of conscious volition; such an automaton is startlingly revealed to us in the well-known case of the retired soldier, who, carrying his dinner across the street, dropped it in automatic response to a sudden and authoritative order to present arms. Somnambulism also furnishes an illustration of the fact that the human automaton can operate with singular skill in the absence of all consciousness. But it is to hypnotism and certain cases of mental shock and hysteria that we chiefly owe our knowledge of this sub-conscious automaton. The experiments of many physicians in different fields have now substantiated the fact beyond the possibility of doubt that the mind is like a telephone system, consisting of numerous simple and complex circuits,—as, for example, a simple circuit of telephones in a single building, with a central system of its own; these circuits, connected with those of other buildings,—as, for example, all the buildings in the Borough of Manhattan and centralised in the borough; these—that is to say, the various systems of the various boroughs,—again connected and centralised at a central office of Greater New York, and that of Greater New York connected with those of other cities and cen-

tralised at Washington, every city being thus put into communication with all the other great systems of the country. This vast and complicated telephone system can be disassociated so that a part of it will operate by itself; New York can be cut off from Washington, and Washington thereby prevented from exercising any control over it.

This analogy, however, is deficient in not accounting for one of the most essential and interesting characteristics of the human mind, — that is to say, its faculty for self-consciousness. It is probable that animals possess very nearly as complete an automatic system for the conveyance of nerve messages as man; with the single exception of the fact that the whole nervous system which man has in common with the lower animals is subjected in man to a higher centralisation or control, and that this control is at the same time the seat of man's self-consciousness and of his self-restraint.

If we examine the structure of the brain, we find a large part of the nerves of the body centre there; the nerves affecting the movements of the tongue centre in the inferior extremity of the so-called Broca's convolution, injury to which produces aphasia, or disorder of the faculty of speech. The nerves of the eye are also centred in the brain, and there are centred also the nerves of the nose, the mouth, and the ears. Again, all these various nerves are connected in another portion of the brain, so that a healthy and useful relation can be established between the various functions in the body. For example, the flight of a pigeon involves not only the use of the wings and the use of the eyes to direct the flight, but also the faculty of correlating the messages which a pigeon receives through the eye and directs to the wing, thus enabling it to direct its flight in a manner to avoid the obstacles thereto. Now, it is

possible, by removing a part of the brain of a pigeon, to deprive it of this correlating faculty; so that, although the pigeon can see and can fly, it is unable to direct its movements in correlation with the objects which it sees.

It is possible to trace the development of the nervous system from the simplest form, in which it simply conveys a message from the surface of the body to the muscle, to that in which it conveys a message from the surface of the body to a centre in the brain, which connects it with different muscles of the body; this system being connected again with another system of nerves, which come from the eyes, ears, nose, and mouth, all of them being centralised so that the whole animal moves in obedience to all the messages it receives from all these organs, whether they come in consciousness or not. This is the machinery which men have in common with the lower animals. But in addition to this machinery, man has the faculty of controlling this machinery to a certain extent through doubtless an additional central nervous system.¹ And this additional central nervous system seems at once to be the seat, not only of his self-control, but of his self-consciousness. The evidence of this additional central nervous system is to be found in the fact that it can be disassociated from the purely automatic system that man has in common with the lower animals, either by accident, disease, or hypnotism; so that a man can be divested of all self-control and all self-consciousness by, as it were, cutting off the new central nervous system from the rest. When this faculty of self-control and self-consciousness is, as it were, shunted off the nervous system by hypnotism,

¹ It cannot be stated positively that no animals possess this developed nervous system, though it can be said that if they do possess it, it is developed only to a limited degree.

disease, or accidental shock, the subject remains perfectly capable of all the automatic actions of the human body; nay, more, the automatic machinery will comply with any suggestion made to it, the faculty of self-control or self-direction being no longer in operation.

No one who has witnessed experiments on hypnotic subjects can fail to admit the duality of the mind, or recognise that there is in man an automaton which, though in a normal state under his control, can by hypnotism be withdrawn from his control as completely as though one were connected with the other by an electric switch.

Physiology, too, confirms the application of this analogy. The threads which unite the nerve centres are not continuous; on the contrary, every nerve centre appears to have threads of its own, which remain under normal conditions in contact with those of the other nerve centres with which they are connected. It seems probable that when one set of nerve centres is put out of relation with the others, by hypnotism or otherwise, contact is broken between the centres at the point where the threads of each centre meet in much the same way as in an electric circuit.

All experiments made upon hysterical subjects by suggestion, or upon hypnotic subjects by hypnotism, seem to be the result of breaking the connection between one set of nerve centres and another; and the most familiar dislocation that takes place is that between the automaton which man shares with lower animals, and the self-conscious, self-controlling force which is peculiar to himself. When this dislocation has been effected, the subject in whom it has taken place will act with all the docility and something of the brutality of a lower animal, in conformity with the slightest suggestion made; and, however gentle may be the disposition of the subject

in a normal state, nothing can exceed the ferocity with which the subject will act if the suggestion be one to elicit it. Suggest to the subject to be gay, and the subject will laugh; suggest sorrow, and the subject will weep; suggest dignity, and the subject will draw himself up to his full height; and yet there is no act so contemptible or foolish of which, in obedience to suggestion, he will not be guilty; if, however, connection be restored, the subject returns again to the normal state, once more self-conscious and once more capable of habitual self-control.¹

When, therefore, we bring together the conclusions which result from an examination of the human mind from the point of view of natural evolution, human environment, and a study of the actual constitution of the brain, the result may be summed up briefly as follows: —

First, as the result of purely natural evolution, man possesses both the anti-social solitary ferocity of the carnivora and the social, gentle docility of the ant.

Second, the mind is composed of two different parts, — the automaton, which man shares with the lower animals, and the power of self-consciousness and self-control, which is peculiar to himself.

Third, while the institutions — that is to say, the artificial environment which man has made for himself — have, in a measure, tended to promote the exercise of self-control, that one of his institutions which is known as commercialism has been perpetually appealing to his selfishness, so that the automaton in him has contracted habits of pursuing selfish ends which have become in

¹ This is so familiar to those who have made any study of hypnotism that no time will be wasted in repeating its various phenomena. A recent useful book on the subject is that of Dr. Boris Sidis, — “The Psychology of Suggestion,” — to which the reader is referred.

great measure uncontrollable; and his intelligence has become so far an instrument of selfishness that the better impulses in his nature are in continual danger of being suppressed thereby.

It will be remembered that we have studied, in the first place, the environment furnished by nature; in the second place the environment created by man; and in the third place we started upon the study of man himself in order to come to some conclusion as to the extent to which man is still capable of modification by these two environments.

Now, it is obvious that if the mind of man, instead of being as homogeneous as we might without knowledge of its structure be induced to believe, is, on the contrary, composed of two totally different elements, one of which is practically indistinguishable from that of the lower animals, and the other of which is, on the contrary, peculiar to man, we have to distinguish between the effects of environment, whether natural or human, upon these two factors. Indeed, the inconsistencies of our system of education and the hybrid results of it are both probably due to the fact that we have failed to take into account the dual character of the social mind. Thus, while religion has been addressing itself to the conscious factor, and urging it to the attainment of high ideals, industrialism has been training the automaton so that it has acquired uncontrollable habits altogether inconsistent with these ideals. Every man who has made efforts to control his temper will recognise the operation of these opposite forces, — in the first place the strong desire to control the temper, and in the second place the uncontrollable force of habit in giving expression to it.

To this fact is doubtless due much of the inconsistency with which we are familiar in the human mind.

We have already observed this inconsistency in the ant, which, though instinctively gentle to its fellows, shows equally instinctive fierceness to its enemies. Just in the same way a man who is a pattern father and husband is often a merciless business man; and we are familiar with the fact that the most ferocious soldiers are often the gentlest husbands. But there is, perhaps, no arena in which inconsistencies of character are more developed than in politics; and this is doubtless because in our relations to one another the effects of our conduct are immediately seen, whereas, in our relations to the State, the effects of our conduct are for the most part not seen. Thus, a man who will not consciously cheat his neighbour will have no hesitation in cheating the State; a man who will not surrender his political principles for a gift of money from an individual will not hesitate to sacrifice his political principles for a public office from the State. And so the mere fact that the State is an impersonal thing, does not suffer pain, or, if it does, abstains from crying out, blunts our moral sense to injuries affecting it. The result of this is that a code of morals obtains, as regards our duty to the State, quite different from that which controls us in our relations to one another. Now, the State is part of the environment which man has created for himself, and is indeed the largest part of it; and if our moral sense is blunted in our service to the State, it is blunted in our relations to one of the most important factors in our environment.

Again, in the relation of an individual to the State, there is exactly the same inconsistency of action in the automatic and the conscious parts of man as has been already described in relation of the individual to religion and commercialism; for at one moment all that is contemptible in us is engaged in shirking the smallest duties to the State, and at another we are laying down

our lives in obedience to the highest conceivable ideal of patriotism. The history of New York furnishes illustrations of this inconsistency of action: our ancestors seemed, in the early days of the colonies, to be animated by a high sense of self-respect in demanding self-government from those who were sent out to govern them by both Dutch and British governments alike; and yet, when the commercial spirit was aroused by the wars in which England was involved with France and the Indians, the good burghers of New York could not resist the temptation of driving the hardest of bargains with the armies which England sent out for their defence, of making the needs of their neighbouring colonies an occasion for extortion, and even of furnishing weapons at a high price to the Indians, for the purpose of using them against these very neighbours. Nevertheless, within a few years, we find them rallying to the popular cause in revolt against the greatest military power in the world, and refusing to lay down their arms until that revolt was crowned with success. Once, however, the victory won, they became engaged in a shameful and continuous scramble for political office, until the cry of freedom for the negro and of honour for the national flag aroused them anew to deeds of patriotism, only at last to relapse again into the same vulgar struggle for office and for wealth.

Nor is the history of New York peculiar in this respect; whatever be the people, we cannot but recognise that so long as there is a spark of vitality in the people it inevitably responds to the call which is made on them. If the State bids its citizens grow rich, every man sets himself to the work with merciless disregard for the consequences to his neighbour; if the State, on the contrary, asks them to sacrifice the dearest thing they have, they make the sacrifice with a willingness inconceiv-

ably inconsistent with the greed they had only a moment before exhibited.

It does not seem, therefore, unreasonable to believe that the character of the State, and particularly the character of the call which the State makes upon its citizens, is of consummate importance in forming national character; and before we leave the subject it may be well to consider a little more closely to what extent and in what manner the social mind responds to the influences about it.

Under the dual theory of the social mind above described, it is found to consist of very opposite factors: one is automatic, unconscious, and animal; the other is voluntary, conscious, and human. Now, it seems reasonable to suppose that the unconscious automaton is as necessary a product of the environment as the ant is, or the ape; it will become exactly what the environment makes it. And if the environment perpetually appeals to its selfishness, it will be as selfish as the ape; whereas if it appeal, on the contrary, always to its unselfishness, it will become as unselfish as the ant. It is hardly necessary to observe that, if this be true, the competitive system tends to result in an automaton uncontrollably and mercilessly selfish.

As soon as the Christian Church allied itself with the Roman State, the effect of the competitive system of the Roman State became so obviously hostile to the religious life that all who were bent on leading religious lives felt driven to protect themselves from it by living in communities especially created for that purpose; and the monastic system created by this imperative necessity became at last so extensive that it threatened to become more powerful than the State. But just as selfishness corrupted the Church, so it corrupted the monastery

also; and the monastic system fell as much because of the greed within its walls, as because of the greed without them. The fact of monasticism, however, serves to corroborate the theory that the religious life and the competitive life are inconsistent with one another; and the vitality and permanence of such communities as that of Sisters of Charity indicates the importance of keeping those engaged in unselfish lives from the inevitable tendencies of the environment which the gospel has characterised in the words, "the world, the flesh, and the devil."

Fortunately, however, the unconscious automaton is more or less under the control of a conscious will. But when we come to consider how far the lives of those about us are determined by habit, and how far by conscious will, we cannot but be struck by the fact that the vast majority of our fellow-citizens are probably controlled by habit altogether; that only a few are ever controlled by conscious will, and even these few are controlled by conscious will only for an insignificant portion of their whole lives. Nor is this all; for, as has been already observed, when the conscious will does undertake to resist the force of habit, the force of habit is generally found so overwhelming that the conscious will can make but little, if any, headway against it.

It would seem, under these circumstances, as though the struggle of the conscious will to control the unconscious automaton in man is not likely to be crowned with success. Fortunately, however, the automaton in us is not left entirely between its own selfish instincts and the feeble efforts of a conscious will. There have also been developed in family life affections, and habits of mercy, which are doubtless responsible for by far the largest part of human benevolence; and so we come to the conclusion that while our good instincts spring from

the family, our bad instincts are to great extent cultivated by the State, except at those rare times when great issues arouse in us the for the most part latent sentiments of patriotism.

The artificial environment, then, which man has created for himself is found to include forces so opposite that, while the necessities of life are training within us an automaton to act in obedience to selfishness and furnishing our reason with motives of selfishness, an opposite non-natural force which we call religion is urging us to lives of unselfishness, but so inadequately that up to the present day this religion has done the work of the devil almost as often as that of God.

Moreover, the conscious deliberate factor in us is so confounded by the opposite doctrines taught by the competitive and political system on the one hand, and by affection and godliness on the other, that it is able to adopt neither the one nor the other, but, like the infusoria which we see shooting aimlessly in every direction under our microscopes, we are driven alternately by both, and are moving, therefore, persistently in the direction of neither.

Herbert Spencer has pointed out that development in animal life is characterised by the growing certainty and definiteness of animal movements, the erratic movements of the infusoria being replaced by the definite persistent pursuit of the higher carnivora. Now, if a similar progress is to take place in the moral development of man; if the incoherency, uncertainty, and indefiniteness of his movements in the search for happiness are to be replaced by coherency, certainty, and definiteness, — it must be by a removal of those causes which to-day occasion the one and a substitution therefor of an environment that will permit the other. In other words, the conflict between the necessities of his physical being and

those of his moral being must be eliminated; and this can only be accomplished by substituting for the competitive system which creates this conflict a co-operative system that will bring it to an end.

Is such a co-operative system possible?

Among the habits which have been formed in man by the competitive system is one which looks with fierce jealousy upon any infringement of what is generally termed individual liberty. The isolated savagery of the great carnivora and that of the least civilised races of men has been already commented on. They have slowly yielded to the process of socialisation, but only with great reluctance, and often under a hope, not always grounded, that socialisation would result in an enhancement of liberty. And we are to-day confronted with two notions of liberty so inconsistent that they are deluging the whole of South Africa with blood. Until some of the confusion attending the Boer and British notions of liberty is removed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, usefully to study the question of how far a more perfect system of co-operation can be realised; for co-operation involves the sacrifice of some freedom, and the essential question arises how much freedom will men consent to sacrifice. A careful study of this sacrifice will show that the freedom sacrificed under an intelligent system of co-operation will result in a new order of freedom as much more precious than that sacrificed as the substance of *Æsop's* bone is more precious than its shadow.

CHAPTER V

LIBERTY

THE most formidable subjective obstacle to the adoption of a co-operative scheme of society is probably to be found in the false notions which prevail on the subject of liberty. Notions of liberty have arisen in the same way as notions of justice by the fitful action of the environment on our conscious will and by its constant action upon our unconscious automata, so that the few whose conscious wills are awake during a material part of the day are likely to have approximately correct notions about liberty, whereas those whose lives are practically delivered over to the unconscious automata within them are likely to have very incorrect notions about it. To these last, liberty generally means the right to do what they want; and as the environment created by commercialism is one of perpetual competition which sets every man on the task of getting the best of his neighbour, the right to do what one wants becomes reducible to the right to benefit oneself, even though it be at the expense of one's neighbour.

Now, no society could exist if every individual in it were allowed the unbridled right to benefit himself at the expense of others. The needs of society, therefore, have curtailed this right so that as a matter of fact our liberties are everywhere circumscribed by law; and, although most of us are for ever clamouring for liberty,

we are, nevertheless, conscious of the necessity of law, and the conflict between liberty and law, both of which we respectively approve, makes it no easy task to determine where liberty should end and law begin, or, indeed, what, in view of the necessity of law, liberty in fact is.

One of the standard objections to collectivism is that it will interfere with liberty. But as to the meaning of this word "liberty," there is probably no subject on which men are so little agreed. Those who object to collectivism on the ground that it will interfere with the liberty of individuals regard liberty as the opposite of too much law and of too much government; so that according to them the more absolute government is, the less liberty there is. This view, however, is assuredly a mistaken one. The government of the Tartars in Russia during the fourteenth century was ruthless, brutal, and absolute; and yet it interfered so seldom and so little with the individual that the Russian people were hardly aware of its existence. It generally contented itself with receiving the tribute of the Russian princes; and as long as the tribute was paid, the Russian people had little to fear from the great Khan. Sir J. R. Seeley points out that there was during this period of Tartar despotism at the same time the greatest degree of cruelty and the greatest degree of liberty. He also points out that the same state of facts can be noticed to a less degree in the present Turkish Empire. On the other hand, the government may be mild in the extreme, and yet liberty be violated at every hour of the day, as in the Jesuit government of Paraguay, of which it is said that "all the most private acts that man can do, the acts with which among us no one would allow the least interference, were performed in Paraguay according to a fixed rule and at the ringing of a bell." He

also points out that, according to Shelley, "a man who is starving is not free."

"Nay, in countries that are free,
Such starvation cannot be
As in England now we see."

So, adds Sir J. R. Seeley, "liberty is actually discovered to be something to eat."

But in describing the status of a slave he regards it as one "under an unlimited government." Surely in this respect he is mistaken. A slave may be such through the fact that neither he nor his master are subject to any government at all; in other words, in a perfectly savage state, the stronger man enslaves the weaker man, and the question of liberty therefore is a mere question of physical strength. In the so-called state of nature there is no such thing as the particular kind of freedom that we enjoy under a civilised form of government. In the state of nature the individual is free only so long as he is strong enough to remain free; and he has as many slaves as he is strong enough to enslave.

Here is, I think, one of the fundamental errors that underlies our general notions of liberty. We conceive that liberty is greatest in the savage state and least in the civilised state; whereas as a matter of fact liberty is generally least in a savage state and most in one of civilisation, for the foundation of liberty is law. *Legum omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possumus.*¹

It must be admitted that there is a kind of civilisation that does seriously diminish the liberty of the individual, as, for example, that of Paraguay; but the important thing to keep in mind is that the extent of liberty which the individuals of a community enjoy is

¹ Cicero pro Cluentio, 53.

due mainly to the wisdom of its institutions ; that is to say, to the extent to which intelligence and morality prevail therein. For example, history shows that man has until very lately helplessly staggered from one kind of tyranny to another ; the tyranny exercised by the soldier under the Roman Empire yielded to the tyranny of the Church in the Middle Ages ; and while the Church was contesting the right to misgovern with the king and the nobles, the tyranny of these three became in part replaced by the tyranny of the corporation or guild ; and in the reaction from the tyranny of the corporation and the guild the workingman found himself exposed to the tyranny of the Market ; and in endeavouring to liberate himself from the tyranny of the Market he is now subjecting himself to the tyranny of the trade union.

A very little consideration of these facts will lead to the conclusion that government has been modified mainly through the efforts of different groups of a community to get into a position where they could tyrannise respectively over the rest ; with a general tendency, however, in the direction of substituting for a compulsory tyranny one which is more or less willingly consented to. So, while there is little or no element of consent in the subjection of the weak man to the strong in the state of nature or under a military form of despotism, there *is* an element of consent and approval on the part of the governed to the governing class in the religious form of despotism. This element of consent and approval is still more developed in the corporation or guild, and again still more in the trade union. The direction, therefore, towards which men have tended has been to substitute for a tyranny to which they do not willingly consent, and over which they have no control, one to which they do more or less willingly consent, and one over which they have some control.

The amount of liberty which an individual enjoys does not always depend upon the form of government; under no government was the liberty of the individual less a matter of public concern than under that of the Venetian Republic; and the Kaffir servant in the South African Republic to-day can hardly be said to be altogether free.

Again, social and industrial conditions may create a kind of slavery under the most popular form of government. Thus the social institution of marriage condemns every woman who has once become *déclassée* to a life of disgrace, and excludes her from all so-called respectable means of living; and the trade union in some districts imposes rules upon the workingman which he is powerless to resist. We must not then allow ourselves to be misled by mere form. True liberty is the most precious of the rights claimed by man; and in discussing what it is we must not allow ourselves to be misled by a form of government which keeps the word of promise to the ear and breaks it to the heart. A shirt-maker who cannot earn more than forty-eight cents a dozen in the city of New York, or a coal-miner who cannot work for more or less than the wage determined by a trade union to which he does not belong in Wales, may have less real liberty than a eunuch in the palace of the Shah.

A man who in England or the United States is willing to work and cannot get employment, or a woman who has been betrayed and is refused work in consequence, is outraged because civilisation seems to offer them less rights than a state of nature. They are surrounded by an inexhaustible supply of food, and yet they may not take and eat; there is plenty of work to be done, and yet they may not do it. This condition of things they regard as wrong, and they describe their

wrongs by saying that civilisation produces not freedom but slavery.

An American who in France is arrested and confined at the discretion of a *juge d'instruction* without the privilege of having the reason of his confinement tested in court by Habeas Corpus considers his right to liberty improperly abridged.

A Turk, already the husband of many wives, who desires in England to add an English girl to his seraglio, complains when told that the laws of England do not allow it. His liberty, too, he regards as abridged. And the Shah, it is said, was indignant because in the absence of a man condemned to death, the laws of England forbade a subject being produced upon whom to exhibit to him the *modus operandi* of the gallows.

The divergent views entertained in different parts of the world upon liberty, justice, and morality at large have given rise to the theory that they are questions of geography. This theory, however, is believed to be a profoundly mistaken one. Subjective notions about liberty may be matters of geography; but the thing liberty, of which every man has a more or less divergent idea, none the less exists outside of the notions entertained regarding it.

When an English gentleman says there is more freedom in England than in any country in the world, he means not necessarily that men are more free in England than elsewhere, but that it is in England that he himself finds least restraint on his actions. He is not free to murder in England, or steal there, but this does not interfere with his freedom, because he has no desire to murder or steal. As to all the details of life which he regards as important, — trivial though they sometimes are, — he is free, and he is secure. He is not obliged to announce his arrival in a town to the police,

or to show his passport on the frontier. He is not exposed to arbitrary arrest, as in France, or to police interference, as in Germany. He is not even obliged to take a check for his luggage when he travels, as in America. If he is in the enjoyment of a sufficient income, he is practically free to do *what he wants to do*, and this is what he calls being free.

The unemployed British workingman, however, does not enjoy the same freedom; with perhaps more faculty for work he is obliged to accept the slavery of a work-house or starve. A similar servitude is forced upon the South Wales coal-miner; for he must either work subject to the conditions imposed by a trade union to which perhaps he does not belong, or not work at all. Under these conditions the attitude of the British gentleman towards the liberty enjoyed in England is likely to be different from that of the unemployed.

Surely, however, there is some measure of liberty less uncertain than the conflicting views regarding it entertained in the same country by these two men.

Perhaps nothing will help us better to get a clear view of just what liberty is and what it is not, and particularly just what relation it bears to the government on the one hand and to social conditions on the other, than by reviewing briefly during the last hundred years the history of one of the most precious of our liberties, — liberty of contract.

§ 1. LIBERTY OF CONTRACT

In the disorders which attended the breaking up of the Roman Empire, government, in so far as it protected property, may almost be said to have ceased to exist. Those who commanded the armed forces of Europe were robbers on a large or small scale accord-

ing to the scope of their power and the success which attended their depredations. In this respect there was little to choose between a Chilpéric and a Robin Hood. As a defence against this predatory system, industrious citizens organised themselves all over Europe into voluntary societies which took the name of guilds or corporations; the purposes for which these were organised varied; they began by organising for the purpose of mutual protection against pillage, and they ended by organising for mutual protection against the tendency of competition to reduce prices and wages.

But the inevitable tendency of government to become oppressive made itself felt in these voluntary associations, as it had before made itself felt under established forms. And the Corporation became as tyrannical as ever had been the King, the Noble, or the Church. The French Revolution was aimed as much at the Corporation as at the Crown. The economic expression of this Revolution is to be found in the doctrine of *laissez faire*. At the close of the eighteenth century both England and France were dominated by it: one of its most seductive formulæ was Liberty of Contract; everybody was to be left perfectly free to make such contracts as he could; liberty was the order of the day,—liberty for the employer; liberty for the employee; liberty for the landlord; liberty for the tenant. What has become of that liberty to-day?

Liberty for the employer meant the destruction of the guild, and, with the guild, of all the safeguards which guilds had put round the isolated workingman so that he should not be at the mercy of the employer. And how did the employer use his liberty? He forthwith, by the operation of the law of Nature which furnishes more beings than she can nourish, in order out of the superfluity to select those most fit, profited by free

competition between workingmen to reduce them to starvation wages. The workingmen were driven, by the ruthlessness with which the employer pushed his advantage, to combine in order to secure by combination terms which when isolated they were unable to secure. It would seem as though liberty of contract between employer and employee included liberty for the employee as well as for the employer; and that if employers had the right to combine with employers to keep down wages, employees had the right to combine with employees to keep them up. But a Parliament composed of employers thought otherwise, and enacted a law in 1799 forbidding combinations between workingmen, though it left the employers' right to combine intact. By this Act of 1799 they cut away the logical ground for their own doctrine of *laissez faire*. After a struggle of over twenty years, during which the trade unions learned their first lesson in Parliamentary tactics, they secured the repeal of the Act of 1799. They did more, without being incorporated themselves, they secured the right to sue in certain cases; so that though they could use the courts for the purpose of attacking others, they could not themselves be attacked there; they share with the State the sovereignty that can use the courts to discipline others, but are beyond the reach of the court itself. A trade union can fine a member, deprive him of his share in the benefit fund to which he has for years subscribed, expel him, outlaw him so that he cannot get occupation in the trade again, and yet the trade union is, so far as the law courts are concerned, absolutely beyond the reach of the outraged member.

But not only is a trade union an irresponsible master over its own members; it is often, as a matter of fact, an equally irresponsible master over all workmen

engaged in the trade, whether they are members of the trade union or not.

In the first place, in many trades, every person engaged in the trade has to be a member of the trade union, however unwillingly; as Mr. and Mrs. Webb say, — themselves apostles of trades unions, and therefore anxious to avoid exaggerating defects, — “The plater and riveter who, because he is outside the United Society of Boiler-Makers, is politely refused work by every shipbuilder on the northeast coast, is just as much compelled to join the Union as if membership were by a new Factory Act made a legal condition of employment.” This is brought about by the policy of refusing to work in establishments where non-unionists are employed, and is as effectual in compelling membership in the highly organised trade unions of the Northumberland coal-miners and the Lancashire cotton-spinners as in that of the boiler-makers just referred to.

But not only do the trade unions in many districts practically compel even the unwilling to become members, but in certain other districts they control the actions even of those who refuse to join; for example, although not one-third of the 120,000 men engaged in coal-mining in South Wales are members of any trade union, or in any way represented in trade-union negotiations, and although of the recognised workers a large portion forming three separate unions expressly refused to agree to the sliding scale of 1893, and withdrew their representatives from the committee engaged in negotiating the same, the whole of the 120,000 men with infinitesimal exceptions are compelled to accept the sliding scale notwithstanding their protests against it, and not only are they compelled to accept the rate of wages determined by the trade unions, but a sum of sixpence per annum is deducted from the earnings of about 40,000

men to meet the expenses connected with the agreement. In the Rhondda Valley and in a few other districts the compulsion goes still further: the employers deduct a few pence per month from their workmen's earnings as contributions to the trade union, whether the workmen are members of the trade union or not; and some trade unions are thus supported by deductions made from the wages of workmen who are not members of them; indeed, the largest and most important in South Wales has no other means of support than this compulsory deduction made in the employer's pay office, and is without any lodges, branch officials, or other organised machinery.

As a necessary result of this system practically two-thirds of the miners in the South Wales coal field — that is to say, 80,000 out of 120,000 — are taxed for the support of the trade union which imposes conditions of employment upon them without giving them any opportunity of expressing their desires or of taking any part in the negotiation; in other words, here we have a case of taxation without representation aggravated by the fact that 80,000 men are dictated to by a minority of 40,000 as to what is generally supposed to be the most intimate right of man; that is to say, the wages for which he will work.

A similar case may be cited in Dublin where the coopers are so admirably organised that they allow no one to work at their trade except when brisk business occasions more work than they can do; and they then draw workmen from other towns, but do not admit them to membership. Nevertheless, they compel the strangers to contribute weekly, so long as they work in Dublin, to the Dublin union, and when work gets slack issue orders that they leave the town; and leave the town they must, or starve.

As is said in the "Federalist," "Power over a man's subsistence amounts to power over his will." There can be no more complete destruction of freedom of contract or so-called liberty than in the cases just described.

The more closely we study the operation of so-called freedom of contract, the more inevitably we are driven to the conclusion that it must lead, under the competitive system, to industrial slavery. We have seen in the above cases that it does lead to industrial slavery; indeed, we are driven to the conclusion that it must always do so. The more complete the freedom, the more inevitable is this result; because, the more free an employer is in the contracts he makes with his workmen, the greater the necessity he is put by the pressure of competition to lower the workmen's wages, and the more inevitably are workmen driven by combination to resist the deduction of wages. This can only be done effectually on a scale commensurate with the trade, because the workman is not fighting his particular employer so much as he is all the employers who are in the field of competition, and are compelling by their competition a reduction of wages in one district to a corresponding level to that which rules in another. In other words, the competitive system, when allowed full liberty of action under the principle of freedom of contract, not only leads to industrial slavery, but must do so. There is no alternative; if in certain trades and in certain favoured districts this industrial slavery is not at present operating, it is because special circumstances favour that particular district; but competition will eventually reach the district and apply thereto the fatal law.

And this law does not apply to workmen alone: it applies equally to employers; for combination among workmen inevitably leads to combination among employers; and employers therefore find themselves soon

brought to the same condition of subservience as the workmen. Far from running their own business in their own way, as was boldly asserted to be the right of every employer under the system of *laissez faire*, employers find themselves driven to accept the rate of wages fixed by arrangements between trade unions and employers, whether they have formed part of the employers' combination or not; and the inevitable effect of this system is to crush the small employers, leaving only the large. In 1891, for instance, the small boot-manufacturers protested against "the capitalist manufacturers' conspiracy" by fixing uniform standards of wages, to crush out their smaller competitors. It is interesting to read the comments of the labour press on this outcry of the small manufacturers. It is characterised as a "ridiculous superstition, too obviously absurd to admit a moment's thought;" "if smaller manufacturers cannot continue to exist except by paying less than a proper standard of wages for work done, this is the clearest proof that they have no right to exist as such."¹ It is very much like what we are accustomed to hear the employers say regarding the workingmen. The fact is, both are perpetually crying out for liberty of contract, and both perpetually combining to make liberty of contract impossible.

But this is not all. Not only does workman combine with workman to keep wages up, and employer with employer to keep wages down, but at last the two combinations effect what are called in the trade "alliances" for the purpose of putting a stop to freedom of contract altogether; that is to say, the combination of workmen and the combination of employers together form a third combination, both agreeing that the employers shall

¹ Editorial in "Shoe and Leather Record," vol. x. page 254, April 10, 1891.

employ no workman, and the workman shall work for no employer, who does not comply with the alliance agreement. So at last we arrive at the consummate paradox that not only does freedom of contract put an end to freedom of contract, but competition puts an end to competition. The final result of trade alliances is that no person is allowed to engage in the trade, whether as employer or as workman, unless he complies with the rule determined by the alliance; in other words, we find in full-fledged operation at the present time the same conditions that prevailed in the mediæval guild; and it was in great part to break down this tyranny of the guild that the doctrine of *laissez faire* was invented.¹

It will be seen, therefore, that the competitive system admits of little progress. Competition created the mediæval guild; when the tyranny of the guild became intolerable, it was broken up by the principle of freedom of contract; and the operation of freedom of contract under the competitive system has only brought us back, after a century of so-called progress, to the point from which we started, — the tyranny of the guild again.

There is but one conclusion to be drawn from this story: competition is inconsistent with complete liberty of contract; and complete liberty of contract is probably not attainable in this world at all.

Collectivists offer as a solution for this discouraging conclusion a system of government under which com-

¹ A good illustration of this so-called alliance is to be found in those concluded since 1890 between the Employers' Association and the Trade Union of Birmingham. (See the *New Trades Combination Movement, Its Purposes and Methods*, by E. J. Smith, Birmingham, 1898, and an article in the Birmingham "District Journal" for April, 1896, by W. J. Davis, Secretary of the National Society of Amalgamated Brassworkers. See also Birmingham "Daily Post," 1895 and 1896.)

petition could be to the greatest degree possible eliminated through the abolition of private property in those things the ownership of which enable one set of men to control the lives of others. The feasibility of such a scheme will be discussed in another chapter. If collectivism is ever possible, it is assuredly to-day still a long way off. And what we are in this chapter studying is not an ultimate solution of the problem of liberty, but an answer to the question what, under existing conditions, is this thing which we call liberty, and for which Redskins have fought and it is alleged Boer and Filipino are still fighting.

It seems to follow from the foregoing history of human efforts to secure liberty of contract that under existing conditions absolute liberty of contract is unattainable. With this conclusion fresh in our minds let us next study what elements enter into this so-called liberty, in the hope that when we have reduced it to the elements of which it is composed we may be in a better position to decide just what it is, how far it may be attained, and to what extent Boers, Filipinos, and Redskins are respectively attaining it.

§ 2. ANALYSIS OF LIBERTY

The state of nature gives the individual the maximum opportunity of liberty, but exposes him to the greatest risk of losing it. The lowest savages of all, such as the Wood Veddahs of Ceylon, live in the woods much after the fashion of the anthropoid apes: they have no social institutions, and they know no law. Every male mates with the female he can capture, and lives with her so long as the caprice lasts, or as he is not deprived of her by a stronger male than he. Being deprived of the co-operation of his fellow-creatures ex-

cept that of the female he lives with, he has to dispense with all the comforts and securities that result from co-operation.

His liberty is not limited by law: it is, however, much limited by Nature's predatory scheme; any animal stronger than he can deprive him of it, and he has only his own individual resources with which to defend himself against such stronger animals.

But Nature includes not only the predatory or competitive scheme, but also that of co-operation; and while it presents us with the tiger as the consummate result of the one, it points to the ant as the product of the other. Now what Nature has done for the ant in substituting co-operation for competition within the community, man has to a less degree done for himself through his social institutions and his political schemes of government.

The history of the progress of man is the history of the slow steps through which he has abandoned the license he enjoys in a state of nature in order to secure the advantages conferred by law.

The process through which man has slowly abandoned the license of nature for the security of law is twofold: compulsion and consent; that is to say, during some periods of his development man has been civilised through compulsion by a more or less benevolent despot; at other periods man has contributed to his own development by himself organising institutions to that end.

The institutions which man has devised for the purpose of securing himself from the risks which attend the savage state are manifold; sometimes they partake of the nature of government, — that is to say, they are institutions which can compel consent by the authority of some established power in the State; at other times they are not governmental but voluntary, as, for example, the

Church, the Guild, and the Trade Union. But whatever be the process, it is characterised in every case by the abandonment, whether voluntary or involuntary, of a part of the license enjoyed in a state of nature for the purpose of obtaining the security possible only under the safeguards of law.

One of the first steps taken by humanity was to emerge from the isolated family condition of the anthropoid ape and the Wood Veddah into what is generally described by sociologists as the horde system. The horde was probably made up of individuals, not of families. Marriage under the horde system was probably not recognised as an institution. Under conditions which made "maternity a matter of fact and paternity a matter of opinion," children derived their names from their mothers, not from their fathers. The sacrifice of liberty made by the individual under the horde system was practically confined to a recognition of the authority of the chief. This is probably the kind of civilisation that prevailed in Assyria and Egypt.

Another step is to be found in the institution of marriage; under this institution the individual sacrificed the license he enjoyed under a natural state as regards sexual relations, and under it was founded the patriarchal system which affords a striking contrast to that of the horde. The horde system tends to produce a nation of slaves abjectly following the lead of a military chief; the patriarchal system created, on the contrary, a fierce and jealous individualism. Every patriarch tends to become a chief over his own family first, and over his weaker neighbours afterwards. It was only with the greatest reluctance that the patriarch consented to surrender any part of his absolute authority in order to combine with neighbouring patriarchs in common defence against a common invader. But the

nations built upon a patriarchal plan which survived were those in which the patriarchs had sufficient intelligence and sufficient self-control to make the necessary sacrifice. The slow steps through which these successive sacrifices were made can be followed in the early history of Greece ; we see there the great patriarchal families gradually uniting in common defence against a common invader to form the City States of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. We see next the City States combining with one another, sometimes against a Greek, sometimes against a foreign foe. But in Greece the fierce individualism of every city made it impossible for them to grasp the idea of a great State ; the cities were unable to make the necessary sacrifice, and they fell, therefore, one by one, before the genius of Philip and Alexander.

Rome achieved by compulsion what Greece had failed to accomplish by consent. Roman arms compelled the surrender of conquered cities ; and a high degree of political sagacity succeeded in welding the conquered cities into an empire. But it is during the eighteenth century that the last great step has been made. What Grecian cities could not accomplish by consent, and what Rome was unable permanently to accomplish by compulsion has been accomplished by the Cantons of Switzerland and the Colonies of the United States. The sacrifices which every Colony had to make in order by combination to secure the advantages of a great nation are the sacrifices which the Federalists secured from the United States, which the Southerners threw into the hazard during our civil war, and the wisdom of which has been justified by the prosperity and comparatively high degree of civilisation which now prevails from the Atlantic to the Pacific slope.

At every step we see man by intelligence and self-control surrendering a part of the license he enjoyed in a state of nature in order to secure the advantages which through co-operation can only be enjoyed under a government constituted by consent and administered for the benefit of all; and these steps have been consecutively as follows. From a state of isolation to that of the horde through recognition of the authority of a chief; from that of the horde to the city through the patriarchal system involving surrender of license in sexual relations; from the city to the State through surrender of some political freedom in recognition of State sovereignty; and from the State to the United States through the surrender of State sovereignty. Every one of these sacrifices is represented in the political status of every citizen of the United States: he has surrendered the absolute freedom of the state of nature through the recognition of government at large; he has surrendered freedom as regards sexual relations by his recognition of the institution of marriage; and our existing government represents to him three distinct concessions,—a concession of political liberty through recognition of the government of the city or town in which he lives; a concession of political liberty through the recognition of the government of the State in which he lives; and a concession of political liberty through the recognition of the government of the United States.

Now, what are the advantages he has gained in exchange for these concessions respectively? It has been pointed out that in the savage state he was exposed to many risks; these risks may be divided into the following groups,—risks to life, or death; risks to personal freedom, or slavery and imprisonment; risks to limb, or bodily injury; risks to property, or pauperism.

It is obvious that of these our present system of gov-

ernment practically secures us from the first three except in the abnormal case of war; that is to say, that risks of life, liberty, and limb are by our governmental institutions reduced to a minimum. Government, however, has very incompletely secured us from risk to property; that is to say, we are most of us exposed to the danger of becoming paupers.

The great political struggles which we have before us are the struggles between different fractions in our community upon the question of property. As regards security or risk to property, those who are in favour of maintaining existing conditions are generally termed conservatives; those, on the other hand, who think existing conditions can be improved are generally termed liberals; and those who demand a radical change in the system are termed radicals, socialists, or anarchists, according to the extent to which they desire to see existing conditions subverted.

We do not propose to enter profoundly into the questions which divide these three groups in this chapter. It suffices the purpose of our discussion here to point out that the conservatives proceed upon the theory that the πολλοί are not fit for self-government, and that their happiness can best be promoted through the generosity of the governing and wealthy class; the liberals are willing to recognize in the πολλοί a larger faculty for self-government, but cling to maintaining the effectual ascendancy of the wealthy class; whereas the radicals, socialists, and anarchists repudiate the alleged generosity of the governing, or wealthy class, with scorn, and pronounce the πολλοί better fitted to govern than they.

But apart from the question which fraction of the people is best fitted to govern, there is one of a more fundamental character which demands our very careful

consideration. We have already referred to risks to property. We have now to consider what property is.

§ 3. PROPERTY, RIGHT, AND DUTY

Property is practically unknown in the purely predatory scheme of nature. We see it arising in nature when animals abandon the isolation created by the predatory plan and adopt some form of socialisation. We see it, for example, in flocks of birds when they return to a nesting-place. Every bird returns to her own nest, and any attempt of one bird to appropriate the nest of another immediately brings upon her the resentment of the whole flock. Individual sparrows who attempt to rob one nest of straw to make their own are immediately set upon by the other sparrows in the flock. But notions of individual property in nature are comparatively rare. It is in such highly organised communities as those of ants that we find the notion of property most developed, but in these communities the idea of property is collective, not individual. The most amazing quality of the ant is its notion of collective property. If ants are observed in the process of tearing to pieces a dead caterpillar, it will be found that they do not themselves devour the morsels they separate, as would a pack of wolves in a similar case. On the contrary, every ant carries off its morsel to the nest. Every ant's nest is a storehouse of collective property, and teaches a humiliating lesson of social life to man. If we turn to human institutions, we shall find that they have been organised more with a view to protecting private property than public, and Herbert Spencer has propounded the doctrine that the less a government owns in the way of property, the better.

It will be useful in studying this question to push

our analysis of liberty a step farther; let us begin by agreeing upon terms.

It is clear that we need three words, in discussing this subject, to convey essentially different things: one generic word to convey the general notion of ability to do what one wants; one specific word to convey the notion of ability to do what one wants irrespective of consequence to others and uncontrolled by social conditions; another specific word to convey the notion of ability to do what one wants, due regard being had to the consequence to others, and controlled by social conditions. Although the words "freedom" and "liberty" are used interchangeably, the latter is more specifically used to convey the idea of political liberty, or liberty under the law. Let us agree for the purpose of this discussion, without attempting further to justify it, to use the word "freedom" in the first sense required; that is to say, to convey the general notion of ability to do what one wants. The word "license" conveys the idea of freedom irrespective of consequence to others and uncontrolled by social conditions. And the word "liberty" will then conveniently be reduced to mean freedom limited by regard for others and controlled by social conditions or law.

Every advance of civilisation is marked by a surrender of license, because the progress of civilisation is away from the condition of isolation which characterises the savage and predatory plan towards the system of co-operation that characterises communities of citizens. Co-operation involves a sacrifice. Now, every sacrifice of license gives rise to two things: a right and a duty. It has been already pointed out that every step from license to liberty is made for the purpose of securing some advantage. Now, the thing surrendered represents the duty, and the advantage secured repre-

sents the right. A moment's consideration will serve to illustrate this.

A savage kills whom he chooses and can ; a citizen surrenders this license to murder. Now, this surrender of a part of his old license, converted into the language of morality, corresponds to the *duty* to respect life, and the advantage secured by the surrender corresponds to security or *right* to life.

Again, a savage satisfies every sexual caprice. The citizen surrenders this license, and this surrender, translated into the language of morality, corresponds to the *duty* to respect chastity, and the advantage obtained by this surrender consists in security from assault and recognition of connubial *rights*.

Again, the savage takes what he chooses and keeps it as long as he chooses or can. A citizen takes and keeps only what the law allows. The surrender made by the citizen, translated into the language of morality, corresponds to the *duty* to respect property. The advantage he secures consists in security to and *right* in property. It is by a series, then, of surrenders that we secure rights and assume duties.

No one any longer doubts the wisdom and advantage to a community of the rights secured by the abandonment of the license enjoyed in a savage state to kill, maim, and rob ; but the right to property differs from the right to life and limb in a peculiar and important respect. For while the right to life and limb is a right which confers an unmixed good upon a community, the right to property has conferred upon those who have the faculty of accumulating it, or who by the law of inheritance are protected in the enjoyment of property they have not accumulated, opportunities for oppression. Now, when property is used by one set of men to oppress another it gives rise to conflict, and it may be said with-

out much exaggeration that most of the political problems of the present day arise out of this conflict. To the student the problem presents itself in this form: how can the advantages of property be preserved and the facilities for oppression be obviated?

The recognition of right to property has played an essential rôle in the progress of civilisation. Civilisation cannot advance save on the condition of securing a sufficient supply of the necessities of life or wealth; and wealth cannot be accumulated unless right to property be recognised. Indeed, the social state is differentiated from the state of isolated savagery by the notion of property; the notion of a man's property in his wife is at the basis of the domestic state; the notion of a man's property in his flock is at the basis of the pastoral state; the notion of a man's property in the land occupied by him is at the basis of the agricultural State. And although property has built up an aristocracy which up to this century has always been found in control of the agricultural State, property in its commercial and industrial development has broken up the power of the landed aristocracy, as, for example, that of the patrician in Rome and that of the feudal baron in the Middle Ages. The French Revolution was a revolt of the wealthy bourgeoisie against the noble and the throne; and French collectivists are to-day prophesying a new revolution of the workingman against the bourgeoisie.

How far this heralded revolt can be made consistent with a high degree of socialisation is not yet clear. It does seem clear, however, that in so far as private property can be used by a few to pauperise the many, the problem of property has not yet been solved consistently with a high standard of justice.

Let us, then, agree to define property as the right of the individual to the exclusive possession, enjoyment,

and disposition of things, subject to limitations determined in every nation by its own laws, — no system of laws regarding property having yet been devised that is consistent with a high standard of justice.

Bearing this definition in mind, liberty may roughly be divided into three kinds, — personal liberty, which is better understood to mean liberty from personal restraint or imprisonment; political liberty, which can be defined as the right by such peaceful methods as the ballot to determine the character of our political institutions, the power to direct legislation, and to determine to whom the administration of our laws shall be confided; and (the third and last great division of liberty) economic liberty. It is around and about economic liberty that most of the battles of the present day are waged.

§ 4. ECONOMIC LIBERTY

The great problem of economic liberty arises out of the conflict between the individualistic idea of civilisation and the socialistic idea of it. Extreme individualism is marked by ferocity and selfishness, and is illustrated by the lion, the tiger, and man in the savage state. Extreme socialism is marked by habits of altruism and affection, as illustrated by the bee, the ant, and man in the ideal Christian State; and here it must be observed that man has practically never reached the high condition of socialism observed in bees and ants; on the contrary, he stands midway between the extremes of individualism on the one hand and the extremes of socialism on the other.

It should be further observed that extreme individualism knows no law, no right, no duty; whereas socialism is the embodiment of law, of right, and of duty.

There are some standard objections to socialism which are singularly unsound. One is that individualism creates character. If by character is understood ferocity and selfishness, the proposition will not for a moment be disputed. But if by character is meant capacity for self-sacrifice and self-control, it ought not to be difficult to demonstrate that these qualities are hardly elicited by the individualistic condition at all, whereas they are necessary to a high degree of socialism and are promoted by it.

There is another argument of the individualist which seems equally unsound. It is the argument built upon a false use of the word "liberty;" for if we test individualistic ideals of liberty by their fruits, we shall find that they generally mean full play to selfishness for one-self, but full security from the selfishness of others. This is the ideal of liberty expressed by an oppressing employer when he demands the right to manage his own business as he chooses, or the right to do what he wishes with his own. It is against this false notion of liberty that we have particularly to guard.

There is, however, another argument of the individualist which puts him upon stronger ground. This argument is built upon the unfitness of humanity to-day for the socialistic State. Undoubtedly socialism in the full sense of the word — that is to say, the entire abolition of private property in the sources of production and the sole property of the sources of production in the State — involves a degree of altruism, self-sacrifice, and self-control which cannot be said to exist in our community to-day. The result of attempting to impose such a government upon any of our existing communities would probably be to create such dissatisfaction that government would become impossible. Solon, in proposing his Constitution for Athens, professed the desire

to give Athens, not the best government possible, but the best government that Athenians could endure. It is the application of this wise principle which makes unwise the idea of suddenly imposing socialistic forms of government upon a community little fitted for it. While, therefore, the individualist is clamouring for an ideal of liberty which, giving full play to the selfishness of the few, allows the few to oppress the many, the socialist is demanding institutions which, because they are compatible only with self-sacrifice and self-control, would, in a community in which neither is developed to a sufficient degree, probably lead through a period of factious discontent to anarchy. The practical statesman has to determine, not the degree of liberty a man ought in the end to enjoy or ought in the end to sacrifice, but rather the degree of liberty which present conditions can afford to allow in recognition of individualism on the one hand, or to curtail in the interests of socialism on the other.

The political problem that every community is to-day more or less unconsciously solving for itself is how to move towards a higher degree of socialisation fast enough to prevent revolution, and yet not so fast as to impose institutions more highly socialised than the individualistic instincts of the community can tolerate.

It is impossible to define these limits at large, for they vary in every community. It is, however, of interest to point out that the higher the degree of socialisation, the more rights of private property tend to be curtailed, and it may be laid down as a general rule that whenever rights of property become sufficiently oppressive upon a sufficient number they will certainly, under a popular government, be curtailed. For example, the right of property of one man in another has during this century been denied and abrogated. The right of

a landlord to ask what he likes for his land has been curtailed in Ireland. The right of a capitalist to manage his business as he chooses has been curtailed by factory legislation; and the growing tendency of municipalities to own and operate their own franchises is daily diminishing the scope of private capital and correspondingly increasing that of collectivism.

Every step through which the tendency of capital to oppress labour has been diminished serves to illustrate a fact of no small importance in connection with the problem of economic liberty. When the workingman first attempted to emancipate himself from what he regarded as the oppression of the capitalist, he regarded the capitalist as his enemy; all he could see was that the capitalist determined his rate of wages. He was not sufficiently well informed to see behind the capitalist the remorseless tyranny of the Market. To-day, when he has, by the organisation of trade unions and by the daily struggle with the capitalist, as an organised body, become enlightened as to the economic conditions under which both are suffering, he has become aware of the fact that he cannot in his own interests demand too high a rate of wages from his employer, because the moment the rate of wages becomes sufficiently high to consume the margin of profit, the employee ruins the employer. No one knows better than the organised trade union how merciless is the oppression of the Market upon the employer as well as upon the employee.

It has been pointed out that the system of private property has led to oppression, and that workingmen in the early part of the century were persuaded that this oppression was entirely due to the greed of their employers. Now, in so far as employers are lacking in generosity and in a sense of justice to their employees, they ought undoubtedly to be held responsible. But the or-

ganisation of trade unions has had for effect to demonstrate to the workingmen that their employers are very little less subject to the tyranny of the Market than themselves. For example, when workingmen were sufficiently organised to make a collective demand for higher wages, they often found themselves confronted by an employer who, with his books in his hands, showed that the prices he obtained for the product of their work barely left himself a margin for existence, and that any rise in wages would bring the cost of manufacture to such a point that he would be beaten in his own market by foreign competitors. Now the officers of trade unions in England have attained such knowledge and skill in computing the profit of their employer that they often know more exactly what the employer is earning than the employer himself; and they use this information to determine the occasions when they can demand a rise in wages and when, on the contrary, such demand could not be granted.

In this manner the workingman to-day is beginning to understand that the employer is as much under the domination of market price as the employee himself.

But the Market which rules mercilessly employer and employee alike exerts a perhaps still more disastrous influence beyond national limits. Demand is by no means constant. It varies with the wealth and prosperity of the community. During prosperous periods demand is great; but the very extent of demand one day is a sure forerunner of a decreased demand the next, and when the home demand diminishes, what is to become of the factories which have been mounted on a scale to meet a demand which no longer exists? Must the fires of the factory be extinguished? Must the workmen be dismissed to starve? Must the employer lose the capital he has invested in the industry? It is not well that

any of these things should occur, and to prevent this occurrence there is no other way than for the manufacturer to seek abroad the demand which no longer exists at home.

This perpetually recurring state of things, this tendency of production to outstrip effectual demand, is the goad that has driven England to colonise, and colonisation is only another word for conquest. England has no choice; either she must shut down her factories and see her self-respecting workmen driven to almshouses, or she must compel existing communities to trade with her against their will or create a new demand by creating new communities. Both of these systems mean war, for colonisation nearly always means either the conquest of natives or the conquest of a Power which can no longer keep natives in control.

The African continent is a great field for the former of these two processes; Turkey and Spain the Powers which are at this time best illustrating the second.

The Market, or, as Adam Smith in his eulogy of the competitive system describes it, "the higgling of the Market," has become master of us all.

With systematic persistence, the automatic regularity of which political economists until very lately were never weary of admiring, the Market reduces us to deceit amongst ourselves, — caveat emptor, — and, as regards our neighbours, to conquest.

Again, great wealth creates great needs, so that what is a luxury to a workingman becomes a necessity to a millionaire. And the millionaire who is for ever haunted by a fear of losing the wealth that makes these necessities possible is driven by his needs to the task of accumulation; so that, as all things the millionaire most values in the world can be obtained only through the instrumentality of wealth, wherever wealth can be ac-

cumulated there is also the millionaire. This explains Johannesburg.

But the object of this exposition is not to condemn wealth. On the contrary, wealth is essential to civilisation; to abolish wealth in a State would be to condemn it to the fate of Lacedæmon. It is not wealth which is the enemy; it is the competitive system, which, under the peaceful guise of the Market, exerts over us all, capitalist and labourer alike, a despotism as great as that of Genghis Khan. As great and more immoral; for whereas that of the Khan produced in its victims only subserviency, that of the Market produces selfishness, avarice, and deceit; it sets every man against his neighbour, by stealth within the community, and by open war outside of it.

The enemy of justice is not wealth; it is competition. To abolish competition altogether may be impossible; but the problem of how far competition can be diminished without, in the effort to diminish it, causing more misery than itself occasions, is one which contemporaneous history shows is being solved only in those civilisations that have substituted government by consent for government by compulsion.

It is in England, the United States, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Germany that the problem is being attacked; not in Russia, Turkey, or Thibet. And it is in proportion as the government is indeed a government of the people, by the people, for the people that the solution is becoming more and more effectual. Here, then, is the value of what we have termed political liberty, because it is only through political liberty that we can ever hope to acquire all the rest.

Now, the essential machinery through which political liberty works is the franchise.

It may be imagined that because the foregoing pre-

sents an argument in favour of popular government it is assumed that the government which the people enjoy in the countries quoted is good or even tolerable. No such assumption, however, is intended. On the contrary, if any assertion on this subject were necessary, it would rather be to the effect that the government in all these countries is not only bad, but intolerably so. But why is it bad? ~~Because~~ the competitive system makes it bad. The Market rules our government in the field of politics just as despotically as it rules the citizen in the field of economics. What interferes with the making of good laws? The financial interests of our legislators. What prevents good administration of the laws we have? The financial interests of both administrator and administered. Who controls the United States Senate? The Trusts. Who controls the New York Legislature? The New York Central Railroad. Who controls Parliament? It is a tradition amongst Englishmen that no man controls Parliament. And yet we hear faintly sometimes in England of the Beer Interest, and some people think a certain Chartered Company had something to do with the Transvaal war.

And who is to blame? Can a man, the day he enters Parliament, cease to live? Must he not derive his income from some business? And is there any business in the world which is not or cannot be affected by legislation?

We are caught within the meshes of the Market inextricably. And within these meshes few can be rich, and fewer still, honest.

In considering what if any remedy there is to this wicked condition of things we are brought back to the question of liberty. We have seen just how much political liberty we enjoy, and we ought now to be clear as to

how little we can be said to enjoy economic liberty at all. These pages will have been written in vain if they have not also made clear that although wealth does bestow a greater economic liberty on the wealthy than on the poor, the former are (with wider limits) as inevitably subject to the dominion of the Market as the rest. This condition of things is not a simple one; it is extremely complicated; to understand it requires a careful study of political economy in all its numerous branches, — industry, trade, finance, currency. Few problems require more knowledge and judgment for their solution than those of currency and finance; a ratio of sixteen to one has been proposed as a general panacea for the woes of the unwealthy, and the injustice of the enhancement in value of one metal over the other is argued in favour of it. But admitting this injustice, admitting that every time legal tender enhances in value the debtor class is wronged in the interest of the creditor, it is by no means sure that the condition of the creditor may not be such as to render a sudden reversal more pernicious to the debtor than to him. Moreover, if the sudden enhancement of gold in its relation to silver was unjust to the farmer, the sudden depreciation of gold in its relation to silver will certainly be equally unjust to the workingman. Those in favour of Free Silver assume that the same class will suffer by a remonetisation of silver that gained by its demonetisation. But this may not be true. On the contrary, the man who will suffer first and perhaps most from such a remonetisation will be the wage-earner.

Again, the intricacies of finance are such that the capitalist can often gain more by making a sacrifice than by refusing it. The day Jay Gould decided to disgorge a part of his ill-gotten gains he gained more by the rise in the stock of the company to which he made restitution than he lost by what he restored.

The one thing necessary in order to solve the economic problem is knowledge. Our workmen are intelligent, and they have in most of their trade unions shown a remarkable capacity for self-control and collective action. But they have not had the time to study; their knowledge is generally limited to the particular economic conditions under which they work, and only a very few of them have ever had a chance to peer outside.

Amongst the wealthy there is a growing sympathy with the working class and a growing indignation at the injustice which existing conditions occasion. But most of this class are so absorbed in the task of growing richer that they have little time to give to study, and those who do study generally wear blinders imposed by their individual interest that make the acquisition of knowledge difficult and that of wisdom almost impossible.

Ignorance, then, is our chief enemy, and closely allied with Ignorance is Greed. For surely the desire for wealth — in whomsoever it may be — which pursues it at the cost of poverty for others is greed. And in the word "greed" is included not only the greed of the miser, which is obvious and contemptible, but the greed of refinement, which, because we are accustomed to it, has ceased to be obvious; the greed of the dainty lady, which blinds her to the injustice of the conditions surrounding her through her dependence on the delicate things which these conditions contribute to furnish; the greed of the place-hunter, of the politician, nay, even the greed of the Church. The competitive system permits of wealth enough to furnish security for only very few; the large majority are in daily fear of poverty, and one-fifth are a hopeless prey to it. And so one-fifth of our population are the victims of Despair; and the rest are the slaves of Greed.

§ 5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the liberty or license of the savage state is attended by so many risks that as a matter of fact it is enjoyed by very few, sometimes only by one, at the cost of all the rest. This is a part of the predatory scheme which has become converted into the great scientific dogma couched in the words, "survival of the fittest." All the vices attend it and are promoted by it, — selfishness, ferocity, and lust. The finest results of its handiwork are to be found in the tiger and the ape.

Man has sought, by the exercise of intelligence and self-control, to emancipate himself from the operation of this cruel law; and every intelligent sacrifice he has made has been expressed in institutions which we to-day recognise as so many steps in the progress of civilisation. The very principle of the survival of the fittest which condemns the individualist to solitude, savagery, and sin comes in aid of every wise effort towards socialisation; for the higher the degree of socialisation of any given group, the stronger it is in the conflict with less highly socialised enemies. Thus the nations in which self-control was encouraged by the institution of monogamy have prevailed over those in which polygamy or polyandry contributed to diminish self-control rather than enhance it. And the nations in which patriarchs surrendered a part of their absolute power over their homes in order to combine against a common foe prevailed over those in which a fierce individualism made this sacrifice impossible. Tribes, the chiefs of which combined to constitute the Greek city, prevailed over those who refused to make the sacrifice necessitated by such a combination. But the Greek cities whose jealousies prevented permanent combination into

a great State were conquered by a nation free from such local impediments. And the States which in America have yielded their sovereignty to a powerful Federation have to-day become one of the great Powers of the earth.

And out of this slowly increasing socialisation emerge all the virtues, because socialisation cannot take place without them. So ferocity tends to disappear and is replaced by courage; lust is replaced by love; selfishness by altruism; license by liberty. And this process furnishes an answer to those who claim that virtue is a matter of opinion and geography. Men's minds may differ as to what virtue is; obviously there is a profound difference between the opinions on the subject of a Washington and of a Ute; or of Aguinaldo and McKinley; or of Kruger and Salisbury. But outside of these divergent opinions virtue remains as clearly and beautifully delineated as the Samothracean Nike; headless, perhaps, and armless, but still standing in superb defiance against all the winds of controversy. For virtue in any given community is an embodiment of its socialisation. Wherever the socialisation is low, virtue is low, nay, sometimes buried, as the Nike was for countless years, deep down under the mould of ignorance. But when wisdom raises the level of socialisation and removes man from the condition of the savage towards that of the saint, she removes the mould of ignorance from above the prostrate limbs, she lifts the goddess on her feet, and sets her up once more upon the prow of the ship of State, — a symbol of matter made alive and eternal through the genius of art and hope.

Virtue, then, includes all those qualities necessary to a high degree of socialisation. Vice includes all those qualities that make socialisation difficult or impossible.

Applying this definition to liberty, and without attempting at this time an exhaustive analysis of what liberty is, we may roughly divide it into —

Personal liberty, which is the freedom or security from *physical restraint* consistent with a high degree of socialisation.

Political liberty, which is the freedom or security from *governmental oppression* consistent with a high degree of socialisation.

Economic liberty, which is the freedom or security from *want* consistent with a high degree of socialisation.

In many countries constitutional government has provided the machinery through which political liberty can be enjoyed; in a few, such provisions as those of habeas corpus have to a large degree secured personal liberty; but in none is economic liberty enjoyed save by a comparative minority; and a large majority are reduced by economic conditions to a state of subjection.

Slowly the problem of economic liberty — the last of our great political problems — is being worked out. The solution of it proposed by collectivism is the one to which we shall next direct our attention; and in the course of our study of collectivism we shall have to return to and complete that of liberty.

BOOK II. COLLECTIVISM

INTRODUCTION

WHEN a French drayman harnesses his three Percherons to his cart, he sets them in a row tandem with their heads in the direction to which he desires to go, and by the use of the whip and certain conventional noises endeavours to co-ordinate the efforts of his team so that they all act as a unit to the utmost possible, every pound of work being employed usefully to move the cart with the least waste of energy in the desired direction. What should we say of a drayman who, instead of uniting the efforts of his horses by harnessing them all to the same end of his cart, should attach each one to a different end of it, and, applying the lash impartially to them all, set each one upon counteracting the efforts of the rest, so that the direction be determined by the accident which horse was the strongest, and the speed by the difference between the strength of one horse and that of those pulling against him?

We should say that such a drayman was mad. And yet this is practically what the competitive system does in setting one man against another in the work of production.

Obviously the illustration fails in many particulars. In such occupations as farming, every farmer produces the things which the community needs and asks for, and to this extent farmers co-operate; but it is the interest of every farmer that his neighbour's crop should fail in

order that his may secure a better price; it is the interest of the railroad to charge as high a price as it can wrest from the farmer for taking his crop to market; and it is the interest of the middleman to buy the farmer's crop at the lowest and sell at the highest possible price.

To this extent, therefore, farmer, middleman, and railroad are working against one another. These three represent three essential factors in the machinery of economics, — the producer, the transporter, and the salesman. It would be useful to the community that these three dray horses should pull together instead of pulling against one another, and in some communities, by the adoption of a simple expedient, the folly of our mad drayman's system is eliminated. In South Australia the railroads are owned by the State; the State carries goods as well as letters and telegrams. It has receiving-depots and a produce-export depot, and through the agency of the State the farmer can convert his produce into money with the assistance of the transporter and salesman instead of in conflict with him. "Now in South Australia all the farmer has to do when he wishes to send a box of butter, honey, or some sheep abroad, is to write to the agricultural department, and if they are approved and forwarded, the consignor has nothing more to do but sit at home and await returns by check."¹

The principle of extending the sphere of government so as to substitute co-operation for competition, as illustrated by this South Australian system, is the principle of collectivism; and those who believe in the possibility of ultimately extending this principle to its utmost limits look forward to a day when the State will own all so-called "sources of production," leaving to indi-

¹ Bulletin of the Academy of Political and Social Science, New Series, No. 10, p. 9.

viduals property only in the things they for personal convenience and enjoyment use.

There is, however, a widespread ignorance as to the effect of this system, and it may, therefore, be well at once to point out that it is by no means so revolutionary as is generally imagined. For example, were the State sole owner of the land, there need be but little difference between our tenure under the State and our tenure to-day. Every man who occupies land under the present system contributes to the extent of his occupation to the maintenance of the State. This contribution¹ is called a tax to-day; in a collectivist State it would be called rent. The principal change effected by collectivism would be as to the extent of any one man's holdings. In such a State no Winans could evict whole villages in order to secure a deer forest for his exclusive personal enjoyment; nor could a French chocolate manufacturer depopulate a Canadian island larger than one of our United States for a game preserve. But every man could enjoy the exclusive use of such land as he could within reasonable limits require, under a tenure just as secure as — or, with this Anticosti experience fresh in our minds, shall we not say far more secure than — under the existing plan.

Another widespread mistake regarding collectivism consists in the notion that it involves the division of property amongst the people. On the contrary, far from involving the principle of division or dissipation, collectivism is the embodiment of the principle of concentration. Mark Twain wittily objects to the proverb, "Don't put all your eggs in one basket," by substituting for it, "On the contrary, put all your eggs in one basket, but watch that basket." Collectivism proposes to vest in the State both land and capital, the private ownership

¹ In France taxes are called just what they are, "contributions."

of which now sets man against man, and to vest it under conditions which will put men shoulder to shoulder in co-operative production, eliminating anxiety, diminishing toil, and permitting a leisure and a freedom for the promotion of knowledge, culture, and art which the world has not yet seen. Above all, the economy of time occasioned by such a system would permit every individual voter to exercise a watchfulness over the State which is impossible under existing conditions, and the impossibility of which is perhaps the principal cause of administrative mismanagement and political corruption.

Collectivists do not necessarily demand or expect that collectivism be introduced suddenly or by violent means into the State. On the contrary, temperate collectivists — and we may disregard the views of the intemperate — ask for nothing more than the gradual introduction of a less unintelligent and of a less immoral economic system, by just such reforms as are being introduced to-day in almost every civilised country. In England municipalities are annually increasing the scope of their activities, acquiring their own gas-plants, water-works, and tramway systems; the same thing is taking place in the United States. In Switzerland the State has just decided to purchase its railroads; in Belgium, Prussia, and Austria the State owns many of them. In New Zealand and Australia State ownership is still more largely recognised. The collectivist, therefore, preaches nothing new, but rather justifies a political movement that has already begun.

It is possible and even probable that the movement may proceed too fast; that the State may not be able to accommodate itself to all the new functions which it is perhaps in some countries too rapidly assuming. In such case a reaction will undoubtedly set in, and such a reaction the prudent collectivist will not violently

resist. Such reactions furnish the periods of rest already alluded to,¹ which are found to be indispensable to organic development, and during such reactions, and indeed at all times, individualists will be for ever clamouring against collectivism and pointing out the hopelessness of the ideal towards which collectivists are striving. It is important, then, that this collectivist ideal be temperately set forth, in order to silence the contention that it is altogether ridiculous.

In order to anticipate this clamour it is important also to point out, first, the difference between collectivism as a method from collectivism as an ideal, and, secondly, that, even as an ideal, collectivism is not the utterly insane thing people generally imagine it to be.

As regards the first point, it is unnecessary to repeat here what has already been explained in the preface; and as regards the second, no more need be added than the consideration that the practicability of ideal collectivism forms no essential parts of collectivist doctrine. This last is so important a point that it deserves careful emphasis.

It would be perfectly proper to leave out of this work all reference to ideal collectivism, and, indeed, in the first plan laid down it was decided to treat ideal collectivism as a non-essential and leave it out of the discussion altogether. To this method of treatment, however, there is a serious objection. Individualists find their strongest ground of vantage in the supposed impracticability of collectivism, both as a method and as an ideal, and, in discussing its demerits, confound the two so as to throw upon the method some of the objections that apply only to the ideal, and upon the ideal some that apply only to the method. For example, it is an objection to ideal collectivism that men are not

¹ Vol I., pp. 157-164.

yet good and wise enough for it, but this objection does not apply to the method; for if New York is not too bad and foolish to own its own water-works, it is not too bad and foolish to own its gas-works also. Again, it may be an objection to the method that municipal ownership may lead to extravagance, but this objection has no application to ideal collectivism, the economy of which no one will put in question. Again, individualists, in discussing the method, are never tired of pointing out the hopelessness of the ideal to which it tends; they denounce the suggestion that New York should own its gas-works as "the thin end of the wedge," and disparage the programme by derisive taunts at the ideal. Now, although men are not to-day fit for ideal collectivism, and it would probably be a great mistake to attempt suddenly to introduce it, the scheme itself, as applied to an improved generation, is not as foolish a thing as individualists maintain it to be. If individualists were right in contending that the extension of State functions would inevitably lead us to peril or ruin, then we should have to pause before entering upon it. But if, on the contrary, the extension of State functions may lead us to continually improved conditions, and if introduced gradually cannot have for consequence anything worse than a temporary stay in the progress towards such improvement, then this clamour of individualists about the "thin end of the wedge" may be disregarded; and if, pushing our argument to its extreme limits, the big end of the wedge turns out to be nothing worse than the very best condition, economic, social, and political, that humanity is at all capable of, then this clamour can be turned against the individualists, and out of it a justification found for the very programme against which it is directed.

For this reason it has been considered wise to look at

this dreaded Gorgon of collectivism in the face, take it at its very worst, scan it feature by feature, and challenge for ourselves with deliberation the conclusions that many are induced to assume from others through ridicule.

Without admitting, therefore, that it is incumbent upon the practical collectivist—that is to say, the man who proposes collectivism as a programme—to prove the attainability of ideal collectivism or collectivism regarded as an end, the attempt will be made to present the scheme of government to which collectivism tends, in its least practicable extreme, so that we may deliberately study the very worst that can happen to us by persevering in the collectivist programme. And incidentally it may be pointed out that while individualists are for ever sneering at the hopelessly happy results of the collectivist programme, they carefully keep in the background the hopelessly unhappy condition to which their own condemns us. They mock at collectivists for having an ideal, but are silent as to the fact that they themselves have none. They warn us that collectivist schemes of improvement are too beautiful to be true, forgetting that the pathos of their own programme is too true to be beautiful.

The enormity of believing that human misery can be lessened is the charge brought against collectivism, whether as a method or as an ideal. Let us, then, grapple with it at its worst, in its most undiluted shape, and judge for ourselves whether, even if to the utmost degree possible realised, it would be as bad as it has been painted.

Before presenting, however, the collectivist ideal, one reservation cannot be too strongly emphasised: it has been explained that no reasonable collectivist proposes to introduce a complete collectivist system suddenly

upon the State. Of the many reasons against such an attempt the principal one, perhaps, is that the existing generation is totally unfit for it. But a social condition which would be impossible to our generation would be not only possible but highly beneficial to a generation that had been educated to it. If in a community no child had ever seen one man working for another, but every child had from its infancy been accustomed to the thought that every human being without exception was expected to devote three or four hours out of the day to the work of the State, there would be neither desire to reduce fellow-creatures to servitude nor repugnance at the necessity of compulsory work. In other words, a condition that would be intolerable to such of us as seem to-day to be masters of our own time and of that of others, would not be intolerable to a future generation to which such an apparent mastery had never been known.

All the instincts of the wealthy and of the educated have been formed under conditions so different from those of a collectivist State that it is difficult for us to conceive of such a State without repugnance. In order properly to understand ideal collectivism, we ought to divest ourselves of these instincts and consider it from the point of view, not of ourselves, but of the future generation, whose moral instincts will not have been blunted by the habit of lording it over their fellow-creatures.

If we can rid our minds of the immoral prejudices which our economic conditions have imposed upon us, we may then be able to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of collectivism, — not for ourselves, who are unfit for it, but for an as yet unborn generation less ill used than ourselves by prosperity and selfishness.

The task is a difficult one, and yet it is indispensable to a fair estimate of collectivism. Those, therefore,

who are incapacitated by selfish instincts from accomplishing it, are not likely to read the following pages understandingly. It is only for those who can escape from the bondage of instinct that the attempt will be made to give some account of a scheme of government that they only can understand. But, however difficult it may be for us to-day to appreciate the possibilities of a complete collectivism, it is by no means so difficult to understand the advantages to be derived from the slow application of collectivist principles in so far as the present generation is capable of it. It cannot be too often repeated that it is by no means necessary to collectivism, whether regarded as an economic theory or as a political programme, that it should be proved to be ever possible or practicable in its ideal or ultimate development. The principal aim of this book is to destroy the doctrine of Herbert Spencer that there are sound scientific, economic, or political grounds for reducing government to the least possible. The extent to which collectivism can be wisely resorted to depends upon the economic, political, and moral development of the people. Many intelligent Italians believe Milan to be capable of assuming the control of its own franchises, but would deplore any general attempt at the municipalisation of franchises in all the cities of Italy. Keeping in view, then, the essentially local character of the political problem presented by collectivism, let us attack the question of collectivism by considering the definition of it given by Schäffle, who has written one book for the purpose of telling us what it is, and another for the purpose of explaining that it is impossible.

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS COLLECTIVISM?

SCHÄFFLE defines collectivism as follows:—

“The economic quintessence of the socialistic programme, the real aim of the international movement, is as follows:

“To replace the system of private capital (i. e. the speculative method of production, regulated on behalf of society only by the free competition of private enterprises) by a system of collective capital; that is, by a method of production which would introduce a unified (social or ‘collective’) organisation of national labour, on the basis of collective or common ownership of the means of production by all the members of the society. This collective method of production would remove the present competitive system by placing under official administration such departments of production as can be managed collectively (socially or co-operatively) as well as the distribution among all of the common produce of all, according to the amount of social utility of the productive labour of each.

“This represents in the shortest possible formula the aim of the socialism of to-day, however variously expressed, and in some cases obscurely conceived, may be the proposed methods for attaining it.”¹

To this account of ideal collectivism the following observations may be made:—

In the first place, if I were undertaking to make a definition of ideal collectivism, I should avoid the use of the word “official” because the official under our

¹ The Quintessence of Socialism, Dr. A. Schäffle, p. 3.

present system is and must be a totally different person from the official under the collectivist State, for reasons which will be explained later. To use the word "official," therefore, in connection with the administration of a collectivist State, is to associate with such a State the notion of an intolerable bureaucracy. As this is one of the standing objections to collectivism it will have to be considered separately later on.

In the second place, and this is by far the most important change that will be proposed to Schäffle's formula, the attempt to distribute "among all the common produce of all, according to the amount of social utility of the productive labour of each," is not a necessary feature of collectivism. On the contrary, in the form of collectivism that seems least impractical, there will be comparatively little attempt made to distribute the income of the community amongst its members in proportion to the amount or utility of the productive labour of each, but rather all will to the utmost possible share equally in the income of the community. Nevertheless, the inevitable natural inequalities amongst men will make it much easier for some to perform their allotted task than others, and therefore, although all will receive the same share of the community income, some will receive it with less labour, and doubtless with less disagreeable labour, than others; and these, as they enjoy a larger leisure than the others, will be at liberty to apply this leisure either to their own pleasure and advantage or to the public good. Moreover, no rigid rules can be laid down on this point. The collectivism of one State is likely to differ from that of other States just as much as popular government in the United States differs from popular government in France. It may be found convenient to confine the system of equal sharing to the barest necessities of life, or, on the contrary, to apply it

to all its comforts and superfluities; this will depend upon the character of the people and the extent of their development.

Justice, according to many authors, demands that men should be rewarded according to their utility, — in other words, that human institutions should proceed exactly as Nature does; for Nature begins by committing the injustice of favouring one individual at birth more than another; and she adds to this injustice throughout the entire life of her favourite; for the favours granted at birth continue throughout his life so to operate as to sacrifice all others to him. Now, this consequence of natural injustice at birth is exactly what man has attempted to resist; he has already so far succeeded that the man of excelling muscular strength no longer lords it over his fellows, but he has substituted for the tyranny of muscular strength the tyranny of that particular form of craft which is skilful in amassing wealth. One tyranny is as bad, and in some respects worse, than the other. The moral rule is not, "Do unto others according as they are able to do unto you;" it is, "Do unto others according as you would they should do unto you." Act with others according to their weakness and your own, rather than according to their strength and your own. In other words, diminish for every man the consequence of Nature's injustice. If he is sick, nurse him; if he is weak, strengthen him. This is the order of justice.

But even if this moral rule be set aside as non-existing, if we look only to the question how we can so frame our institutions as to make the whole sum of happiness the greatest possible, it is conceivable that a different economic system might substitute for selfishness that form of it which seeks satisfaction mainly through the

¹ See chap. v., Practical Working of Collectivism.

satisfaction of others. In communities of ants and bees nature has done it; and man can do it for himself by suppressing the selfishness that characterises our present competitive system and is at the same time the direct consequence of it.

One of the worst results of our competitive system is that it rewards men according to their deeds, giving to the few more than they need, and to the many less; stimulating them to effort for the purpose of benefiting self, instead of for the purpose of benefiting the community. The higher order of selfishness, called altruism, has already been realised in the family: a man works for his family because he loves it; altruism has also been realised, but to a less degree, in the city and the State. A man will work for his country — nay, will die for it — because he loves it. The next step in altruism is not so impossible as it seems, if once our institutions make it possible. Relieve a man from the necessity of always working for himself, and he will soon acquire and possibly delight in the taste for working for others.

The form of ideal collectivism then proposed here is one in which every man will receive to the utmost possible the same share of the national income, and not one that gives to men according to their deeds; for this last would stimulate selfishness, and selfishness is the great obstacle to human happiness. Those who propose to admit this stimulus into the ideal collectivist State lose the moral point of collectivism, the main purpose of which is to strike at the root of selfishness. To expose society to the changes involved in collectivism without removing the stimulus of selfishness would, from the moral point of view, be to attack the symptom and leave undiminished the disease.

The Spencerian doctrine that justice involves the idea

of "inequality of benefits" is consistent with the brutal predatory plan of Nature, but inconsistent with the human ideal which seeks to compensate the unfortunate for the unhappiness to which natural defects expose them. For gifted men are those whom Nature favours; every gift is a source of happiness. Intelligence furnishes the resource of mental stimulation; all creative faculty bestows moments of creative rapture; physical strength contributes to the joy of life; all these things are in themselves sources of happiness. Our present social institutions add wealth to these gifted men, so that they not only enjoy the happiness that flows naturally from their natural gifts, but also the further happiness that springs from riches. A lawyer enjoys the exercise of his profession; he would not willingly abandon the triumphs of the court-room in order to break stones on the highway. A journalist enjoys the sparkle of his own editorial; the sculptor enjoys the plasticity his art gives to implastic stone. Their occupation is in itself a delight; it ought to be delight enough, and would be delight enough, were necessities and ordinary comfort provided for them. But under our competitive system, success in the struggle for wealth brings to these men wealth also, whereas the ungifted have poverty added to the drudgery of their employment. These are the conditions condemned by Christ in the words: "Unto every one that hath shall be given, . . . but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath."

Were this a necessary condition, it would have to be endured; but Christ has himself suggested a different ideal, — one under which the gifted man shall account to his fellow-creatures for his gifts, and not make of them an instrument of oppression; one under which the ungifted man shall at any rate be assured by the community

the same necessities and ordinary comforts as the gifted; and thus — if he may not enjoy the raptures of the creative faculty — he may at any rate be saved from anxiety and want. So only can be realised the social condition proposed by Christ under which “Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.”

The aim of collectivism is to substitute love of the neighbour for love of self by framing institutions that make this substitution possible. Nature furnishes us with such institutions in the beehive and the ant’s nest. These, however, must be adapted to the care for the individual which characterises human justice and is conspicuous by its absence from animal communities. But the fact that Nature has furnished us a model of collectivism must not be forgotten in answer to those who contend that collectivism is impossible because it is contrary to Nature.

The form of collectivism proposed by Schäffle is that in which the members of the community are to receive an income proportionate to deeds, whereas that proposed by the form of collectivism under discussion will distribute national income in proportion to needs; the needs of every individual being recognised as practically the same.

I say practically, because, in working out the scheme, considerable difference will be found to exist between individuals in this respect, and these differences of needs will give rise to differences of possession without unduly stimulating selfishness or causing discontent. A study of these details, however, must be postponed until the main lines of the collectivist scheme have been presented.

Another reason why a collectivism which endeavours

to distribute national income according to the utility of the labour of each is not recommended as a solution of our social problem is this: we have laid down the general proposition that if the environment is one which stimulates selfishness, the individual will tend, under the influence of this environment, to become more selfish. Now, if the collectivism proposed continually urges individuals to work for the State for no other motive than that their work result in direct advantage to themselves, they will not be working for the community, but for themselves. The moral purpose of collectivism, in so far as it attempts to solve the problem of environment, is to substitute for this sort of selfish interest an interest in the community which will benefit self only on the condition of equally benefiting all the other members thereof. That those most gifted by nature, and therefore able to accomplish their work with the least pain to themselves, are to receive a larger share of the national income than their less gifted brothers, who are obliged, in order to perform their allotted task, to work longer hours at an occupation possibly less agreeable to themselves, is clearly neither just in principle nor beneficial in result; for such a system would tend to stimulate the very same kind of selfishness as is stimulated by our present system, and as it is the moral purpose of collectivism to eradicate. If, therefore, the conclusions to which we have come in the preceding pages are at all sound, such a collectivism as this would fail to solve the moral problem which we have before us; namely, the problem of how to modify our artificial environment so that instead of stimulating selfishness it will stimulate the reverse of selfishness, or altruism.

The form of collectivism, therefore, that will best meet what seem to be the moral necessities of the situation is one in which no individual can gain much save

through the gain of all his fellows, the motive of every man being as much as possible to benefit the whole community, and only through the benefit of the whole community benefit himself. In addition, however, to the theoretical argument against dividing income according to deeds derived from the advisableness of diminishing selfishness in the community, there is a practical argument against it which is of no small importance:

Those who oppose collectivism very properly point out that if the social income is to be divided according to deeds, the division must be intrusted to the government; and that the power of determining how much of social income is to be enjoyed by the various members of a community is a power far greater in extent and far more liable to abuse than any power enjoyed by any civilised government to-day. If the scramble for office, which must always take place, whatever be the economic scheme of society, is to be intensified by the fact that the heads of the government are not only to enjoy the consideration and authority that pertain to office, but also are to have the power of distributing national income according to deeds, politics would, under such a system, tend to become a field for the basest intrigue and the most remorseless audacity. Such a collectivism would submit the fortune of every individual to the *ipse dixit* of those who had control of the government. A more arbitrary form of government, or one more likely to result in injustice, cannot well be conceived. It is true that ingenious plans have been devised for determining division according to deeds; but all of them must necessarily give rise to endless discussion and manifold interpretations, and would have ultimately to be left to the decision of some State official, administrative or judicial. Hence would arise the necessity for a large and expensive judicial organisation with an elaborate system

of courts, juries, lawyers, attorney-generals, and district attorneys; and, indeed, it is probable that the economy resulting from collective production would be more than compensated by the waste of time involved in the determination of how collective income should be divided.

The scheme of collectivism, therefore, proposed in these pages proceeds upon a simpler plan: it follows nature closely, for it follows the plan of the ant-hill. Every community undertakes to furnish for the individuals which constitute it a certain amount of food, of comforts, of luxuries, of security, and of pleasure. Justice demands that the race be not exhausted or degenerated by the process of obtaining these, and, above all, that the necessity of procuring food be not used by a skilful few as a means for exploiting the many. It is submitted that this demand of justice would be attained were the State to set all the citizens at work according to their best abilities, every citizen working for the benefit of the community during the comparatively few hours that would be required to secure necessities and ordinary comforts; that all should share in these necessities and ordinary comforts equally; and that such a plan would afford a large amount of leisure which every individual could apply to the pursuit of pleasure, whether in the shape of luxury, or art, or literature, or the satisfaction of individual aspirations. We shall later show that such a plan would secure the greatest economy of production and the greatest personal liberty; that it would eliminate every *economic* occasion of injustice, and, by diminishing base motives of action to a minimum and relieving humanity from the exhaustion which attends competition, advance the race in body, mind, and spirit.

This aspect of collectivism furnishes an opportunity

for disposing of one objection to it, which is more popular than well founded. It is a favourite way of disposing of collectivism to say that it is a form of society fit only for angels and not fit for men; or, in other words, that so long as men are human they are not fitted for a collectivist society. This objection would be founded if, as a matter of fact, collectivism disregarded the natural and social needs of man; but it is not true of the collectivism proposed. The principal natural needs of man are food, clothing, comfort, and the satisfaction of his natural affections. These needs belong to that natural part of man which political institutions cannot eliminate. Any political scheme which undertook to ignore these would be false. Far from ignoring these, however, collectivism seeks only to furnish to these needs the highest form of satisfaction. It further recognises that man not only seeks the satisfaction of his physical needs, but also of his moral needs; and that the attempt to satisfy physical without at the same time satisfying moral needs is bound to lead to as much unhappiness as the attempt to satisfy moral needs without regard to those that are physical. Now the system under which we live makes just this last mistake. It stimulates men to satisfy their physical needs at the cost of cruelty to their neighbour, and in so doing it keeps men not only unjust, but unhappy; for the unhappiness which a man occasions in others tends to come back to him ultimately in some form or other.

The collectivist plan, on the contrary, recognises that man has moral as well as physical needs, and it proposes to minister to both by making the interest of every man in the satisfaction of his physical needs consistent with the satisfaction of those that are moral also.

We shall remain all wrong about collectivism if we imagine that it ignores the natural needs of man. On

the contrary, it begins by recognising that every man is, and must always be, engaged in the pursuit of happiness, and it proposes to make that pursuit more successful than under the present system. It proposes to eliminate from this pursuit to the utmost possible the bitterness that attends not only struggle and defeat, but, under the competitive system, success also. It proposes to add to the pursuit of happiness the satisfaction that results from benefiting others as well as ourselves. It proposes to dignify labour, so that the more menial it is, the more beautiful; for it is rendered not unwillingly upon the compulsion of a sometime odious master, but willingly as a contribution to the general good.

Collectivism takes all the cynicism out of a doctrine against which many rebel because they do not understand it. I mean the doctrine that selfishness is ineradicable, and that, although one form of selfishness may be substituted for another, the substituted form will be selfish, however much it may be higher in character. For example, a man who obeys a generous impulse and gives alms to the poor is declared by this doctrine to be as selfish as the man who refuses alms, because the philanthropist is gratifying himself in giving the alms as much as his opposite is gratifying himself in refusing them. In one sense there is no doubt about the truth of this statement, for we are all seeking our gratification and we are all to this extent selfish; but one man is driven by his selfishness and the industrial environment to the gratification of himself without regard to others, whereas other men are urged, in spite of the artificial environment which surrounds them, to gratify themselves by contributing to the happiness of others. As the selfishness of the former causes pain to others, whereas that of the latter causes benefit and happiness to others, clearly that of the latter is preferable in the

social state to that of the former. But we are confronted under existing conditions with the appalling fact that the man who yields to the impulse of charity and gives alms to a suffering fellow-creature is often doing a greater injury to the whole community than the man who, obeying another kind of selfishness, refuses them. In the presence of such an anomalous condition as this we cannot but ask ourselves whether it is not possible to imagine conditions different from those which prevail, and under which the generous form of selfishness may be stimulated rather than the other.

Now this is practically what collectivism seeks to do. It seeks to create conditions under which men will be benefited through the operation of generous impulses, rather than through those that are base.

But all this discussion will seem vain to a man who is convinced that it is impossible to frame a form of government which will at the same time recognise the inequality between men, and also contrive so that those inequalities shall not result for men in very different degrees of happiness.

Let me, then, at once remind such a reader that in the chapter on Justice the possibility of altogether eliminating the consequences to men of the inequalities which characterise them has been fully admitted; but it was at the same time laid down that human justice is a struggle with these inequalities, having for its purpose the reduction to the utmost possible of the unhappiness which results therefrom. It was there recognised that such inequalities as made one man more or less attractive than another inevitably tended to make one man more or less happy than the other; the same is true as regards health; the same is true as regards intelligence; the same is true as regards physical strength. No man

who has enjoyed the exercise of physical strength can pretend that a weak man is not to that extent less happy than a strong man; no man who has exercised the faculty of intelligence can pretend that he is not to that extent a happier man than an unintelligent one. The problem before us is not to obliterate all the consequences of inequality, for this we have admitted we can never do; but what it is possible to do in the way of diminishing the consequences of these inequalities, this is what man, in aiming at justice, has attempted to do; this is what our duty binds us to do; this is what religion orders us to do; and this is what, by an intelligent study of political and economic science, man may to a great extent ultimately accomplish.

Recognising, therefore, the limits which are imposed upon us by the inequalities of nature with which we are powerless to grapple, but recognising at the same time the inequalities which we by our unintelligent interference with nature have ourselves created, it may be possible for us to conceive of a system which will at any rate eliminate the inequalities we have ourselves added to those of nature.

In proposing to abolish the principle of private property in the sources of production, we must be careful to distinguish what we mean by sources of production. It is not part of the collectivist plan to deprive men of property in the things which they themselves use for their personal comfort and pleasure; as, for example, in the things that contribute to making a man's home pleasant to him, — his furniture, his books, his works of art, his musical instruments, and other instruments of pleasure. It will be seen, when we get a completer idea of the collectivist scheme, that there is no injury to society in a man's owning these things and at his death passing them on to his children.

The essential feature of collectivism is, that it prevents any man from making himself master of the sources of production so *as to use this mastery for the exploitation of other men.* Everything which constitutes a natural monopoly is to belong to the State. Land is to belong to the State, or to be controlled by it, and no individual is by property in land to demand rent of a fellow-citizen; and as the land belongs to the State, the product of land will also belong to the State; and no man is, by accumulating this product and depriving others of it, to put himself in a position to exact service therefor from his fellow-citizens. As a natural consequence of this, the State being the owner of all the sources of production and of the product itself, the State alone will be in a position to command and control the labour of the citizens, so far as that labour is necessary to the support of the community.

And here we come to the next obvious objection to socialism suggested by the word "State." Those born and bred under existing conditions will answer that the State thus constituted sole proprietor of land and the produce of land, sole distributor of this produce, and sole mistress of the labour of her citizens, will constitute as despotic a power as the world has ever seen; that this despotic power will go into the hands of the mob, which will use it for its own advantage, and that no tyranny excels the tyranny of a mob.

Undoubtedly this objection is one which goes to the very root of the question; and undoubtedly, if the officials of the collectivist State are to any degree to resemble the officials of the State in which we live, and if they are to be remunerated as these officials are; if they are to form part of a political machine at all similar to that which now appoints them; and if, being such officials as those we now have, they are to enjoy

the power which it is proposed to grant in the collectivist State, — nothing can be conceived more odious or abominable than such a power in such hands. And this is just where it becomes necessary that we should exercise all the power of imagination that we have in order to escape from the bondage of ideas under which we are committed to the view of officialism by the conditions under which we live, and under which for thousands of years our ancestors have lived before us. For we have to begin by eradicating from our minds the picture which naturally suggests itself when we use the word "official."

The official under our existing conditions is a man who, driven by the necessity of making his bread, has offered himself for service to the State. His employer is either the State to which he has to be subservient, as in Prussia, or is a political Boss, as in the United States.

In the first case, the official becomes part of a system under which one class undertakes to govern the rest of the nation, seeking its own benefit first, and the benefit of the governed only in so far as that benefit is secondary to its own. In the second case, he is a part of a machine which is engaged in practically the same work, except that while in the former case the governing class is more or less consented to by the governed, in the case of a political machine the consent of the governed class has been obtained through a sort of unconscious fraud, and in consequence of a defect in the political machinery of the State. In both cases, however, the official is operated upon primarily by the motive of taking care of himself, and only secondarily, if at all, by the desire to take care of those for whose benefit his office has been constituted. Moreover, the necessity of maintaining himself or securing advancement in office creates a

subserviency to the power that put him there, and this power is a selfish power in both cases, and in one is generally corrupt.

The point to which attention must chiefly be directed in considering the position of an official under our present system is that the official is always haunted by the fear, not only of losing advancement, but also of losing with it the increased facility advancement gives him of making bread.

The official in a collectivist State would occupy a totally different position. He has nothing financially to gain or lose from the office he occupies; his share in the national income is exactly the same whether he occupies the official place or not. There is therefore no haunting fear lest he lose the place, nor is there any subserviency to a governing class or to a political machine arising out of the necessity for making bread, which is the primary necessity of our present system. In fact, in a collectivist State every individual is an official, and thereby put on an absolute equality, so far as officialism is concerned, with every other member of it. The man who is growing corn is an official of the State; the man who is killing cattle is an official of the State; the man who is distributing dry-goods is an official of the State; the man who is administering justice is an official of the State.

There may and will, of course, be in the collectivist State, as in ours, a great difference between the consideration which is attached to various functions in the State; and here we have to recognise the inevitable reflection in the State of the natural inequalities of men. If a man is fitted by his physique for physical labour and not fitted by intelligence for intellectual labour, the advantage of the State is that he should do the physical labour and leave the intellectual labour to the intelligent;

but under our system the man fitted by nature for physical labour and correspondingly unfitted for intellectual is urged by the higher rewards given to the latter to seek the employment for which he is unfitted, or to destroy the system which excludes him from it; whereas under the collectivist State the physically strong man will have no mercenary motive for trying to do the work of the intelligent man, nor will the intelligent man have any mercenary motive for trying to do the work of his physical superiors. All receiving substantially the same income from the State, the mercenary motive disappears; all being in the service of the State, many of the worst features of officialism disappear.

To conceive, therefore, of the official under a collectivist State as being in any sense like an official of our own State, is altogether to fail in understanding what is meant by collectivism. Nevertheless, there is no doubt but that collectivism must be postponed until selfishness is a less paramount factor in human character than to-day, for selfishness has a dangerous influence upon those occupying positions of authority. Under the existing system the tendency of selfishness is to convert government into an intolerable bureaucracy; for those who form part of the governing body, being alive to the fact that their maintenance in power depends considerably upon the docility of those governed, are unconsciously set upon promoting this docility. The official tends to put on more and more the language of authority and to exact from the public more and more that of subservience; in such a country as Prussia this tendency is plainly visible on both classes. Prudence has made the people submissive, and power has made the official intolerable. In countries such as ours, where popular institutions have long prevailed, this tendency is much less observable, and in proportion as the

people becomes more in fact the controlling influence, it is likely to give way altogether to a more enlightened view, which will put the official more in the position of an adviser to the public than in that of its master.

In the closing chapters of this volume collectivism will be presented from the moral point of view. It may be that the importance of this view has been exaggerated. To those, however, who have endeavoured and failed to reconcile a just life with the inevitable struggle for life that characterises the competitive system, collectivism offers the only solution. If, then, collectivism renders easy a religious life that is difficult or impossible under existing conditions, and if it offers a hope capable of inspiring earnest people with an abiding enthusiasm, then it may not be unreasonable to expect that the official may not only be liberated from the mercenary motive, but be inspired by a faith and courage that will banish the perfunctoriness characteristic of the present irreligious age. And if existing conditions nevertheless permit of so zealous and efficient a post-office official as Anthony Trollope,¹ what may we not hope of conditions that will tend to bring to government service courage, hope, and conviction?

It is doubtful whether our community is ready yet for a system which would give the officials that exercise power a much larger control over our daily lives than they now have. It is probable that the evils attending such a system, if thrust upon us by a revolution of the working classes, would be considerable; for they have not learned to govern with consideration, and surely the wealthy are not yet ready to submit without resistance.

But we have seen that the various functions of the State will differ much in the character of the labour

¹ See Anthony Trollope's *Autobiography*.

they involve; and this suggests a new problem on the one hand, and the solution of a problem on the other.

The problem it suggests is this: if more labour is involved in some functions in the State than in others, how will these functions be distributed without arousing discontent?

As has been already stated, collectivists have erred in claiming that all causes of discontent will be abolished by collectivism; for it must be admitted that it is probably impossible so to distribute the functions of a social system as to cause no discontent. These causes can, however, be diminished, and the method proposed by Rodbertus is, slightly modified, roughly as follows:

Different employments differ in hardship and in agreeableness. It is harder work to dig than to sew; it is less agreeable to dig underground than above ground; to stoke at the mouth of a furnace than to hoist sail on deck. Under the present system the differences between these kinds of employment are expressed in wages. The navvy gets higher wages than the sewing-girl; the miner gets higher wages than the navvy; and the stoker gets higher wages than all. Under the collectivist plan, this method of rewarding a more arduous or disagreeable employment is impossible; it is proposed, therefore, to reward it in time, — that is, the more arduous and the more disagreeable an employment, the less will be the time of employment; on the other hand, the less arduous and the more agreeable the work, the longer will be the time of employment. If we assume six hours' work to be the time which the farmer will daily devote to working in the field, the miner will not be called upon to work longer than three hours; and if six hours be deemed a day's work for a sailor, three hours will be regarded as sufficient work for a stoker; or, indeed, inasmuch as even three hours of stoking may well be

regarded as excessive, it could be arranged that sailors take their turn at stoking, thereby reducing the hours of stoking for every man to such an extent as to make what is now an occupation so odious that few except drunkards can be induced to engage in it, a matter of such short inconvenience as not to form an important feature in a sailor's life.

It may be objected that one man's day's work is a very different thing from another man's, or in other words, while one man will show considerable results at the end of the day, his neighbour may show very little. This is undoubtedly true; but it forms no objection to the plan, because the experience of trade unions has shown that in most trades piece-work is possible and actually employed; for example, factories engaged in the cotton industry are run on the piece-work plan; miners work on the piece-work plan. Out of a total trade-union membership in Great Britain of 1,003,000, more than half—that is, 573,000—insist on piece-work; 140,000 use both piece-work and time-work in various departments; only 290,000 insist on time-work, and this not because it would be impossible to frame a scheme of piece-work for these protesting trade unions, but because the variety of the work involved in these trades makes collective bargaining for each variety difficult.

Under these circumstances work would be done in a collective State almost entirely on the piece-work plan, so that those who got through their work with the greatest rapidity would enjoy the greatest amount of leisure. All those who showed a disposition to shirk work would be put to a piece-work trade, and only those who showed willingness to work would be put to a trade in which piece-work was impossible.

Trade-unionism has rendered no small service in

demonstrating the possibility of this piece-work system ; for if it is taken in connection with a recognition of the fact that, some employments being more onerous or disagreeable than others, a less amount of time ought to be exacted from those engaged in the one than from those engaged in the other, it is obvious that tasks could be so contrived as to permit of a distribution that would be approximately just. For it will be possible under the piece-work plan to permit those who are able to work more expeditiously than others to secure for themselves the advantage of their natural superiority without thereby causing the slightest prejudice to their inferiors. Again, — and upon this point too much emphasis cannot be placed, — a large use of piece-work removes the objection to collectivism that, being deprived of the spur of self-interest, work will be done perfunctorily, and the economy occasioned by collective action more than compensated by laziness and lack of zeal. This objection would be a formidable one were labour to be parcelled out according to time ; but the moment it is parcelled out on the piece-work plan every worker has an interest in getting through his work with the greatest possible despatch. And here is illustrated one of the features of collectivism which most advantageously contrasts it with the competitive system. Under the competitive system the principal way in which we secure what we want is through the instrumentality of money. Do we want consideration ? We purchase it with money. Do we want leisure ? We purchase it with money. Do we want love ? We even purchase love with money ; and, when not purchasable, we can rarely without money enjoy it. Under collectivism the sordid element of money is eliminated. If we want the consideration of our fellow-creatures at large, we must earn it directly by the service we render them and by the

affection that prompts this service; if we want to marry, no want of money need stand in the way; if we want leisure and the liberty that belongs to leisure, we must earn them directly by the rapidity and efficiency of our work. In other words, the competitive system in making money the channel through which all the good things of the world are procured creates an environment that favours the qualities of the money-maker, or selfishness; collectivism, on the contrary, creates an environment that favours the social qualities, or altruism.

State education will obviously furnish a classification of youth according to ability, physical and mental, so that no individual, while at school or after leaving school, will be called upon to do work for which he is physically or mentally unfit.

Within the limits imposed by this classification, there ought to be not only the fullest opportunity for choice of tasks on the part of individuals, but wherever choice cannot be exerted, owing to a large demand for the particular kind of occupation preferred, the fullest opportunity for rotation ought to and could exist, so that no one class of individual should be subjected to distasteful occupation for a longer period than another.

It is obvious that in the drawing up of this scheme of occupation there is ample room for error and injustice. There is also ample room for error and injustice in the attribution of individuals to their respective tasks; and in the struggle of factions to acquire control of the political offices to which is intrusted the duty to determine these classes, and the attribution of various individuals to the tasks so classified, there is room for much of the antagonism which exists to-day. If, however, any one will take the trouble to read over the schemes of piece-work which trade unions have adopted in the

various factories of England, it will be seen that the equalisation of tasks is by no means an insoluble problem; and it will be also seen that if rotation in tasks is determined by lot within the limits laid down by physical and mental capacity as determined by physical and mental classification, no great injustice ought to obtain.

But this whole question of occupation and the attribution of tasks cannot be understood so long as we remain under the impression that the members of a collectivist community will have to labour as many hours in the day as under our present system. If this were to be the case, — that is to say, if we were to have to labour for the State as long as we now have to labour in order to support life, and if, in addition to this necessity, we were not to be masters of the occupation to which we were put, but were, on the contrary, to be in this respect subject to the dominant faction in the State, — such a condition of things would indeed be in one sense perhaps worse than the system which prevails to-day. If, however, we examine the working of a collectivist plan, we shall find that the hours of work which would be imposed upon every individual by the State would be so diminished that the pressure of the State would only be felt during very few of our waking hours; the rest of them would be practically at our own disposal; and as this part of the collectivist plan is an essential one, we shall do well to give it special attention.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVISM¹

LET us begin by considering how large a part of our population is now devoting its entire time to the work of competition, as distinguished from that part of the population which is devoting its time to the task of production.

It is obvious that all those who are devoting their time to the work of competition would be without employment in a collectivist State; they would therefore be able to give their entire time to production; and the time they gave to production would be so much taken away from the time which those now engaged in production have to give to it. For example, the United States to-day keeps alive, according to the last census,² about sixty-five millions (65,000,000) of men, women, and children; of these about forty-five millions are either too young to work, or are unfit to work, or are dispensed by sex or wealth from the necessity of working. This eliminates children, women not engaged in remunerative work, old people, criminals, paupers, and the insane. Now if, of the remaining twenty millions who do the work of production, it is found that ten millions, or one-half, are engaged in work that results from the competitive character of our industrial system, it is clear that

¹ See, upon the question of the waste that attends the competitive system, and the economy that would result from collectivism, Appendix on Trusts.

² Written in 1898.

in a collectivist State in which there is no competition, these ten millions would be applied to the work of production; and therefore every man would have to work only one-half the number of hours he now works in order to keep the community alive.

Let us see if we can form any idea how many are engaged in the wasteful work of competition, and how many, therefore, would in a collectivist State be set free to relieve the labour of those engaged in production.

It is estimated that out of every one hundred men who start a new business ninety become insolvent. This means that for every ten who are fit and able to conduct a new business ninety engage in new business who are unable to earn their bread at it; and this furnishes in one class of business men a measure of the wastefulness of the present plan. Under a system of collectivism the exact number of men necessary to conduct business in any given place could be mathematically determined; and the ninety unsuccessful men who are now engaged in futile efforts to destroy the business of the ten successful men would be employed in production to their own advantage and to the relief of those already engaged therein. The wastefulness, however, of the present plan is not confined to the fact that many are engaged in attempting to do what can better be done by a few, but also by the fact that in the conflict between the successful as well as the unsuccessful a vast horde of men are employed by the mere fact of the competition, who would be thrown out of employment and, therefore, be serviceable for production in case the element of competition were avoided. Amongst the men so employed are commercial travellers; these men occasion waste to the community not only through the fact that instead of producing themselves they are living on the production of others, but through the fact that they

constitute a large part of the passenger traffic of the country, — that is to say, the railroads are put to the expense of carrying these travellers all over the United States in order that they may each have an opportunity in every corner of the United States of decrying the goods of one another. And this throws a side light on the evils of our present plan, for the railroads have an interest in encouraging this work; because if they did not have this horde of commercial travellers to carry about the country, many of them might not be able to pay interest on their bonds, whereas, if the railroads were owned by a collectivist State, the less passengers they had to carry, the richer would be the State. The testimony taken by the Industrial Commission furnishes admirable instances of the waste that attends competitive production and the corresponding economy that would attend a collectivist system. Mr. Edson Bradley, President of the American Spirits Manufacturing Company, testifies that in the whiskey business, "somewhere between the distiller and the consumer in this country, \$40,000,000 is lost. This goes primarily to the attempt to secure trade." He further testifies that the whiskey combination had been able to dispense with 800 salesmen. Mr. Gates, President of the American Steel and Wire Company, testified that combination in this industry had led to the dismissal of 200 commercial travellers. Mr. Dowe, President of the Commercial Travellers' National League, testified that "35,000 salesmen had been thrown out of employment by the organisation of trusts and 25,000 reduced to two-thirds of their previous salaries. . . . The baking powder trust has replaced men at \$4,000 to \$5,000 a year by others at \$18 a week. . . . The displacement of travelling men represents also large loss to railways, amounting, on the estimate that each traveller spends \$2.50 a

day for 240 days, each year to \$27,000,000, while the loss to hotels would be at least as much as to railways." Adding up these losses, we reach the following result:

35,000 salesmen at an average compensation (including commissions) of \$3,000 each a year	\$105,000,000
Loss in railroad travelling	27,000,000
Loss in hotel expenses	27,000,000
Together	<u>\$159,000,000</u>

In the *few* industries, therefore, in which competition has been diminished by the trust system, an economy of \$159,000,000 is estimated to have been already effected. These figures enable us to appreciate the enormous economy that would result from an elimination of competition from *every* industry. It is important to note that an economy that constitutes a loss to commercial travellers, railroads, and hotels under the competitive system would constitute a pure gain to a collectivist community; for it would mean so much less work for railroads and hotels and so much more labour for production. Our present system, then, encourages useless expenditure; whereas collectivism would secure an equivalent economy.

Another important economy would be made, too, in the running of all public enterprises, through the absence of the necessity of collecting revenue therefrom. In municipal tramways, for example, no less than one-half the force could be dispensed with; for the functions of the conductor are practically confined to collecting fares. A similar economy would be practised on railroads; in telegrams; no stamps would be required for postage; no costly corps of clerks for book-keeping.

Another source of bootless expense to the community arises from advertising. Mr. P. Magnuson, quoted by Professor Ely,¹ has estimated that five hundred million

¹ Socialism and Social Reform, p. 122.

dollars a year are spent in advertising; whereas the cost of conveying the useful information given by advertising would not amount to more than five million. The labour of all the men and all the wealth employed in this work of advertising, estimated together at four hundred and ninety-five millions a year, would be saved in a collectivist State.

Under our system gas is furnished to our cities by gas companies, each one of which tears up the streets at great detriment to public convenience and public health, in order to lay its mains for the mere purpose of competing with existing companies, but only with the result of forcing a consolidation which tends to make gas dearer instead of cheaper to the consumer. Professor Ely estimates that the consolidation of gas companies in Baltimore has cost eighteen millions, of which ten millions represents pure loss.

Very much the same thing is true of railroads. Professor Ely quotes a railroad manager who claims that if the railways of the United States were managed as a unit instead of by competing companies, such management would effect an economy of two hundred millions of dollars a year; he cites, as an instance of useless paralleling of roads, the numerous railroads which connect New York with Chicago. He estimates that these lines cost two hundred millions of dollars, and that the maintenance of the useless lines involves perpetual loss. He is obliged, however, to admit that in this case there is a considerable accommodation, owing to the fact that the parallel lines pass through different places and occasion some advantage in the time-table. This, however, is not the case with many other lines in the United States. The Colorado Midland parallels the Denver and Rio Grande, passing through the same places, and, inasmuch as both are subjected to the necessity of con-

necting and forwarding passengers to lines at their extremities, both are obliged to run trains at the same hours. There is in this case no advantage either to the time-table or to new places.

Nor does the paralleling and competition of parallel roads always furnish better accommodation to the public. Between Chicago and Denver there is one line able easily to run trains from place to place in twenty-four hours; but for the purpose of avoiding freight war with the competing lines it has entered into an arrangement with the competing lines under which it agrees not to run passenger trains in less than thirty-six hours. The public, therefore, instead of gaining, loses an advantage of twelve hours by this arrangement, thereby learning at no small inconvenience that competition does not always compete.

What is true of railroads and gas companies is also true of telegraph business. The Western Union is capitalised at one hundred million dollars. It is estimated that the cost of laying the lines actually used by the Western Union would be twenty millions; eighty million dollars, therefore, have been wasted by the existing system which encourages private companies to construct lines for the purpose or with the result of compelling other companies to buy them up. Professor Ely adds that "it cost England nearly as much to make the telegraph a part of the post-office as it did all the other countries of Europe put together, because in these the telegraph had been from the beginning a part of the post-office, and the wastes of competition had been avoided."¹

Another of the most wasteful features attending our present system is the expense of distributing goods;

¹ "Socialism and Social Reform," p. 120.

take, for example, the articles which enter most into our daily life, — milk, bread, butter, eggs, meat, fish, and vegetables, — and compare the method of distributing letters adopted by our government in the post-office. The fact that the government is the only instrumentality through which letters are distributed permits the government to effect a great economy in time, labour, and expense by sorting the letters beforehand according to streets and confining the distribution in any one street to a single carrier, who distributes the letters with the greatest economy of time and labour door by door. This is the economical system for distributing all things in regular use that would be adopted by the collectivist plan. Compare this now with the plan adopted and necessitated by the competitive system. Every block is served with milk by a very large number of milk-dealers instead of by one; every block is furnished with bread by a very large number of dealers instead of by one; every block is furnished with meat by a very large number of dealers instead of by one; and so on through every article which enters into our daily use.

Not only is there great waste of labour in the business of producing and distributing the necessities of life under the competitive system, but the competitive system creates a large class of business that absorbs much of the wealth of the community and employs a very large number of its members. For example, under a collectivist system there would no longer be any necessity or advantage in insurance, whether against life or against fire, or against accident, or against hail, or against defective title, or against any other cause. The reason of this is obvious; we insure ourselves against pecuniary loss arising out of these accidents because otherwise the whole loss will fall upon ourselves. In a collectivist

State some of these occasions for loss would not exist at all, and those that did exist would fall upon the entire State and would consequently be inappreciable by any one member of it. For example, a man insures his life so that his children should not be reduced to poverty by his death; but in the collectivist State the widow and the child are provided for, being all of them members of the State and therefore all of them sharers in its income. Death in such a case would practically not constitute a loss at all; it would rather constitute a gain to the State financially, because the number of deaths of the very old and the very young — and therefore of the unproductive members of the community — is known to be far greater than that of its productive members. We can to a certain extent measure the economy that would result to the State from an elimination of insurance by a reference to the insurance reports of the State of New York and to the amount of capital invested therein.¹ The capital invested in life and casualty insurance companies alone doing business in the State of New York is \$1,834,051,844,² — over one thousand three hundred and thirty-four millions of dollars; it increased during the single year of 1897, \$105,727,002; so that, assuming that an average workingman earns \$2.00 a day, over fifty-two million working days were wasted in life and casualty insurance alone in a single year; or, taking three hundred and thirty days to represent the working days in a year, the whole labour of over 157,500 men was lost to the nation in 1897 through the wasteful necessity of life and casualty insurance alone. And to this must be added the time devoted to life insurance during the year of all the officers,

¹ Capital is taken as the measure because it represents the accumulation of premiums paid for the benefit of insurance.

² Report of State Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York for 1897.

actuaries, book-keepers, clerks, and the host of agents who have become proverbial for the extent to which they worry and annoy us.

Another kind of business that would be eliminated in a collectivist State is the class of brokers; not only Wall Street brokers, but real-estate brokers, mining brokers, and brokers of every description, in so far as they are engaged in competition. The abolition of Wall Street would carry with it the abolition of gambling in stocks which is a necessary feature thereof. No law has yet been devised, though the attempt has often been made, that would, so long as the competitive system endures, put a stop to gambling in stocks. A law which would successfully stop gambling in stocks would stop legitimate dealing in stocks also. But the immoral element involved in "puts" and "calls" is only an exaggeration of the immoral element involved in all industrial transactions built upon the principle of private profit; for although business can be conducted in such a way as only to furnish to those engaged in it a fair remuneration for time involved therein, it perpetually furnishes a temptation to those involved therein to contrive so that it shall furnish a large rather than a fair return. In fact, the whole struggle of business consists in endeavouring to secure the largest return of profit for the least expenditure of labour. The man who succeeds in getting the largest return for the least expenditure is the successful business man; and no man does this with more security than the next class to which attention may be called, whose occupation would come to an end in the collectivist State; namely, the banker.

It would take too long to enter here into an accurate and fair estimate of the service rendered by the banker and the reward he obtains for it. Most writers who favour socialism undervalue the functions of the banker.

They are so impressed by the enormous incomes which bankers make that they do not appreciate the enormous services they render; and although in a collectivist State the banker *qua* banker would tend to disappear, the man who to-day does the work of a banker would, it is hoped, do the same work for the State. So that although the business of banking would disappear, the best form of government would be the one in which the individuals who have been discovered to be best fitted for the onerous and difficult duties of finance would be those to whom this duty would be intrusted. Whether, as matter of fact, the man best fitted to do this difficult work would be intrusted with it under the collectivist plan is an objection to collectivism which will be considered later.

But there is another large class of intelligent men who are now engaged in fighting the quarrels which result from the competitive system who would be left without an occupation under the collectivist plan; namely, the lawyers. With them, the hatred and vindictiveness which arise from litigation would in a collectivist State in great part disappear also; for lawyers constitute the class whose business it is to conduct these quarrels, and, alas! also to inflame them. When we take into consideration the fact that in the city of New York alone there are nearly ten thousand practising lawyers, and when we add to these the clerks, stenographers, book-keepers, and office-boys employed by each of these ten thousand lawyers, those employed in the courts, the sheriff's office, the county clerk's office, marshals, deputy sheriffs, and others; and when we take into account that most of these men are engaged in the business of fighting, we cannot but be struck by the enormous advantage to the community of a system which would practically eliminate this class altogether.

It must not be understood to mean, however, that there would be no necessity for courts under the collectivist plan. Even though crimes against property were eliminated by collectivism, there would still be a temptation to commit crime, owing to sexual jealousy and in a certain degree to intemperance and idleness. It is believed that both intemperance and idleness would tend to diminish with the disappearance of the misery that reduces men to the physical condition that engenders them; but there would still, doubtless, be some intemperance and some idleness; there would certainly remain unhappy marriages; and as every man is to remain possessed of a small amount of property there would be minute questions of property sometimes involved. But it is hardly conceivable that such questions could involve any system of justice more elaborate than that of the justice of the peace and possibly a single court of appeal. The absence of competition would so simplify the law that no question would be likely to arise that the parties to the litigation could not themselves explain. How little litigation would be likely under a collectivist *régime* may be judged by comparing the litigation to which the administration of the Post-Office gives rise with the interminable lawsuits which result from the administration of railroads.¹ Moreover, it is to be hoped that in a collectivist State the community would at last have leisure to study criminology and learn to understand that the criminal has to be treated as a sick man rather than as a wicked one. The whole system of criminal procedure would be changed, and the type now known as the criminal lawyer would in such case disappear. The existing system, under which every

¹ This is undoubtedly more true of railroads in the United States than in England, probably because competing roads have not been tolerated in England to the same extent as in our country.

prosecuting officer considers his reputation involved in securing the punishment of every criminal brought before the court, necessarily gives rise to a corresponding class of lawyer who regards his reputation as well as his fee involved in opposing the efforts of the prosecuting officer by any means, however unjustifiable.

If, now, we consider that the large number of men thus liberated by the substitution of collectivism for our present form of government would not only be employed to diminish the labour of those now engaged in production, but that it constitutes the very part of our population which is engaged in fanning the flame of hatred in the minds of men, the advantage to a community of having this perpetual source of trouble removed will be obvious. But we are not concerned so much now with the reduction of hatred under the collectivist plan as we are with its economy. We shall therefore next pass to the consideration of the wastefulness involved in the field of production itself, having heretofore considered rather the wastefulness which attends our present system of distribution.

At the present time horses in the West have become so valueless that they are left unbranded by their owners, lest the branding of them involve the payment of taxes thereupon. Cattle, on the other hand, have of late risen in value; the price of them fell so low some time ago as to involve the ruin of all those largely engaged in them; but to-day every one is rushing back into this business. This state of things furnishes a very fair opportunity of judging how imperfectly informed the producer is as to the needs of the community. In other words, *he is only informed that the community is overstocked with an article by being ruined in the course of producing it.* This plan is not only productive of misery to a large number of individuals in every community, but it is necessarily

an extremely wasteful one. The object of every community ought to be to produce the things it needs, not the things it does not need. The present system, on the contrary, obliges the community to be continually producing the things it does not need as the only means by which it can arrive at a knowledge of what it does need.¹

For under the existing system, over-production occasions a surplusage of things in themselves valuable, but the exchange value of which has been diminished by their abundance. And the producer cannot afford to keep this surplusage, because he has fixed charges to pay. He has to sell his crop at a loss because he must have money to pay rent, or interest on mortgage, or salaries, or for his own support during the year. It is this pressure he is under to sell which impoverishes him. And its consequences are far-reaching; for as the price of raw cotton goes down, cotton manufacturers are encouraged to buy and to increase the output of

¹ And yet Herbert Spencer does not hesitate to lavish encomiums on the present system; for example, he says in "A Plea for Liberty," p. 17: "Under our existing voluntary co-operation with its free contracts and its competition, production and distribution need no official oversight. Demand and supply and the desire of each man to gain a living by supplying the needs of his fellows spontaneously evolve that wonderful system whereby a great city has its food daily brought round to all doors or stored at adjacent shops; has clothing for its citizens everywhere at hand in multitudinous varieties; has its houses and furniture and fuel ready made or stocked in each locality; and has mental pabulum from halfpenny papers, hourly hawked around, to weekly shoals of novels and less abundant books of instruction, furnished without stint for small payments. And throughout the kingdom, production as well as distribution is similarly carried on with the smallest amount of superintendence which proves efficient; while the quantities of the numerous commodities required daily in each locality are adjusted without any other agency than the pursuit of profit."

To him and to all individualists the agony caused by the failure to make profit which attends ninety per cent of all new business ventures is a matter of no importance.

their factories; and so over-production of raw material tends to result in over-production of manufactured goods.

In a collectivist State the industry or good harvest of one year would have for effect a diminution of labour the next; or greater comfort or luxury next year for the same labour; no man's labour would be lost, and the bountifulness of Nature would be a blessing and not, as now, a misfortune.

The efforts to prevent the over-production of cotton in the South gave rise to a convention in 1892, regarding which Professor Ely quotes a telegram from Memphis, January 8, as follows:—

“That the farmers of the South are in earnest in their endeavours to solve the serious problem of over-production of cotton is evinced by the enthusiastic meeting of delegates to the convention of the Mississippi Valley Cotton-Growers' Association, which was called to order in this city this morning.”¹

And again the speech of the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce:—

“In 1890 we harvested a cotton crop of over eight million bales,—several hundred thousand bales more than the world could consume. Had the crop of the present year been equally large, it would have been an appalling calamity to the section of our country that devotes so large a portion of its labour and capital to the raising of cotton.”²

Nothing could better illustrate the evil of our present system and the benefits of a system of collectivism than such a state of things as is described by the President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce. If, under a collec-

¹ Ely's "Socialism and Social Reform," p. 134.

² *Ibid.*

tivist State, more bales of cotton were produced in any given year than the community of the world could consume, the State would store away the unused cotton and would modify its agriculture in a manner to bring the cotton crop into proper relation to the needs of the community. But such an event could not be an "appalling calamity;" it could not be anything but a benefit; so much more wealth for the community; so much less labour for its citizens; and what is true of the cotton crop is equally true of all other crops. Over-production is impossible in a collectivist community, for all the over-production of one year would mean less work in that particular kind of production the next. Every citizen in the community would profit by so-called over-production instead of, as now, suffering from it.

This question of over-production is closely allied to that of invention, which, as is well known, has been a source of despair to workingmen; for improvements in machinery almost always throw large numbers of them out of employment. In India, as has already been described, the destruction of hand-loom weavers by machinery brought about a misery hardly paralleled in the history of war: "the bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India." And yet invention, far from bringing distress to the workingmen, as under our system it must, would, under a collectivist State, prove an unqualified advantage; for every invention that increases the efficiency of human labour diminishes the amount of time that must be spent in labour in order to obtain the same result. In other words, in a collectivist State the saving of labour is a benefit to every individual in the community, whereas under the competitive system the saving of labour is of immediate benefit to the owner of the patent alone, and means immediate distress to the labourers it particularly affects.

One of the standard objections to collectivism in this connection is that a collectivist form of government would remove all stimulus to invention. This is believed to be a profound mistake.

In the first place, inventors are not always urged to invention by the prospect of financial reward. The great discoveries of humanity which are at the basis of all our practical advances were made by men who neither sought nor obtained a reward therefor. It was not with the view of making money that Newton discovered and propounded the laws of gravity, or Ohm the laws of electrical resistance. Nor do inventors to-day, as a matter of fact, reap the reward of their inventions. Capitalists often have an interest in suppressing inventions; for inventions generally involve the expensive transformation of existing plants. For example, Mr. Babbage¹ describes how a patent for welding gun-barrels by machinery had long been unused because of the cheapness of hand labour; but as soon as a strike forced up wages recourse was had to the patent, which until then had been neglected.

Capitalists often prefer to dispense with an improvement rather than go to the expense which improvements generally occasion. This was the unwritten motive for the opposition of England to the construction of the Suez Canal, and was believed by Mr. De Lesseps to be the motive of their opposition to the Panama Canal.² Again, no one who has had personal acquaintance with inventors can believe that their discoveries are to any material extent the result of financial motive. It would be difficult to imagine the conditions under which Edi-

¹ "Economy of Manufactures." Babbage (London, 1832), p. 246.

² Mr. De Lesseps has stated that it cost England £100,000,000 to change its shipping so as to fit it for passage through the Suez Canal; and this expense applies more or less to change of machinery due to invention in every factory.

son and Maxim would not invent. They cannot help inventing; they are as much under a necessity to invent as a hen to lay eggs. Undoubtedly there are certain environments which favour the production and utilisation of inventing types, and others that disfavour the production and utilisation of such types. And undoubtedly a motive for invention is a part of the environment which does contribute to invention; but would such a motive be wanting in a collectivist State? I think it can be shown that it would not only be present, but that it would be a stronger motive in the collectivist State than in our own; for under our own the reward which an inventor receives for an invention is a patent, and a patent is, as all lawyers will testify, merely a subject for litigation. In other words, every man who invents a useful thing has to overcome first the objections of the patent office; secondly, the objections of the capitalists; and thirdly, the objections of infringers; all three of which mean obstacles of no small order. And not until they are all overcome, if indeed they any of them are, is the patent likely to be a source of income to the inventor. Under the collectivist State, however, every man is interested in increasing the productiveness of the State so as to diminish hours of labour; and nothing, moreover, would be easier than for a collectivist State exceptionally to reward invention by diminishing the hours of labour due by the inventor to the State.

From one point of view, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that invention would prove more beneficial to the collectivist State than to our own, that a more immediately advantageous motive could be given for invention in such a State, and that much fewer and lesser obstacles would be presented to the utilisation of such inventions.

Moreover, as Professor Ely has pointed out, the ten-

dency of invention in a collectivist State would be to replace work which now involves drudgery by a machinery that would tend to lessen or eliminate it. His words on this subject are interesting enough to deserve quotation:—

“An advertisement (of what is technically called the before-and-after kind) which attracted the author’s attention some time since is significant. It was simply an advertisement of a mop; but as a naturalist can construct from a single bone a likeness of an extinct animal, so a sociologist, sufficiently skilful, could tell us a good deal about the kind of society in which this advertisement appeared. The advertisement gave two pictures, — one of an ordinary mop, out of which the water was wrung by a bedrabbled, sorry-looking maid, and the other of a smiling, comely housewife, who was wringing the dirty water out of the mop by simply turning the handle. This method of extracting the dirty water without soiling one’s hands was the essential feature of the patented mop. Now, of course the author knows nothing about the merits of this mop, but he claims that the advertisement itself of the alleged improvement signifies a great deal. It is significant that the advertisement appeared in the United States, where women’s wages are high and many women of respectability do their own housework, and not in Germany, where labour is cheap and servants abundant. It is significant that improvements of this kind should be more abundant in the North than in the South. Equally significant is the undoubted fact that the tools used by the slaves in the South were of an inferior kind. The Northern farmer, who hoed his own Indian corn, used a beautifully constructed hoe, weighing a few ounces, and despised the heavy and clumsy tool used by the Southern slave in the field. Equally significant is the fact that when it was made illegal to send chimney-sweeps down chimneys in England, the chimneys were still swept, but

by improved tools, and not by boys in the chimneys themselves.”¹

“The author spent some time among the Shakers at Mount Lebanon, New York, and was much pleased to see the improvements which had been introduced in the kitchen, rendering kitchen work so agreeable that the sisters preferred it to any other occupation. One thing which he remembers is that the soiled clothes were washed by the aid of water-power. Now, what did all these unusual improvements in the kitchen signify, except that the community of interests resulted in the devotion of a larger proportion than usual of the inventive talent and energy of this social group to occupations ordinarily termed menial?”

If it were conceivable that a law could be made or enforced requiring that millionaires, and none but millionaires, were to serve as stokers, there is no doubt that all the ingenuity in the land would at once be put to making the work of stoking less detestable than it now is; if necessary, naval architecture would be reformed from top to bottom, so as to reduce the work of stoking to that pressure of a finger upon a button which is the only physical work that is imposed by modern conditions upon the millionaire to-day.

The improvements due to invention would differ, perhaps, in character but not in quantity, for invention obeys the particular stimulus which gives rise to it. Thus Karl Marx points out² that mechanical traction was not introduced into mines until a law forbade the use of women and children there, and the “half-time system stimulated the invention of the piecing-machine,” thereby replacing child labour in woollen-yarn manufacture. Again, immense improvements have been made

¹ This last illustration is given by Mrs. Annie Besant in the *Fabian Essays*.

² *Capital*, Part I.V. chap. xv.

in the charging and drawing of gas retorts, owing to labour troubles, and there is no doubt that all arduous work would soon be made less arduous if we all had to take a turn at it.

The standard objection against the economy of collectivism is that government is to-day much less economical in its administration than private enterprise, and the cost of ships built by the admiralty is compared in this connection with that of ships built in private yards. It may be admitted that the government does not to-day administer as cheaply as competitive enterprises without for that reason yielding the superior economy of government administration on a sufficiently large scale. In order to establish a proper comparison between collective and competitive administration, a contrast must not be made between government and private ship-building, for in this particular industry the special economies of collective administration do not enter. A more enlightening contrast would be that between the transportation and delivery of letters by the government, and their transportation and delivery by as many private individuals as chose to compete in the business. The advantage of the government system over the competitive system is too obvious to need comment. It is the application of the post-office plan to all transportation and to the delivery of all necessities that constitutes the special feature and special economy of collectivism.

Again, the present official cannot fairly be compared with the official in a collectivist form of government. Religion, religious sense of duty, above all, religious enthusiasm, cannot be said to prevail largely in government official life. They ought to and could be the *primum mobile* of a collectivist administration. But this needs time.

CHAPTER III

SOME FEATURES OF COLLECTIVISM

It would seem, then, from the foregoing consideration, that from a collectivist form of government great economy would result. Many socialists believe that it would reduce the necessary amount of labour to be performed by every individual to three hours a day. The probabilities are that although some occupations — such as farming — which are attractive would involve the expenditure of more than three hours a day; others, such as mining, might not require labour of as much as three hours a day. One thing, however, is certain; the number of hours which every man would have to work per day would be largely diminished. The amount of leisure, therefore, that he would enjoy would be largely increased.

The importance of the diminution of hours of labour has been already pointed out in the discussion of the feasibility of collectivism; for if what individualists call the tyranny of the collectivist State is to operate on the individual only during a comparatively small part of each day, the so-called tyranny — if tyranny it be — may well be endured during these few hours in view of the benefits to the mass which such a system would confer.

But a thorough examination of the collectivist plan will serve to diminish still more the number of hours' work which an intelligent collectivist State would be obliged to exact from every individual. In order to

make this more thorough examination into the collectivist State, it will be necessary for us to consider for a moment the groups of citizens which such a State would have to take account of, — that is to say, the groups into which mankind inevitably falls by nature.

§ 1. PAUPERISM AND CRIME

The problem of pauperism will confront us under the collectivist State just as certainly as under the competitive system. There will always, under every condition, be a fraction of the population unable to contribute its share of effective service to the commonwealth. This will take the shape then, as now, of unwillingness to work; unwillingness to work being then, as now, mainly due to incapacity to work. This part of the population will have to be treated with more intelligence than it is now treated, or it will prove a source of danger in the State. The very fact that we do not now treat this fraction of the population as we ought is an indication of the extent to which ignorance prevails, and of our present unfitness for a collectivist form of government. This ignorance is one of sentiment as well as of intelligence. Sentimental people will not recognise that a pauper is just as much in need of training as a criminal. The training is of a different character, but it is none the less training. A pauper is generally a person whose physical vitality is below par. He is instinctively lazy because his physical strength is deficient in the vitality which enables him to decide upon working. To this deficiency Professor Marshall, in his *Economics*, refers as constituting perhaps one of the most important differences between men. One man is always ready to go to work; another man gets to work with so much reluctance that whenever his work is interrupted it requires a

painful effort to return to it. This effort is an indication of weakness of nerve rather than of weakness of muscle; but whether it be of nerve or of muscle it is a weakness; and this weakness will confront us in the collectivist State to some extent, although doubtless to a much less extent than under the competitive system.¹ Now, there is only one cure for unfitness or unwillingness to work, and this cure is coercion.

Coercion may be brutal and it may be benevolent. No man is more unhappy than a man who is physically strong enough to work and nervously unable to do so. Nervous inability to work generally expresses itself in the unwillingness to which reference has just been made. Unwillingness is for the most part due to inability to make up one's mind to work. Under the competitive system a man has to make up his mind to work or has to starve. When he reaches the brink of the grave, society salves its conscience by putting him into a poorhouse, where he is kept for an insufficient time, rendering him all the more unfit for work, and plunging him at the end of that time once more into the competitive mill. The time that he remains in the poorhouse depends in part upon the decision of a magistrate who is generally ignorant of the problems of pauperism, and it depends also — in England, at any rate — upon the caprice of the pauper. Under certain conditions he thinks himself fit for the poorhouse and commits himself thereto; and under another condition he gets tired of the poorhouse and decides to leave it. The folly of this system is evidenced by the hopeless result that "once a pauper, always a pauper."

The condition of the pauper is undoubtedly capable

¹ To a much less extent because this weakness is generally the result of overwork, underfeeding, worry, and the alcoholism to which all these inevitably tend.

of being improved. Instead of immuring him within the four walls of an institution from which he emerges no better fitted for serviceable work than before he entered it, a method has prevailed in Holland since the beginning of the century, of returning the pauper to the land, and giving him there an opportunity of recovering the physical strength or the nerve strength, as the case may be, which regular life, open air, and healthy occupation contribute to restore. The benefit of this system to the pauper is twofold. The labour of the pauper is applied in a manner which is least expensive to the community. In the Dutch farm colonies every pauper is put to the work for which he turns out to be best fitted; the strongest and less intelligent to that of digging, those that are less strong and more intelligent to work where less strength and more intelligence are required. So that a farm colony can be made, if not quite self-supporting, very nearly so. But the principal importance of the farm colony is that if the pauper is capable of reformation at all, the life of a farm colony is one that will tend to reform him and restore him to serviceable work under the same conditions as his other fellow-creatures.

Now, the coercion necessary to reform the pauper we have not yet intelligence enough to exercise. The New York Legislature has three times thrown out a pauper colony bill for no other reason than that they refused to subject the pauper to confinement during a time long enough to effect improvement.¹

¹ The pauper colony bill three times presented to the Legislature and three times rejected by it proposes an indeterminate sentence; that is to say, it proposes that a pauper shall be confined for a time not exceeding three years, but subject to reduction as soon as, in the opinion of the constituted authority, the pauper is deemed fit to earn his own living outside of the institution. It has proved heretofore impossible to make our Legis-

The widespread ignorance on the subject of pauperism seems to make a long period of education necessary for intelligent legislation on the subject; but the question of pauperism has already been discussed elsewhere¹ and need not be referred to here further than to recall the argument therein made that until the pauper is recognised to be morally and nervously sick, and therefore as much in need of humane treatment and, if necessary, humane coercion, as a patient in a hospital, it is impossible to expect that the pauper problem can be to any extent solved.

In a collectivist State the pauper will have to be cared for by the State as now. The pauper and the criminal then, as now, will represent the lowest grade of humanity with which the State will have to deal, for it is the only part of the community upon which coercion will have to be used.

The Elmira Reformatory furnishes a model of the way the collectivist State will deal with the criminal. The Dutch pauper colonies furnish a model of how the collectivist State will deal with the pauper. The collectivist State, however, will have the advantage over our present competitive system, in the fact that there will be no longer any persons under the collectivist State to complain of convict labour, all the product of convict

lature understand that under this system of indeterminate sentence no pauper who is fit for freedom would remain as long as three years under confinement; many, indeed, might be restored to the community within a month or even within three days, if at the expiration of the three days it were clear that the pauper were willing and able to provide for himself; for it need not take longer than three days for intelligent administrators to understand that a pauper has been committed to the institution by mistake.

¹ "Evolution and Effort," chap. x., The Problem of Pauperism, p. 157; and *ante*, book i., chap. iii., § 7 (a) Poverty.

labour going to the benefit of the whole community instead of to the disadvantage of the workingman.

In proportion as the inmate of a pauper colony becomes fitted for life outside the institution he will be given more and more liberty, until at last he graduates therefrom under conditions similar to those which now attend liberation from the Elmira Reformatory; and he will be put to such employment as he has been specifically fitted for in the institute.

§ 2. DISTRIBUTION OF WORK

With the single exception, therefore, of the pauper and criminal classes, there will be no separation of citizens into castes according to occupation. There will doubtless be unskilled labourers in the collectivist State as in ours; not because men will be forced into unskilled labour by a competitive system, or kept confined to unskilled labour, notwithstanding the fact that they deserve a better order of employment; but because out of every hundred men born into the world there is a certain proportion by nature fitted only for unskilled work, and against this classification of nature human institutions are powerless. Under the collectivist system every man born into the world will be born under equal conditions; that is to say, equal opportunities. If he is fit for a high class of work, high-class work will be open to him; if he is fit only for the lowest class of work, it is only the lowest class of work that he will be asked to perform. But he is not for that reason to be deprived of his share of the total collectivist income. On the contrary, it is perhaps because he is an unskilled workman, and therefore called upon to do least pleasant work, that he deserves the full share of income more than those who, being favoured by nature, are able

to do a higher class of work, or by other natural gifts are able to perform their allotted work in a shorter time than others.

There will therefore be in the collectivist State some classification of individuals, though to a less degree than in our own. The difference, however, between them will be less, for all will be furnished with the same necessities and even comforts of life; but those engaged in the higher work of the community will have the advantage which necessarily results from the gifts with which nature has endowed them; that is to say, they will generally benefit in the first place by shorter hours of work and therefore longer hours of leisure; in the second place the work will be less arduous because more agreeable; and in the third place they may possibly be better able to avail themselves of the opportunities for increasing the sum of positive pleasure which will be offered to those willing to employ their leisure in rendering extra services to the State therefor.

To this last point it will be necessary to give some special attention. There are some pleasures which necessarily involve more expense than others; for example, the pleasure of sailing, riding, driving, bicycling, and everything that needs tools of an expensive character. There seems no reason why, within limits, those persons able and willing to render more service than that allotted to them might not be permitted to render such service and receive as compensation the opportunity for enjoying a larger share of these positive pleasures than those that are not willing or able to render these extra services. For the aim of collectivism is not to level all men, but to prevent some men from becoming subject to others, and to give to every man the opportunity of doing his best service for the State without involving the

State in the loss of service which has been shown to result from the competitive system. There is no reason why a man who is better fitted by nature to work for the State than another should not be allowed to render extra services to the State and to receive therefor some extra compensation in the shape of extra pleasure. The danger and injustice which have resulted from the granting of extra benefit to extra service under the competitive system is that it has made it possible for one man so to accumulate extra benefits that he was able to monopolise these benefits and to have more of them at his disposal than he could himself enjoy; and the effect of such monopoly has been to deprive others of his fellow-creatures, not only of these benefits, but even of the necessities of life. It is in the *accumulation* that evil resides, not in the extra benefit. So long as accumulation is avoided, the system of extra benefits would give to every man a stimulus for work which would benefit the whole community, injure no one, and increase the positive pleasure which every man could secure for himself out of the common stock.

The foregoing will serve to explain the natural classification into which the least gifted citizens of the community will naturally fall; the lowest of all will be the criminal class, which for reasons above explained will probably be smaller than at present; next will come the pauper class, which for reasons also explained is likely to be smaller than at present. Upon these two classes coercion will have to be used, but it is hoped that the coercion will, under more enlightened conditions, be less unenlightened than now. The next class in order will be those whom education has demonstrated to be least fitted for intelligent work and will include the unskilled workman; and above him will be constituted

classifications of work which will not constitute classifications of individuals.

Nothing would be worse than a classification of persons that would tend to degenerate into a system of caste. The work, however, would be classified in such a manner as to be generally graded to various degrees of intelligence and education; for example, the ability developed by the child at school would determine the degree to which it was to the interest of the State to extend his education and the extent to which his education was carried, and the character of the education he receives would tend to determine the character of work which would in the first instance be assigned to him.

If the effect of general education and equal distribution of income upon the race was to put an end to unskilled workmen as a class altogether, so that there was no man in the community so unintelligent as not to be fitted for skilled work, as it seems possible, though not for a long time probable, unskilled work would have to be distributed among all members of the community by rotation, or by lot, or by a mixture of both.

This plan may seem a fantastical one to those accustomed to our present system, but as a matter of fact it is not half so fantastical to us as would to Alexander the Great have seemed the idea that under any conceivable system a man could one day enjoy the executive power vested in the President of the United States and the next day be peacefully practising law or unostentatiously devoting himself to artificial incubation; and yet such to-day is the life of ex-President Harrison, and such was but lately the occupation of ex-President Hayes. There is nothing degrading about manual work; indeed, the daintiest of our millionaires pride themselves upon being sportsmen; and no sportsman who has ever succeeded in bringing down big game without the assistance

of a guide (and surely none but such deserve the name of sportsman) would fail to admit that it involves work, no other than that of the butcher's boy. The greatest novelist of the day takes pleasure in the manual labour attending the cultivation of his field. Ruskin, the daintiest of our art critics, did not disdain to dig; and we all remember the devotion of Gladstone to the hewing of timber. If the hard and unpleasant work of life, the burden of which is now thrown entirely upon the shoulders of a particular class, were divided between all those who to-day consume the product of their toil in such wasteful and unnecessary professions as commercial travelling, advertising, life insurance, litigation, stock-broking, etc., it is obvious that the amount of manual work that each man would have to do would be comparatively small.

Nevertheless, it is useless to close our eyes to the fact that an attempt to compel the men who, under our present system, are dispensed by wealth from the necessity of doing manual work, to do such work would be likely to result in hopeless failure. Indeed, the mere thought of it cannot but raise a laugh. It is utterly absurd; and the absurdity of it prevents men from imagining the practicability of such a plan even with a totally different population, animated by totally different motives under totally different conditions. But the bare idea of Wall Street brokers engaged in carrying a hod suggests the extreme inexpediency of allowing such an experiment as collectivism to be forced upon us to-day, and the advisableness, therefore, indeed, the imperativeness of a study of the conditions which might give rise to such a misfortune. Notwithstanding, then, the smile with which the collectivist system of government is likely to be greeted by those whose imaginations do not permit of their grasping the extent to which conditions can change,

let us next turn to a consideration of the effect upon the community of the large amount of leisure which under a collectivist system it would enjoy.

§ 3. LEISURE SECURED BY COLLECTIVISM

No man who has closely followed politics in the United States will be disposed to deny that one of the chief reasons for the abuses which are tolerated in politics is the fact that very few citizens have time to take account of them. There is, of course, a certain number of people in this country who are by wealth endowed with more leisure than they can enjoy; but this class has not yet in this country learned that politics can constitute as interesting an occupation as the pursuit of bags of anise-seed, nor become alive to the fact that their wealth imposes upon them some duty to the State in consequence thereof. In England, where the existence of leisure is of old standing, this lesson has been learned, and a very considerable part of the leisure class devotes itself to public affairs; not because it is compelled to do so, but partly because of the interest of the work itself and partly because of the personal consideration which results therefrom. As, however, the holding of public office exposes a man as much to public abuse as to public consideration, it may not unreasonably be concluded that the interest of the work itself, enhanced by a certain sense of *noblesse oblige*, is perhaps the largest element in the motive which induces men of leisure in England to devote their time to public affairs. The fact is that man is not as bad as commercialism is always trying to make him. Even men who are obliged by industrial conditions to devote all their time to making money are continually seen giving up their evenings to works of philanthropy and to the general good. If we

take due account of all the disinterested work done by busy men in the city of New York alone, we cannot but be impressed by the fact that the amount of time that New York citizens are willing to give to this class of work is determined not by themselves, but by the obligations which the necessity of supporting their families imposes upon them.

And if this be true of the upper and middle class, it is still more true of the workingman. Under existing conditions the workingman returns to his home for the most part worn out by the labours of the day. Nevertheless, he is often driven by the necessities of his condition to devote his evening to the interest of his trade union. What leisure he has, then, is taken up by the necessity of organising in order to maintain a successful conflict with capital. It is not surprising, therefore, that he has no time to give to politics, or that, absorbed as he now is by the necessity of organising labour against capital in the struggle to maintain a high rate of wages, he has not yet become alive to, or indeed has leisure, for the duty which he owes to the State. If it is possible to conceive of a condition of things in which all this conflict would be eliminated; in which every man would be free from worry regarding the support of himself and his family; in which every man would be called upon to work only five instead of ten hours a day, so that after the midday meal he would be free to devote himself either to pleasure or to public affairs, — if we can conceive of such a condition of things, then we may be able to understand how it would be possible for such a community to become enlightened as to its interests so that the great enemy of all human progress — ignorance — may be eliminated.

§ 4. IGNORANCE THE ENEMY OF COLLECTIVISM AND ELIMINATED BY IT

I have ventured to say that ignorance was the great enemy to human progress. Let us next consider the rôle which ignorance plays in this very question of collectivism, and to what extent collectivism is rendered unattainable by the ignorance of the wealthy minority first and by that of the unwealthy majority afterwards.

Ignorance of the wealthy minority: it would be an interesting thing to find out how many bankers, stock-exchange brokers, insurance agents, and lawyers, had ever read a book on collectivism. They all denounce collectivism with vociferous unanimity, and yet, when asked on what ground, they generally answer with perfect assurance that collectivism proposes to divide the whole wealth of the community between the members of it, and that, in view of the inequalities of men, such a division would impoverish the wealthy without enriching the few, and could only give rise to a stage of general misery out of which would ultimately result the same conditions as prevail to-day.

Those who know anything upon the subject at all are likely to quote the story of Rothschild, who, upon being confronted with a socialist, asked him how much, upon a general distribution of wealth, would be due to every member of the French Republic. Upon being answered that a careful calculation had determined that every individual of the State would be entitled to three francs and sixty-five centimes, Mr. Rothschild handed him this amount on the condition that he would say nothing more about it. This is the convincing kind of argument with which the wealthy minority is for the most part content.

Upon the difference between this kind of socialism and the form of collectivism proposed in these pages it is not necessary to enlarge; but it is important to keep in mind the fact that so long as such ignorance as this prevails amongst our wealthy minority it is hopeless to expect that the improvement of social conditions along these lines can receive any help from them, although they, perhaps, are more profoundly interested in an intelligent understanding of this question than those rash members of the unwealthy majority who are being driven by legitimate discontent to push this question to a premature experiment. It would not be fair to reproach the wealthy minority with ignorance on this subject; on the contrary, it would be most unfair to do so. A man who has spent his day in the tumult of a stock exchange is not disposed thereby for the serious study of abstract politics. The same is true of the banker who has to work his way through the legal intricacies of a railroad reorganisation, or the lawyer, who has to advise not one but many bankers in similar operations, and to fight their battles in crowded law courts.

But all these men, and not these alone, but all men, women, and children who are consciously or unconsciously subjected to the perpetual stress and strain of competition, are not only deprived of the leisure necessary for an intelligent understanding of political affairs, but they are, on the contrary, unfitted for a proper understanding of collectivism by the environment to which they are subjected. We cannot in this connection take sufficient account of the automatic mechanism in us which myriads of years have been engaged in constituting. This automatic machine is set upon the satisfaction of its needs by a force which in the absence of moral sentiment is uncontrollable. Were the moral sentiment, which alone can control this machine, free

from the same influence of the competitive environment, the moral sentiment might be strong enough to control the machine; but, as has already been pointed out, our moral sentiments are put into such conflict with our physical needs that we are deprived, by this conflict, of a consistent moral standard, and we are therefore like a mariner without a compass, steering sometimes, under obedience to our moral sentiment, in one direction, and steering at another time, under obedience to our physical needs, in a diametrically opposite one; so that whether we consider the automaton in us which is the result of the competitive system, or the moral sentiment which is perpetually in conflict with the competitive system, we can find in neither one nor the other much hope for escape from the bondage to the competitive system under which man has from the beginning suffered.

Let us consider for a moment the character of the ignorance to which the wealthy minority is subjected:

1st. Ignorance of facts: in the first place, he does not know how wasteful our present competitive system is; on the contrary, he has been taught by political economists to believe that it is one of great beauty and consummate art; he does not know any better system to put in its place; on the contrary, he has been by education teaching the beauties of the competitive system to the workingman and has thereby been putting a club in the hands of the workingman that he will in the end inevitably use to break it up. The rich man does not know the danger he is in; he does not know how he can escape from it. He neither believes in the danger nor the possibility of escape if there be danger.

2d. Ignorance of mental habit: he is so accustomed to believe in the sacredness of private property that he regards every man who disputes the principle of private property as an enemy of society; he is therefore incapa-

citated by this mental habit from the possibility of seeing things as they are; and, above all, of recognising that the abolition of private property would bring to himself in the end more happiness than its maintenance.

3d. Ignorance of imagination: it may not be strictly accurate to speak of ignorance of imagination, but our capacity for imagination depends largely upon our knowledge. The scientific men of to-day can imagine electrical possibilities which a few years ago would have been unimaginable. In the same manner, were the wealthy minority informed regarding facts, they would be capable of conceiving of a collectivist State which to-day is impossible to them through ignorance of these facts.

Let us consider next the ignorance of the unwealthy majority. This is ignorance of a very different character from that of the wealthy minority; for the unwealthy majority is driven by its poverty to look to a change in social conditions as the only chance for relief; to the same extent, then, as the wealthy minority are unfitted by their peculiar ignorance to appreciate the possibility of collectivism, the conditions of the unwealthy majority make them disposed to exaggerate its benefits. Few things, probably, stand more in the way of a collectivist programme than the exaggerated notions of the unwealthy majority regarding the benefits which would attend it, and the erroneous notions regarding the possibility of introducing a collectivist system at once and without the necessary intermediate steps.

One of the dangerous notions regarding government which prevail amongst workingmen is that the work of government is easy, requires no education, no special experience, and can be trusted as well to the workingman as to the millionaire. Perhaps in one sense this might be true; perhaps the millionaire might be as little

fitted to govern a collectivist State as a workingman; but one thing is certain: the task of managing the collectivist State would be one of stupendous magnitude, requiring consummate skill, consummate judgment, and encyclopædic information. The difficulties attending the management of a collectivist State will be referred to more at length later on. In this context attention will only be directed to the fact that so long as the unwealthy majority is possessed by the idea that the difficult task of government can be intrusted with indifference to the ignorant as well as to the educated, all experiments at collectivism initiated by them are likely to end in failure.

The workingmen are no more to be blamed for this widespread conviction than the rich are to be blamed for their equally widespread ignorance; not only have workingmen still less opportunity for acquiring knowledge on these subjects than the rich, but their experience has not been of a character to justify the belief that better government is to be obtained from the wealthy than from the unwealthy. On the contrary, the administration of Tammany Hall in the city of New York, little though it in one sense contributes to the comfort of the poor, nevertheless gives advantages to workingmen which appear to them more conspicuous and of more importance. It was Tammany Hall that in 1820 secured the extension of the franchise to workingmen; it was Tammany Hall that in 1870 rescued the city from the control of the State Legislature at Albany and conferred upon its citizens the advantage so dear to the workingman, and so little understood by him, of so-called home rule. It is the district leaders of Tammany Hall who go into courts to rescue workingmen from the harsh application of sometimes good laws. It is in the liquor saloons of Tammany leaders that the workingman

finds his club. It is to Tammany leaders that the workingman goes for a job for himself, and for jobs for his friends and relations. And, above all things, it is to Tammany Hall that the workingmen owe the rate of two dollars a day paid by the city to those who clean its streets.

By the side of such favours as these the question whether the streets are clean, though perhaps of really more importance to them, is not felt to be of the same importance; and the workingman, like the rest of us, is influenced, not by what is his real good, but by what he believes to be his real good. The paramount idea in the mind of every workingman is to get his wages raised. Tammany has constantly helped him in the prosecution of this idea; and for this reason Tammany — and if not Tammany, some other organisation equally corrupt — is pretty sure always, under the existing competitive system, to be maintained by the workingman. And the effect of this upon the workingman is twofold. It encourages him, consciously as well as unconsciously, to support corrupt government; and it confirms him in his conviction that keepers of liquor saloons are just as well able to govern as statesmen of the highest education.

It has been already suggested that one of the difficulties of a collectivist State, as indeed of all States, is to secure the services of the men most fitted for public office. The conspicuous merit of the competitive system is that it automatically does put fit men at the head of commercial enterprises, for the reason that none other than fit men can under the competitive system successfully conduct them. The difficulty of all government is that public office tends to be filled by favour rather than by merit. Now, under the existing system, although public office is exposed to this evil tendency, industry

and commerce not being in the hands of government, but for the most part in private hands and therefore subject to the competitive system, are not exposed to it. But under a collectivist form of government, industry and commerce being largely under the control of the State and therefore not subject to the competitive system, would be as much subject to this evil as functions now under the control of government, and the collectivist State would be relieved of the constant pressure which under the competitive system now automatically forces the best men to the head of business affairs. A collectivist form of government, therefore, would be more exposed to the danger of unfit public officers than our own, because the industrial offices of the community as well as the rest would tend to be filled by favour rather than by merit. Indeed, this weakness of the collectivist form of government is by some deemed so great that they have condemned it for this reason altogether. And the danger arising through this source must not be underestimated, for it may well be asked if, under our own form of government, unfit men are foisted into public office, how much more will this be the case in a form of government still more democratic than ours, in which education will no longer have the advantage over ignorance that to-day the wealthy exercise over the poor! And how rash it would be suddenly to adopt a collectivist régime so long as the notion prevails amongst the majority in the State that one man is just as fit to govern as another!

The ignorance, therefore, of the unwealthy majority which disposes it to believe that the uneducated are as fit for public office as the educated is perhaps the most formidable obstacle to collectivism to-day, and seems assuredly a fair reason for straining every nerve to prevent a premature experiment of it. But this ignorance

is being somewhat diminished in England by the efforts at co-operation which have for many years been made there. Mrs. Sidney Webb¹ has pointed out that, however unsuccessful many of these experiments have been, they have had the effect of demonstrating the importance of putting at the head of business affairs men who are by capacity and education fitted therefor. This, too, is daily brought home to the workingman in the success and failure of strikes and of trade unions. There is, therefore, a slow education now going on which is of a character to teach the unwealthy majority the lesson of which they stand so much in need.

But even after this lesson is learned the workingman will by no means be equipped with the knowledge necessary to govern a collectivist State. And perhaps the most important point to be retained in this connection is that under our existing competitive system not only is the workingman deprived of the leisure necessary for acquiring knowledge, but it is difficult to conceive how under a competitive system he ever could enjoy it. It has already been pointed out that the tyranny of the Market puts an iron limit to wages and to leisure which under the existing industrial system is a form of wage. Up to a certain point the standard of living can be raised ; but it can be raised only up to the point where by so raising the standard the workingman becomes, by good living and sufficient hours of rest, better fitted for doing the work he is given to do. And if it is a workman's duty to punch eyes in needles, his standard of living can be raised to the point which will enable him to punch eyes into the largest number of needles in a day, but it can never be raised beyond this point. The moment the point is reached at which the maximum work is got out

¹ The Co-operative Movement in England.

of a man during the best years of his life, that moment capital can no longer afford to improve his condition; for beyond this point the investment will result in loss instead of in profit.

And if the workman whose working power it is sought to raise by increasing his wages uses in mental labour the leisure which is allowed him for rest, the question arises whether he is not diminishing his capacity for work thereby.

It is notorious that workingmen whose leisure is increased do not spend their leisure in study: they cannot be expected to do so; they spend it in amusement or in their trade unions, or in reading the newspapers; and how little real education there is for them in reading the newspapers may be judged by the admitted fact that, in the United States at any rate, commercial exigencies — the tyranny of the Market again — tend to lower the standard of newspapers so that they serve to paralyze the intelligence of men rather than to improve it. Upon this theme alone a book might be written; but it is not necessary; the forces that contribute to keep the workingman in ignorance of the facts it is most essential for a voting citizen to know are too obvious to need discussion. The essential point is that so long as the competitive system lasts the ignorance must last; it would seem, then, that under this system an honest, enlightened democracy is well-nigh impossible. If the voter not only is to-day ignorant of the facts necessary to make a sound judgment on the political problems he is called upon to solve, but if he must always remain ignorant of them so long as he is kept by the competitive system subject to the tyranny of the Market, does it not seem difficult to believe that a real democracy can prosper?

As a matter of fact, no prosperous democracy ever has

existed, if by democracy is understood government by the people. Every form of government tacitly assumes that it is to be controlled by a few; and every form of government has been controlled by a few. The people are given a periodical opportunity to throw out one oligarchy, but only on the condition of putting in another. In availing themselves of this opportunity the people exercise undoubtedly a valuable control. But the people cannot be said to govern; they are governed, and by a succession of oligarchies, with the privilege of being ungrateful to them all. And it is because every democratic government is to this extent a sham that so-called democracies have sometimes prospered. It is because the few well-informed men in a community, for the most part, prove themselves stronger than the uninformed many, that republics survive. Unfortunately, what has been the rule up to the present can no longer be counted upon as likely to be the rule hereafter. The uninformed many, without having acquired enough information to be able to solve the problems of government, are rapidly becoming sufficiently organised to wrest the reins of government out of the hands of the minority, and when they do this we shall see the working of a real democracy under the competitive system. It is hardly necessary to add that the selfishness of the workingman, embittered by hatred and uninformed by education, is not likely to deal gently with those to whom they attribute all the evils of past misgovernment, nor is it likely that in the satisfaction of a long-pent vindictiveness they will be in a temper to build up an enduring or a prosperous government of their own.

When, after the passage of the last Reform Bill in England, Mr. Lowe, in speaking of the workingmen to whom the franchise had been extended, said, "Now let

us educate our masters," he did not appreciate that by educating them they would become masters in fact as well as in name. Indeed, the irascibility of conservatives over the growing power of the workingman is very much like that of a parent who, to stop the clamour of a disobedient child crying for a loaded weapon, were to put it in his hand and then grow angry when the child, having learned its use, proceeded to employ it to his own advantage.

Fortunately, just as competition in the realms of nature under one set of conditions produces the tiger, but under other conditions produces the ant, so competition in our own community under one set of conditions produces the sweater, and under other conditions produces the trade union. And although it is impossible to expect that the workingman will, under the competitive system, get the leisure to study the abstract science of government, the trade union furnishes him with a school of practical politics which is of incomparable value. When, during the last century, the old guild ceased to exist, and our legislatures became impregnated with the doctrine of *laissez faire*, the workmen were reduced to combine as the only alternative to starvation wages, and in their combinations they were ruled by the doctrines which successively overthrew the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848. They were indoctrinated by the theory of the equality of men and of the natural consequence of the doctrine that "what concerns all should be decided by all;" and so early trade unions were characterised by the most extravagant democracy. There were no permanent officers, no permanent committee, no permanent secretary; the chairman was elected at every meeting for that meeting only; every member voted on every measure; in a word, the government was that of a town meeting. As trade unions

became too large and scattered for this simplest form of government there was gradually developed a system of instructed delegates; that is to say, of persons delegated by every branch to cast the vote decided upon by the branch at a meeting of delegates of all the branches. And all questions that were raised at the meetings of delegates upon which the delegates had not received instructions from their various branches were referred back to the branches by referendum. This system necessitated a recording secretary in each branch and a recording secretary for the meeting of delegates; and as the trade union increased in numbers and in strength, more and more work fell upon the secretaries, so that it became impossible for them properly to do the work of the trade unions and at the same time do the work of their respective trades. Paid secretaries became therefore necessary, and with the paid secretary came, under the democratic system, all the evils of a practically omnipotent bureaucracy; for the secretaries soon became so superior to the ordinary workingmen in the handling of political machinery that the referendum became as purely a matter of form as was the plébiscite under the Empire. This the rank and file would not long tolerate; and, what with the decay of some trade unions through disaffection of members, and the purgation of others through their revolt, there gradually became evolved a system of representative government such as we have in our most enlightened republics, under which a representative body of workingmen keep control of a paid body of administrative experts, thus as nearly as possible solving the problem of combining efficient administration and popular control.

Now let us consider the political errors which some of the trade unions have corrected in their members.

First, they have learned that all men are not born

equal, in the sense that some men are better fitted to manage a trade union than others.

Secondly, that a man cannot work in a factory and manage a trade union at the same time.

Thirdly, that factory hands cannot by any system of instructed delegates or referendum manage a trade union themselves.

Fourthly, that a paid expert is the best person to administer.

Fifthly, that an elected representative is the best person to control.

Sixthly, they have learned to distinguish between those matters which should be left to the administrator, those which should be left to the representative, and those which should be reserved to the members. Or, in other words, they have learned the proper functions of administration, representation, and referendum respectively.

In addition to these political lessons, trade unions have taught their members some valuable social lessons also. For example: They have become accustomed to see the funds which they contribute to the trade union spent in supporting those members who are out of work. They have even become accustomed to see these funds applied to the maintenance of a strike in a different place and for the immediate benefit of members who are total strangers to them; and, in the effort to maintain a high standard of wages for all, the workmen in one town where wages are high have been known to consent to a reduction of their wages in order to raise the general level above that which ruled in other places. It is a fact of no small importance that when the question was put whether the York branch of the Flint Glass Makers would consent to a reduction of their wages in

the interests of other branches, the vote in favour of consenting to this sacrifice was 75 to 9.¹

It is true that the motive which underlies the sacrifices involved in the foregoing examples is the selfish desire to maintain high wages, each for himself; but two distinct steps towards collectivism are made by the adoption of the trade union plan. In the first place it tends to create a habit of opinion that the interests of the individual can best be advanced by advancing the interests of the whole group to which he belongs; and in the second place it creates a willingness to make a personal sacrifice for the realisation of this general end.

It must not be imagined that trade unions are an unmixed good because they result in these two advantages. It has already been pointed out that, like all the fruits of the competitive system, trade unionism has its bad as well as its good side, but in connection with the question we have particularly studied it is obvious that trade unions constitute a school of political science and moral discipline to which it would be a good thing if our millionaires were sometimes subjected. Nevertheless, the education furnished by trade unions is in some respects not beneficial, for it produces a type which, because it is the result of successful battle, has all the evil characteristics which successful battle tends to produce. Upon this subject no better authority can be cited than the authors of "Industrial Democracy," themselves warm admirers of trade unions and earnest advocates of the principles for which they stand.

"Those who know the trade union world will have no difficulty in recognising, in certain of its sections, both in corporate policy and in the characters of individual leaders, the same strong, self-reliant, and pugnacious

¹ Address of the Central Secretary of the Society in the *Flint Glass Makers' Magazine*, October, 1895, vol. ii. no. 8, pp. 447-451.

spirit; the same impatience of sentiment, philanthropy, and idealism; the same self-complacency at their own success in the fight, and the same contempt for those who have failed; above all, the same conception of the social order, based on the axiom that to him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath. To the idealist who sees in trade unionism a great class upheaval of the oppressed against the oppressors, it comes as a shock to recognise in the trade union official of this type, pushing the interests of his own clients at the expense of everybody else, merely another embodiment of the 'spirit of the bagman.'"¹

It is questionable whether the benefits that workmen derive from trade unions compensate for the spirit of "complacency" and "contempt" which they engender. For this is the very spirit which is most hostile to that of sacrifice and considerateness under which alone a collectivist State could survive. It is to be feared, therefore, that, with trade unions or without, the workingman has a long way to travel before he can understand or appreciate the principles which lie at the very foundation of collectivism.

To the ignorance which specifically characterises the wealthy minority on the one hand and the unwealthy majority on the other must be added another kind of ignorance which characterises both of them, — such ignorance, for example, as that regarding the true character of pauperism and crime, to which reference has already been made. Obviously there is for this triple ignorance only one cure, — education; and not only the education of schools, but the education of experience. How the education of experience can be applied belongs to that part of our subject which deals with the proper steps to be taken

¹ Industrial Democracy, p. 581.

in order gradually to fit our present society for collectivism, and this will be studied later.

Reverting now to the question from which we digressed in order to consider the difficulty in the way of collectivism which results from the ignorance of the community, — that is to say, the question of how tasks are to be classified so as to reduce the inequalities and consequent injustice which characterise our existing system, — let us consider how far the work allotted to each individual in a community would be affected by its diversity.

§ 5. DIVERSITY OF WORK

Few things perhaps deserve more attention in making a study of collectivism than the diversity of work which it would occasion. Under our present system we suffer much from the monotony of our employment. One of the principal objections to machinery is that it tends to convert the man who attends the machine himself into a machine, and this tends to degrade him and produce a degenerate type. The same is true more or less of every unskilled workingman; he is converted by the character of his employment into little better than a beast of burden. The same is true, to a less degree, of those engaged in mental labour. It is probably the exhaustion which attends mental labour that contributes very largely to the infertility of those engaged in this kind of work; moreover, mental labour, attended, as it usually is under the competitive system, with worry and excitement, doubtless contributes to the nervous prostration from which the wealthy suffer; so that the wealthy, after having devoted more hours of the day than they ought to the work of their brains, are driven to all sorts of expedients in order to counteract the mental labour by reaction of muscle and limb. There

are very few men confined to crowded court-houses who do not feel the necessity of physical exercise, and there are still fewer who can afford to indulge therein until their systems are already broken down by the want of it. It is no small merit, therefore, of the collectivist system, that it would permit rotation of tasks so that no man's whole time would be given to unskilled labour and to the work of attending upon the same machine, neither would it be confined to a counting-house or government office; the diversity of employment so occasioned would benefit not only every individual, but, to a still more important degree, the entire race. There is little hardship attending two hours of physical labour, or two hours of factory work, or two hours of mental labour, but there is an exhausting and degenerating consequence of ten hours devoted to any one of these things.

Another element in collectivism which should be pointed out is that there are certain occupations that cannot conveniently be distributed among different citizens, for example, such expert work as civil engineers or that of physicians; these cannot be intrusted to any but men specifically educated for the purpose; nor is it practicable for an engineer who is in charge of a great work to devote thereto only a few hours of each day; nor for a doctor when engaged in practice, by confining his labours to certain hours in the day, to expose his patient to the danger of death during the other hours. In these occupations, therefore, a somewhat different principle would have to be applied. The engineer or the physician would work continuously while he worked, and being engaged, therefore, twice as many hours in the day as his fellow-citizen, he would be entitled to complete rest for as long a time as he was working twice as many hours as the rest.

There is no reason why this principle should not be

applied to other men as well as to engineers or physicians, and why a man or woman should not elect for a given time to work double hours or extra hours in order to secure a corresponding amount of complete leisure.

In this connection it may not be inadvisable to point out that the complete leisure men would enjoy under these conditions during a part of the year would give them as much opportunity for enjoyment as they now have. It would enable a few of them to combine in a yachting cruise; it would enable another one of them and his family to set aside certain months in the year for embellishing a country home; the rent for which would consist of so many hours of extra work to the State. In other words, the amount of direct pleasure that could be secured under a collectivist State would depend much more upon the skill and industry of its citizens than now. For now the large majority are committed to lives of labour from which pleasure is for the most part excluded altogether, whatever be their skill and whatever be their industry. And those who, on the contrary, have leisure for enjoyment cannot but be saddened by the thought—if the thought ever occurs to them—that their leisure is enjoyed at the expense of others.

Having now briefly considered the industrial changes that would take place in a collectivist State, let us as briefly consider some of the special characteristics of its government in its internal affairs first and its external affairs afterwards.

As has been already suggested, the general classification of tasks in the first place, and the attribution of these tasks to individuals in the second place, must be intrusted to somebody; and it is the fact that this duty is imposed upon government that constitutes one of the

chief dangers and difficulties of collectivism. At the present time this task is confided to no one. It is left to competition. Men are born under conditions which make the opportunities for selecting agreeable and remunerative tasks open to some and closed to others; but the merit of the competitive system is, that notwithstanding the fact that the race is an unjust handicap, those who are best fitted for the difficult tasks are generally in industrial matters intrusted with them, the process of selection being an automatic one similar to that adopted by nature. It is because the competitive system in this respect is a natural one that it has received the support and admiration of those who believe in natural rights, who believe that the system of nature is the best system, and that it is a necessary one.

The effort of this book has been to demonstrate that the system of nature is not the best one, and that it can be in large part replaced, and the injustice of it eliminated, by wisdom.

But the injustice and inequality of nature can be eliminated only by wisdom; it can never be eliminated by folly; and so long as folly prevails in a community, so long collectivism is impossible. To the extent, however, to which wisdom prevails in a community, collectivism is possible. In other words, if we can conceive of a community composed entirely of men who appreciate the difficulty of government; who appreciate the inequalities of men, and the better fitness of some men than others to conduct the various branches of government for which they are specially fitted; who recognise that the advantage of the whole community and of themselves as members of that community is best served by putting the best men into office; and from whom the necessary motive for office has been eliminated by the substitution of co-operation for competition, — obviously

in such a community collectivism would be the best form of government. But we have seen that the community in which we live is characterised, on the contrary, by two kinds of ignorance: the ignorance of the wealthy minority, which does not believe in the possibility of collectivism at all; and the ignorance of the unwealthy majority, which believes not only that collectivism is possible, but that it is possible whatever be the men intrusted with the government thereof. Under these conditions we cannot but regretfully admit that an attempt at full-fledged collectivism to-day would be ruinously premature. Let us assume, however, that it is possible, by certain steps which will be discussed later, gradually to diminish the ignorance of both the wealthy minority and the unwealthy majority so that the one have abandoned the theory that collectivism is impossible, and the other have learned that government can safely be put only into the hands of men specifically fitted therefor. In such case what would be the machinery of such a government, and in what particulars would it chiefly differ from our own?

§ 6. INTERNAL POLICY

In the first place it would be indispensable, in such a community, that every member in it be known, and all not members be rigidly excluded from its benefits. This would mean an absolute end to immigration for the purpose of permanent residence within its borders.

The exclusion of all foreigners from permanent residence would be necessitated by the fact that every member of the community would be entitled to a share of its income as well as a vote in its government. This share and this vote would become so valuable that every man entitled thereto would not fail to secure his right by a

proper system of registration, and as the fundamental theory of such a community would be that no man should be compelled to work save for the State, which was itself organised for the benefit of all who worked for it, it would not be consistent with this principle to employ the labour of others who were not members of the community. For this reason, therefore, no person could be admitted to naturalisation except under such peculiar conditions as now give rise to *La Grande Naturalisation* in France; that is to say, by a decree specifically granting naturalisation for extraordinary services in each case. Incidentally this would settle the question of impoverishment by accretion of population from outside, or degeneration of citizenship for the same reason.

This policy would not be open to the charge of unjust exclusiveness because it would proceed upon the theory that collectivism was the highest type of government, and that by excluding the members of other nations from the enjoyment of ours, the adoption of this system by other nations would be encouraged. It would be of interest to every collectivist State to encourage the adoption of collectivism in other States as will be seen when we come to regard the external relations of a collectivist State. Moreover, collectivism, properly understood, is a religion, and the spread of this religion could best be served, not by admitting foreigners within the State, but by compelling them to remain outside and converting them into apostles of this religion within their own.

Every adult man¹ in a collectivist State is to have a vote in its government, and the exact form of this gov-

¹ It is believed by many that by the time humanity has reached the stage which fits it for collectivism, the circumstances attending politics will have so changed as to eliminate the objections which now exist to female suffrage. But whether this be so or not must depend upon circumstances, and it is not herein intended to judge of these circumstances beforehand.

ernment would not differ much from that of our own. The idea, however, that such a government would, as imagined by Bebel, be entirely free from party or faction, is assuredly a mistake. The management of such a government as that of the United States under a collectivist plan would resemble the management of an enormous corporation by the side of which no existing corporation could compare in magnitude. The determination of how the resources of this vast country could best be employed to the benefit of every individual in it would be a matter not only of great difficulty, but one upon which opinions would be found to differ. The classification of tasks, the system of rotation, the preference given to one class of tasks over another, the attribution of tasks to individuals, — all these things would give rise to differences of opinion. The extent to which those men most gifted by nature would be permitted to enjoy benefits obtained through their superior ability to do their work in a shorter time, or through the rendering of extraordinary services to the State, would doubtless give rise, not only to differences of opinion, but to differences of opinion so radical as to create parties in the State. One party would doubtless contend that there should be no option whatever given to the more gifted individual, but that all should toil the same number of hours under as nearly as possible the same conditions, whereas another party would favour the granting of special privileges to persons who are able to render special services to the State. Again, there would doubtless arise two questions of foreign policy to which we shall refer presently, upon which a profound difference of opinion would exist; and in addition to differences of opinion there would be perpetual conflict for office, arising out of the desire of men for the consideration that springs therefrom. As has been already suggested, the struggle

for wealth is in great part a struggle for the consideration and power that arise from wealth; and although we may eliminate private property from a community, we can never eliminate the desire for consideration and the desire for power, and both of these are inseparably connected with public office.

The fact that this struggle would subsist in a collectivist State is one that cuts both ways. It clearly gives rise to the possibility that faction might become sufficiently powerful to wreck the State; but at the same time it furnishes the argument that if the struggle of faction is great enough to make it possible to wreck the State, it must also be amply sufficient to prevent the uniformity of type which has so often been regarded as hostile to it. We have insisted upon the extreme importance of avoiding institutions that would create such uniformity that variability would disappear, and with variability progress. The effect of collectivism, however, would not be to create such uniformity as to limit the activities of men. The limit imposed upon men by collectivism is a limit to the accumulation of *individual* wealth. No limit would be imposed upon the work of accumulating wealth for the State. On the contrary, the leisure at the disposal of individuals which could be devoted to this work of accumulating wealth for the State would be much larger than at present, and the consideration that would result from such work ought to be a sufficient motive to justify it. It does not seem, therefore, that there would be a dangerous diminution of party activity in a collectivist State. One element of discord and hatred would be eliminated from it; that is to say, the mercenary motive. That the mercenary motive has heretofore been sufficient to divert every good institution from the object for which it was organised has already been sufficiently insisted upon. The impor-

tance of eliminating such a motive, then, is obvious. It is submitted, however, that if this mercenary motive be eliminated, while a necessarily degenerating influence will have been withdrawn from politics, politics will still remain sufficiently animated by differences of opinion to prevent the uniformity inconsistent with a progressive type. It may be recalled that in discussing the question of variability the suggestion was made that, until man became perfect, variability would be indispensable to perfectibility. It may now be added, as a corollary to this statement, that, until man becomes perfect, there will be faction in the State. When man is perfect, if that time ever comes, there will be need neither for faction nor for variability.

§ 7. EXTERNAL POLICY

It must be remembered that a collectivist State will still be subject to competition of other States, or at any rate it will be subject to such competition until all the other States in the world are collectivist also. As the likelihood of this last taking place is extremely remote, we shall have to assume that if a collectivist State is surrounded by other States which are not collectivist, there will be competition between these States.

It is obvious that the task of steering a collectivist State through the dangerous channels of diplomatic relations with States that are not themselves collectivist would be a difficult, if not an impossible one, and in this respect some States are infinitely better situated than others. The problems presented to such a country as that of the British Empire would in such case be of enormous magnitude. To us in the United States, who are self-supporting, the task could hardly be regarded as a difficult one, and yet the policy to be adopted in

various contingencies would be likely to give rise to considerable differences of opinion. The foreign complication in which we were lately involved by the misgovernment of Cuba furnishes a case in point. That part of the community with whom indignation predominates would urge a collectivist State, as in ours, to intervene; but in a collectivist State, as in ours, there would be a part of the community that would compare the evil that would result from intervention with the evil to which intervention would put an end; under the influence of this comparison it would decide that a higher wisdom required us to abstain from an intervention that was as likely to increase bloodshed as to diminish it. Moreover, a collectivist State ought to succeed in limiting moral responsibility more intelligently than we do. Among many of our best citizens there appears to be no sense of limitation whatever. Whenever evil exists, they regard themselves to a certain extent responsible for it. They are as willing to dash our armies against the Turk in Armenia as against the Spaniards in Cuba, and are willing to neglect the arab in their own streets for the Bedouin in the desert. A collectivist would be permitted to apply a different principle; his argument would be this: the only political institutions consistent with the doctrines of Christ are those of a collective form of government, because these are the only principles consistent with peace it would be inconsistent, by violating peace, to force these principles upon other men. It would be contrary to our principles to do so. What we can do is to present an example to other men for other men to follow, and we shall not be tempted by any consideration to part from the doctrines of peace except in the defence of the institutions which religion has taught us to create and cherish. Millions for defence, then, but not one life, not one cent, for aggression.

§ 8. VALUE, EXCHANGE VALUE, CURRENCY, AND FOREIGN TRADE

Existing works on "Socialism" devote much time and space to the discussion of value. But the form of collectivism proposed in the foregoing pages renders the discussion of value unnecessary. Before proceeding to the explanation of this, it should be pointed out that political economists are not concerned with a definition of the word "value," but only with that of the words "exchange value;" that is to say, in order to have correct notions as to the economic forces engaged in the industrial field, it becomes important to determine what elements enter into determining the exchange value of a commodity. Exchange value is clearly determined primarily by supply and demand, or, in other words, when supply is small and demand great, exchange value rises; whereas when supply is large and demand small, exchange value sinks. One of the inconveniences of this obvious fact is that it applies as much to wages as to any other commodity, and political economists are therefore obliged to admit that, under existing industrial conditions, the wages of men and women, upon which their very life depends, are a mathematical result of the relation between supply and demand, and that during the occasional crises that characterise our present industrial system the periodical increase of supply and diminution of demand cannot do otherwise but drive men to beggary and women to prostitution.

There is, however, a limit to the minimum exchange value of an article, and this limit is cost of production; in other words, exchange value cannot long remain below cost of production, and therefore cost of produc-

tion must enter as an element in determining exchange value.

The question is still further complicated by the fact that exchange value is measured by a medium which itself varies in exchange value. In other words, gold and silver, which serve to state in figures the exchange value of commodities, are themselves subject to variation in value, and it becomes difficult, therefore, to determine in any given case whether a modification of the price of a commodity is due to a modification of the exchange value of the commodity, or to a modification of the exchange value of the gold or silver which state in figures its market price. These questions are not raised here for the purpose of solution, but only for the purpose of pointing out that in the form of collectivism proposed in the foregoing pages they have little or no importance, and in order to make this clear it becomes important to state with more accuracy than has heretofore been stated what machinery will, in the proposed collectivist State, replace the existing system of exchange and circulating medium.

In discussing this subject we must begin by carefully distinguishing between internal and external industrial conditions. Let us begin first with Internal Industrial Conditions:

(a) Internal Industrial Conditions

The essential feature of collectivism is that in its internal industrial conditions there is little exchange, little trade, and no circulating medium. All adult individuals, male and female, with the exception of paupers and criminals, are entitled, by virtue of the compulsory work that they do for the State, to a certain proportion or dividend of the State income, and this proportion is delivered to them in the shape of dividend coupons,

divided into fractional parts in much the same manner as our own currency.¹ These dividend coupons must not be confounded with the labour cheques proposed by Karl Marx or Rodbertus, or with the labour exchange notes that were actually used by Josiah Warren and Robert Owen. Neither do they represent gold or credit, as bank notes do under our conditions, nor are they any longer, therefore, subject to the fluctuations in the value of gold and silver and credit, whether due to accidents of discovery, to interested legislation, or to commercial panic. A dividend coupon means nothing but that the individual to whom it is delivered has become entitled, by virtue of the compulsory labour he has done, to the fractional parts of the State income expressed therein. These dividend coupons ought, unless the State be bankrupt or less productive than any State now in existence, to be sufficient to assure to every adult individual, not a pauper or a criminal, the necessities of life. The more prosperous the State, the larger the amount of comforts and luxuries these dividend coupons will assure.

If the preceding estimate of the economy of a collectivist system is at all correct, the degree of comfort and luxury such a system should furnish every individual ought to be considerable.

In addition to the dividend coupons issued against compulsory labour just explained, another variety of coupons will be furnished to every individual who chooses to contribute any part of his leisure to the benefit of the State. These might conveniently be termed "voluntary labour cheques." It has already been explained that the State ought not, under a collectivist system,

¹ How these dividend coupons are calculated is explained in chap. v. § 4, g.

to exact more than half of a day from every adult individual in it. Every such individual in it, then, would have half of every day at his or her disposal. The use to which this leisure will be put will obviously depend upon the taste of every individual. The artist will devote it to art; the poet to literature; the scientific man to science; the statesman to politics; others, and even the foregoing at times, will devote this leisure to increase their material comforts; as, for example, — the construction of a house in the country; the securing of instruments of amusement, or of a longer vacation than the State habitually affords. Through the instrumentality of these voluntary labour cheques, the industrious individual will secure an advantage over the less industrious. Through the thrift with which both kinds of labour cheques are used, the thrifty will have an advantage over the unthrifty. Under this plan, therefore, the objection that collectivism will necessarily reduce all men and women to one dead level falls to the ground. Every man willing to work will have work, and will receive for that work an assured and sufficient share in the necessities and comforts of life; but between the man who does least for the State and the man who does most for the State there will exist a difference in the positive pleasures of life which ought amply to satisfy the industrious without giving the unindustrious legitimate cause for discontent.

Those who attack most successfully this scheme of distribution point out that if dividend coupons are transferable there will be the same opportunity for accumulation of dividend coupons as for accumulation of money, and that by virtue of this accumulation those who accumulate will be able to reduce to subjection those who do not accumulate. They also point out that after the system of accumulation has operated during a

sufficient time it might become of a character to bankrupt the State, for the State being prepared only to satisfy every year the dividend coupons distributed during that year, and calculating every year its income upon the basis of actual wealth and actual population, might one day find itself called upon suddenly to honour a vast accumulation of dividend coupons in the hands of the few thrifty, and thus render it impossible for the State to furnish to the unthrifty even the necessities of life. These objections seem fatal to a collectivist system, and no form of collectivism to which they apply would seem likely to survive; and yet they depend for their efficacy upon a condition which, under the proposed collectivist system, would not exist. They take for granted that dividend coupons are to be transferable. They take for granted that under a collectivist system dividend coupons are capable of accumulation. It cannot be too emphatically insisted upon, then, that dividend coupons, under the proposed collectivist State, would be neither transferable nor valid for more than a stipulated period. Inasmuch as it is the specific intention of collectivism to prevent traffic and to prevent accumulation, it is obvious that dividend coupons issued for this purpose must be neither transferable nor valid for more than a limited period. The instinct of accumulation for the benefit of one's self is the very instinct which a collectivist State is intended to discourage and destroy. The instinct of accumulating for the benefit of the community is the instinct which collectivism is intended to encourage and promote. Centuries of selfish accumulation have created in us a habit with which none of us are happy, and without which, nevertheless, we would be unhappy. What man needs for his happiness is to escape from the despotism of this instinct of selfish accumulation. This instinct is so essential to our

present system that the whole economy of our State would go to pieces were it not to exist, and it has become so far a part of the fibre of every thinking man and woman that we find it difficult to conceive of a condition of things which would render the exercise of this instinct unnecessary and immoral. But inasmuch as the scheme of collectivism has for its express purpose to assure to every man a fair share of the necessary comforts of life, not only during his working years, but also during that old age in which no work can be done, and inasmuch as the economy of the collectivist plan herein proposed seems sufficient to justify the belief that this fair share of necessities and comforts can be assured to all the citizens of a collectivist State at one-half of the labour now employed in securing it only to a few, there is left under the collectivist system neither necessity nor motive for accumulation.

Although it is important that dividend coupons which are issued against *compulsory* labour applied to the production and distribution of *necessaries* should not be transferable, there is no reason why such a restriction should be put on voluntary labour cheques. The essential task of collectivism is to assure to every man and woman a real as well as nominal liberty of contract by assuring the necessities of life to all in exchange for a few hours of labour. As regards the hours of labour required for producing necessities, liberty is impossible in any condition of life save for a favoured few; but as regards the hours of labour voluntarily undertaken to increase the pleasures of life, liberty is possible for all under the collectivist plan, because under this plan no one man is able to dictate terms to another through control of the means of subsistence. Once, therefore, the means of subsistence are assured, and thereby liberty of contract, every man is free to offer services or return

them according to the terms offered. Accumulation and exploitation are therefore not to be feared as regards voluntary service offered to obtain the pleasures and luxuries of life, as they are to be feared in the securing of necessities. To secure necessities a man *must* work; to secure pleasures or luxuries he may or may not work as he likes. For this reason voluntary labour cheques may be transferable, whereas dividend coupons may not. This matter is more fully explained in Chapter V. on the practical working of collectivism.¹

The dividend coupon, then, is not money, one of the essential uses of which is to enable one man to accumulate with facility by substituting for divers bulky commodities one single commodity that is not bulky and can therefore be easily accumulated. Dividend coupons simply constitute the machinery through which every man will take the income to which he is entitled in the shape in which he desires it, so that every man may spend his income in the way most suited to his taste: one in the luxuries of the table; another in beautiful raiment; a third in scientific investigation; a fourth in music or art or literature; a fifth in out-of-door exercise, — leaving to every man that most precious of all human liberties, the right to apply the product of his labour as suits best his own individual taste. By this method, then, collectivism will control a few hours of every man's day, but the remaining hours will be at his disposal for the satisfaction of individual tastes in a manner which no civilisation up to the present time has been able to compass. This is the true measure of individualism, for it is an individualism which assures the maximum of liberty to every man, with a minimum of risk and a minimum of inconvenience to all.

¹ See pp. 410-412.

(b) External Industrial Conditions, or Foreign Trade

It is a somewhat singular fact that most writers on "Socialism" take it for granted that in a collectivist State foreign trade would cease to exist. Professor Flint¹ goes so far as to say that "Socialists, being obliged to admit that foreign trade would disappear in a socialist community, have entered upon a conspiracy of silence on the subject, owing to their inability to face the difficulties which this disappearance of foreign trade is likely to occasion."

It is difficult to understand to what the idea that foreign trade must disappear in a collectivist community is due. Every community is likely to produce more of an article than it can itself consume, and to be able to engage advantageously in exchange with other nations of its surplus production for theirs. The only difference between foreign trade as practised by our industrial State and that practised by the proposed collectivist State is that in our case individuals carry on foreign trade, whereas in the proposed collectivist State the State alone would carry it on; and in order to carry on this trade, gold would remain an important element in the wealth of the State. Indeed, the wealth of the State would be enhanced by the fact that inasmuch as gold would no longer have any use as currency within the State, the gold employed under existing industrial conditions for currency within the State would all of it be available for the purchase of commodities abroad; and with the view of being able to continue the purchase of commodities abroad, the State would have an interest in mining gold if it produced gold; or, if it did not produce gold, in producing articles which could readily be exchanged for foreign products. The

¹ "Socialism," p. 246, by Prof. Robert Flint.

machinery of foreign trade would in no way be changed, although it would be relieved of the pressure which now forces prosperous nations to conquer new markets by the perpetual tendency, under the profit system, of production to outstrip purchasing power; because in a collectivist community, the moment it was found that a given commodity was being produced in larger quantities than either the State itself could consume, or other nations be willing to purchase, the State could immediately diminish the extent of this manufacture and apply the labour theretofore employed by it to industries for which there existed a greater demand.

Some authors¹ think that the State will find it difficult to put a money value on products sold to foreigners because of the absence of the use of money to determine cost. This objection seems to indicate a failure to grasp the real facts of the case. The dividend coupon proposed will be a far more efficient method for determining cost than the present system of coin, because coin is at present subject to variation in value, whereas no such variation in value will interfere with the calculation of the cost in labour of every commodity. Moreover, foreign trade will be determined, under a collectivist State, as in ours, by foreign demand, cost of production being serviceable only for the purpose of fixing the minimum price at which it will be advantageous to export.

¹ Graham, "Socialism New and Old," p. 208.

CHAPTER IV

OBJECTIONS TO COLLECTIVISM DISCUSSED

§ 1. THAT IT WOULD PROMOTE OVER-POPULATION

ONE of the formidable objections made to collectivism is that it would furnish no check to population; and that therefore the principle announced by Malthus would eventually prove ruinous to the State. To this objection there are many answers. In the first place, it is no longer contested that it is not the well-to-do who most increase the population, but, on the contrary, those who are reduced to a state of such misery that no increase of responsibility can make the misery much worse. In other words, reckless fertility is the result of despair, and infertility among the poor is due more often to physical degeneration than to prudence. Malthusians will answer that in our State prudence checks population in a large class; whereas under collectivism prudence would not operate at all. To this a very simple answer can be made. There is a form of collectivism which proposes to give to every man unconditionally according to his needs, to which this objection would apply; but nothing would be easier, under the form of collectivism here proposed, than to give a prudential motive for the check of population, which would probably be far more effectual than that which exists under existing conditions. In other words, a collectivist State could lay down the principle that no person was entitled to a full share of the collectivist income until he attained the age of

twenty-one years; that prior to that time, and as soon as a child is born, the father would have to furnish hours of work, in excess of those which he owed as an individual, for every child brought by him into the world. It is submitted that this plan would operate as a check to population as great as that which now exists, because whereas under our present system it is the woman who bears the immediate brunt of every child that is born, under this plan the man would at once bear a share of it also; and as the man is the one of the two most responsible for increase of population, it is upon him that it is most important that a check should fall.

In addition to the check herein proposed, and which could be made more or less by the State according as there was a tendency in the population to increase too fast or to diminish too fast, we have to take into consideration the fact often already suggested, that the enhancement of the position of women which characterises this century has already been found to do much to determine this question of population. The more of a drudge a woman is, the less she has to say on this subject; the higher the part she plays, the more she has to say upon it; and as the collectivist form of government has for its direct purpose to make the benefit of the State serve the benefit of the individual, thereby bringing about an equality between individuals which cannot exist under the competitive system, women will share in the advantages to be derived from collectivism more than men; for they will no longer suffer from the industrial inequality to which, under our existing laws and customs, they are subjected.

Because, therefore, there will be no element of the population reduced by recklessness to disregard the question of population; and because, on the contrary, it is the sex most responsible for increase of population that will,

under the system proposed, suffer the immediate consequence thereof; and because the enhancement of the position of women who suffer most therefrom will give them more to say on the subject, — it is likely that a State of collectivism will have as much, if not more, control over population than ours.

§ 2. THAT COLLECTIVISM WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE OF THE HOME

The popular notion that collectivism would tend to break up the home is founded on the vague notions of such a common table as existed in Sparta, and upon the better-founded fear arising from the fact that many of those who to-day preach socialism denounce the institution of marriage. For the first of these two notions there is no ground whatever, as a common table forms no part of the proposed collectivism. As regards the second, it is a lamentable fact that some of those who most loudly advocate collectivism, and most urgently demand that it should be immediately instituted, tend to regard collectivism as a system under which they will be relieved of every restraint, whether upon lust or upon vindictiveness. The greatest danger, indeed, that we have to confront is the possibility of a collectivist experiment being undertaken upon these lines.

Enough has been said to show that collectivism is consistent only with a high degree of self-control; it must fail, and fail ruinously, if attempted upon the principle of self-surrender. The very fact that some partisans of collectivism are enemies of the institution of marriage is perhaps the most serious reason why it is indispensable that the subject of collectivism be earnestly studied by the conservative element in the community; for no greater calamity could fall to any State than

that its government should be handed over to men who, by destroying the institution of marriage, would break down the very prop upon which all sound government rests.

It has been repeated, perhaps, too often that marriage and the family which results from marriage furnish in themselves the first and best school for self-control, and for all the social qualities. Indeed, one of the indictments made against the industrial system is that it tends to break up family relations. In many of the cotton industries in the United States the employment of women has become so universal that men have been driven by it to herd in lumber camps; and the most important centres of cotton industry have, through this exclusion of the men, received the name of "she towns;" and even when the sexes are not separated, the employment of women in factories has caused the housewife to disappear; the result being that families working in factories do not have homes of their own, but live in large boarding-houses, thus leading, not only to relaxation of family ties, but to a diminution of parental authority.

Not only, however, does the industrial system to-day tend among working people to break up the home, but it is itself responsible for many of the evils which attend marriage, such as those that result from "marriages de convenance" and those that result from prostitution.

The evils that attend marriages that are made for money have already been treated at some length; it does not seem necessary, therefore, here to do more than recall the fact that although all marital unhappiness does not by any means inevitably result from these, a great deal of it undoubtedly does; moreover, the prevalence of the idea that marriage can be resorted to for any other purpose than the life association of men and

women who love one another, creates confused notions about marriage which tend to obscure and diminish its sacramental character. With the disappearance of the sordid motive which now degrades the approaches to marriage, it would be easier to maintain the high ideals of married life that would contribute most to making unhappiness in it improbable.

But the greatest boon which collectivism would bestow on the institution of marriage is that it would put an end to prostitution. In an earlier part of this book it was promised that the question how prostitution could be prevented would, in its proper context, be examined. The subject is not an easy or agreeable one to treat; it will be disposed of, therefore, in the fewest words possible. If, however, the treatment of it is summary, it is not so because the subject itself is unimportant. On the contrary, if it is true that collectivism would put an end to prostitution, this alone, for those who can comprehend the horrors of it, ought to justify the sacrifice necessary to the realisation of it. If it is clear that our present competitive system is responsible for the evil and injustice to both sexes that result from prostitution, then the maintenance of this system is, so far as every one of us by indifference tolerates it, nothing less than a crime.

We must begin by making ourselves clear as to what prostitution is.

Mere promiscuity of sexual relation does not constitute prostitution, for many a woman is unfaithful to her husband many times without losing social consideration, provided only she conduct herself with sufficient discretion to avoid scandal.

Nor does sexual intercourse for money constitute prostitution; for then prostitution would include all those who marry for money. The real definition of a

prostitute is a woman who has intercourse both promiscuously and for a money reward. In other words, both promiscuity and gain must be united in order to constitute a prostitute.

Now it is clear that in a collectivist State, because every woman in it received the same income, she would be lifted by this income above the necessity of prostitution for a livelihood.

Prostitution is generally the direct result of the disgrace put upon a woman by loss of virtue. She is turned out of her home and out of her legitimate employment. She has then but one recourse. It is sometimes due to lack of employment; and sometimes to the greater facility prostitution affords for making a livelihood with the least labour. In all these cases the "primum mobile" is the making of a livelihood. As collectivism would remove this "primum mobile," as collectivism would assure a livelihood to every woman upon the single condition of her performing her allotted work, there would be practically no motive for prostitution. If she refused to perform her allotted task she would become a pauper — but a prostitute never. For a collectivist State, as has already been stated, would segregate paupers, and not leave them to demoralise its citizens by profligacy and prostitution.

It may be objected that society keeps itself pure by casting out women of loose character, and that an innocent girl should not be called upon to work at a factory side by side with one who will deprave her if she can. An exhaustive answer to this question would involve a study of the special conditions of each State, the laws of each State, the mental attitude of the people, their tolerance of morality or their intolerance of it. It is a problem common to every society and not to the collectivist society alone. This exhaustive study it is not the

province of this book to undertake; it must be disposed of, therefore, by the following few general considerations.

In the society of the wealthy to-day we are constantly confronted by the same problem as would be presented by a collectivist State, in which prostitution would be rendered impossible by State employment regardless of morality. In other words, wealth does for the wealthy class what collectivism would do for the unwealthy; it makes prostitution improbable if not impossible. And the wealthy manage to solve the problem of promiscuity, — every wealthy society for itself in its own way.

Again, the likelihood of immorality would be indirectly as well as directly diminished by the absence of prostitutes as a class. It has been already intimated that prostitution committed injustice to *both* sexes. By this it was intended to refer to the injustice of exposing our young men to the perpetual temptation furnished by the facilities of prostitution. The whole question of sexual morality is mainly one of suggestion. Take eight men who have grown accustomed to believe that they cannot dispense with sexual connection; put them in a crew and remove the suggestion that they can obtain relief at any time by substituting therefor the notion of loyalty to the crew or a desire to win a race, and the sexual desire which before seemed uncontrollable practically disappears. The moment the race is over, the old suggestion returns, and the night of a boat race has become proverbial in consequence. The same is true of men who go on hunting expeditions, yachting cruises, into lumber camps, etc. Sexual desire becomes dormant or controllable as soon as facilities for gratifying it disappear; the moment the facility returns, the moment they return to the suggestion, once more desire becomes uncontrollable.

What, then, would be the consequence if the suggestion were minimized by the absence of prostitution altogether?

But this is not all: the men who seduce young girls and married women are men who have learned to gratify their passions through the facility afforded by prostitution. If our youths were never afforded the chance of taking that first step which leads to the *facilis descensus*, they would, from the fact of never having gratified their passions, be less likely to undertake to gratify them at the cost of seduction. The suggestion would be absent; all women would tend to be as sacred to a man as his sister; the relation of the brother and sister is due entirely to the absence of suggestion; he has learned to regard her with an unconscious respect which removes the possibility of erotic suggestion. What actually happens in the small family of to-day could also happen in the larger family of to-morrow.

This must not be understood as a contention that collectivism would destroy immorality; far from it; the subject is a difficult one and uncomfortable to discuss. All that is claimed is that it might diminish immorality and that it would put an end to prostitution. This last is reason enough for it.

In conclusion, then, an intelligently constituted collectivism would appreciate the importance of maintaining, above all things, the integrity of the home; the common table would therefore be discouraged; the separation of members of a family would be avoided; every family would be encouraged to live permanently in the same house, to adorn the house and make it attractive; and the right of inheritance, limited as described already, would permit of the handing down of all those things which tend to make the home characteristic and beautiful from generation to generation, not

only for a few rich, but for every member of the community alike.

Few attacks upon collectivism are more insidious than those which set up as a warning the failure of the numerous attempts at socialism which were made at the beginning of the century in America. All these attempts proceeded upon the plan that men and women could live harmoniously in a so-called colony, sharing a common table and daily brought into dangerous and unavoidable propinquity. The hopelessness of such an experiment is well conveyed in "La Clairière," and ought to serve as an explanation why our American attempts at socialism universally failed. Collectivism does not offer a solution of the sexual problem; it only eliminates the *economic* causes of prostitution, and the economic reasons which induce men and women to marry for money instead of marrying for love taken in its highest sense. The sexual problem will doubtless always remain a source of ecstasy and rage; it will produce discord in the home and in the street; it will determine political as well as social conflicts; it will serve not only as a scourge, but as the stimulant so insisted on by individualists. It will promote the variety so necessary to evolution, — human as well as natural. It is the instrument of nature for torturing and delighting man which no political scheme can ever eliminate. The attempt to dispense with the home is an attempt to disregard a natural occasion of unhappiness which human effort may diminish, but cannot hope entirely to destroy; for the home is the human device for diminishing the effects of this natural occasion of unhappiness upon the happiness and advancement of man. The mistake, therefore, of eliminating the home from the ideal collectivist State cannot be too much insisted upon. For the home is the school and shelter

of family affection and family sacrifice, where men and women learn control over sexual passion and the beauty and happiness of devotion to others.

§ 3. THAT COLLECTIVISM WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE OF LIBERTY

The most formidable objection to collectivism is that it will interfere with liberty. A chapter has already been devoted to studying what liberty is, and the conclusion has been arrived at that of the three great liberties, — freedom from physical restraint, freedom from political oppression, and freedom from want, — the first seems to have been practically as well as theoretically solved; the second has been theoretically but not practically solved; and the third has not been solved at all.

The question presented in this section is capable of being more clearly stated now that the economy of collectivism has been explained; it divides itself into two parts: Does collectivism offer a practical as well as a theoretical solution of the problem presented by the effort to attain political liberty; and Does collectivism furnish any solution at all of the problem presented by the effort to attain economic liberty.

Of these two, let us consider the last first.

(a) *Economic Liberty*

Mr. Spencer adopts Sir Henry Maine's theory that social life must be carried on by either voluntary co-operation or compulsory co-operation; "the system must be that of contract or that of status, — that in which the individual is left to do the best he can by his spontaneous efforts, and get success or failure according to his

efficiency, and that in which he has his appointed place, works under coercive rule, and has his apportioned share of food, clothing, and shelter.”¹

This theory fails to recognise that the system of contract under the competitive system, far from permitting a large element of liberty, is one which, on the contrary, submits the community which adopts it to a condition of economic despotism. The actual experience of the last century in its effort to realise so-called liberty of contract has demonstrated that under competitive conditions liberty of contract is impossible. A community which adopts or consents to the competitive system deliberately puts into power a despot more evil than Nature, — for the Market favours a few at the expense of the many without securing for the favoured few the fertility essential to the wholesome perpetuation of the race.

Now if the tyranny of the Market makes liberty of contract impossible; if in addition, by favouring an unfertile few at the expense of the fertile many, it exercises a debilitating and demoralising effect upon the race, it fails not only in securing the liberty which Spencer claims for it, but also in realising those conditions which have been laid down as essential to the attainment of justice.

So much depends upon this part of the argument that no excuse ought to be necessary for dwelling a moment upon it.

Until the revolutions which in England and France substituted constitutional government for that of absolute monarchy, the mass of men were subject to individual lords; the tyranny exercised over them was an individual tyranny, — that of one man over another. The forces which overthrew the individual tyrant were those of industry and commerce. But in dethroning

¹ “A Plea for Liberty.” Introduction, p. 6.

the king the merchant did not secure liberty; he only changed tyrants. The new tyranny is one of conditions or institutions, such as the tyranny of the Market, the Trade Union, Employers' Associations, and Trade Alliances.

The new tyranny is in one sense less obvious than the old; it is perhaps less humiliating; but it is none the less destructive of liberty. Nothing need be added to the chapter on Private Property in order to demonstrate that the vast majority are the slaves of the particular occupation through which they earn their daily bread.

If the tyranny of the Market secured a living under reasonable conditions for all, it might still be endured; but in this it fails lamentably. It grinds humanity as in a mill, and its results sorted out are: a very few millionaires; some men of moderate fortune; a mass of workingmen on the ragged edge of want; and a daily renewed fifth of prostitutes, criminals, lunatics, and paupers.

Again, if the tyranny of the Market wrought out of the misery it occasions some lasting moral good to mankind, then, too, it might be endured. But except that it is part of the engine of tribulation out of which some sanctity emerges, but much more despair, the direct tendency of the Market is to promote selfishness and deceit.

The substitution of the tyranny of the Market for that of the absolute Monarch, then, is not only degrading to the morality of mankind, but fails to furnish security from want. Does it secure political liberty?

(b) Political Liberty

Spencer is himself a witness that the existence of this system, even under popular forms of government, does not secure political liberty; he says: "How little the men who drew up the American Declaration of Independence and framed the Republic anticipated that after some generations the Legislature would lapse into the hands of wire-pullers; that its doings would turn upon the contests of office-seekers; that political action would be everywhere vitiated by the intrusion of a foreign element holding the balance between parties; that electors, instead of judging for themselves, would habitually be led to the poll in thousands by their 'bosses;' and that respectable men would be driven out of public life by the insults and slanders of professional politicians."¹

Under no competitive scheme of government that has ever been suggested has political liberty been in fact attained, and neither Herbert Spencer nor any individualist has ever shown us how, under the competitive system, the vicious circle through which political revolutions have despairingly revolved can ever be broken. So long as ninety-nine hundredths of the working population are engaged all day in the labour necessary to earn a bare living, these ninety-nine hundredths can neither study their own needs nor understand their own misfortunes, nor watch the government, nor effect the necessary combinations to secure the execution of their collective will. They are committed by economic conditions to ignorance, and delivered by both to the machine and to the boss.

It would seem, then, that a careful analysis of our

¹ Introduction to "A Plea for Liberty," p. 13.

existing conditions demonstrates that not only do we fail to enjoy liberty, whether political or economic, but that the competitive system is destructive of both. Let us, then, begin the study of how far collectivism affects liberty by ridding our minds of the assumption that individualism favours it.

Most students are inclined to accept without scrutiny the assumption that individualism means liberty, and collectivism restraint. This is the assumption implied by the title, "A Plea for Liberty," a book written by a group of individualists already quoted. But it is demonstrable, on the contrary, that individualism is destructive of political liberty; and that it makes economic liberty impossible. We are now in a position to push the analysis of liberty a step farther, and inquire how far it is inaccurate to say that individualism is consistent with personal liberty — or security from personal restraint.

(c) *Personal Liberty*

The question of liberty is to-day fundamentally a question of economics. Before the merchant turned the soldier out of the political arena, the minority ruled the majority by *military* organisation. The condition of inequality produced by the military plan is perpetuated by the economic, no workingman being able to lift himself out of his condition unless possessed of extraordinary genius or favoured by such conditions as lately presented themselves in the United States. By this, however, it is not meant to imply that the revolution which put the merchant in power instead of the feudal lord brought no improvement. On the contrary, it has conferred upon the workingman a boon of priceless value; for it has given him the

political franchise, — that is to say, it has put into his hands a weapon by the use of which he can secure all the liberties, provided economic conditions permit of its intelligent employment. Unfortunately, economic conditions are such that the workingman is as yet unable to wield the weapon which political revolutions have put into his hand. He is learning to use it; the information he is acquiring in his trade unions is teaching him to use it; but they may not be teaching him to use it wisely, and there is probably no greater danger now menacing civilisation than the possible misuse of this weapon by the proletariat.

The enemy of liberty, then, to-day is economic both in the sense that the Market, which is the economic despot of us all, keeps down wages, thereby making four-fifths of our population slaves to their employment, and in the sense that, so long as wages are kept down, the entire energy of this four-fifths of the population is consumed in making bread, there is no surplus energy left at the end of the day for political instruction, combination, or efficiency; or perhaps it would be more correct to say there is just surplus energy left for political combination, but not enough for political and economic instruction, and without instruction combination is a menace to the State. Keeping the economic character of the problem clearly in our minds, let us now compare the degree of personal liberty attainable under existing conditions with the degree of personal liberty attainable under a collectivist State.

Liberty has been defined to be the freedom, consistent with security, from physical restraint, political oppression, and want, and with a high degree of socialisation; it has been roughly stated that, as regards physical restraint, the problem has been in great part solved; but by physical restraint has been meant only the restraint exercised by

imprisonment; it has not covered the physical restraint to which every workingman is put by his employment. And yet this is no small part of liberty. At present it is fully enjoyed only by a few wealthy. Under the collectivist State it would be enjoyed in a great measure by all.

The economic character of the problem of liberty has been insisted on because one of the chief claims of collectivism is its economy. Collectivism harnesses all its horses to the same end of the cart. Every human being capable of useful production is encouraged by it to co-operate with every other in producing for the common benefit, instead of being encouraged (as he is in the competitive plan) to do his utmost to prevent his neighbour from so doing. It is contended for this system that, taking account of the immense number of men and amount of time now dissipated in the mere work and waste of competition, the diminution of pauperism and crime, and the general enhancement of human productiveness by diminished hours of toil, the same amount of comfort as is now enjoyed by the middle class could in a collectivist State be enjoyed by all with a daily task on the part of every one of not more than three to six hours, — the shorter period being allotted to the more disagreeable tasks, the longer to the more agreeable.

If this be true, then, the liberty enjoyed by the citizens of a collectivist State as compared with that enjoyed by citizens to-day is a matter of arithmetic. To-day a workingman's liberty of action is practically confined to one day in seven; for the hours of exhaustion in which he is neither working, eating, nor sleeping during the week days can hardly be counted. In a collectivist State he would have, in addition to the day in seven, one-half of every day, and the hours of exhaustion would,

owing to the diminution of time spent in toil, cease to be hours of exhaustion and become added to his hours of leisure.

When, therefore, individualists, in declaiming against collectivism, hold up liberty as the particular appanage of their system, they are confounding the shadow of liberty for its substance under conditions which furnish a striking example of credulity on the one hand, and, on the other, of their capacity for self-deception. To a nation whose chief wealth is derived from factories where workmen rise at morn to the sound of the factory bell, labour by time according to a factory clock, and are regulated as to rest and recreation by factory hours, the authors of "A Plea for Liberty" in the chapter entitled "A Plea for Liberty *for Labour*," denounce collectivism as a "conception of life or conduct" which would compel men "to rise at morn to the sound of a State gong, breakfast off State viands, labour by time, according to a State clock, dine at a State table supplied at the State's expense, and to be regulated as to rest and recreation."

The only points in which the State despotism denounced in this paragraph differs from the factory despotism actually in force are points as to which the individualist author is altogether wrong. Collectivism does not involve "dining at a State table," and the form of collectivism under discussion, which upholds the family as the most precious of human institutions, expressly disclaims it. In other respects the two despotisms are exactly the same, save that individualism exercises its tyranny upon every waking hour of a workman's life, and by so doing deprives him not only of personal liberty, but also of that which is political and economic; whereas the so-called collective despotism would exercise its so-called tyranny during less than

one-half of a man's waking hours, would secure him absolute economic liberty, and furnish him the leisure for securing him political liberty also.

(d) Summary and Conclusion

In our first inquiry into the meaning of the word "liberty" we had to content ourselves with an incomplete analysis, because the ideas of it entertained under our existing competitive system are so distorted by the system, and our language contains so many of the errors regarding liberty incorporated within the terms which we have to use in describing it, that, so long as no other than the competitive system was before our minds, it was impossible to reach a final conclusion regarding liberty.

For the purposes of analysis, therefore, we began by dividing liberty into three kinds :

First, personal liberty, or freedom from restraint.

Second, political liberty, or freedom from despotic government.

Third, economic liberty, or freedom from want.

Of these, the first was described as freedom or security from such personal restraint as imprisonment, and we had to content ourselves with this superficial notion of personal liberty. The second, or political liberty, was described as freedom or security from despotic government, security consisting mainly in the faculty afforded by the electoral franchise for turning out a government if it became despotic or obnoxious. This, again, was a superficial interpretation of the phrase "political liberty," because it failed to take account of the fact that a nation might be in the nominal possession of the electoral franchise and yet the vast majority be disfranchised by economic conditions.

Adopting these provisional and superficial accounts of personal and political liberty, we concluded that in the most civilised countries to-day we had secured personal liberty, had theoretically, but not practically, secured political liberty, and had failed to secure economic liberty altogether. The further conclusion was reached that, under the competitive system, economic liberty, or security from want, was impossible except for a very small minority.

A study of collectivism presenting an economic condition which ought to diminish by one-half the labour of every individual in a community, and thus create a leisure during one-half of every day for every individual therein, and a very brief examination of the conditions created by such a system, serve to show that the leisure so created is the real equivalent for liberty, — that we have heretofore contented ourselves with the shadow instead of the substance, — with appearing to enjoy liberty when in fact we were not enjoying it. The reason of this will best be understood by considering for a moment what are the fundamental problems which the political student is called upon to solve.

In a previous volume¹ it was pointed out that there were certain conditions imposed upon us by nature which man can never eliminate by art. In so far as these conditions are hostile to happiness, the best he can do is by art to diminish the extent of this hostility. The task of the sociologist and political student is to examine the systems adopted by man to diminish this hostility, with a view to determining whether they are the best systems possible.

Among the conditions imposed by nature which contribute both to his happiness and unhappiness are two instincts which are necessary to his existence.

¹ Government, or Human Evolution, pp. 307-316, 338-342.

One is the instinct of self-preservation, which sets man upon furnishing himself with food, clothing, shelter, and physical comforts, and gives rise to what may be called the economic problem of society. The other is the instinct of self-perpetuation, which gives rise to the sexual problem. The two instincts which set man upon the solution of these two problems are overmastering. If, in a given community they ceased to be overmastering, the community would disappear. Of the two, perhaps the economic comes first, because in the life of man it precedes the other and acts upon him every hour of every day, whereas in the life of man the latter comes subsequently to the former and acts upon him fitfully rather than all the time. Theoretically, therefore, the economic problem comes before the sexual problem. In fact, however, under the competitive system, the sexual problem becomes also an economic problem; so that it may be said that the economic problem is immeasurably the more important of the two. Moreover, the extent to which economics are the basis of all our problems — political, social, and religious — becomes clear when we remember that food, clothing, and shelter a man must have. It is only after these are provided that he can satisfy, or even entertain, his spiritual, intellectual, and moral aspirations.

The first, fundamental — the essential — problem, therefore, for every community, is how to obtain food, clothing, and shelter for all. The slavery imposed by it is a natural slavery, shared by the savage and the lower animal. It is one at which, in this world, it is useless to complain. These three things, food, clothing, and shelter, must somehow be secured. The question humanity has to solve is how these things can be secured with the greatest safety and with the least effort. As a matter of fact, the history of civilisation

is the history of a long attempt to solve this problem; and because it is complicated with another natural law known as "the survival of the fittest," it has given rise to the competitive system under which we now live, and which individualists defend as the best of which man is to-day capable.

The collectivist answers by pointing out that the survival of the fittest is a natural law which, ever since the dawn of civilisation, man has been more or less unconsciously engaged in combating, and one which he has succeeded already, to a large degree, in eliminating from social conditions; that his efforts, however, in eliminating the application of this cruel and unjust law to social conditions, have had for effect to prevent the extermination of the weak only on the condition of maintaining them in the miserable existence endured by the pauper, the criminal, and the insane; that, in so far as the competitive system still prevails among us, it constitutes a mill the unlovely product of which mercy compels us to support in lunatic asylums, penitentiaries, and almshouses; that the system is attended by gross and unnecessary economic waste; and that it is so exacting upon the time and energy of the race that, except for a small and favoured few, it practically deprives them of liberty altogether; that, in a word, given the simple problem of how a given community should procure for itself food, clothing, and shelter for every individual in it, the plan adopted by the community for solving it under the competitive system is one which if, as illustrated at the opening of the chapter, a drayman were to apply to the harnessing of his team, we should regard the drayman as insane; that the problem has been complicated by the application thereto of the competitive system, whereas, as a matter of fact, it is a comparatively simple one. Re-

turning to the illustration with which this chapter opened, if a drayman were to hitch his three horses to different parts of his cart, so that they work against one another in different directions instead of working with another in the same direction, the problem of getting his cart to market would be not only complicated but practically hopeless, whereas, if he were to adopt the more rational method in common use among us, the problem of getting the cart to market becomes one which is solved every hour of the day. Collectivism, then, does no more than propose a sane in lieu of an insane method of national production and one which, if substituted, solves the problem of liberty.

The natural slavery to which the necessity for food and clothing sets the savage is measured by the number of hours which he has daily to devote to the task of securing them. Men have been engaged, since the beginning of the world, in performing only that part of the task which is agreeable, and putting that part of the task which is disagreeable upon others. Thus, in the savage state, the men do the hunting and the women do the rest. In the more advanced stage of civilisation a few men appropriate to themselves the easy and pleasant tasks and put the difficult and unpleasant tasks upon the majority; and this exploitation of the majority by the minority has been going on under different forms of government ever since the world began, so that to-day, under forms of government which we call "popular," thanks to the competitive system, the workman is more of a slave, so far as the enjoyment of real liberty is concerned, than he was under the despotism of a Genghis Khan. The economic problem presented to humanity is how to secure the necessities and comforts of life with the greatest security and the least effort. It has already been shown that the greatest security can only be

obtained by collective effort, — that is to say, by association. The question presented by the collectivist and individualist respectively is: whether in this association individuals are to work against one another, or whether they are all to work together. Now, the claim of the collectivist is that, by constituting the society in such a manner that every individual in it is co-operating with every other individual in it, the problem presented by nature — how to secure food, clothing, shelter, and the comforts of life — will be solved with the greatest security and the least effort; and, as a necessary corollary, the time which every man is obliged to devote to this work by a law of nature, the effect of which we can diminish but never eliminate, will be reduced to the least possible, and the leisure which every individual in the community will enjoy will be increased to the utmost possible. Now, this leisure, as has been stated, is the real equivalent of liberty; for liberty has been defined subjectively as being the faculty to do what one wants, and has been defined objectively to be freedom consistent with the greatest security. Now, in so far as the securing of food, clothing, and shelter involves irksome duties, it is a *natural* and *necessary* limitation to man's freedom; and the community which solves the problem how to reduce the hours devoted to irksome duties to the utmost is the community which will best have solved the problem of liberty, for it will have extended to the utmost the hours in which every man will be free to do what he wants. If, therefore, the collectivist is right in claiming that the substitution of collective action for competitive action would have for effect to reduce the hours of labour of every man in the community, collectivism is the social scheme which best solves the problem of liberty, for it is only during hours of leisure that a man is really free.

And leisure not only gives a man a right to satisfy his subjective notion of liberty, — that is to say, the right to do what he wants, — but it also solves the problem of political liberty; for it gives him the time indispensable to acquiring a knowledge of the needs of the community, for determining the political action necessary to satisfy these needs, and for combining to make that political action effectual.

Revising, then, the rough, incomplete, and superficial classification of liberty with which we had to content ourselves in the chapter devoted to this subject, and viewing liberty from the point of view of the collectivist State, the following conclusions seem to result from it.

First, as regards personal liberty: in so far as by personal liberty is meant freedom from false imprisonment, our present State practically has secured it; but in so far as it means freedom to do what a man wants to do, as opposed to doing that which the necessities of life oblige him to do, personal liberty is a part of the economic problem, and, as such, has not been solved under the competitive system at all. The problem of personal liberty is best solved under the social scheme, which would enable every individual to perform that part of the task of securing food, clothing, and shelter that is irksome in the shortest possible time, thus leaving him free to do what he wants during as large a number of waking hours as possible. This is the result claimed for collectivism.

Second, as regards political liberty: it will be seen that whereas we at present have in our hands the electoral franchise, — that is to say, the machinery through which we can, theoretically, turn out a bad government and put in a good, — the vast majority is, as a matter of fact, so overworked that it has no leisure

either intelligently to frame a political programme or, when framed, to enforce it; so that our political machinery rusts from disuse, and we remain subject, as before, to the despotism of the minority. Collectivism solves this problem, in the first place, by simplifying the problem of government, through the elimination of the economic complications that result from the competitive system; and, in the second place, by giving every individual leisure in which to follow day by day the action of the government, and to combine, whenever necessary, to secure the execution of the collective will. It is only, therefore, through collectivism that political liberty can be really attained.

In the third place, collectivism solves the economic problem or furnishes to all equally security from want.

It seems, then, that it is only by a collective form of government that the three great liberties can be enjoyed, not only in semblance, but in fact.

And with the enjoyment of real liberty comes emancipation from different forms of subjection to which men and women are to-day exposed. The tyranny of the Market, which is the necessary product of the competitive system, and is bearing mercilessly upon us all, forbidding the few who have wealth and are willing to be generous from being generous, and committing the rest, who have no wealth, to a life of hopeless toil and daily anxiety, — this tyranny disappears, and with the disappearance of it disappears also the problem of the unemployed and the slavery of prostitution, of pauperism, and in great part of crime.

And of all the contentions made by the individualist in favour of the competitive system, none, perhaps, now seems more ironical than the contention that the competitive system develops character. It has already been pointed out that, if by character is meant selfish-

ness, ferocity, and lust, then the competitive system does favour this development; but if by character, on the contrary, is meant the faculty of self-control, of self-sacrifice, and the attending virtues which arise out of the social state because they are indispensable to it, then it will be seen that the competitive system tends to render this character impossible, whereas collectivism promotes these qualities all the time.

Last, but not least, the competitive system creates an environment to which the vast majority of the individuals of a community are unconscious slaves. The workman does not know the extent of his slavery, — the degree to which he becomes a mere part of the machinery which he keeps in motion. The business man, the bank president, whose daily life in another place has been described, — nay, the members of our government, who appear to enjoy positions of authority, — are themselves unconscious of the daily habits to which they are not-knowing slaves. The compulsion which the competitive system puts upon every workman, whether he works with his brains or with his hands, moulds him contrary to his conscience and contrary to his will. The more compelling the environment, the more hopeless it is for the individual to criticise or resist its action upon him. It is in hours of leisure only that a man is released from the subjection of the environment, and it is during the hours of leisure that he can learn to emancipate himself from the slavery of the environment and develop whatever there is in him of individual good. That the leisure afforded by collectivism will be applied by many to mere relaxation and idleness is undoubtedly true, but that every man who has in him the rendering of some social service will have leisure for that service is equally true; so that the faculty of social service which we see now daily crushed out of men by the neces-

sities of competitive life will in all of them have in the collective State the fullest opportunity for the freest exercise. The artist will no longer be subject to the control of the wealthy patron, the writer to the requirements of the paying public, or the preacher to the regulations of an established church or the caprices of a fashionable congregation. During the hours of leisure secured by collectivist economy a man, having his physical needs satisfied, will for the first time be indeed free, and have his time and energy emancipated for the untrammelled satisfaction of spiritual and mental aspirations.

§ 4. THAT COLLECTIVISM WOULD FURNISH INSUFFICIENT STIMULATION

It does not seem to occur to those who object to collectivism on the ground that it would not furnish sufficient stimulation for individual activity, that the curse of our present system is that it so over-stimulates individual activity as to lead not only to individual but to racial degeneration. This matter has been sufficiently discussed to make it unnecessary to enlarge upon it again; suffice it to remind the reader that the true art of government would seek to get out of every human being the maximum amount of work of which he is capable, not during the first few years of his life only, but through the whole productive period thereof. Under the present competitive system undue pressure is brought to bear upon us from our infancy: the number of hours which a French child is obliged to spend over his books is recognised now by the highest medical authorities in France as destructive rather than constructive of brain tissue; experiments made upon the attention of men, women, and children have demonstrated that such

attention as a child gives to the learning of a lesson can only be maintained without exhaustion for about twenty minutes at a time; and yet children are called upon in France to spend as much as twelve hours in the day with a book before their eyes. It has been well said that children are saved from insanity by the very inattention which teachers are expected to punish and prevent. It is probable that one of the principal causes of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon over the Latin race generally is due to the fact that our children are not so much exhausted by early education as theirs; but it is also probable that over-education is still an injury to our race, and the increased prevalence of examinations as a condition of preferment is likely, if continued under our present institutions, to increase the temptation to begin the process of cramming at an early age, and to keep it up as long as is necessary for passing examinations.

And the pressure under which children suffer, owing to the necessity of passing examinations in some cases and the ambition of parents in others, is continued throughout the mature years of life and generally to the grave. Indeed, those men are often the least unhappy who are driven by this pressure to an early death; for they are saved the dreary torments of a long struggle with ill health. The competitive system presents throughout a wasteful, unjust, and merciless plan; every man and woman engaged in the competitive mill, instead of receiving the interested care for the future which characterised the slave-owner of old and characterises the cab-driver of to-day, are pitilessly driven by the lash of competition, so as to expend in a few years the energy of an entire lifetime, at the cost of misery to themselves and degeneration to their offspring. As a deliberate plan of government, such a system as

this is not only immoral but imbecile; it submits us to a less intelligent *régime* than that of the slave and of the cab-horse.

In this connection it may not be unwise to ask ourselves whether the necessity for stimulation has not been much exaggerated. Those who admire fine phrases more than precise thought will quote in this connection Emerson, who says that "Mankind is as lazy as it dares to be." Nothing can be more untrue. If we judge mankind from the degenerate types produced by the over-stimulation of the competitive system, Emerson may be right. Tramps are lazy; so also are paupers; so also are those who have been degenerated by wealth and those who have been degenerated by a tropical climate. But wherever we find man undegenerated, he is characterised by a prodigious activity. We shall be told that this activity is due to the competitive system; what shall we say, then, of children? Who can have failed to notice the perpetual movement in which they delight; the busy toil with which they construct toy castles and ineffectual encampments in the sand; with which they imitate the industry of their parents; boys playing horses; girls playing at cookery, and the dressing and undressing of dolls; artificial shops, mechanical toys; everything, in fact, which permits of their giving activity to the principle of imitation, which is the first expression of their intelligence?

But those who oppose collectivism when unbiassed by personal interest do so for the most part through defect of imagination; they insist upon trying to impose collectivism upon our own generation, whereas this has over and over again been pointed out to be a mistake. The children of this generation learn to adopt the view of life which they find in their environment. If they be children of healthy and industrious parents, they will

be naturally as industrious as is the ant. If, on the other hand, they are children of parents who have been worn out by the competitive system, or of those who have been long affected by wealth, they will either be brought up to try and shirk work, or to believe that they are dispensed from it. This will create two currents of thought, very different in kind but identical in result; for the result of both is the laziness which Emerson so improperly applies to the whole race.

In a collectivist State the idea of not working would not occur to a human being from the cradle to the grave. On the contrary, the necessity of working would be as perpetually present to his mind as that of food and drink; none in the community would during the years of production be dispensed from work; and therefore the example of laziness would nowhere be seen. Under these conditions the suggestion of laziness, to which most of the laziness that exists in the world is due, would be entirely absent. Tramps and paupers for the most part are slaves to the suggestion that they can get on without work: this paralyses their nervous centres and makes them unfit for work; and just as persons believing themselves paralysed and bed-ridden for years have been known to jump out of bed on the cry of "fire," so the pauper and the tramp, when the suggestion under which they labour is removed and another will substituted for their own, are found pretty nearly as able and willing to work as others. This has been amply demonstrated in the labour colonies of Belgium and Holland. The power of suggestion involves two elements: first, an enfeebled bodily condition which renders an individual subject to suggestion; secondly, the example of laziness which makes the suggestion possible. Now a collectivist State would rid the race of both of these elements; for there need be

neither the over-exhaustion which tends to subject men to the force of suggestion, nor the example of laziness which tends to create the suggestion itself.

Under these conditions, habits of industry are likely, under a collectivist State, to be not only more continuous but more universal than under our own. It may be objected, however, that although habits of industry will suffice to keep a people alive, they will not suffice to advance a people along the line of progress. For this purpose it would seem that something more than habit is necessary, and that the competitive system alone can furnish this kind of stimulus. In order to test this objection it may be well to consider for a moment of what elements stimulus to exertion, outside of habits of industry, is made up.

Obviously men will not do more work than their habits direct unless such work is either aimed at the avoidance of pain or done in the pursuit of pleasure. The aim of the collectivist system is to reduce pain; it need not, however, for that reason diminish the element of stimulus which consists in the pursuit of pleasure.

If we analyse the motives which induce men to engage in scientific research, they will be found to consist mainly of three distinguishable motives: curiosity, the pleasure which accompanies doing anything that we are fitted to do, and a desire for consideration or fame.

Now, curiosity will be enhanced rather than diminished in the collectivist State, because it is killed in most of us by the overwork involved in earning our daily bread. Curiosity is consistent only with a certain freshness of the mind and body: a horse, when first taken out of the stable, will observe and shy at every object in his path; but as soon as he becomes fatigued he will cease to take notice of these things altogether.

The same thing is true of ourselves in a long day's walk. We are all of us familiar with the eager interest we take in a new book during the first hours of reading, and how the interest flags as the brain grows weary; and we are all familiar with the fact that young men who are keenly interested in scientific subjects at the University lose all interest in them when their minds are worn out by professional labour. Obviously, then, if collectivism prevents both mental and physical exhaustion, curiosity will be enhanced by it rather than diminished.

Moreover the pleasure which accompanies the doing of anything that we can do well is like curiosity in the fact that it is consistent only with the absence of fatigue, and that when fatigue is absent the pleasure of work is in itself stimulus enough.

But of the three elements which go to make up the stimulus for human action, none is as powerful as the desire for human consideration. As has been already pointed out, once we are beyond the reach of hunger, the race for wealth becomes, in fact, a race for human consideration; but the race is distorted in its purpose and disgraced in its methods by the substitution of the means for the end, — of wealth for affection. So long as men desire the affection of one another, — and we cannot conceive of men ceasing to desire this, — so long they will have always the stimulus necessary for the fullest development and use of all their mental capacities.

The conclusion, then, to which we seem to be led, is that the effect of collectivism would be to diminish the stimulus that results from pain and enhance that which results from pleasure. All trainers of animals will bear witness to the fact that, of these two stimuli, pleasure is the more potent. Nor is it otherwise with

the human race. Every individual, too, in a collectivist State, would have a stimulus for the rapid performance of his work, in the fact that, through the adoption of the piece-work plan, the sooner the daily task was accomplished, the more time he would have for himself. This time he could devote to securing means of enjoyment and all such specific advantages as a man can furnish his family and himself without making these means of enjoyment an opportunity for oppressing his fellow man. And if to these direct sources of pleasure to himself there be added all those pleasures connected with efforts to advance the general good, the dignity of such efforts, and the social position which success in these efforts commands, clearly there is in the collectivist State no lack of stimulus. All that collectivism does, then, is to diminish the stimulus of pain; it enhances that of pleasure.

§ 5. THAT COLLECTIVISM WOULD BE ARTIFICIAL OR CONTRARY TO NATURE

It ought not to be necessary, after all that has been already written about nature, to deal at any length with this objection. It has been pointed out before that all civilisation is contrary to nature. In the natural state men hunt and devour one another; every device which man has invented to diminish the rigour of climate, his method of preparing food, — in a word, everything which distinguishes man from beast, — is artificial or contrary to nature.

There is nevertheless a principle underlying this objection which is sound; for there are friendly forces in nature as well as hostile, and it is when we violate or ignore these friendly forces that we are guilty of error or even crime. The objection, therefore, that

collectivism is contrary to nature must be examined in order to test whether there is in it anything which violates a friendly law of nature, or one which, even though not friendly, is imperative. In other words, is there anything in collectivism which is unwholesome, immoral, or unwise?

A full answer to this question involves an answer to every objection that can be raised to collectivism, one after the other. This has been already in great part attempted. All, therefore, that will be added here is to point out that in its essential characteristics collectivism is less artificial, less contrary to nature, than our present system. For the two systems differ mainly in the fact that whereas our present system admits private property, collectivism admits it only to a very small degree; and it has been already pointed out that the recognition of private property by a community is a device peculiar to man.

In nature we find two main theories of property: First, among insects that live in communities there is the theory of property in the community alone, and, secondly, among those that do not live in communities there is the theory of private property for those who are strong enough to claim it; but there is seldom any recognition of private property in the individuals of a community or pack. Among the solitary carnivora the sense of private property is most highly developed, but it is defended only by its owner. In the larger carnivora private property is defended by violence; among the smaller rodents it is defended by stealth. Squirrels hide their store of nuts; seldom outside of man is private property respected. Even when carnivora unite, as wolves do to hunt in packs, there is no recognition of private ownership by the pack; every wolf takes what food he can for himself, the strongest get-

ting most, the weakest least. In no community in nature does there seem to be the recognition of the right of one member to accumulate for himself, in order, by such accumulation, to command the services of other members. Now this is the essential feature and the essential evil of private property and of our existing system.

Collectivism proposes to eliminate just this: it proposes to recognise private property only in those personal effects the accumulation of which can never enable one man to control the services of another; all those things, on the contrary, the accumulation of which could control the services of men, are owned by the entire community.

Now, this is the system that we observe in the most highly developed communities furnished by nature, in the hive of the bee and the hill of the ant.

Collectivism is therefore less artificial than individualism. Again, the competitive system, as has been already pointed out, occasions distress, owing to the tendency of production power to outstrip purchasing power. Outside of man food is secured and accumulated directly for consumption; under our existing industrial system food, clothing, and the other necessities of life are produced or manufactured, not for consumption, but for money. There may be a glut of food and clothing in the Market, and yet thousands suffering from the want of both because they have not the money to pay for them. This is highly artificial; highly contrary to nature. Collectivism, by eliminating the distressful factor of money, is returning to nature. Here, again, the collectivist plan is less artificial than our own.

§ 6. THAT COLLECTIVISM WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO ART

Those who are impressed by the fact that art seems to have flourished most prosperously at periods of great wealth are disposed to believe that collectivism, which is ineradicably associated in the minds of the ignorant with the disappearance of wealth, would necessarily involve the disappearance of art also. The fallacies attending this reasoning are numerous.

Collectivism, as has been already explained, by no means involves disappearance or even a diminution of wealth. On the contrary, it is believed that collectivism will greatly increase collective wealth. It is true that collectivism means the disappearance of enormous fortunes in the hands of a small minority, and if the possession by a very few persons of great wealth is necessary to the cultivation of art, then indeed must it be admitted that collectivism would be injurious to art; but the notion that an accumulation of large wealth in the hands of a few persons is necessary to the cultivation of art is wholly wrong. Undoubtedly, under the competitive system, such an accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few is necessary to the cultivation of art, because, art being a luxury, no one can indulge in it who has not great wealth, and so art has been the first to suffer when a period of wealth has been succeeded by a period of poverty; but with the concentration of wealth in the State, the extent to which art will prevail will depend, not upon the taste of a few individuals, but upon the wealth of the community, and if it has been proved that a larger degree of wealth can be maintained, under a collectivist form of government, with less labour than under a competitive form, then the great obstacle to the cultivation of art will be removed,

for the principal obstacle which now stands in the way of the cultivation of art is the necessity under which the artist labours of earning bread.

Collectivism, then, does not involve the diminution of wealth. Under our present system wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few at the expense of the many. Collectivism will concentrate wealth in the State for the benefit of the many, and it is believed that this concentration will result in greater wealth than has ever been known before. It is also believed that, owing to the economy of production and distribution, every individual in the community will have a much larger share of luxury than under existing conditions; that no one willing at all to work will lack either the necessities or the comforts of civilised life; and if this be true it should not be difficult to show that collectivism, so far from prejudicing art, will, on the contrary, greatly enhance it.

Before, however, further considering the effect of collectivism on art, let us consider briefly the effect upon art of our existing competitive system; for it is difficult to conceive of conditions more hostile to the development of art than those which prevail to-day.

If art suffers by poverty, it suffers almost to the same extent by wealth; no artist can live unless he can sell the product of his labours. He is to this extent, therefore, the slave of the wealthy. The standard of his art is set not by his own ideal, but by the ideal of the patron for whom he works. If his patron be a Julius the Second or a Lorenzo de Medici, he may produce the work of a Michael Angelo, but if his patron be a Chicago pork-packer or a Manchester cotton-spinner, his work is more likely to be that which we so often find disgracing the walls of our modern exhibitions.

Unfortunately such patrons of art as marked the

periods of Pericles and of the Renaissance are rare. The tendency of commercialism is to degrade standards rather than elevate them, and under these circumstances it is not a matter of surprise that wealth should have produced more bad art than good, or that to-day it should be engaged in diverting genius from working out high ideals of art in order to immortalise the features of voracious middlemen.

But commercialism tends not only to degrade art by the general lowering of its standards, but it degrades the artist by forcing him to expedients which characterise promoters of patent medicines. The artist must advertise. He rarely can support life while he waits for an artistic public to court his studio. The public is engaged, not in collecting works of art, but in making money; and only a very few, therefore, devote any considerable part of their time to art. We find, therefore, artists combining, as merchants do, for the purpose of bringing their works before the eyes of reluctant purchasers. They organise exhibitions, salons, art associations, and these promptly get into the hands of the most skilful manipulators among them, so that genius tends to be excluded from the very exhibitions organised in order to bring genius to public notice. Sometimes the organisation of art and literature is left to the State; it was George III. who instituted the Royal Academy; Richelieu who created the Academy in France. But the art institution, like all other human institutions, is promptly captured by an intelligent and interested minority, who use the institution to advertise themselves at the expense of the institution and the object for which it was constituted. And so Whistler never gets into the Royal Academy, and the doors of the Immortals are closed to Balzac and to Alphonse Daudet.

Commercialism, too, creates the dealer. In the days of the soldier the patron of art went himself to the artist's studio and commissioned him to create after his own imaginings. But the merchant and manufacturer are too busy "higgling" and manufacturing to search for art. Just as by the power of the purse they converted the mediæval knight into the modern mercenary, so to-day they impose their standards upon art through their control of the Academy and of the dealer. It is the dealer to-day — the eternal middleman — who visits the studios; and the dealer commissions the artist, not to paint as his heart may inspire, but to supply the demand of Birmingham and Manchester.

It is true the dealer sometimes educates the Academy. The first paintings of Burne-Jones were refused by the Academy. A dealer — and the world owes him thanks — took up Burne-Jones, invested largely in his paintings, needed the talismanic letters R. A. to raise prices to a maximum; and so Burne-Jones became an Academician.

But our dealer and Academy alike weighs the tyranny of the Market. And the Market in art means portrait-painting and the commonplace. Royalty, too, exercises an influence on literature and art. In Germany both are harnessed to the chariot of the Hohenzollerns. In England the throne lifts from obscurity a Belli, a Winterhalter, and an Edgar Boehm. It condemns London to the sculpture that disgraces the ancient site of Temple Bar.

And because Royal Academies, aldermen, and State institutions at large become captured by commercialism, the individualist rails against all interference of the State with art whatever.

But State intervention is in some fields of art essential; it is essential, for example, in that of architec-

tures no other instrumentality can replace it. In order to be persuaded of this we have but to compare the architecture of our American cities, where individualism has been allowed to run riot, with cities in Europe where the State has at certain periods been allowed to exercise a beneficent control. The only city in the United States which has any claim to beauty is Washington, and Washington was laid out and in great part built by the State. In New York every public square is disgraced by the incongruity of buildings put up to suit individual tastes and individual necessities. At the very gateway of Central Park is a block of buildings which may serve as a comment on individualism in architecture. On the south corner is a huge Astor hotel nearly twenty stories high, with a showy façade a few yards wide on Fifth Avenue and about an acre of hideous brick exposed on its side and rear. Next to it comes a building one-third its height, put up and occupied by a grocer. Next to this is a brick building about a third of the height of the grocer's; and next again, on the north corner, a wooden shanty one story high occupied by a liquor saloon.

In Paris, the beautiful city of the world, the most beautiful of the public places have been laid out entirely by the State. The Place Vendôme was built in one piece by Louis XIV., the Place de la Concorde by Louis XV., and the Place de l'Étoile by the Empire. All the great buildings which at every corner delight the eye have been built by the State, — the Louvre, the Luxembourg, the old Palais de Justice, the Sainte Chapelle, the Panthéon; and within a few months the Invalides, heretofore lost to view on the other side of the river, has been brought within the landscape effect of the Champs-Élysées by a bridge and two State buildings.

If a city is to be beautiful, it can be so only through the collective action of the State.

Again, if our landscapes are to be saved from the factory and the railroad, it can be accomplished only through the collective action of the State.

And if State institutions have heretofore fallen into the hands of an interested minority, it is because State institutions themselves are subject to a higher sovereignty than the State, — the sovereignty of the Market.

Very few are alive to the extent to which industrialism is responsible for the ugliness of our modern life. Nowhere is this perhaps better illustrated than in approaching a picturesque town by train. Railroad builders, in laying their tracks and designing their yards, have considered nothing but how to secure the largest profits from the least expenditure. The result of this is that they have never sought to conceal their work when unsightly, or adorn it when capable of adornment. Upon approaching, therefore, such a town as Angers, it is difficult to believe in its traditional picturesqueness, so thoroughly has the railroad builder devastated that portion of it where the traveller lands. It is only after the traveller has got entirely beyond the reach of the railroad builder that he discovers the beauties of the place. This is true of almost every picturesque town in the civilised world. Under a collectivist form of government the object to be secured is not the making of money, — it is the happiness of the people; all would, therefore, be equally concerned in so disposing of the railroad plant as to conceal it where it could not be adorned. Where it was possible, tracks would be sunk; and on the other hand, when they must be raised, they would be laid upon viaducts that would add to the landscape rather than detract from it. There are few things more beautiful than an artistically constructed bridge. There are few things more painful to

the eye than a railroad bridge constructed with regard only to economy. Many artists have undoubtedly sympathised with Ruskin in his onslaughts upon railroads, but they seem none of them to have appreciated that the hideous results of railroads were mainly due to the sacrifice of every consideration to that of making money. There is nothing in the modern spirit inconsistent with the highest art provided only this sordid motive for economy were eliminated. By this it must not be understood that economy will be a matter of no importance to a collectivist State. On the contrary, economy, in so far as consistent with happiness, should be its special care; the curse of the present system is that economy is practised on the public for the benefit of the few, whereas under a collectivist State economy will be practised by the public for the benefit of all. Any public work that would permanently set up an object of ugliness to the public eye would, upon this theory, be a thing not only evil in itself, but evil in its consequences; for it would be inconsistent with that high standard which it is the special province of collectivism to attain, and would therefore be inconsistent with the happiness and dignity of the people. Illustrations could be heaped one upon another, showing the extent to which beauty is sacrificed by the competitive system. There is hardly a beautiful spot in the civilised world that has escaped the degrading hand of the advertiser. There is hardly a street in our American cities which some individual has not, out of regard for his pocket, disgraced either by leaving a portion of it unimproved and exposing thereby the blank party walls of the buildings on either side, or by building to a height grotesquely greater than his neighbours and exhibiting his own party walls in all their dreary ugliness high above the adjacent roofs. There is hardly a cathe-

dral on the continent of Europe which is not crowded almost out of sight by private buildings erected to fill a private purse. Let but once this necessity for collecting rent disappear, and the State will have no interest in crowding; no interest in making one building higher than another; for refusing to build where a building is required by symmetry, or insisting on building where, on the contrary, art demands an open space.

The havoc, too, which the existing industrial system is playing with our scenery is a matter for public lamentation. Few industries contribute more to this than that of lighting by electricity. The Swiss have discovered that waterfalls can be coined into gold; and coin them into gold they do with reckless disregard for the beauty of their vales. Witness, for example, the Valley of the Inn between the Lake of St. Moritz and Celerina, where, in the space of four hundred yards, two electric lighting plants have been constructed, and one of the most picturesque glades in Switzerland converted into a hideous factory.

Before the necessity of making money every consideration has yielded and does to-day yield, — considerations of beauty, of art, of morality; it is only by eliminating the necessity of making money, or rather by confining compulsory labour to a few hours of every day, that man can become emancipated from the slavery of modern conditions, whether it be for the development of individual character or for the realisation of artistic ideals.

In a collectivist State there will be artists recognised by the State performing their daily task for the beautifying of the State. And there will be by their side artists unrecognised by the State; so that if the State be controlled by inartistic people there will be, nevertheless, thanks to the leisure furnished by collectivism,

free scope for the exercise and development of individual genius by the side of those favoured by the State. Here is illustrated the essential difference between the collectivist and the individualist scheme of government. In the latter men seem to be free, but are in fact slaves; in the former men are obviously, during a few hours of the day, subject to State rule, but during the remainder of the day they are in fact free. And the enjoyment of this real freedom will have for result to create a freedom in literature, music, and art unknown before. For under the competitive system genius is daily being stifled by the necessity of making bread; whereas, bread being provided by the few hours of compulsory labour required by the State, the artist, the writer, and the musician will be free during the remaining hours to work out each his own conceptions before a public itself free to appreciate them, not under a false standard of exchange value, but for what they have in them that is beautiful and true.

CHAPTER V

PRACTICAL WORKING OF COLLECTIVISM

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY

THE previous chapters having laid down a few of the general principles of the collectivism proposed for study in this volume, we shall next endeavour briefly to sketch how collectivism can be rescued from the dreamland to which individualists are disposed to consign it and reduced to a practical programme applicable to-day; how the change from our present conditions may be slowly effected; and how the collectivist plan, more or less realised, may be made to work so as to combine economy of production with the fullest individual liberty.

In one sense of the word collectivism is already a part of our existing political programme, and already to a considerable extent realised. Every public park is a tribute to collectivism. It is the appropriation of land by the State for the enjoyment of the public. The post-office is a demonstration of the utility of collectivism; for through the post-office the State undertakes the collection, transportation, and distribution of letters and small parcels. And the unreasonableness of some individualist opposition to collectivism is made clear when we consider that while no individualist objects to the State carrying small parcels, any programme that would suggest the advisableness of the State carrying large parcels, live stock, or human beings would be stigmatised in the United States as rank socialism. And

yet this rank socialism is peacefully and beneficially realised in Belgium and other European States. And in Australia the State not only owns the railroads, but acts as salesman of the products transported. So also in the United States our cities generally own their water-works, but seldom their gas-works; whereas in England the reverse is true, and correspondingly the ownership of gas by the city is denounced as immoral by owners of gas stock in New York; whereas shareholders in water companies in London look with approval on the ownership by the city of its lighting plant, but condemn city ownership of water-works as dangerous socialism. It seems probable, therefore, that much of the opposition to collectivism is due to so-called "vested interests," — the vested interests of shareholders in gas and water stock, — and when we remember the riot caused by the rag-pickers when, in 1832, the Parisian authorities forbade the exposure of rags in the streets owing to the danger of cholera through infection, when we remember that the rag-pickers based their right to indignation and revolt upon their vested interests in rags, and found many individualists to espouse their cause, we may well look with scrutiny upon opposition to collectivism which is marshalled under the banners of "vested interests."

§ 2. PREPAREDNESS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES FOR COLLECTIVISM

Singularly enough, the United States presents a striking contrast to the rest of the civilised world as to its maturity for the adoption of collectivism. As regards the actual adoption of the collectivist programme it is behind, but as regards commercial development it is ahead, of other countries. In other words, while in

Europe and Australia the ownership by the State of public utilities is far more extensive than in the United States, the development of commercial enterprise with us has, in the necessary evolution of individualism under the spur of intelligence, prepared our industries for purchase by the State to a singular degree, and presents a remarkable example of how individualism carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction. For just as the freedom of contract which ushered in the industrial revolution of the close of last century carried within itself the seeds that eventually destroyed freedom of contract by the organisation of trade unions, employers' associations and trade alliances, so also competition has ended in the United States by destroying competition in many trades through the organisation of trusts. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that, politics not furnishing in our country the prizes offered in Europe, genius has abandoned the political arena for that of business, and the progress made in the development of business has therefore been more rapid in the United States than in Europe.

Under these circumstances it is not easy to decide what country to choose as the arena for our hypothetical collectivism: the United States, which is behindhand in the actual adoption of collectivism and ahead in commercial preparedness for it, or some European State where the converse is true. And indeed this suggests one of the difficulties that attends the hypothetical treatment of the question.

§ 3. THEORIES OF KARL MARX AND THE FABIANS

For not only do conditions vary in every State to start with, but it is impossible to conjecture what direction

the movement may take at the various stages of its development. Karl Marx was probably wrong in his conjecture. To him conditions were becoming rapidly worse and worse to the unwealthy, and he therefore concluded that they would ultimately become so intolerable that a new social State would be born out of the revolution to which the concentration of capital inevitably seemed to tend. But although capital has in our country continued to become concentrated in a few hands, wages have increased, hours of labour have diminished, and the small farmer and tradesman, though in certain places harassed and impoverished, cannot at large be said to have been expropriated in accordance with the prophecy of Karl Marx. The same is true in Europe.

The Fabian theory of collectivism seems more sound than that of Marx. According to this theory, collectivism is to creep upon the civilised world by invisible steps, and is, perhaps, never to be realised in its entirety. To this last point it may be well for us to give a few moments' consideration, for it is one upon which there exists a widespread misunderstanding. The first questions a wealthy inquirer is likely to put upon this question of collectivism are: "Will there be any domestic servants in your collectivism? shall I be able to keep my horses? where shall I go for my grouse-shooting?" It is a pity, perhaps, that the wealthy are so little alive to the misery occasioned by present conditions as to be unable to accept a programme that looks to the elimination of this misery without first assuring themselves that it shall not interfere with a single one of their comforts and amusements. No wealthy man who was animated by a religious spirit would take this view of a great social problem. But we must reluctantly admit that the number of wealthy who are willing to sacrifice a single

amusement for the diminution of harlotry and pain are few; and that if the wealthy are to any important degree to become interested in socialism, it must be on the condition that the collectivist programme will not sensibly affect their comforts and may perhaps avert an impending danger. To them, then, let it be at once made clear that collectivism involves no unremunerated expropriation, no spoliation of deer forests, no destruction of game. They may adopt collectivism with as little real sacrifice of personal convenience as when of old the Roman Senators adopted the ritual of Christianity. Indeed, they may derive from it some of the advantages which the corrupt Roman Empire derived from the still honest Christian official. For just as the days of the Empire were prolonged by the infusion into its administration of Christians unpolluted by the pervading corruption, so the days of the millionaire may be prolonged by the avoidance of the Revolution prophesied by Karl Marx, and in some countries to-day by no means impossible.

Adopting, then, the Fabian theory of gradual rather than revolutionary development, let us consider some of the phases through which this development might pass in our own country, — the United States of America.

§ 4. HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES

(a) Present Political Conditions

Most cities of the United States are to-day administered by an organisation primarily constructed for the purpose of keeping control of municipal spoils, and secondarily associated with one of the national parties. In Philadelphia the organisation in control is Republican;

in New York it is Democratic. Obviously the party not in control is willing to adopt any policy not too inconsistent with its national platform which seems likely to oust its rival from the city offices; it naturally, therefore, comes to pass that the party not in control is generally the party of municipal reform, because in the first place it is the natural ally of the independent reformer, and in the second place, being driven by this chronic though reluctant alliance to favour good and oppose bad administration, it attracts to itself the moral element of the community. There is therefore in every city a national party not in control which is willing to adopt a programme likely to dispossess the enemy, provided this programme be not too violently inconsistent with the national platform.

The wage-earner is the element in the voting population which the party not in control has to secure in order to dispossess the enemy, because, in the first place, he represents a large vote, and, in the second place, he is the natural ally of the organisation in control.

Upon this last point it is difficult to be too emphatic. The wage-earner generally supports the organisation in control, however corrupt, for two reasons: In the first place he has little advantage to derive from honest government. He pays no taxes; he is not aware of the incidental consequences of high taxes on rent, etc.; he is secretly and sometimes avowedly pleased to see the rich bled by the organisation to which he belongs.

In the second place, if he derives no direct advantage himself from the organisation, his friends and his relatives do: one is a barkeeper interested in violating the law regarding early closing; another is a policeman interested in levying tribute on the barkeeper, who is himself thankful to be permitted by the protection of the organisation to secure large profits during Sunday

and late hours by the payment of a relatively small tribute to the policeman; another is a street-cleaner at two dollars a day; another is a public-school teacher; another is employed in the Building Department, an employment furnishing numerous opportunities for petty plunder.

Absence of sensible interest in good government, and an undefined but no less for that reason ineffectual sympathy with bad government, keeps the wage-earner loyal to the organisation in control.

He is, however, by no means incapable of revolt against the organisation. On the contrary, the moment the small stake he has in the government is attacked, he at once makes himself felt. The public parks are his, and any attack upon them is at once resented; the downthrow of Tammany Hall in 1870 was preluded by an outburst of popular protest against a supposed expropriation of Central Park; and that of 1893 began with the attempt of a few Tammany horse-fanciers to take a strip from the same park for a speedway. Moreover, willing though he may be to see the policeman add to his salary by an occasional present from a willing saloon-keeper, the indignation of the people blazed in New York when it was revealed that the police had become so far corrupt as to extort money from a widow by depriving her of the custody of her children.

(b) *Extension of Municipal Ownership and Administration*

The wage-earner is therefore by no means irresponsible either to an attack upon his own slender rights or to an attack upon the rights of the defenceless. It does not, then, seem unreasonable to believe that he

would respond to and support a programme which sensibly increased his stake in good government, and by so doing enhanced his value and dignity as a citizen. For example, the high price charged for gas by the private corporations which furnish gas to New York make the use of gas as fuel impossible to the unwealthy, and subjects them to the necessity of using coal which they have to buy in small quantities at correspondingly high prices because they have no room to store it. If, instead of having to pay to a private company \$1.15 per thousand feet for gas, the city were to manufacture its own gas and furnish it, as Glasgow and Manchester do, at fifty cents a thousand feet, the city would be conferring a benefit to every wage-earner which in dollars would mount up to three figures at the end of the year; he would then for the first time realise the advantage of good municipal government and the importance of preserving it from jobbery, sinecurism, and corruption.

The same is true of transportation. At present the cost of running a street railway by electricity is probably small enough to permit of three-cent fares without loss. The existing companies, capitalised at figures far exceeding cost and built in large part with the proceeds of bonds bearing four per cent interest, are making fortunes for their promoters. Were the city to buy these tramways at an honest price, — that is to say, a price that would fairly compensate the promoters, not only for outlay, but also for the courage and ability they have shown in bringing tramways to their present state of improvement, — the city would not only immediately save the difference between the four per cent paid by the present companies on their bonds and the high dividends distributed on their stock on the one hand and the two per cent paid by the city on the other, but it would also benefit by the economy it could bring into the original

cost of new tramways in as yet undeveloped thoroughfares.

Municipal ownership and administration of lighting and transportation plants would not only give the wage-earner a substantial stake in the city, but would result in an appreciable saving to him of money and make him for the first part a veritable partner in municipal enterprises. It is true that such an experiment might not succeed; it might result in the construction by the city of lines that would not pay; it might result in extravagance; in a deliberate increase of officials for the purpose of increasing municipal spoils and securing political support. And if the carrying out of this programme is left to Tammany Hall, such will probably be the case. But if the programme is presented to the people and carried out by men of conscience such as exist in New York, there still is a chance of its succeeding as well in New York as in Glasgow, Manchester, and other cities of England and Germany. The wage-earners of New York are rapidly learning the value to them of such a programme; they will one day certainly insist upon it; the question which men of conscience and education have to decide is whether they will wait to see it increase the power of Tammany Hall, or, by proposing and carrying it out themselves, secure for it the advantages economic, political, and moral derivable therefrom.

There will, of course, be pessimists to say that the experiment will fail; to such, two answers can be made: The first, that a properly understood political faith will not permit the possibility of failure to paralyse an effort which is in itself commendable.¹ The second, that if the experiment fails, it will only show that our cities are not yet fit for the collectivist programme. It will not prove that the collectivist programme is itself impractic-

¹ See book ii. ch. vi. § 3.

cal, for European cities have already shown themselves fit for it. That Americans will willingly admit themselves inferior to other nations in this respect is not consistent with American traditions, and need not therefore prevent our proceeding with our hypothetical collectivism. It may take time for the wage-earner to learn the advantages of honesty and the necessity of vigilance. But he will probably learn it at last; and then he will have fitted himself for a new advance. But assuming the worst, — that he does not, — we shall have then to admit that we are unfit for collectivism, and proceed with our hypothesis in Europe rather than the United States, — an assumption which, be it clearly understood, is believed to be unjustifiable and superfluous.

Assuming, then, that eventually a large number of our cities have learned the art of furnishing cheap and good gas and transportation, the next natural step for them to take is to apply post-office methods to the city distribution of coal, ice, milk, and all those things as to the production of which there does not enter the element of skill to an appreciable degree. The foolish manner in which these things are now distributed has already been described; an economy of certainly thirty per cent would be effected by delivering through one agency from door to door instead of through a thousand agencies at spots widely distant from one another. Municipal distribution, however, need not and should not put an end to private enterprise. Some persons will want to have coal of a particular quality, ice made by a particular process, milk from a particular farm. Let these remain gratified and let private enterprise be allowed to gratify them; so far let individualism be not only tolerated, but even fostered; for here we come to a point in our collectivist scheme which cannot too much be insisted on. There are certain functions, such as tramways, which are

in their nature monopolies; no more than one pair of rails can be conveniently laid in a street. There are other functions which in their nature partake of monopoly without being essentially so, as, for example, bridges and ferries; there is a limit to the number of bridges or ferries that can be profitably used. There are other functions, such as the distribution of coal, which, while they can conveniently and economically be performed by the city, can at the same time be performed by private enterprise. It is no part of intelligent collectivism to refuse to private enterprise all the liberty it needs in those fields where it can be exercised without public detriment; indeed, it will be later seen that it is upon this liberty that collectivism depends to keep it free from the levelling tendency of which individualists accuse it.

(c) *Extension of National Ownership and Administration*

While cities are learning to furnish gas and transportation, and to distribute ice, coal, milk, bread, and all the other articles that enter into necessary daily consumption, the extension of municipal activity cannot but have its echo in national affairs. One of the national parties will become alive to the fact that what a city can do with city utilities a nation can do with national utilities. It is impossible to predict which of the national parties is most likely first to adopt this programme. It may seem to-day as though it belonged most naturally to the Democratic party, which poses as the champion of the wage-earner. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Republican party is endeared to the workingman by the conviction that protection secures him high wages and that it is the party of centralisation, whereas the Democratic party, by repudiat-

ing protection, brought about the closing of factories in 1893 and is the party of decentralisation. Moreover, if the municipalisation of public utilities is to be accomplished by the educated element in New York, it is the Republican party that must do it, not the Democratic; while if it is to be so accomplished in Philadelphia, it is the Democratic party that must do it, not the Republican. Again, monopolies are being so harried by State legislatures that it is not at all impossible that they may themselves seek salvage at the hands of the national government. For example, the Oil Trust is being attacked in almost every State in the Union; some of these attacks have gone so far as actually to indict the magnates at the head of it. If these attacks become in the future as dangerous as they have been heretofore persistent, it is not inconceivable that the magnates may themselves propose to sell out at a reasonable figure. Now, no city or State could buy out the Oil Trust, for the field of its operations is confined to no city or State, but extends over the whole United States and elsewhere. Under these circumstances it is to the national government alone that the Oil Trust could sell; and it is the Republican party which, both through its traditions in the past and its affiliations in the present, is likely to accomplish such an arrangement with the least difficulty. It is impossible, then, to say which of the two parties will eventually propose this programme; the only thing that can be said in the connection with some assurance is, that without doubt the people will ultimately insist upon it. Indeed, if to-day either one of the parties could drop every issue save one, — public ownership of public utilities,¹ — it would probably sweep

¹ This phrase may not be an accurate one, but it has been so currently used in the United States that it has become useful in spite of slight inaccuracy.

the country with an overwhelming majority. For every man who voted for Bryan in 1896 would vote for this platform, and it would also have the votes of the many workingmen who voted against Bryan, especially in the Eastern States, because they were persuaded that free silver would diminish the purchasing power of their daily wage. Under these circumstances it is possible that the question itself will not become an issue between the parties, but that both parties will take it up, the Republican seeking to centralise the purchase of public utilities in the nation, the Democratic seeking to decentralise them in the cities and the States. When this time comes, the danger is that public utilities will be absorbed by the government with inordinate rapidity; it will undertake more than it will at that time be able to accomplish; a reaction will set in and Individualism will furnish a wholesome reaction. But if it be, indeed, true that collectivism furnishes the higher ideal of government, the truest solution of the economic problem, the only realisation of justice soundly understood, the reaction will give way once more to a further advance; the State will have got rid of its vacuoles.¹

Without endeavouring to prophesy at what periods reaction will set in and at what periods collectivism will renew its onward march, let us now consider briefly how the economic changes *can*, rather than how they *will*, be brought about.

(d) *Public Stores*

Once the cities have learned the art of distributing the necessities of life, and the nation has learned the art of running railroads and administering the Oil Trust, the Sugar Trust, the Whiskey Trust, and the other large

¹ See vol. i. pp. 160. 163.

trusts now in existence, the State will have become the owner and manager of enormous business interests. The ownership of the railroads will naturally lead to the ownership of elevators; the United States will learn a lesson from South Australia and undertake the sale of live stock and farm produce; the Department of Agriculture will no longer confine itself, as now, to advice, but will undertake administration. Instead of transporting cattle, as Armour once did, from Kansas to Chicago, to be cut up there and returned for distribution as meat to Kansas, the department will either itself institute packing-houses in every suitable centre, or induce the City or State to institute them. And the price of coal being for the most part made up of the cost of transportation,¹ the nation will acquire coal-fields, and thus furnish the cities and citizens with coal at a lower price. The government, national and municipal, — which for the purpose of brevity we will now unite in the single word State, — will become the employer of labour to so large an extent that it will be easy to create in all large centres State stores at which goods will be furnished at a small profit, presumably lower than at the department stores.² But goods will be furnished at cost to all those who are provided with State orders. Every official will be given the option to take his wages either in currency, or in State orders, or in both, in the proportion he may name. The State order is *at this stage of collectivism* a transferable order on the public stores expressed in money. If a workman earns two dollars a day and he takes his entire pay in State orders, he will daily receive orders on the public stores for goods

¹ In many States, e. g. Colorado, coal can be profitably extracted from the mine at \$1 a ton. It costs the consumer \$4 to \$4.50.

² The expression "department stores" is used in the United States to mean all large shops in which there are many departments.

to a value of two dollars. The State order will read: "Good for \$—— at the public store." As the State order will have an advantage at the public stores, the workman will presumably take at least a part of his wages in State orders; and as the State order will go to a small premium in view of the advantage to the non-official of securing a part of the favour allowed to these State orders at the stores, it is probable that the official will take all his wages in State orders. During this period the State will acquire the experience necessary for determining the exchange value of the commodities sold. It will know the cost to the State of meat per pound, of bread per loaf, of coal per bushel; it will know the price at which it can be sold to the official with a margin for safety, and the price at which it can be sold profitably to the public without competing too severely with the department stores and private enterprise in general. The profit made will serve to reduce taxation for all, and to create a sinking-fund for the redemption of bonds issued in purchase of public utilities. Public stores mark a great stride towards collectivism, for they will lead to the gradual purchase of large tracts of farming-land, the building of improved dwellings, and the slow conversion of the retail dealer into a government official. And they can do this without despotism or occasioning distress. A sound scheme for establishing public stores will provide for the issue of bonds necessary to buy up the stock of honest retailers who run danger of insolvency through State competition. Public stores will not necessarily occasion more insolvency than department stores. Small retailers have on their side the advantages of neighbourhood, personal acquaintance, and personal taste, and they may continue to have this advantage even in the final development of collectivism, as will be later shown, thus leaving a large

latitude for individual enterprise and full scope for the satisfaction of personal taste.

Obviously the introduction of public stores marks a phase of development fraught with danger and likely to occasion a reaction in favour of individualism. For if it proceeds too rapidly, the State bonds offered in purchase of stock may go to a dangerous discount, and more retailers may apply for State employment than the State can usefully employ. Hence the need for great caution and deliberateness in this part of the programme, — a caution and deliberateness which is likely to be wanting if this movement be left entirely in the hands of demagogues or the discontented poor. But if this part of the process is in the hands of such men as to-day manage the administration of large trade unions and successful co-operative stores backed by men of wealth, leisure, and education, it is not inconceivable that it may be introduced with sufficient self-control to avoid either widespread distress or national bankruptcy. In such case the State will already have assumed the principal features of a collectivist community; that is to say, it will be the owner of a sufficiently large part of the national land and other sources of production to show the results of collectivist economy in higher wages and shorter hours of labour, and State orders will have largely replaced coin as internal medium of exchange. As soon as the State has become a sufficiently large owner of the sources of production to be able to employ all that part of the population which desires State employment without too great a cost, it will then, perhaps, have attained the last stage consistent with human imperfection; it will not have attained the ideal; but it may take centuries to attain the ideal, and man may be incapable of it altogether. Let us, then, consider a little more closely this phase which for the purpose of brevity we may call Partial Collectivism.

(e) *Farm Colonies — Pauperism, Prostitution, and Crime*

There is one important function of the State the development of which has not been considered, — the work of what in New York City was formerly called the Department of Charity and Correction. These branches have lately been separated for administrative reasons, but they form part of the same subject, so far as the student is concerned, for they deal with the same problem, — the treatment of the waste of our population. The subject has been already discussed.¹ No more will be added here than is necessary to show how an intelligent treatment of this waste will dovetail in to the collectivist programme. The pauper and criminal — an exception being made of the *crimes passionels* which form a relatively unimportant part of offences now punished in our criminal courts — constitute the waste of our population, — that is to say, that part of it which is unfitted for social life by moral or physical degeneracy. The Dutch, and more lately the Belgian, method of treating the pauper and the criminal as incapables is the only one that recommends itself to mercy and to common sense. They are put into farm colonies, where they are induced to do the most work possible, and in a manner to contribute most to their own support. The inducement offered is of two kinds: there is a cell with bread and water for the recalcitrant; and there is a small wage which can be spent in tobacco, tea, and other luxuries for the industrious. Experience shows that the cell is never used with paupers, and seldom with criminals. Criminals are kept in totally different colonies from

¹ *Ante*, book i. ch. iii. § 7 (a), Poverty; and Evolution and Effort; ch. x., The Problem of Pauperism.

paupers. It is probable that as yet the differentiation between different classes of criminals and different classes of paupers is extremely incomplete, and that a State which gave proper attention to this, the most burning question of social life, would arrange for a large variety of colonies through which criminals could graduate one after another, and thus become ultimately fitted for social life. Moreover, when the State became a large landowner, the difficult problem how to secure employment for the graduate of a pauper colony would be solved. It would then become possible for the State to devote some attention to a fraction of our waste population that has heretofore proved an insoluble problem, — the prostitute. That a State professing and calling itself Christian should have tolerated all these centuries a condition of things under which a woman could be compelled by purely economic considerations to join the ranks of harlotry is an admission which no self-respecting man or woman can make without a burning sense of shame. State employment under the same gentle inducements as was suggested for the pauper seems to furnish a simple solution of the problem; but it must be noted that while State employment would in an individualist community be stamped as ignominy because it took the shape of an asylum, State employment need never in a collectivist community bear this stamp, except where the cell has actually to be used. In order to make this distinction clear, the municipality would, before it owned farms of its own, have to create two kinds of colonies, the Voluntary and the Involuntary, to which those who committed themselves and those who were committed would respectively be confined. So long as these so-called voluntary colonies bore the outward and visible sign of employment for the purpose of furnishing relief, they would be shunned,

and would in the minds of the ignorant be vaguely associated with prisons and imprisonment. But as soon as the municipality owned farms of its own and opened public stores, then all outward and visible signs of pauperism would disappear; all unemployed persons willing to work would be taken into the employment of the State, and only those unwilling to work would be consigned to the compulsory colony, where no great severity, to judge from existing experience, need be applied, but the indignity attending which most would wish to avoid. *Now the day when the State shall have become a sufficiently large owner of land and a sufficiently extensive employer of labour to be able to furnish employment without shame for the pauper who has been restored by sound food and regular hours of labour to a normal condition of body and mind, for the criminal who has graduated from the criminal and compulsory pauper colony and become thereby fitted for social life, for the woman who has been betrayed, and for the widow who has to support a child, a sufficient progress will have been made to justify the effort, — nay, even the danger of the experiment, — for then, for the first time, will a solution have been proposed of the economic problem presented by prostitution, pauperism, and for the most part also by crime.*

(f) *Advance from Partial Collectivism to
Collectivism Proper*

So long as the State is not substantially the only owner of the sources of production,¹ the proposed collectivist scheme will not be realised; for so long services will be remunerated upon the wage plan, and there will

¹ Production of necessities and ordinary comforts, but not necessarily of superfluities, which may indefinitely be left to private enterprise.

consequently be a perpetual struggle for the more highly remunerated offices, a struggle which will have an economical as well as a political stimulus. It is quite possible that humanity will never get beyond the partial collectivism above described, and if it did not, an advantage would already have been secured of priceless importance. But there is no reason why humanity should not, when once this advanced stage of partial collectivism were attained, ultimately improve sufficiently to enter the next phase and emerge into a condition which, though not ideal collectivism, may, perhaps, conveniently be called Collectivism Proper.

It is obvious that as the State slowly increased its ownership of the sources of production it would keep track of the cost of production, as regards every necessary of life, and it would be in a position, therefore, to state the exchange value of these commodities in terms of what may be called dividend coupons upon the collectivist principle, — that is to say, upon the principle that all who contributed to production were to share equally therein, or as nearly equally as conditions might permit. It has been objected that this calculation is difficult, if not impossible. It may be well, therefore, briefly to consider how the exchange value of commodities can be expressed in dividend coupons.

*(g) Determination of Exchange Value of Commodities,
Expressed in Dividend Coupons*

It has been already explained that under a collectivist régime there will be two kinds of scrip: dividend coupons and voluntary labour cheques.¹ The former will

¹ It must be carefully remembered that the State order recommended during the initial steps towards collectivism is totally different from the

be issued to represent that part of the nation's income to which the holder is entitled by virtue of the compulsory labour he does with a view to the production and distribution of necessities; the second will be issued to represent so much time voluntarily expended for the purpose of securing a particular advantage. These two kinds of scrip differ essentially in kind, and their exchange values represent different things. The essential feature of the dividend coupon is that it represents a fraction of the national income. It is proposed to calculate it as follows:—

At a time when the population of the United States was fifty millions, Mulhall estimated that the amount of grain annually produced in the United States was 2,400,000,000 bushels. Of this, ten per cent must be deducted for seed, and a further deduction of about fifty per cent must be made for the feeding of stock. This would leave about 1,000,000,000 bushels available for human food. This figure divided by 50,000,000 would entitle every inhabitant, upon an equal division, to twenty bushels of grain per annum. This amount of grain, therefore, would represent the share of every member of a collectivist community in the grain production of the State. If, at the time of the conversion of exchange medium from currency to dividend coupons, \$1.00, or a hundred cents, were the cash value of a bushel of grain, one hundred units might conveniently be taken as the commercial expression in dividend coupons of a bushel of grain; and every inhabitant would therefore be entitled to 20×100 or 2000 units of value arising out of his right to an equal share in State production of grain.

dividend coupon recommended in a collectivist State. In the former case it is an order to purchase so much goods expressed in dollars, and is transferable. In the second it represents a fractional part of national income, is expressed in units, and is *not* transferable.

The same kind of calculation could be applied to meat; the number of pounds of meat¹ to which each inhabitant was entitled could be arrived at as in the case of grain. If meat at the time of conversion was worth twenty cents a pound, the number of pounds of meat to which every inhabitant was entitled would be multiplied by twenty units, and this figure, representing the share of every inhabitant arising out of meat production, would be added to the 2000 units representing his right to a share in the State production of grain.

This process would be applied to all the commodities produced by the State through the medium of compulsory labour, and thus the total share of each inhabitant in the total income of the State would be determined in dividend units or coupons. Under this plan every inhabitant would be free to spend his dividend coupons as he chose; one preferring much meat and little bread; another much bread and little meat; and a family adjusting their provisions to their respective tastes in exactly the same way as we now do through the exchange medium of currency.

These dividend coupons would be subject to readjustment every year according to the abundance of the crops and of the commodities manufactured respectively; and it would be subject to a further occasional adjustment, in view of the fact that infants do not eat, and that up to a certain age it may or may not be expedient to throw the support of children upon the parents.² This adjustment would be effected by deducting from the population the number of infants that do not eat solid food,

¹ Mulhall (*Industries and Wealth of Nations*, 1896, p. 5) explains just what he means by, and how he arrives at, the annual production of pounds of meat.

² See Chap. IV., *Objections to Collectivism*, Sec. 1: That it would promote over-population.

and the number of those children whose support the State deems it wise to impose upon the parents.

Now what can be done for meat and grain can be done for everything which the State produces, superfluities as well as necessities, pianos, bicycles, yachts, as well as coal, ice, and milk. There will, however, in the collectivist plan proposed, be, as already stated, two different systems applied to the production of necessities and the production of superfluities that contribute to refinement, amusement, and pleasure. The labour necessary to produce the one will be exacted; that necessary to produce the other will be voluntary. Thus, if a man desires a bicycle or a woman desires an extra gown, they will be informed that the bicycle or gown costs a certain number of hours of labour or a given quantity of piece work; and they will have to do these hours of labour, or the given quantity of piece work, either at the production of necessities or at that of superfluities, according as the exigencies of production may require.

The element in this system most repugnant to individualists is the element of coercion; "it is odious," says he, "to have to work as directed by the State, instead of working at the employment chosen by one's self."

(h) Choice of Occupation

The question how far a man to-day chooses his own occupation has already been discussed. Here no more need be said than to recall the undoubted fact that wage-earners cannot be said to choose their occupation at all; and professional men for the most part select the occupation to which they are most fitted when it is not already selected for them by the profession of the father. Nature, therefore, determines for these last the choice,

rather than the individual. Let us now consider how this choice of occupation would be determined, first, in a partial collectivism, and next in a collectivism proper.

In a partial collectivism the conditions as regards choice of occupation would be similar to those which prevail to-day, because the individual could always choose between the occupation offered him by the State and the occupation he could make for himself outside of the State. Nevertheless, the large scope of State employment would enable the State to offer good terms, and thus render it a formidable rival to individual employers. It is probable, therefore, that the children of parents employed by the State would regularly become State employ  s, and that they would only exceptionally abandon State employment. Under these circumstances, the State, through the machinery of State schools, would apply its method of selection early, — that is to say, as soon as children developed special faculties in special directions. For example, as soon as a child developed a faculty for engineering, he would be given an education specifically adapted to develop this faculty; and the same would be true of medicine, science, mechanics, etc. In this manner the ablest children would become separated out from the less able. In view, however, of the fact that the greatest ability is often the slowest to develop, all children would be given opportunities for education to a mature age, a careful difference being made between that part of the education that was compulsory and that which was voluntary. It might happen, for example, that, owing to slow development or administrative error, a youth might be put into the group of manual labourers although he possessed a genius for some higher occupation. The State would be very unwisely administered if it did not provide for such a case. And the obvious method of doing so would be

for the State to offer opportunities for study to all citizens, up to any age, during the hours of leisure which collective production would allow. But genius often works out its own method of education, and it is not at all certain that it would need State aid for its development and expression. Genius has more to fear from crushing hours of labour than from lack of education. Let every man in the State have half the day in which to work out his individual faculties, and there is little room for fear that genius will fail to find its legitimate expression in a collectivist State.

The ablest children being early sorted out as above described, the rest would be classified according to the exigencies of State production.

There would be a group of artisans, of agriculturists, of clerks, of manual labourers; and out of these classes it would be possible for any individual at any time to graduate into another by showing fitness for a higher occupation.

This method would proceed closely along the lines of nature; it would seek to discover the natural adaptabilities of each, and apply each to the work which each was best fitted to perform.

But within every class there would be a large opportunity for choice. Among the agriculturists, for example, every member could state his preference whether for farming on a large scale or on a small; for the growth of grain, or vegetables, or fruits. A youth born upon a farm would have a prior lien for work on that farm if he desired it; but, subject to the considerations arising from the advisableness of keeping a family together, every individual could exercise a choice. It would, of course, often occur that there would be more applications for a particular employment than there were places to fill. In such case the issue would have to be

decided by lot. And those who drew a bad lot would not have half as much reason for discontent as the youth who draws a bad number for military service to-day in France or Germany.

This principle would be applied in every occupation. The first consideration would always be that the members of a family should be given employment in the same place, — that is to say, at the common home; the next consideration would then be the choice of the individual within the group to which he was assigned; and it would only be when the necessities of State production made the employment selected impossible that individual choice would have to be disregarded.

Now, in this method is there really much to distinguish it, so far as freedom of choice is concerned, from that prevailing to-day? Would not the man who wanted to become a doctor become one? — the man who wanted to become an engineer become an engineer? — the man who wanted to become a farmer become a farmer? And if one engineer wanted to abandon engineering and raise sheep, would he not have abundant leisure to qualify himself for sheep-raising, and could he not, therefore, change his occupation as readily under a collectivist State as under present conditions?

And those who were assigned to manual labour, would their lot be a very hard one? They would be so assigned because they were physically fit for it. Five hours of manual labour is not an irksome task for a man easily able to perform such labour for ten. And the rest of his day he could devote to whatever most interested him; the rest of the day he would enjoy the truest liberty, the only liberty worthy of the name.

Under partial collectivism the question of employment would be complicated by the question of wages. But if collectivism proper were introduced as heretofore

suggested, that is to say, by the wage-earner supported by men of wealth and conscience, the wage question would slowly become eliminated; there would be a slow increase in the wage paid to the manual labourer without a corresponding diminution in that paid to the managers; the increase in the wage to the manual labourer resulting from the slow increase of economy under a system which replaced competition by co-operation. Individualists contend that individualism means levelling up, and collectivism levelling down. Our crowded gaols, penitentiaries, and almshouses bear witness how untrue it is that individualism levels up. The foregoing explanation how wages would rise under collective production bears witness how little collectivism levels down.

It may be urged that this system of levelling up would have for effect to drive all the most successful managers into the ranks of the competing individualists, and this is undoubtedly true; the struggle between collectivism and individualism would be long and bitter. And it is well that it should be so; for until the people were sufficiently developed morally and intellectually to make the collectivist plan prevail over the individualist, the adoption of collectivism would lead to failure and calamity.

It must not be forgotten, however, that, the more the State acquired, the less field would there be for individualist enterprise. If the State expropriated a mine as soon as it began to pay, no great individualist wealth could be made of it. The fact that the State paid fairly for such a mine would encourage individuals to explore and develop mines, but the fact that the State would eventually purchase them would prevent any great accumulation of wealth in individual hands. It is probable, therefore, that individualism would find little field for

action outside of such occupations as required great skill, taste, or talent. The manufacture of pianos might long remain in individual hands, as might that of articles of dress and personal adornment; actors and opera singers would doubtless long find higher remuneration outside of the State than within it. But it seems as though the field of operation for individual effort outside the State would eventually be confined to a comparatively few occupations; in these occupations individual enterprise would operate through the voluntary labour system.

(i) Voluntary Labour Cheques

Let us suppose, for example, that the manufacture of pianos had been organised into a trust and been purchased by the State, and that, owing to the incapacity of State management, pianos ceased to be manufactured up to old standards. There would be nothing to prevent those having special genius for such manufacture combining during their leisure hours to manufacture pianos of a better grade. And this need not involve actual co-operation in the manufacture of every person interested in good pianos; for voluntary labour cheques would, though limited in time, like dividend coupons, differ from dividend coupons in that they would be transferable. Let us see how this principle would work. Let us suppose A to have such gifts as Steinway had, and to desire to manufacture pianos of the greatest perfection. He would raise subscriptions from all interested in the work exactly as Steinway doubtless did to secure the capital for his enterprise; only the subscriptions would not be in money, but in voluntary labour promises. Assuming that A induced a hundred persons to promise an extra hour of labour a

day, or its equivalent in piece work, for six months, in return for which each was to have a piano of superior make, A would go to the Labour Bureau and tender these promises of voluntary labour, in exchange for which he would secure from the Labour Bureau skilled labour from the State Piano Factory to do the work under his supervision, either from the ranks of compulsory or from those of voluntary labour. In other words, the subscriber would labour in accordance with his labour promise, and thus earn voluntary labour cheques, which he would transfer to A, and with these A would secure skilled labour, transferring these voluntary labour cheques either to the State for compulsory skilled labour, or to individuals for voluntary skilled labour.

Now, what could be done for pianos could be done for dress, for country houses, yachts, automobiles, and for all the other things that enter into the enjoyment of life.¹

There is no greater error than to suppose that collectivism involves levelling down, or the reduction of free men to the condition of State slaves. On the contrary, it is a system of collective production, which diminishes the time that must be given to the work of production and distribution of necessities to a minimum, and thus leaves to every man the maximum of time and liberty for the satisfaction of his individual tastes and the development of his industrial abilities.

But if the State bureau refused the application of A for labour?

There is obviously ample room for error and for spite in the collectivist State, and individualists dwell much on the helplessness of the individual in such case. There does not seem, however, room for apprehension on this score. The task of A, for example, might be made

¹ The subject of Voluntary Labour Cheques is further treated, *post*, 416, 419.

more difficult by such refusal, but it would not for that reason become impossible. On the contrary, he could still find out for himself, without State aid, all the persons willing to give voluntary labour for the compensation A could offer them. Let us consider a moment what is the character of this compensation, and, in connection with this subject, what are the probable limits of State and individual enterprise.

(j) *Limits of State and Individual Enterprise*

It has already been pointed out that one of the fundamental evils of the competitive system is its wastefulness; but another evil as great is the exploitation of one man by another to which it gives rise. The facility which is given by it to the money-making man for accumulating wealth at the expense of others,¹ so that a few are very rich and the many are very poor, is too obvious to need exposition. Now this condition of things renders easy the exploitation of the poor by the rich; for the poor have to work in order to earn bread; they have no choice. They are kept by the fear of hunger from demanding a just compensation.² To countenance this system on the plea of liberty of contract is rank hypocrisy. The isolated workingman is only able to *demand* compensation when he is in a position to refuse his labour; at all other times he has to take what is offered to him.

¹ Individualist economists insist that wealth is not made by one man at the expense of others, but to their benefit. Undoubtedly the wealth of one man often and generally benefits others; but the net actual, visible result of the competitive system is that a few are undeservedly favoured; the majority earn a bad living; and a fifth are in misery. This is what is meant by the words "at the expense of others."

² Trade unions do much to diminish this helplessness, but it has been shown that they can only do this at periods of expanding trade and high prices. When trade contracts or prices go down they are helpless.

Now this helplessness of the poor is due to the fact that the wealthy control the employment which the poor need in order to live; and *it is this helplessness which collectivism is mainly concerned in preventing*. Moreover, it is the function of collectivism to prevent this, not by the tender of alms, which is humiliating and unjust, but by the furnishing of bread for labour to all in the community under similar conditions, so that all contribute and all receive an equal share of the common enterprise.

From this point of view it might be wise for the State to undertake nothing more than the management of natural monopolies and the production and distribution of *necessaries*, leaving the production and distribution of comforts and luxuries entirely to private enterprise. Indeed, the scope of State enterprise beyond that of monopolies and necessities would remain a matter of policy as to which it would be impossible to establish any rigid rules. If the State were admirably administered, doubtless the economy and convenience of State management would tend to increase its scope, whereas if State management were not good, private enterprise would tend to take everything but the necessary functions of the State out of its hands. It will be seen, therefore, that collectivism by no means involves a total subordination of individual to State enterprise, but, on the contrary, permits of every possible degree of both, provided only the State keeps control of monopolies and of the production and distribution of necessities, thereby making the exploitation of one man by another impossible by providing the necessities of life to all.

As, however, it may not seem easy to understand how individual enterprise could take any given industry out of the hands of a collectivist State, let us consider a little more closely how A would set about the task referred to.

If State-made pianos were badly manufactured, there would doubtless be many persons desirous of possessing pianos of a better make. Let us assume that two hundred families averaging five members each were found desirous of owning good pianos; they would probably most of them be quite unfamiliar with the manufacture of pianos; they could not, therefore, themselves contribute usefully thereto. A would, therefore, have to find a sufficient number of skilled men who would be willing to devote extra time to the manufacture of pianos, according to A's method, in return for certain advantages which A would have to secure to them. These advantages would take the shape of voluntary labour cheques issued, not through the State, but by A. Were pianos the only things manufactured by private enterprise, the rewarding of labour by voluntary cheques would be a matter of some difficulty, but if many things were manufactured outside of the State there would arise by the side of State cheques a system of private cheques which would facilitate the task of A. In other words, there would grow up by private enterprise private labour bureaus or banks, at which all persons desiring things not procurable from the State would apply, tendering therefor products of voluntary labour or promises of voluntary labour in exchange therefor. The artist who desired an automobile would tender the work of his art, and according to his skill would receive the automobile in exchange for more or for less hours of labour.¹ The mechanic who wanted a cow would tender his labour, and according to his skill would receive

¹ It must be remembered that the piece-work system would be largely used in a collectivist State, and that an artist, therefore, would probably offer his completed work, instead of so many hours of labour, in exchange for voluntary labour cheques, and use the voluntary labour cheques so obtained to purchase his automobile.

the cow in exchange for more or for less piece work or hours of labour. Thus, by the side of the State system of dividend coupons and labour cheques, would grow up a private system of labour cheques, more or less important than the State, according as the scope of the State were small or large. And the voluntary system, whether public or private, would involve two kinds of scrip, — promises of labour and voluntary labour cheques. Individuals would tender promises, and thereby induce others to offer voluntary labour. Both sets would then set to work in their respective fields, redeem their promises, and receive voluntary labour cheques in exchange therefor, which each could use in exchange for the product of the work of others. To make this subject clear: A obtains from B C D promises to labour in return for a piano. With these he secures the voluntary services of P Q R, skilled workmen in the piano trade. B C D labour in their respective fields and become entitled to voluntary labour cheques which entitle them each to a piano. P Q R labour at the manufacture of pianos and receive voluntary labour cheques therefor. The labour cheques which P Q R earn, they exchange for any of the articles manufactured through the labour of B C D and others.

Side by side, therefore, with State production would arise a system of production by private enterprise, and thus collectivism would escape from the rigidity and uniformity which individualists insist are indispensable to it, and which all would, if indeed indispensable to it, greatly deplore. For man needs variety and freedom, and any system of government that would eliminate these must occasion either degeneration or discontent. Too much emphasis, therefore, cannot be put upon the unlimited scope permissible to private enterprise, once

only two things are provided for by the State, — the necessities of life, and economy in the production of them. These two are indispensable attributes of a wisely constituted State, because, if the necessities of life are not furnished to every member of the community, a large part of the community — under our present system the larger part — is subjected to exploitation by the minority on the one hand, and on the other hand is delivered over to pauperism, prostitution, and crime.

If the necessities of life are not furnished with the greatest economy of production and distribution, so much of the time of the community is spent, as under our present system, in the drudgery of production and distribution, that no time is left for individual enterprise, for individual improvement, for the exercise of individual liberty, or the pursuit of individual happiness.

Collectivism is thus shown to contribute, as our definition of justice demands, to the care of the individual as well as to that of the race, and, indeed, properly limited, to furnish the only full scope to individual initiative, so often stifled, under our existing competitive system, by the crushing necessity of earning our daily bread.

(k) *Dividend Coupons, Labour Cheques, and Currency*

The question naturally arises, Why, under the contemplated collectivism, is it proposed to substitute dividend coupons and labour cheques for coin as a medium of exchange? No categorical answer will be attempted to this question, because it is quite conceivable that collectivism should attain the highest development consistent with human imperfections, and coin be maintained as a medium of exchange outside of the public stores. Coin

must be eliminated from the public stores because, as has been already explained, State production and distribution being conducted on the plan of equal division, every member of the community would be entitled to his share of State income, and this share could be most conveniently expressed and utilised by the dividend coupon already described. But it might very well happen that the development of collectivism would never proceed beyond the purchase of monopolies and of sufficient land to assure a sufficient share of the necessities of life to all applying to the State for employment. This would constitute the condition already described as Partial Collectivism. The existing competitive system for the production of luxuries might be maintained, with its currency and banking system, its profits and accumulated advantages to those possessing the special talents of the money-maker. There are, however, obvious objections to such a system. In the first place, it would fall far short of the moral standards we profess; in the second place, the competitive system, with its attendant joint-stock companies and coin currency, would exert a dangerous influence on those charged with the government and administration of the collectivist State. It does not seem conceivable that those in control of so powerful a machinery as that of a collectivist State could resist the corrupting power of wealthy magnates able by accumulation of wealth to offer enormous rewards for political favours. And these considerations permit of our understanding clearly the difference between the labour cheque and coin as mediums of exchange. Coin is capable of unlimited accumulation; the labour cheque is capable of accumulation within narrow limits only.

Let us consider how this principle would work in the example already furnished by our piano-maker A.

Were A to raise subscriptions in coin and pay workmen in coin, he would be enabled, by a margin of profit on every hour of labour furnished, to put aside an amount of coin that would represent value, not only during his own life, but in all time. Were he, on the contrary, to receive subscriptions and pay workmen in labour cheques that were of value only for a limited time, he would have no interest in endeavouring to make a margin of profit out of his workmen; for by the time the margin of profit was realised the labour cheque would have ceased to have value. Let us take an example: two hundred families of five members each want pianos; each piano requires two hundred hours expended on it. Each family furnishes promises of two hundred hours of labour, or their equivalent in piece work, — that is to say, each person furnishes promises of forty hours of labour, or their equivalent in piece work; these promises are good for one year only.¹ They are therefore incapable of accumulation; profit thereon is incapable of accumulation. A, or rather the private labour bureaus or bank through which A works, could, of course, convert the promises of labour into commodities; and these commodities could be converted once more into new labour promises. But unless these new labour promises were expeditiously used, they would become unavailable by lapse of time. There is therefore a material difficulty about accumulating wealth upon the labour cheque plan which is conspicuously absent from the coin system. The fact that labour cheques are limited in

¹ The term of one year is purely arbitrary; it might be one month or it might be two years; if ingenuity succeeded in finding a method for accumulating and exchanging cheques that were due for cheques that had still their time to run, doubtless the term of the cheque would be reduced to render the process difficult; if, on the other hand, no such effort were made, and it were found useful to favour the negotiability of labour cheques, their term would be extended.

time would involve a difficult and constant readjustment that would stand much in the way of extensive accumulation. Doubtless human ingenuity would, under the mercenary stimulus, find a way for accumulating even under adverse circumstances; but if it did, those who suffered by it would always have a remedy; they could turn to the State; contribute to make its management better, and fit it to take the industry which gave rise to accumulation out of the private hands that accumulated. Thus the two systems would stand forever watching, controlling, and supplementing one another.

Individualists will mock at this system of labour cheques as barbarously clumsy, forgetting that this very clumsiness is its particular virtue; for individualists cannot rid their mind of the idea that the object of manufacture is to make profit, whereas the proper intention of manufacture should be to supply wants.

Under the labour cheque system, therefore, men will be set to manufacture to supply a want, and not to make profit; and manufacture will thereby be restored to its true function, and rescued from the false function to which it has been put by those who seek to make profit for themselves out of the labour of their fellow-men.

(C) *Elimination of Corruption by Substitution of Labour Cheques for Coin as Medium of Exchange*

Let us next consider the rôle which joint-stock corporations and coin currency play in political corruption. There are two obvious methods by which a legislator or official can be bribed. One is by the payment of money; the other by the contribution of stock. This last takes different forms. The briber either offers stock out and

out, or, when the legislator is a little fastidious, he is told to buy stock in the companies to be benefited, and a margin is supplied by the briber to cover fluctuations.

Now, so long as these two principal instruments of corruption exist, the temptation to exercise them and be influenced by them is too great for many of our fellow-creatures, whereas if, by the substitution of labour cheques for coin, profit-making were practically eliminated, these two instruments of corruption would cease to exist, and it is difficult to see how they could be replaced; for the sudden possession of labour cheques by an official would have to be explained, and would, in fact, be inexplicable in any quantities sufficient to constitute a bribe.

A money bribe can be more conveniently handled. The sudden possession of a large sum of money by a poor official would, of course, create suspicion; but money can be put safely away; it can be locked in a safe until it is invested in small enough fractions to escape inquiry.

Labour cheques could not be thus concealed; they have to be used within a limited period, or they have to be invested in commodities within that period, or they must be exchanged in a bank within that period. They are clumsy, and their clumsiness is their advantage to the community; for their clumsiness makes corruption as well as accumulation difficult.

(m) Land

It has been already pointed out that the first steps of collectivism in the direction of ownership of land are likely to be taken for the purpose of creating farm colonies for paupers and criminals, and for the purpose of

erecting suitable buildings for the housing of State officials; but it is by no means impossible that the application of single tax might be a still more likely method of securing State ownership. The theory of single tax has not been given the attention that it perhaps deserves in this volume because it has given rise to controversy, and the claims of its adherents seem greater than the theory warrants. In other words, the application of single tax does not seem sufficiently effectual in one sense, and in others it might become altogether too much or too rapidly so. It has been deemed wise, therefore, to omit from our study of collectivism this particular method proposed for attaining it; the more so as other more direct methods seem sufficiently efficacious.

But there are other methods for State acquisition of lands which might anticipate those already mentioned; for example, a repetition of such a condition of things as occurred a few years ago in New England, where thousands of farms were abandoned because they did not furnish a sufficient inducement for cultivation. This opportunity has now been largely seized by men of means, who have converted these abandoned farms into summer homes, for which the picturesqueness of the country admirably fits them. If such a state of things, however, were to take place on a sufficiently large scale in our prairie States, which afford few attractions for summer residence, a State bent upon extending its acquisitions to land would doubtless avail itself of the opportunity.

And the use to which the State would put such acquisitions would depend largely upon the conditions then prevailing. If the land was abandoned for some reason which the State could eliminate, as lack of railroad accommodation, or high rates of transportation, the

State would doubtless use the land for the purpose of collective production. If, however, the culture of the land were abandoned because of infertility requiring slow and expensive treatment, the State would apply it to the purposes of a farm colony, where the education of the pauper or criminal was of more importance than agricultural profits.

Once, however, the State became a large owner of land, the economy of State production and distribution¹ will enable the State to offer farm produce at lower prices than private owners. These lower prices, however, will benefit only a part of the population, for at the initial stage only officials receive State orders available at public stores, and State orders alone receive the benefit of the lower prices resulting from State production. To others, farm produce will be sold at market prices. As, however, the official world would increase in size, the demand for farm produce other than that produced by the State would diminish, prices would fall, and the individual farmer would cease to produce as profitably as before. A considerable extension, therefore, of State production is likely to lead to agricultural distress. This distress, however, can be averted by a still further development of collectivism. Every farmer who feels the competition of the State could be allowed to sell his produce to the State, receiving therefor labour cheques, and profiting thereby from the lower prices prevailing at the public stores. Such a farmer need not be deprived of his farm; indeed, neither a farmer nor a farmer's children for endless generations need ever be deprived of the family farm. On the contrary, it would be the policy of a wise collectivist State to keep

¹ It is everywhere assumed that State administration is good; if it is not good it will not be tolerated, individualists will resume control, and the progress of collectivism be consequently arrested.

families in their respective farms. Nor should the task be a difficult one. For what would be the possible history of a farmer in the slow development of the collectivist State? He might begin by paying his taxes in produce; he might end by bringing all his produce to the public stores. So long as he brought a proper amount of such produce, the State would have no reason for turning him out; it would only be in case he grossly failed to furnish the amount of produce his acres should harvest that the State would have to interfere. And the farmer would have the same interest then as now to furnish the maximum possible; as the more he furnished the more would he be entitled to take out of the public stores.

The farmer's children would doubtless be attracted then, as now, to the towns, but one of them would be encouraged to remain on the farm, because the farm would furnish them all a summer home. And it would be the wisest economy of a collectivist State to encourage all the members of a farmer's family, wheresoever they reside, to return during the harvesting season to the ancestral farm, thus emptying the cities during the months least fitted for city life, furnishing the country with labour at the time when labour is most needed there, and maintaining the family affection, from which all other human sympathy starts. Then, indeed, will Thanksgiving Day have restored to it its original significance and become a national holiday in fact as well as in form.

Nor does it seem necessary for State ownership to be extended to farm lands, except for the purpose of preventing idleness or checking land hunger. Whatever land a family can profitably cultivate, it ought to be allowed to cultivate, no farmer being allowed to exploit a farm labourer, through the wealth of the one or the

poverty of the other; but, both being put on a basis of equality by the assurance to both of the necessities of life, liberty of contract becomes for the first time possible.

And so a farmer needing labour would apply to the State for it; the State would furnish it; and the happiness of both employer and employé would depend, not upon economic, but upon personal considerations. Each would have an interest in being personally agreeable to the other; the employer, so as to have the benefit of cheerful and effectual service; the employé, so as to have the benefit of a comfortable home. And if they quarrelled, the quarrel would ultimately tend to injure the one at fault; for an employer who quarrelled with all his employés would lose the benefit of additional help, and the employé who quarrelled with all his employers would be relegated to State farms and eventually to pauper colonies. And so personal relations would be very much then what they are now, except that the economic causes for misery would be eliminated; and we are thus brought to the conclusion for which we were prepared at the outset, that collectivism is essentially a matter of economics.

(n) Domestic Service

One of the features of collectivism which render it most repugnant to the educated and wealthy is that it seems to make domestic service impossible; and the educated are so accustomed to lean on this kind of service that they cannot conceive of existence being tolerable without it.

Individualists used to dispose of collectivism on this score by the question, "Who will black our boots under your collectivist *régime*?" This attack upon the whole moral, political, and economic theory united in the

word "collectivism" has had much of its virus removed by the late introduction among fashionable people of yellow shoes that do not need blacking; and this pinprick into the inflated arguments of individualism is a type of much that is said for and against the details of collectivist life. It is easy for individualists, resting comfortably in the luxuries provided by the system they uphold, to ridicule conditions in which the prospect of their ever being deprived of their luxuries becomes sufficiently humorous to carry with it a conviction of its impracticability. But the questions involved are too serious to be disposed of by a joke.

Domestic service, like slavery, may long still be necessary, not only for the masters, but also for the servants, and it is probably the institution which will be the last to go. Perhaps, indeed, it will never go. Perhaps there will always be born into the world men and women *naturally* fitted for nothing but domestic service; perhaps also domestic service may remain indispensable to the educated class: but there is something in these words which is familiar; they seem to have been heard before. In the fifties this is exactly what slaveholders contended regarding their slaves; and yet the slaveholders have learned to do without slaves; and their slaves, a *naturally* subject race, seem to be learning to earn their own livelihood.

It is by no means indispensable to the demonstration of the superiority of collectivist over individualist economy that we should describe just how the community is one day to dispense with domestic service. Even though collectivism never attained the development which would dispense with domestic service, it would, by the practical abolition of pauperism, prostitution, and for the most part of crime, have rendered an incalculable service to mankind.

Moreover, as has been already explained, invention will be directed in a collectivist community towards diminishing the need for, and the drudgery of, domestic service. Already this has been to a great extent accomplished. The introduction of hot and cold water into every bedroom, though open to objections arising from imperfect plumbing, which are easily removable, greatly diminishes the labour of servants; the same may be said of a more extensive use of bath-rooms and closets. The introduction of cheap fuel gas would lighten the labour of cooking and eliminate the dust and dirt of our existing coal ranges. Dust could be eliminated from our streets, and in great part, therefore, from our homes, by the substitution of mechanical for animal traction and asphalt for stone pavement and macadam. When a few generations of those who fare sumptuously every day have been replaced by a less gluttonous progeny, a very slight modification of meal-time would again diminish the necessity for domestic service. The breakfast to which the entire French nation has accustomed itself can be prepared with the minimum of labour; the midday meal would be the only one requiring much preparation, the evening meal being restored to the simplicity which is recommended by hygiene, and therefore contributes to comfort and well-being.

If our memories carry us back to the days which immediately followed the close of the Civil War, we shall recall many a delicate lady who, in the conquered South, deprived of her slaves and too poor to pay servants, did the domestic service of the entire family without losing her refinement or even imperilling the whiteness of her hands. Indeed, to some of us the performance of this menial service gave to the Southern lady a new interest and a new dignity, and we are tempted to inquire which of the two, the Southern lady

before the war, who did nothing, or the Southern lady after the war, who did everything, was most entitled to our affection and our esteem.

§ 5. SUMMARY

Let us now briefly resume the stages through which it is imagined a collectivist State is likely to pass.

I. *Partial Collectivism.* In the first stage the State issues to all working for it transferable orders on public stores, expressed in currency, and this it continues to do until it has become sufficiently master of the sources of production to realise the economies of collectivism. It will acquire enough land to create more or less self-supporting colonies of different grades which will assure work to every person applying for it, and to which paupers, criminals, and prostitutes will be committed; different degrees of crime, prostitution, and pauperism being kept in different colonies, so as to permit of graduation from the lowest grade, through intermediate grades, into those where no coercion is necessary, thereby providing, not only for reformation, but for restoration to community life. During this initial stage pauperism and prostitution ought entirely to disappear with the economic conditions that give rise to them, and crime to be much reduced. The economies of collectivist production and distribution will be applied to slowly raising the wages of its employés to a single standard. When this single standard is realised, it will be in a position to pass to the next stage, called —

II. *Collectivism Proper.* In this stage the State begins by confining itself to the purchase of all monopolies and quasi monopolies, — such as railroads, municipal franchises, and trusts, — and to the production and distribution of necessities. It need not attempt to produce

luxuries. All persons in the State are required to perform necessary labour in as nearly equal proportions as may be, piece work being applied to the utmost possible, for the double purpose of encouraging efficiency and furnishing to every man the opportunity to get through his compulsory work in the shortest possible time. In exchange for compulsory work, which, it is assumed, will take only a comparatively small part of the day, every citizen is provided with lodging and dividend coupons, which he can apply as he chooses to the purchase of clothing and food. But outside of State enterprise, individual enterprise will flourish to whatever extent the genius of the people shall determine; individual enterprise may even compete with State enterprise; coin currency may be maintained; farms may continue to be worked by farmers upon the condition of furnishing to the State a given product per acre according to the fertility of the soil.

But during this stage an advance may be made by substituting for coin currency a system of voluntary labour cheques, transferable but limited in time, with a view to preventing corruption and accumulation. These voluntary labour cheques would probably be issued primarily by the State as soon as it undertook to produce other things besides necessities; and if the State, by the ownership of mines and considerable control of foreign trade, could withdraw coin from circulation, and it was deemed advisable to do so, it could force the system of voluntary labour cheques on private enterprise also.

§ 6. THE IDEAL COLLECTIVIST STATE

It is by no means necessary to the adoption of the collectivist theory of economics or to the political programme of collectivism, that we should be able at this time to demonstrate clearly and precisely that the ideal collectivist State — that is to say, a State in which there is no private enterprise whatever — is practically possible. The preceding sections have attempted to show that the slow adoption of the collectivist theory would have for result, at different stages of its development, first, the elimination of pauperism, prostitution, and in great part of crime, and, secondly, the elimination of the corrupting instrument of gold and joint-stock companies. The effort has also been made to show that this would not be attended by a blunting of individual enterprise, but, on the contrary, that by increasing the leisure of every man and assuring him the necessities and probably the comforts of life, he would for the first time in human experience enjoy true liberty. If such a result were achieved, it would be attended by a total transformation of human character, the perpetual effort to improve one's own condition regardless of consequences to others having been replaced by a similar effort to improve the social condition of all for the legitimate consideration and affection which such improvement would bestow. When, by the elimination of coin as currency, private enterprise becomes engaged in satisfying a general want, not for profit, but directly for consideration, and when consideration can be secured only by voluntary service, sympathy, and affection, and no longer through wealth or money, the environment will be so changed that it seems unphilosophical to attempt now to forecast the exact social and political conditions

that will result. Christianity has suffered from the attempt to describe a future State which our present mental and moral structure makes us unable to understand or appreciate. So also collectivism would probably suffer by an attempt to define conditions for which we are now wholly unprepared.

The political student cannot be asked to do more than to show reasonable ground for believing that collectivism slowly and wisely introduced can eliminate the evils which are to-day the greatest shame to our civilisation, that it conforms to the demands of justice, that it violates no necessary laws of nature, and that it assures the truest liberty. The task of describing the social, political, and economic millennium to which collectivism may give rise must be left to works of poetry and imagination, a flight of literature to which the present volume does not aspire.

In conclusion, then, although no attempt to justify ideal collectivism is made, the conditions presented by what has been called partial collectivism and collectivism proper seem practicable and worthy of earnest consideration. In the foregoing brief sketch the effort to show that the many insoluble problems presented by the existing industrial system would find their solution under a collectivist State, has been far from exhaustive. For example, all those who study the question of taxation with any care will unanimously admit that no scheme of taxation has ever been framed or is likely to be framed under our existing institutions that does not bear more hardly upon one part of the community than another; and that a just system of taxation is exposed to inconvenience so great as to be practically prohibitive. All, too, will admit that in the injustice that attends taxation the honest are likely to suffer more than the

dishonest; that taxation is directly the cause of manifold forms of dishonesty in the effort that men make to escape it; and that, all men being subject to the same pressure and engaged in the same task, there has grown a tolerance of dishonesty in this particular direction which exerts a demoralising effect upon the whole community. It is hardly necessary to point out that taxation would disappear in the collectivist State. If now we take into account the fact that under a collectivist form of government all the pauperism that results under our present industrial system from over-production, from the sweated industries, and from the conflict between capital and labour, would disappear; that prostitution would also disappear; that the dishonesty which results from the relation of business to politics, and the dishonesty which is stimulated by competition in business would disappear; and that the tolerance of evil which has been seen to constitute the necessary result of the relations of every church to every State would also disappear, — it must be admitted that the evils attending collectivism must indeed be great in order to compensate such priceless advantages as these.

And when we consider the standard objections to collectivism, they seem to fall to pieces one after another. It is perfectly true that in the present condition of ignorance and selfishness an attempt to impose collectivism upon us to-morrow would be more likely to occasion a destructive revolution than a constructive benefit; but if time be given for the slow adaptation of human character to the new order of things, it seems impossible to deny that collectivism furnishes, not a Utopia which men can never attain, but a model of government to which men should at any rate slowly direct their steps; and under such a form of government not only would the home be preserved in its entirety, but every

individual would secure the greatest freedom of action consistent with the greatest security from risk; under it we should have at last created an environment calculated to stimulate the noble qualities of man rather than those which are base, and promote a higher type rather than one that is degenerate; and under it alone can we ever hope to come up to the standards of morality set up for us in the Sermon on the Mount.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

BEFORE attempting to draw a general conclusion from the arguments hereinbefore presented, let us briefly summarise these arguments and connect the particular conclusions to which we have come.

The word "nature" is for the most part used to include everything in the world except spirit and art. Everything we call natural is so called to *contrast* it with things spiritual or artificial. We have therefore concluded not to use the words "nature" and "natural" in such a way as to confound them with the words "spiritual" and "artificial," with which they are contrasted. They have accordingly been used to include everything that is material in the world unaffected by the conscious effort of man; and to exclude, therefore, conscious, deliberate, non-natural, or religious, human effort; this last being expressed by the words "artificial" and "spiritual."¹ And as man is himself found

¹ The use of the word "nature," here suggested, is by no means intended to convey that human evolution is not a part of the evolution that preceded man, as some of the critics of the first volume seem to have inferred. (See Professor Giddings's review in the "Political Science Quarterly" for December.) It is proposed to exclude from the meaning of the word "nature" what we call art and spirit, because the word "nature" is currently used in contrast and opposition to the words "art" and "spirit," as is the word "natural" used in contrast and opposition to the words "artificial" and "spiritual." To use the word "nature" at one time to include art and spirit, and at another in opposition to art and spirit, is to court confusion. The extent of the confusion resulting from this double and inconsistent use of the word "nature" has already been

to include two personalities, — one a mere automaton, partaking of the undeliberate, unconscious mechanism of the lower animals and including the purely natural part of him, and the other a conscious, deliberate, controlling personality, which we may, for the purpose of this argument, call will, — we are led by our definition to include the human automaton in the word “nature,” but to exclude the human will. When we apply this definition to the expressions, “natural law,” “moral law,” “law of nature,” “natural rights,” we are driven by it to recognise that natural law is a totally different thing from moral law and that it is fatal to confound them. For the law of nature which determines the relations of animals to one another is the law of natural selection, — a law that ignores mercy and justice, and is for that reason diametrically the opposite of the moral law, which takes account of little else. And so in treating of matters sociological we have decided to confine the words “law of nature” and “natural law” to the law of natural selection, and never again to use them to include the moral law, which is diametrically opposed to them.

And as to the words “natural rights,” we have decided to obliterate them from the language altogether, because if they can be deemed to have any meaning at all, it must be held to be misleading. There are no rights in nature; rights are the creation of man.

dwelt on in the first volume, and need not therefore be repeated here. But in order to demonstrate the absence of any intention to betray the reader into an admission of a break or discontinuity between nature and art or spirit, it is suggested that the words “cosmos” and “cosmic” can conveniently be used to include all three, — nature, art, and spirit. Under this phraseology there is only one evolution, — cosmic evolution; but cosmic evolution can be conveniently divided into natural and artificial, or *præ-human* and human, the ambiguity of the word “nature” being thereby eliminated and the question of the continuity of cosmic evolution left undisputed.

The law of natural selection, or, as it is generally called, the law of evolution, we have found to be very different from that of human selection, because man is no longer a mere product of the environment of nature, but has created for himself an environment of his own. This artificial environment created by man is the resultant of several forces which have at different periods of human history operated in different directions; these forces are selfishness, intelligence, and religion, and, taken singly, these three forces may be regarded as respectively the instruments of nature, art, and spirit. At times it would seem as though spirit and art were allied against nature, as in the gospel of Christ and in the epistles of Saint Paul; but most of the time nature is strong enough to harness both to her chariot wheels. We find, therefore, that the artificial environment created by man — that is to say, his social and political institutions — has been for the most part suggested by selfishness, but that this selfishness has been tempered by religion and intelligence. The most striking feature, however, in human history is that although man seems to be consciously creating his own institutions, they are, as a matter of fact, for the most part the product of a selfish instinct profoundly ignorant and generally proceeding in a direction hostile to human happiness in general.

In other words, although the conscious deliberate purpose of man has been resisting nature for thousands of years, what with the ignorance with which the struggle has been maintained on the one hand, and the perpetual stimulation of the selfish automaton by the artificial environment created by himself on the other, it will have to be admitted that improvement has been intermittent and extremely slow.

But it is because man has not been clearly alive to

the factors of the problem before him that he has to so great an extent failed. A few flashes of intelligence have occasionally illuminated his path, and some of these flashes have been briefly referred to in the preceding pages; but they have partaken of the character of genius in a few, rather than of intelligence in the many; and this mainly because the artificial environment created by man has been such as to blunt the intelligence of the many and to stimulate selfishness; whereas the truest happiness of the race would, on the contrary, be promoted by institutions that would stimulate the intelligence of the mass and diminish the egotism of all.

The question whether our institutions can be so modified as to increase the happiness of man and diminish their unhappiness is the main question presented for solution in this book; and it has been shown that in order to prepare ourselves for an answer to it we have to take into account one after another, in the first place the character of the environment produced by nature, in the second place the character of the environment created by man, and in the third place the nature of the human temperament or social mind which has been the product of this last environment; and particularly how far by change of the environment the social mind is still subject to modification thereby.

The study of these two environments — the natural and the human — has led us to the conclusion that while the latter has resulted in a distinct improvement of type through the self-restraint necessitated by such an institution as marriage, the artificial environment, nevertheless, preserves, through the maintenance of the competitive system, still so much of the natural predatory law that further improvement is likely to be miserably slow if, indeed, it takes place at all.

The rôle of selfishness in dragging down religion and

every high ideal, whether in terms religious or not, has been traced throughout recorded history, and the conclusion has been drawn that so long as our institutions are the mere result of the conflict between the selfishness of one class and that of another, the improvement is likely to be so slow that, when we compare it with the agony it occasions, we cannot but be filled with despair. Indeed, we have seen that there are two tendencies at work in our present system which may destroy our civilisation faster than improvement can vitalise it. For in the first place the artificial conditions we have created tend to degenerate type through the reckless fertility of the lowest types and the comparative infertility of the best. And in the second place recent inventions, such as railroads, telegraphs, telephones, — in fact, steam, and electricity in all their operations, — are continually engaged in unconsciously speeding up the machinery of which we form part, and in wearing us out before our time.

One of the devices by which employers slowly seek to get more work out of their factory hands without a corresponding rise in wages is imperceptibly to speed up the machinery, so that in the same amount of time the same number of hands produce a much larger output. But the speeding up of machinery has been found to be so exhausting to workmen that in the cotton industries and many others they have compelled their employers to adopt an elaborate system of piece work, so that every speeding up of the machinery will involve either higher wages for the operators or shorter hours. It has been estimated that a hand-loom weaver can work thirteen hours a day without exhaustion, whereas mule-spinners complain that they are exhausted by more than eight.¹ We are not all of us sufficiently alive to the

¹ The Cotton Trade in England and on the Continent, by Dr. G. von Schulze Gaevernitz, London, 1895, pp. 126, 127.

extent to which the pressure at which we work has been increased by modern invention. The fact that the cable and telephone puts every business man in immediate connection with every part of the civilised globe imposes upon him the necessity for a rapidity of decision that is in the highest degree exhausting. Every man who has had to correspond much by cable will testify to the infinitely higher degree of concentration that it requires over that of corresponding by mail. Moreover, a man who sits at his desk with a telephone at his side continually putting him in communication with other offices, cables brought in to him at every moment, some of which exact an immediate answer, letters brought by a messenger with instructions to wait for a reply, a client in the chair in front of him, and perhaps several other clients waiting for him in the adjoining room, is not conducting one business matter at a time, but a dozen; he is not conversing with one man, but a dozen; his faculty for transacting business is increased twelve-fold, but the strain upon him is increased twelve-fold also.

Under this strain our business men are daily breaking down, and, if this strain be taken in connection with the tendency of type to degenerate, as above mentioned, it threatens us with a danger not only sensible in degree but imminent in time. It is possible that the present competitive system may over-stimulate the best of us and under-stimulate the rest, and in such case it is a matter for serious question whether the extremely slow tendency to improvement may not be overtaken by the more rapid tendency to degeneration.

With a view, then, to concluding whether it is possible for man, by intelligence and effort, to hasten the rescue of man from the sufferings to which his present

institutions commit him, we have endeavoured to clear our minds regarding a few of the questions which in practical politics seem most to perplex us; and among these perplexing problems first in order comes the question what justice is.

In attempting to answer this question we have been facilitated by having come to a clear idea of nature and natural law; for the moment it became obvious that nature was essentially immoral or non-moral, inasmuch as it recognised no right, but, on the contrary, ruthlessly sacrificed the lives of the unfit many to the survival of the favoured few, whereas, on the contrary, the ultimate aim of human institutions is to protect the lives of all human beings, whether fit to survive or not, it seemed reasonable to suppose that the justice of man consisted in the struggle to resist the injustice of nature; and the more closely we examined nature and justice from this point of view, the more clearly it appeared that, although our institutions have as a matter of fact been for the most part the result of selfish conflict, they have seldom, if ever, advanced the happiness of men except when they have consciously or unconsciously proceeded upon the plan set forth in this definition of justice.

And one of the most important conclusions to which we were led by this view of nature and justice was, that nature presents two kinds of obstacles to the happiness of man, — one kind which man can by no political institution very much modify, and the other kind which man can, by substituting wisdom for folly in the making of his laws, not only profoundly affect, but even put an end to altogether. This classification of natural obstacles to happiness served to limit human responsibility on the one hand, and to accentuate it on the other; so that while one large domain of human effort was admitted to be wholly within the province of religion,

another large domain of human effort was found to lie within the domain of politics; religion being chiefly concerned with the life of man in his individual capacity, politics being chiefly concerned with the life of man in his social relations.

But while it is possible to separate these spheres of activity in theory, it is not possible to separate them in practice; because a study of the history of man demonstrates that so long as the political institutions which man has made for himself are such as perpetually set him upon benefiting himself regardless of his neighbour, religion is incapable of effectually persuading men to conduct their lives so as to benefit their neighbours regardless of themselves. The hopeless and remediless inconsistency between the preaching of politics and the preaching of religion was dwelt upon for the purpose of demonstrating the necessity of a profound change in our political system if we are ever to bring about a reconciliation between politics and religion.

When we come to examine the inconsistency that makes it impossible for us to practise the religious principles that we profess, it is found to result mainly from the competitive system. The competitive system to which we are all subjected is regarded by many political philosophers as necessary, because it is the system of nature. They, however, disregard two facts, — one that man is no longer the slave of nature, but in part its lord; and the other, that although nature's plan is essentially a competitive one, it also has found room for co-operation, as, for example, in communities of ants and bees. If nature, then, can work upon the co-operative plan as well as the competitive one, it would seem as though we had the choice between them. Moreover, reason recommends co-operation, and religion commands it.

Nature, however, is subject to limitations within

which co-operation seems to be confined; for under nature's plan co-operation sacrifices the individual to the community, whereas we have seen it to be an essential feature of human design to make the community serve the happiness of the individual.

Again, nature's community plan involves the entire sacrifice — not to say the massacre — of one sex. It seems, then, as though we could not copy the system of nature, because the system of nature is neither expedient nor just.

For the solution of the problem just presented to us, it is indispensable that we should have clear ideas about government. To this end a special study of government and society was made, with a view to determining whether society was or was not an organism, and what relation government bears to society.

The study of the question whether society is an organism or not led us to the following conclusions: In some of the lowest types of animals, society is in very fact an organism, — as, for example, in the mixomycetes, the sponge, and the hydroids; for in all these the free-moving larvæ become at a certain stage of their existence merged together into a new individual, of which they become almost indistinguishable parts. The larvæ are unable to resist the force which brings them together; once brought together, they all obey a law which to them is absolute and inexorable. They become differentiated according to the parts of the individual to which they belong, and are compelled by the law of their being to serve the interests of the new individual without consideration for their own, which indeed has become merged in the new organism of which they form a part. In this lowest class of society the individual, upon becoming a part of this society, loses all capacity of individual action, and is compelled, by a law over which it

has no control, to act in accordance with the needs of the new organism of which it has become a part.

As animals develop we find that the societies which they form involve less and less abandonment by the individual of the capacity of individual action. The individuals remain, however, subject to a law which they seem powerless to resist, and which may be said to constitute the law of their society; but, nevertheless, every individual constituting this society remains capable of free motion. Nature presents us with almost every form of society, from the loose and occasional grouping of wolves, driven by exceptional cold to hunt in packs, to the compact and continuous grouping of bees in permanent communities; all are characterised by practical freedom of individual movement; and yet, the more permanent the social bond, the more the individual is sacrificed to the community. Thus the bee will use its sting in defence of the hive, but, in using it, will sacrifice its own life. And the ant never seems to work for itself directly, but always for the community to which it belongs.

Nature, therefore, when left to herself, develops animals of totally different kinds along two lines of development that in one respect seem diametrically opposed to each other. Along one line it develops the carnivorous mammals, which in proportion as they grow powerful grow solitary. In another line we see her developing the insect tribes, which in proportion as they grow social grow powerful. Thus the competitive system has made the lion king in Asia, and the co-operative system has delivered over Africa to the dominion of the ant. Now, the law which governs communities of ants is as much the law of nature as the law which governs the felidæ; but if we can imagine the ant as conscious of the law which governs its community, the ant, in

using our language, would describe its social law as its government. But it is apparently unable to change its social law or to resist it; the social law of the ant-hill is the automatic result of co-operation developed by the competitive system, for it must not be forgotten that although competition is eliminated within the ant-hill, it is operating without; and it is through the operation of competition without the ant-hill that the ant has, through its capacity for co-operation, become the terror of an entire continent.

Communities of men differ from those of animals in two respects: man is able consciously and deliberately to determine within certain limits the laws of his government; man is also capable of exercising a high order of self-control. It has been shown that he has heretofore exercised this deliberation and self-control only at rare intervals to any great extent, and only slightly during the rest of the time. In other words, two processes are going on in the development of human society, — the unconscious law of nature, and the conscious effort of man. In so far as the former is at work, human society is still an organism; and so far as the latter is at work, human society is also a construction. Just in the same way as human society is partly an organism and partly a construction, so is human government, which is the law of human society, in part the law of nature and in part the law of man. But man, in modifying the law of nature, does so in two different ways. When human intelligence allies itself with human selfishness, it operates to enhance the injustice of the competitive system. When human intelligence allies itself with morality, it operates to diminish the injustice of the competitive system. We therefore have a series of alliances, the operation of which it is important to keep in mind, — the alliance of selfishness and intelligence,

that we may call craft, and which tends to appropriate the docility of the mass to its own use, and to create institutions that will maintain the crafty minority in power at the expense of the uncrafty majority; the alliance of selfishness and ignorance, that we may call folly, which makes the uncrafty majority an easy prey to the crafty minority; and lastly, opposed to these two, the alliance between intelligence and self-control or morality, called wisdom, which seeks to attain justice.

The operation, then, of craft and folly is to maintain institutions that put the many at the mercy of the few; the operation of wisdom is to create institutions that attain justice or a greater measure of equality for all.

As, however, wisdom has played a subsidiary and only spasmodic part in the history of the world, our institutions are principally due to the operation of the craft of the few and the folly of the many. The result of this is that while the few are protected from some of the inequalities of nature, the many have new inequalities thrust upon them.

The new inequalities thrust upon the many by the institutions prompted by craft and folly mainly result from the institution of private property.

But it must not be supposed that the institution of private property is one with which man could have dispensed; on the contrary, it constituted a phase through which man had to pass. It has its foundation in the law of nature; for we find the fundamental notion of private property of one man in another in the slavery which we know to exist in communities of ants; it may be traced again in the sense of property which the male has in the female, and which developed into one of our most useful institutions, — marriage. The notion of private property we find as a necessary outgrowth of primitive religion. Upon these three notions — prop-

erty, marriage, and religion — is built the patriarchal system, which was found ultimately more fitted than the horde system (which it supplanted) to furnish the stimulus for industry indispensable to the development of civilisation. It was to protect private property as well as to secure life and limb that the patriarchal system yielded to the City State; it was through the accumulation of private property that the aristocracy of birth, to which the patriarchal system slowly gave rise, yielded its privileges to the people; it was therefore through the system of private property that oligarchies became converted into democracies, and it is through the wealth accumulated under the system of private property, and the civilisation built upon the system of private property, that democracy may ultimately be replaced by collectivism.

For political economy is at last, in its very effort to explain the beauties of the industrial system, laying bare the selfishness which lies at the root of it, and the wastefulness and degeneration to which it gives rise.

As our knowledge increases, it becomes clear that selfishness is not productive of happiness, even to the most successful few; that the unconscious growth that characterises organisms ends in decay, whereas the deliberate development that characterises wisdom need not end in decay. For a clear understanding of what justice is will permit us, through wisdom, not only further to diminish the inequality and injustice that characterise nature, but also to eliminate those which human craft and human folly have added to her.

We are led by these considerations to a clear idea of human government. All societies we have seen to be governed by some law, and this law, roughly, is the result of the combination through which weak individuals seek to protect themselves against the strong. The

law which governs societies of animals other than man is natural law; the law which governs man is not the law of nature alone, but the law of nature modified by man; the modifications brought by man to the law of nature are those which result from his struggle with the inequality and injustice of nature. The government of human societies, therefore, differs from the government of animals other than man in that it partly consists of a conscious construction of institutions for the deliberate purpose of attaining justice in the protection of the individual as well as the community, and, as such, is, in a sense, opposite to the unconscious growth of the environment that has an indeliberate tendency to perpetrate injustice by sacrificing the individual to the community. Or it may be expressed as follows:—

Government substitutes for the law of nature alone, which sacrifices the individual to the community, the law of nature modified by human wisdom, which seeks to protect the individual as well as the community; full recognition being given to the fact that man is subject to the law of nature, and that it is by *modifying* this law that human conditions can be improved, and not by *ignoring* it.

The main purpose of government is to create institutions which will to the utmost possible produce equal happiness for all, greatest in amount and best in kind. A study of human history demonstrates the fact that human happiness has been advanced by what we call noble types of men, and has been, on the contrary, diminished by what we call base types of men.¹ We therefore cannot disregard the fact that certain insti-

¹ By noble type is meant the type that seeks happiness through the happiness of others; by base type is meant the type that seeks happiness regardless of the happiness of others.

tutions tend to improve the type which conduces to happiness, while other institutions tend to degrade the type, leading by such degradation to unhappiness. All efforts, then, to secure happiness for humanity, without taking account of the effect which institutions have on type, are likely to prove futile. It becomes, therefore, an important duty for government to create an environment that will tend to produce a noble rather than a base type. It may be said, therefore, that the first test of human institutions is whether or not they will tend to produce a noble or a base type. When we applied this test to the competitive system we found that while in one respect it tends to stimulate intelligence, in another respect it tends to diminish it; for although it stimulates intelligence in the few who are already intelligent, it tends to render these few infertile, whereas by withdrawing hope — and therefore an incentive to prudence — from the least intelligent, it promotes the fertility of the lowest types. Poverty and the poorhouse are the alternative to success. The fear of these drive men to efforts which exhaust, and occasion perpetual worry; these lead to alcoholism, and alcoholism leads to pauperism and crime. The competitive system, therefore, tends rather to degenerate type than to improve it.

The question arises, however, how we can eliminate the competitive system without exposing humanity to corresponding evils. We have seen the unwisdom of forgetting that men are organisms and not machines; they cannot be dealt with, therefore, without remembering that they remain subject to natural law. In studying, therefore, the possibility of replacing the competitive system by some other, we have to ask ourselves what are the objections imposed by nature to such a change, and we have in this respect to remember, first, that man is by nature so constituted that he must in his

political system, however organised, satisfy his natural needs. Secondly, he is the creature of competition as much as of co-operation, and partakes, therefore, of the selfish nature of the carnivora as well as of the social nature of the ant. Thirdly, he must not in any change proposed be subjected to conditions that will destroy variability. Fourthly, it must be remembered that organisms cannot be subjected to sudden changes. In other words, man is an organism, and selfish as well as social in temperament; he is not adaptable to sudden changes, and uniformity would put an end to his improvement.

But it has been seen that the law of nature cannot be set up as an argument against co-operation, because nature herself has used the method of co-operation to produce an insect which by this means has become the terror of a continent. But it is also true that she has done so by the adoption of a plan which sacrifices the individual to the community, and one sex to the other.

We are now in a position to grapple with the problem whether we can borrow the co-operative plan adopted by nature, and combine it with the competitive plan in such a manner as to make the community serviceable to the individual, and make it possible for both sexes to live in harmony therein, without forgetting the four limitations to which we have referred.

It is submitted, first, that through self-control the problem of the sexes has already been partly solved by the institution of marriage; secondly, that the only way of satisfying reason and morality is through the adoption of institutions by which the satisfaction of human needs and the pursuit of human happiness can be attained through the happiness of others instead of at the expense of others, thereby borrowing from nature its principle of co-operation; thirdly, that no political institu-

tions can eliminate the struggle arising from differences of personal attractiveness, and that, therefore, this element of human unhappiness cannot be eliminated by political institutions, even if such an elimination were desirable; fourthly, that ample room must be left under such a system for competition in connection with the natural desire men have in common with other animals for affection, and for consideration, which is allied to affection; fifthly, that the competition which will arise from this source, though it will necessarily give rise to some unhappiness, will maintain a sufficient struggle to prevent uniformity; sixthly, and lastly, that, the variability of the race being preserved by this struggle, its inadaptability to sudden changes must also be taken account of by making this change slowly, in proportion as the improvement of type permits.

Let us now see whether the proposed system of collectivism satisfies the conditions just set forth, and to this end let us study collectivism, first, from the rational point of view; secondly, from the practical point of view; thirdly, from the prudential point of view; fourthly, from the moral point of view; and fifthly, from the political point of view.

§ 1. RATIONAL VIEW OF COLLECTIVISM

Our mental habits have become ankylosed into the conviction that the only desirable thing in the world is money; whereas the really desirable things in it are our own comfort and the affection and consideration of others. We really value money only because it can procure for us these last; but we have lost sight of our real ends in our perpetual effort to secure the means.

The tendency to confound means with ends is observ-

able in many other fields of action, and is extremely serviceable, for upon it is often founded our most valuable arts. The object of rowing is to transport men and things over water; but this object is totally lost sight of in the art of rowing, which, for the purpose of cultivating the art, resorts to boats totally unsuited to the end of transportation. A principal object of studying history is to get light from the failures and successes of human institutions in the past upon the framing of institutions for the future; but it is found that men who study history in order to bolster a particular theory are apt to distort historical facts in order to fit their views; and so it has become useful to profit by the disposition to substitute means for ends, and to encourage the study of history for its own sake. The study of history, therefore, has become separated from that of politics, which it is intended ultimately to serve, with profit to both; for we get better history, and from a more truthful history we ought eventually to get less unwise politics. Again, the chisel and brush, originally used as a vehicle of expression, religious and other, have now become an end in themselves; and we therefore hear artists repudiating the theory that art is a vehicle of expression, and demanding that it be cultivated for its own sake; and one of the results of this view is that we get art purged of literature and restored to the simplicity and singleness of purpose which characterise the works of Michael Angelo and Praxiteles.

Art gains by the doctrine that it is an end in itself through the sincerity that this doctrine engenders; but in gaining sincerity it tends to lose sight of its original purpose, so that while we make skilful oarsmen on still water, we lose skilful oarsmen on rough; while we gain truthful recorders of past events, we tend to lose intelligent application of lessons to be drawn from past

events to the present; while in art we gain sincerity of technique, we tend to lose genius of conception.

Ultimately, however, the benefit outweighs the loss; for there arise new men who use the faithful history of the purely historic school and the sincere technique of the purely artistic school, and apply the one to the foundation of wiser institutions, the other to the creation of loftier works of art.

Something of this kind may yet take place in the present disordered attitude of our minds toward wealth. We have lost sight of the real purpose of our lives — happiness — in the pursuit of the means for attaining it, wealth. As a result of this unfortunate delusion the whole human race has been set upon a relentless pursuit of riches, in the course of which, although they have forgotten the real object of their endeavours, they have acquired an amazing ability for acquiring, creating, and accumulating all those things which go to make up comfort and happiness. It is probable that in no other way could this ability have been attained; at any rate the human race is to-day the richer for having attained it, but it is none the more happy for it; on the contrary the race is kept in misery by a system for creating wealth which deprives the larger part of the comforts of life in order to sicken the lesser part with surfeit of them. It is like a hypnotic subject pursuing its own unhappiness under the domination of a false suggestion. Is it possible for us to arouse ourselves from this hypnotic sleep, to rid ourselves of this false suggestion, and awake to the facts that it is not private wealth we really need, but the comfort, the consideration, and the love that private wealth may promise, but seldom if ever bestows; that private property has only served the purpose of all pain to inform us how we can use our gifts without abusing them; that we have re-

fused so far to learn our lesson because our minds have been clouded by error and our hearts sickened by fear; that just as the genius of art borrows the technique of those who have laboured in sincerity, so the genius of wisdom may borrow the wealth of those who have laboured in pain; and that the faculty of acquiring wealth that has been attained through the injustice of the competitive system may be utilised to attain the justice of collectivism?

If all human effort and human morality can be reduced to the effort to secure the highest type of human happiness, and if we are persuaded that private ownership of the sources of production, though necessary as a stage through which humanity had to pass in its search of happiness, is, nevertheless, now clearly seen by human wisdom to be a source of unhappiness, then assuredly it is not unreasonable to propose that humanity should, in the framing of its political institutions, look to a slow abandonment of private ownership of the sources of production and the substitution therefor of property in the State, it being understood that such a change can be effected only by steps taken slowly and conformably to improvement in type.

§ 2. PRACTICAL VIEW OF COLLECTIVISM

It has been urged that collectivism is not practical; indeed, books have been written to prove that it is impossible. To this objection there are several answers. In the first place, no great work was ever proposed but so-called practical men denounced it as impossible. All the engineers in England without a dissenting voice declared the Suez Canal impossible. Thiers, after personally examining the first railroad in England, decided

with unfaltering self-satisfaction that railroads were "not suited to France." When a few young men, in 1891, proposed a permanent organisation of citizens in New York against misgovernment, permanent organisation to this end was denounced by practical politicians as impossible. Indeed, everything that is very useful and a little difficult appears to those who have not enough imagination to see its feasibility to be impossible.

And everything that is at all worth while doing is difficult. Indeed, if it is worth doing, it must be difficult, or it would have been done before. The mere fact that collectivism seems impossible to many is no argument against it; experience has proved over and over again that what seems impossible to one generation is achieved by the next. At the beginning of the century would not the wise and ignorant alike have declared railroads impossible? And what would they have said only fifty years ago of telegraphs and telephones and Röntgen rays?

In the second place, collectivism is doubtless not practical to-day; but this is no reason for believing that it may not become practical — nay, imperative — later on. As has been already explained, we are too ignorant — both rich and poor — to accept collectivism or adequately practise it; the rich would not without a struggle give up what they have, because their imaginations do not seem able to grasp the relief from anxiety that they would get in exchange; the poor would not be content with what they would get because they expect more than any intelligent or maintainable system of collectivism could give them. Neither the one nor the other have sufficiently studied the subject to effect the change without danger of shipwreck in the process; it is only through a long system of education by experience that the community can be made fit for it.

It is conceivable that a popular revolt might bring to the front a man who was a Napoleon for organisation and a Washington for self-restraint; and that in the hands of such a man the revolution might be effected rapidly without danger to civilisation. But it is extremely unlikely that any form of collectivism adopted suddenly through the genius of a single man could be permanent; the moment his hold weakened with age or was withdrawn by death, the unfitness of the community for so advanced a condition of civilisation would express itself in dissatisfaction and revolt; the crafty would profit by them to secure the reins of government and direct it for their own advantage; this would speedily restore existing conditions, and the failure of a premature experiment would disproportionately retard its ultimate success.

But this is no argument against recognising at once that a more or less partial collectivism is the form of government towards which we should direct our efforts; for every day that we postpone such efforts we increase the danger of a premature and, therefore, ruinous attempt at it; whereas if we at once take steps to bring about gradually what will otherwise happen cataclysmically, we may avoid the ruin that such a calamity would involve.

In the third place, this book is not written for the purpose of showing that collectivism is practical; it is written for the purpose of demonstrating that it is desirable; and, above all, that there is in science not only no argument against it, but, on the contrary, a powerful argument in its favour. Moreover, in this connection, the distinction made in the Preface between collectivism as an ideal or end, and collectivism as a method or programme, must be carefully kept in mind. The extent to which collectivism can be adopted depends upon the

perfectibility of man; how far man is perfectible is to-day a matter of pure speculation; whatever be our opinion regarding the degree to which man is perfectible, there is an important difference between the opinion that man is capable of perfection and the opinion that man is capable of improvement; the extent of man's perfectibility is a matter of speculation; the capability of man for improvement is a matter of faith. An effort will be made in the next section to demonstrate that the belief in the capacity of man for improvement is a duty; and if it be a duty, then it becomes a duty also to study in what direction this capacity for improvement lies. Collectivism, whether as a method in economics, or as a programme in politics, or as a creed in religion, has been presented as furnishing the direction towards which human improvement lies.

Again, however impractical *ideal* collectivism may be, there is a stage in the progress towards it, called partial collectivism, which is not impractical; and the fact that partial collectivism suggests a solution to the problem presented by pauperism and prostitution, and in great part also by crime, suggests that intelligent efforts could and should be made at once gradually to fit us for it. It is true that it may take centuries to accomplish this; but, on the other hand, some solution of existing problems may be forced upon us before we are prepared for it; and it is our immediate duty to decide what steps can usefully be taken at once to forestall a possible experiment that would be dangerously premature. I shall therefore here confine myself to the expression of the belief that a political programme looking towards the slow adoption of collectivism is to-day not only practical but imperative; and that if such a programme be not pursued we shall witness an effort to impose upon us

one that will be neither conceived with wisdom nor executed with moderation.

We are confronted with very much the same conditions as preceded the outbreak of the French Revolution. There was a tension then in the relations of the Crown to the bourgeoisie which is no greater than that which exists to-day in those of capital to labour. Capital, in intrenching itself behind trusts, and labour, in fortifying itself within trade unions, have respectively separated themselves from that neutral part of the community which under less organised conditions leavens the mass; the combatants are not only separated and singled out, but they are unconsciously urging one another on to battle; capital blinds itself to the rights of labour; labour blinds itself to the limitations of capital; and both, ignoring their respective strength as well as their respective weakness, are preparing to strangle each other.

If there be in the community wisdom and temperance enough to establish a *modus vivendi* pending the slow adoption of institutions which will substitute co-operation for the present animosity, a revolution may be avoided; such is the character which any practical programme should adopt. If none such is presented while capital and labour are struggling for the control of the ship, she may be driven on the rocks.

This is the alternative; under these conditions is it the time to ask whether collectivism is practical? As well might Charles I. or Louis XVI. have asked if a constitutional monarchy were practical. We are not confronted with the question whether it is practical, but by the fact that it is imminent. What we have to decide is whether it shall bring with it "airs from heaven or blasts from hell;" whether it shall find us prepared or unprepared.

But collectivism is not the insane dream which most people think it is. The wastefulness of the existing system in money, labour, and agony has not yet become obvious to the practical man, who has through thousands of years been educated to believe that it is not only necessary, but, because necessary, right. When his eyes become opened to the economy of money, of labour, and of pain that would result from a conservative system of collectivism, he will wonder that the difficulties in the way of it ever seemed to him worth taking account of by the side of the benefits to be derived from it; and although he may still recognise the unwisdom of an attempt to foist collectivism on a people not yet fitted by knowledge and self-control for it, he will strain every nerve, by education and by slow changes in our rules of government, to make them fit for it. And in the effort no consideration of time will have any importance for him. It took Islam eight hundred years to march from Mecca to Byzantium, and in this march the life of no one man counted for anything. There was in the ranks of Mohammed a sense of fate that urged them on regardless of so small a span as a day, a year, or a century; huge castles and cities arose wherever the Moslem host rested on its way; springing up as it arrived, perishing as it moved on; and vast ruins to-day serve as footprints to mark its giant strides. Such was the force of a mere idea.

And if so narrow and selfish an idea as that of the subjugation of a capital could relentlessly move generation after generation of men to the accomplishment of its end, how much more could it accomplish were the idea one that looked not to the conquest of a city for a tribe, but to the realisation of an ideal for the whole world.

And the task is not so difficult or so revolutionary as

may at first appear; for although we all of us are, and for centuries have been, committed by commercialism to a struggle for loaves and fishes, nevertheless our arts, sculpture, music, literature, betray the fact that what we really aspire to is the heroic and the beautiful.

I have seen a New York private detective, whose business it was, in the pursuit of gain, to hound his fellow men, forget the business which brought him to Paris as he stood lost in bewildered admiration at the beauty of Notre Dame. And yet the cathedral that overcame this human sleuth-hound is a symbol of sacrifice: its gothic arches; the dim light of its stained glass; its lofty pillars and fretted vault; the scheme of the cross upon which it is built, — all tell the same story. Whatever beauty it has, whatever message it bears, is a beauty and message of sacrifice.

Again, of all cities in the world Paris is the one in which material things, perhaps, engross most the minds of its inhabitants; and yet all Paris for months flocked to "Cyrano de Bergerac" because in him are united courage, strength, and the nobility of a great sacrifice.

We are not as sordid as we seem. The passages in history and literature to which we thrill tell of those who died for their country and of men and women who have suffered for one another; the great works of art that adorn the walls of the Sixtine Chapel or were destined for the tomb of Julius II. set up ideals before which we stand awed because they embody the beauty of self-sacrifice and self-control. These are the things we really love, and the ideals to which we really aspire. We hourly sacrifice them because thousands of years of competition have closed our eyes to the possibility of abolishing it.

But our eyes will be opened; it may take centuries of pain; we may have to pass through revolutions so long, so universal, so bloody, that by the side of them the horrors of the Reign of Terror will seem the momentary triumph of a local mob; it may be that the whole race may perish in the conflict; but if it survives, it can only do so on the condition of at last learning the lesson that the multitude which all these years has been docile to the domination of a crafty few has at last acquired or is surely acquiring enough intelligence and enough education either to possess itself of its share in the good things of the world or to destroy the whole system which deprives them of it.

In the struggle which is impending, every man and woman has to decide what part he or she is to play in it. Shall the educated class, with wisdom and temperance, so lead the movement that the revolution may take place slowly and imperceptibly, as once in England, or violently and with bloodshed, as in France? Shall our civilisation be exposed to the danger of disappearing altogether, as did that of Egypt and Assyria, because having ears we hear not, and having eyes we will not see? Or shall there be revived once more the faith that for centuries followed Jesus of Nazareth along the way of the cross? This faith was strangled by the alliance of the Roman Church and Roman Empire, and is to-day strangled for every one of us by the attempt to reconcile the teaching of Christ with the competitive system. It can live once more only on the condition of abandoning this attempt, — not by rash and revolutionary changes, but by prudent efforts to reconcile our institutions with our faith step by step, as our weakness will permit, rather than by leaps and bounds, as enthusiasm might prefer.

There is more virtue in the self-restraint that will

consent to undertake this work gradually than in the zeal that would work to accomplish it at once; for we shall not live to enjoy the fruits of our labour in the one case, and we are perhaps inspired by the hope of enjoying them in the other.

We cannot hope that our consciences can rest until the perpetual conflict between profession and practice comes to an end. It can end only when we make up our minds that we can abolish the reign of egotism in our hearts only by abolishing it in our institutions.

Collectivism is founded upon the theory that selfishness, hatred, and violence are immoral. It may be regarded as a sort of political religion. It is therefore to those who are earnestly desirous of seeing morality prevail in the world that the task of introducing collectivism into it should be intrusted. By this it is not meant to imply that there is any particular class in our existing community better fitted than any other class for this work. On the contrary, it is believed that the work can be successfully accomplished only through the good element which exists in all existing classes. The danger, however, which threatens us is that the task of introducing collectivism into our society is likely to be taken up, not by those who are anxious to see unselfishness, love, and peace prevail in the world, but by those who, incensed by the injustice of existing conditions, discontented with their own lot and inflamed by vindictiveness, are likely to attempt by violence what can be successfully accomplished only by persuasion.

We have already seen that every effort made by humanity in the direction of a high ideal, whether it took the form of Christianity, or Mohammedanism, or the Crusades, or Chivalry, served ultimately only to secure the ends of selfishness. If the task, then, of in-

roducing collectivism into our civilisation is to be surrendered to those who are animated only by selfishness, it would be inconsistent with the whole history of man that such an effort should succeed.

Prudence, therefore, suggests the importance of at once drawing up a political programme which will give to those who suffer from the existing conditions all the satisfaction which existing conditions will afford; but this should be done, not from a purely prudential motive, not merely to save ourselves from revolution, but in order ultimately to secure the greatest and best happiness for all.

§ 3. MORAL VIEW OF COLLECTIVISM

In the course of this work the word "morality" has been used without any attempt to define it. It has been assumed that we all know what morality is. But students of moral philosophy are familiar with the fact that there is room on this point for profound differences of opinion. For example, is morality the product of the blind and mechanical process of evolution, or does it come from God; is it natural or supernatural; is it human or divine?

To the scientific man — that is to say, the man who confines his reasoning to physical facts alone — it seems capable of proof that morality is the product of a blind and mechanical process. Herbert Spencer has shown that morality arises out of the extension of the concern of the individual for himself to that of the individual for the female in sexual intercourse; of concern for the female to concern for offspring; of concern for offspring to concern for the family; of concern for the family to concern for the tribe; of concern for the

tribe to concern for the nation; and that our morality is now in process of developing from concern for the nation to concern for the entire race. This growing concern continues to be selfish; it attends a growing satisfaction, but it represents a tendency to substitute for satisfaction of self regardless or at the expense of others, satisfaction of self through the satisfaction of others; and the more complete this substitution, the more highly socialised becomes man. It is difficult to add anything to the pages of the "Data of Ethics" on this subject.

The religious, however, are not satisfied with this explanation; to them morality is divine; it comes clothed with a divine inspiration; it is because it is so clothed that it is a law to them. "Science," they say, "affects to ignore the supernatural on the ground that nature furnishes a sufficient explanation for all authentic phenomena without the necessity of calling in a supernatural power; that the observed sequence between cause and effect furnishes a more certain guide for human conduct than the assumptions of religion." But science fails to recognise that the sequence of cause and effect upon which it so confidently builds is itself without any foundation; that it has never explained the first cause of all, — the Creator. And not only has it failed to account for the very beginning of all things, but in the development of man which is called evolution there are great breaks: science has never furnished an explanation for the appearance of life in the world, for the appearance of consciousness in it, or for what Herbert Spencer calls the "Power which works through evolution," and through the operation of which, as he has shown, morality has been slowly developed in the animal world until it has reached its highest development in man. All that science does or can do is to describe

what happens and what is the apparent law of these happenings; it is incapable of explaining what the force is which animates the world or whence it comes.

It seems as though there were lacunæ in the scientific argument against the supernatural which no truly scientific man can afford to neglect. He can say that science will eventually explain them; that it is easier to believe it will explain them than to adopt the faith of religion, which can be often proved to be the product of ignorance, — the ignorance, for example, which attributes to Providence what science can show to be due to purely natural causes. But it is when we come to analyse these words, "natural causes," that a great part of the confusion that presides over the discussion between religion and science become explained.

What are natural causes?

What is nature?

What are its limits? What separates it from the divine?

An answer to these questions has been already attempted in the first volume; and the general conclusion to which we then came was that there had gradually developed in nature a power which is to-day able in great part successfully to resist her. Science has traced the slow development of this power, has described many of the physical laws through which it works; but as to what the power itself is, whence it comes, what gave the bird the faculty to build a nest, the bee to construct a hive, the beaver a dam, and man his ancient temples and his modern homes, science offers no explanation except that it is due to a combination of accident and the survival of the fittest.

But this theory of accident is not insisted upon by science. As regards all these metaphysical questions, it has adopted a method for disarming its religious

antagonists, — the method of agnosticism. It assumes an air of humility and says, "There are some things in the domain of the natural which I do know, but outside of this domain — that is to say, of all that belongs to the domain of the supernatural — I know nothing." As a strategic measure this attitude is undoubtedly in part successful; it, as it were, makes it impossible for the wrestlers to close with one another; but for that reason it must forever leave the contest unconcluded.

It is questionable, however, whether the agnostic position is altogether sincere; for science has learned, by continually fighting the assumptions of religion, indiscriminately to hate them and to hate the religion it holds responsible for them. And so agnosticism, which in form is a correct statement of one of the attitudes of science to religion, is of chief use to science in disguising its real attitude, which is one of denial. It has thus become, like the green lawns that drape our modern fortifications, a screen behind which its guns are masked. Religion is not in this respect at any rate so insincere. Religion boldly proclaims, not less than it knows, as science does, but more than it knows under the authority of Revelation. "God is all good, all wise, all powerful. He rewards piety with heaven; He punishes impiety with hell." The Roman Catholic Church goes farther. She professes to know just what sins commit sinners irretrievably to eternal flame, and what are expiated by a temporary punishment in a mitigated hell, which she calls purgatory. Now, in the court of reason, the bishop who pretends to know too much is out-argued by the sceptic who pretends to know too little; but the fact probably is that both are equally wrong. The bishop may have insufficient ground for his assertions, but the sceptic has still less ground for his denial. We do know that a power exists for which science is

utterly unable to account; we do know that this power has, in general compliance with laws with which this power does not always seem to comply, set in operation a sequence of cause and effect upon the certainty of whose action we can for the most part count, but over which this power seems at rare intervals to have kept the masterdom; we do know that as a part of this plan there has been developed a force in man which is capable of resisting the sequence of cause and effect which has been called natural evolution, so that instead of Nature being left blindly to stagger from experiment to experiment, she may by this new force in man slowly be led along a consistent course of conscious and deliberate design.

It seems as though science had been led by the vociferousness of her denials at last to believe in them; so that, just as an angry man feeds and inflames his anger by the expression of it, science has fed and inflamed her scepticism by the clamour to which she has been driven in order to drown the not always unreasonable contentions of her antagonist.

No attempt will be made here to reconcile the conflict between religion and science; this task belongs to those who write books of religious controversy; and from religious controversy we should, above all things, keep ourselves clear. On the other hand, after having, in compliance with the passion for excluding sentiment and, above all, religious sentiment from political discussion, that characterises this century, treated morality as a fact upon the same plane as the fang of the carnivora or the social instinct of the sponge, it becomes necessary, before closing, to point out that there is between the fact of morality and the other facts discussed here the difference that separates man and beast. And, without adopting all the assumptions of any one creed, it is

above all things important to discard the hostility towards faith which lurks behind the cloak of agnosticism. The word "faith" is not used here inadvertently; for although, in the sense in which it is sometimes used, it may be quite foreign to political science, there is a sense in which it may become an essential factor of it. This ought to furnish a sufficient apology for introducing into a work on political science a short discourse on faith.

(a) *Faith*

Faith may be roughly defined to be a willingness or faculty to believe things that are incapable of proof. Now, just as obedience to temporal rulers is enjoined upon us by the Church in temporal matters, so obedience to spiritual rulers is enjoined upon us in spiritual matters; and this obedience in spiritual matters practically consists in a submission of our minds to spiritual authority, — that is to say, in a willingness to believe regarding spiritual matters what the Church or recognised spiritual authority tells us to believe.

It has been elsewhere pointed out¹ that obedience, which was a cardinal virtue under the conditions which prevailed in the time of Christ, ceased to be a virtue under the conditions which prevailed in the sixteenth century. Man had grown; there was a certain kind of obedience which he had *outgrown*; and this kind of obedience gave way, therefore, to the "sacred right of insurrection." Something of the same kind took place regarding faith, — the obedience to spiritual authority which put the reins of civilisation, from the fourth to the sixteenth century, into the hands of the Church, diminished in proportion as the Church became less fit

¹ "Evolution and Effort," p. 278.

to hold them. So, in compliance with the law that those only are allowed to govern who can, submission of the mind to spiritual authority disappeared as soon as the constituted authority became incapable any longer of justifying itself. The Reformation was a revolt against authority; and it is of no small interest to note that the first throne to totter was that of the Pope. It is amazing how much and how long men will endure domination if they get something for it; it is when they get nothing for it that they revolt; it was when the people got nothing from the king that they revolted in 1789; it was when they got nothing from the Pope that they revolted in 1525.

When the spiritual authority of the Church was broken down in the sixteenth and ensuing centuries, an attempt was made to set up another authority in its place; and the Bible for a long time served this purpose. But literal inspiration of the Bible was incapable of withstanding the onslaught of rational criticism, and when the difficulties attending the alternative between literal inspiration on the one hand, and private judgment on the other, had become sufficiently obvious, all attempt to believe things incapable of proof was abandoned by science and recourse was had to agnosticism.

Now, throughout the early history of faith the main question is one of submission to authority. Paul preached this duty of submission as the one indispensable virtue necessary for salvation; and the Christian world remained subject to this controlling thought until the authority itself was shaken. With Protestantism and with the setting up of a book in the place of a throne, there necessarily came a confusion regarding faith which was well-nigh inextricable. The hopelessness of reconciling private judgment with authority

made it necessary to revise the very foundations that underlie the meaning of the word "faith." There is still a thing we call faith; but it is no more the faith which Paul preached than electricity is to-day the amber (ἤλεκτρον) from which it derives its name.

The faith of which we speak to-day (though it may retain its original meaning in the Roman Catholic Church) is, outside of the Roman Catholic Church, no longer a matter of religious authority; it has become one of private conviction.

But if faith has become purely a matter of private conviction, it seems to have lost the specific quality which made of it a virtue. In the old days faith involved an element of sacrifice; it sacrificed the very conviction which it seems to be the glory of modern faith to encourage and proclaim. The moment the element of sacrifice and submission is eliminated from faith, it apparently ceases to be a virtue and becomes an accident of temperament, custom, or education; one fraction of Christendom is born Roman Catholic and remains Roman Catholic; another is born Baptist and remains Baptist; or, again, one man temperamentally a Romanist but educated by Protestants, as soon as he is weaned from educational influences, follows the dictates of his temperament and joins the Catholic Church; another, temperamentally a Protestant but educated by Catholics, if weaned from the Catholic environment, joins the Protestant Church. Here there is no element of sacrifice; on the contrary, the whole condition is one of surrender, — surrender to habit in the first group of cases, to temperament in the second.

It is earnestly submitted that conviction which is a mere surrender to mental constitution or emotional temperament or habit is *not* faith. Faith involves the idea of an act of will in obedience to what is believed to be

a religious or moral duty. Unless there be found in a man's attitude towards morality some element of choice, — and generally choice that involves some sacrifice, — his attitude cannot be characterised by the word "faith." Otherwise faith becomes another word for conviction, and a very unnecessary word for it; worse, indeed, than unnecessary, for it is confusing.

It may, however, be urged that if Protestantism has killed the authority of the Church, it has killed faith; and that no faith is any longer possible in Christendom outside of the Roman Catholic Church. This is believed to be a profound mistake. Faith is as possible to the man of pure science as to the most bigoted Papist, and it is in the emphasising of this contention that we approach the value of faith in matters of political science. Hence the importance of it.

Of the two theories presented to students of science regarding the problem of human will, one declares man to be the slave of his greater inclination, and the other maintains, on the contrary, that he is master of it. As between these two contentions, logic seems to be on the side of the determinists; but there is an intermediate contention that man can by effort contribute to the making of his greater inclination; and that therefore, although the greater inclination once formed he must act in obedience to it, man is nevertheless master of his own conduct through the fact that he is by effort capable in great part of determining what his greater inclination is to be.

Now, in this intermediate contention there is no logical flaw; it is open possibly to the objection that man's inclinations are so much more determined for him by his temperament than by any effort of his own that the latter becomes, by the side of the former, a negligible quantity. But this objection is an argument of despair.

It means that man is incapable of self-improvement; it is the last expression of pessimism.

Now, of the two doctrines, the optimistic doctrine that man is capable of self-improvement and the pessimistic doctrine that man is incapable of it, which is he to choose? Is he to surrender to the pessimistic temperament in him, or is he, on the contrary, to resist this pessimistic temperament, and by an act of choice, or by the exercise of effort, deliberately decide in favour of self-improvement?

This is the point at which, to my mind, there is scope for the action of faith in the truest sense; and here it is that the action of faith can be made serviceable to political science.

Not only in questions of pure ethics, but also in many political problems, of two theories proposed one will be found, if adopted, to favour the social perfectibility of men, and the other will be found to disfavour it. In both the field of ethics, then, and in that of political science there is in every such case room for an act of faith; in other words, we can resist the tendency in us to adopt the theory which will disfavour social perfectibility, and we can by effort decide to adopt the theory that will favour such perfectibility. Here, then, seems to be a shibboleth by which we can decide between two equally opposed and equally plausible arguments; namely, which of the two will tend most to the perfection of man and incidentally to his highest happiness.

Of course many men are constitutionally optimistic and benevolent; to them such problems present no difficulty; they will adopt the optimistic argument in natural compliance with an optimistic temperament. Others, again, are constitutionally selfish beyond the reach of argument. Nothing is capable of reaching them

but tribulation, and many are proof even against this. But there is a large class of political students for whom, by dint of reading such works as those of Herbert Spencer, the native hue of resolution has been sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought; they have been persuaded by the determinist argument; they have not had presented to them the moral issue which sets against the determinist argument another argument just as logical and possessed of the social advantage that it militates in favour of human happiness and dignity, whereas determinism leads to human unhappiness and probable degradation.

One of the principal purposes of this book is to bring compendiously before the mind of the reader the facts which go to show that if man is willing to sit as a silent spectator of the process of evolution, as Herbert Spencer seems in many passages to recommend, the chances are rather that he will degenerate than that he will improve; whereas if he recognises that he has himself, by his intelligence and his capacity for deliberate effort, become the principal factor in the process, there is no limit to his perfectibility, no limit to the happiness and dignity he may eventually attain. Faith, then, in political science is the virtue which by effort adopts of two equally plausible theories the one that will advance the social perfectibility of man rather than that which will retard it.¹

¹ This brief sketch of faith has not included the somewhat special conditions which result from the attitude of the Anglican or Episcopal Church. Like all Anglo-Saxon institutions, the English Church has looked more to the utility of its creed than to its consistency; and because obedience to the Church is as valuable a virtue to the community as independence of thought, she has included them both, however discordant they may sometimes be. Thus she has preserved the authority of the Catholic Church in her so-called doctrine of Apostolic succession, but has kept clear of the logical conclusion therefrom which in Rome has taken the shape of Papal infallibility. The fact, however, that the Anglican Church does not re-

And now we are in a position to return to the question of agnosticism. Have we a right to be agnostics?

Just as private wealth is a phase through which civilisation has had to pass in its progress from property of no one individual in anything to property of all in everything, so agnosticism seems to be a phase through which the mind has to pass in its progress from the religion of authority to that of collectivism.

When religion professed to know more about the divine than it could know, reason resisted the claims of religion by denial; and when denial overstepped the bounds of reason by denying more than it need, reason recovered her balance in agnosticism. We know that God exists, said the Church. We know He does not exist, said the atheist. We don't know whether He exists or not, said the agnostic.

It seems, however, that if we are to restore its virtue to faith it is our duty to know something about Him; and it seems demonstrable also that if the political student is really engaged in the problem how social conditions can, through the machinery of government, be improved, it is his duty to have convictions about the supernatural; for if the distinction that has been made between the natural and the supernatural is correct, it will be found that it is with the supernatural that the political student has most to do. To this distinction between the natural and the supernatural let us for a moment revert.

In the confusion which reigns regarding the meaning

fuse the prop of ecclesiastical authority to those who wish to lean upon it does not prevent her permitting large scope for the play of private judgment, and particularly for the exercise of the faith which in obedience to a supposed religious duty deliberately chooses of two equally plausible doctrines the one most consistent with the highest morality.

of the word "nature," it seemed as though the only way out of it was to take the most universally employed meaning of the word and eliminate all other meanings which are inconsistent with it. And as nature was characterised best by its opposition to art and spirit, it was decided that nature must be deemed to include everything in the world except what pertains to spirit and to art. Under this definition nature includes that part of man which is common to the lower animals, but does not include that part which is in the main peculiar to man, and which is found perpetually opposed to the animal in him. Thus the animal is an unconscious product of its environment. Man, on the contrary, is continually engaged in consciously moulding an environment of his own. Animals are relatively incapable of refusing a present pleasure to avoid a future pain; whereas the whole moral education of man consists in strengthening the faculty in him by which he can forego a present pleasure in order to avoid a future pain. The actions of animals are determined by habit or instinct, which is the necessary product of their respective environments; whereas man, though lamentably still a creature of habit, is able, by education and reiterated acts of self-control, to create habits which, because they substitute notions of general utility for notions of individual utility, gradually lead to a system of ethics, and this system of ethics differs in every social group according to the extent to which human effort in the direction of high standards of social life have been successful.

The highest standards of social life are obviously those which lead to the greatest and most equally distributed happiness for all; and political students are confronted with the problem of how to frame institutions which are most likely to result in this desired end. And

in framing these institutions they have to take account of the obstacles which nature puts in their way,—such, for example, as the instinctive selfishness which centuries of competitive struggle have created; sexual jealousy, which condemns all existing collectivist communities in nature to the subordination and massacre of one sex by the other; the almost uncontrollable impulse of sexual desire, which necessarily characterises all races possessed of high vitality; the evils which must result from the necessary effort, by such artificial institutions as marriage, to control this impulse; the continuity which links generations of men so that we cannot confine our view to one generation, but must create institutions that will tend to perpetuate a noble type rather than a base; the extreme slowness with which organisms adapt themselves to new environments, and the consequent danger of revolutionary change.

In this study of the formidable difficulties which nature opposes to the efforts of man, the political student is driven to revise the somewhat simple code of morals which is taught by our religious creeds. The ten commandments thundered from Sinai and the more modern Sermon on the Mount are found to order conduct which is not consistent with the institutions under which we live. We are told, "Thou shalt not kill," and yet in all our churches in 1898 prayers were offered up to the Almighty beseeching him to strengthen our arms that we might kill the greatest number of Spaniards possible. We are told, "If any man would take away thy coat, give unto him thy cloak also," and yet the competitive system which some of our political philosophers find so good is one which permits of our surviving only on the condition that in the struggle with our neighbour we contrive so that he be the one that suffers and not ourselves.

In the conflict between the code we preach and the code we practise, a quiet conscience is impossible; its voice may be stifled altogether, as in the case of those who either never had a conscience or have cynically silenced it; or it may, refusing to be altogether silenced, make itself heard occasionally, like the groans of a Desdemona under the pillows of a reluctant Moor. But a voice which can express itself only exceptionally under the pressure of intolerable conditions is not likely to speak words of unfaltering wisdom. Let us consider for a moment how in the field of morality this uncanny system works.

(b) *Morality of Compensation*

Competition creates a peculiar kind of morality that may be called the morality of compensation. It proceeds upon the theory that as the struggle for life obliges the successful man to be the occasion of death to some of his competitors, of ruin to many, and of serfdom to the rest, he can satisfy his conscience by surrendering to works of philanthropy some part of the income he cannot conveniently spend upon himself. This willingness to throw a sop to conscience was thoroughly exploited by the Church in the Middle Ages, and is exploited still by our churches, our philanthropic societies, and even our reform associations, so that we continually find the very men who corrupt our legislatures subscribing largely to good government clubs and occupying prominent places on committees organised for the very purpose of making legislation pure. This morality of compensation has a subtle effect upon our entire population; we are all of us dimly conscious of the evil which results from the social conditions by which we profit, but, unable to see any solution for the problems to which these give rise, we

are driven by conscience to look beyond the field of our own responsibility for occasions of compensating piety and self-sacrifice. This leads bankers who know how to make profit out of the fluctuating values of coin at the expense of the farmers when it rises, and of the workman when it falls, to head committees to secure universal peace and induces fashionable women who exact lower prices from their dressmakers because of the vogue their patronage can confer, to inflame the nation to war with Spain out of sympathy for the reconcentrados. Is it any wonder that Christ said to the young man who asked what he should do to be saved, "Sell that thou hast, and give to the poor"?

And yet we are by no means to conclude that if Christ were among us to-day this would be his instruction. Things have changed since Christ preached in Judea; and, aware that they would change, He said, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."

Wealth can best be conceived by us as a trust, saddled by heavy responsibilities; and the first duty of the wealthy is to learn. If they are capable of throwing off the prejudice which wealth inevitably imposes upon them in favour of the institutions through which they retain their wealth; if they will give to the solution of social problems half the time they do to the protection of their property; if they will endeavour not merely to silence conscience but to satisfy it, — they can do far more towards diminishing unhappiness by using their wealth than by dissipating it. For it must not be supposed that these problems can be solved in a day. Not only does it take centuries to prepare the human machine for great social changes, but it generally takes years to prepare a single human mind for the adoption of sound social views. Reading one book will not do it, nor reading many;

perhaps the only way is the way of suffering. If, reader, after having suffered, you are driven by it to the endeavour to relieve the suffering of others, and you find every effort to do this fail because the social conditions manufacture suffering far faster than you can relieve them; if your eyes are open to this fact, and it at last becomes a burning conviction, so that wherever you look you find the traces of it, — in the paupers that infest our cities, the criminals that fill our jails; in the envy that broods in the cottages of the poor and embitters even the homes of the rich; in the servility of some and the truculence of others; in the falsehood, the slander, the backbiting that the wicked use to prevail over those less wicked than themselves; in the sacrifice of all that we value most in our hearts, because by this sacrifice alone can we make sure of the things that we have learned to believe are indispensable to our bodies, — if there is anything in you that revolts from this sacrifice of all that is noble in life to all that is base in it, then you will be driven by a logic which is inexorable to question this morality of compromise, which, taken at its best, is little more than the tribute vice pays to virtue.

Nevertheless, the morality of compensation has rendered a service to the world, for not only has it contributed wealth to good work, but it has kept alive the dwindling spark of conscience. When one robber baron builds a church, it suggests the founding of a hospital to another; and thus the voice of conscience makes itself heard and perpetuated. But as a theory or rule of conduct the morality of compensation will not bear scrutiny.

If we would conform ourselves to the dictates of justice, it is the inequalities in our own environment that we are bound to diminish, not those in the environment of others; and it is, above all, the inequalities that

result from our own actions to which our attention must first be directed, especially when they enure to our own advantage. We must be just ourselves before we preach justice to others. We must rid ourselves of the beam in our own eye before we set about removing the mote from the eye of our neighbour.

Now, so long as the competitive system exists, there is a discord between morality and practice which is entitled to every dollar of money, every instant of time, that we have to devote to repairing injustice. Doubtless there is more injustice in Armenia than in New York; but the injustice of Armenia is not our injustice, whereas that of New York is. With which, then, are we to deal first?

Many pages have been devoted to proving that the competitive system is not only an occasion of injustice, but that it is an inevitable cause of it; and that every man and woman who is drawing income from investment¹ is directly profiting from this injustice. This fact is so obvious that it tends to argue in favour of revolution rather than of further compliance; it seems to command us to "sell that we have" rather than remain partners to so unjust a system; it makes us feel individually responsible for all the pauperism and crime we see about us; and it seems as though we must immediately remove ourselves from complicity with the social conditions that give rise to them.

Such a conclusion would seem, however, to be immoral as well as unwise. It would be a surrender to emotion; it would be on a par with a father who abandons his family to secure the calm, even though he suffer the rigours, of a monastic life. We are not alone in the world; we are bound to our fellow-creatures by bonds that belong to nature and religion as much as to art.

¹ See *ante*, book i. ch. iii., §§ 4, 5.

We have not forged all these bonds ourselves nor willingly submitted to them; they have been imposed upon us. It may be more self-indulgent to shake off these bonds than patiently to endure them. The problem before us is, not to secure freedom from what galls us in these bonds for ourselves, but to secure this freedom for others; and in no problem is better illustrated the rôle of wisdom, — for wisdom bids us refuse to listen to a voice that sounds like the voice of religion, whereas it is in fact the voice of eagerness; and behind the enthusiasm of eagerness we shall generally find the cloven foot of egotism. This point is of sufficient importance to deserve special consideration.

So long as we are all driven by the conflict of life, each of us to enrich himself regardless of our neighbour, the question arises whether it is not a good thing to encourage the sentiment that is willing to sacrifice itself in the interests of humanity, however foreign from our own field of responsibility may be that in which the inhumanity is practised. For example, admitting that we of the United States are not responsible for the inhumanity practised by Spain in Cuba, is it not a better thing that we should be alive to the claims of humanity there than that we should be dead to them? Does it not tend more to the general good that we should, at a sacrifice of wealth of limb and of life, hold up a high standard of national morality than that, obeying the logic of prudence, we should stay at home to increase our hoard of prosperity and self-satisfaction?

The interest of this question lies in the fact that we seem to have no sure guide to its solution. Some will think we should mind our own business; others will answer that minding one's own business is the principle of the Levite who crossed to the other side of

the way. And between the two the problem remains unsolved.

If, however, we were not only clear as to what our duties really are, but were also engaged in performing them, we should not be left without a rule of action; we should, above all, not seek to compensate for the injustice of which we are ourselves hourly the occasion by undertaking to repair the injustice occasioned by others; we should understand that we must clean our own stables before we meddle with the stables of Augeas.

Here is an example of the importance of coming to a clear understanding as to the limits of our responsibility; and here an illustration of the utility of the conclusions to which we came in the discussion of justice: if we clearly understand what justice is, we can do justice; otherwise we shall be committing injustice in our very efforts to suppress it. For if it is true that we are engaged in a conflict with certain forces in nature of which some are within our control and others beyond it, clearly we are responsible only in so far as we apply the necessary effort to subdue the forces that are subject to such effort; and we are not responsible as regards those forces that are not subject to it. In the correct analysis of these forces lies the main problem of human responsibility.

The lesson to be learned from the preceding pages seems to be that not only does the conflict between the competitive code of ethics and the ideal code produce a false code, — the morality of compensation, — but that, so long as this conflict continues, the morality of compensation may be better than no morality at all.

Nevertheless this conclusion does not much advance us, for there seems to be no code of morality that we can reconcile to our consciences and yet carry into our

every-day life. For example, of all the simple rules of morality, the one comprised in the two words "Be just" is perhaps the one which we are most puzzled to obey. We have seen that the competitive system which we have deliberately adopted, and of which Herbert Spencer and his following so indiscriminately approve, is the system of nature which ignores justice. How, then, shall we compete and nevertheless be just? If our wealth is to be earned at the cost of poverty to others, how are we just? If at recurring industrial crises the employer can no longer make a livelihood except by reducing wages, how can he be just? And if the workmen at such times can raise wages above the starvation level only on the condition of ruining their employer, how can they be just? If it is part of the competitive system that it should create a tyranny, — the tyranny of the Market, which is as irresistible in its pressure as the ocean tide, — how can those who are equally crushed by it, employer and employé, and are driven by the system to fight one another in order to come out alive from under it, how can they be just?

The conclusion inevitably brought home to us by these facts is that under existing conditions we appear to be hopelessly adrift, and are reduced to asking one another with haggard eyes: —

*"Ainsi toujours poussés vers de nouveaux rivages
Dans la nuit éternelle, emportés sans retour,
Ne pourrons nous jamais sur l'océan des âges
Ne pourrons nous jamais jeter l'ancre un seul jour?"*

That we are indeed storm-tossed on a rocky coast seems true; but that we are without a compass, without a port, without anchorage, is not true. Those who, like pirates, are deliberately preying upon one another may be; but all, I think, who want to do their duty may

without much difficulty find out what this duty is ; and this, when clear, will be compass enough. Meanwhile it must not be expected that with the wisest captain at the helm the ship of State can sail straight for the destined port. She will encounter adverse winds before which she will have to tack, — sometimes far away into the sea of individualism ; sometimes dangerously close to the rocky coast of anarchy ; but we have the instruments at our hand to determine our course if we choose to use them. Let us for a moment consider what these instruments are.

(c) Morality of Collectivism

Obviously justice is the admitted aim of political institutions and it is the implied aim of individual religion. Religious teachers may have couched their lessons in other terms ; other virtues may have been given greater prominence in different religious systems ; but the principal result of all ethical doctrines upon the relations of man to man is that they exhort us to act justly. Unfortunately the first difficulty that presents itself to a man who desires to act justly is the problem what justice is. It has been pointed out that the position of an employer who stands between misery to his employees or misery to his own family is inextricable ; and it has been justly said that the most cruel tragedies are those that result, not from a conflict between right and wrong, but from a conflict between right and right. It is because this conflict between right and right is continually presenting itself in the competition of life that our first duty must be to make up our mind what justice really is. And the study we have made seems to show that justice cannot be included within the four sides of a definition, but that it is a perpetual struggle which man is doomed to make

against the injustice of Nature; that Nature is indifferent to justice; that she pursues her ends through the inequalities of her subjects, through their misery and destruction; that all that is most abhorrent to us for its brutality, its venom, and its injustice is the direct result of the favouritism shown by Nature to those best able to kill and eat; that whereas Nature has herself pointed the way towards co-operation as an improvement upon competition, she has not been able to reconcile co-operation with sexual jealousy; nor has she in co-operative communities any concern for the individual, but only for the race; that, in a word, the deification of Nature is a gross blunder; that in the world about us there is much that is beautiful and much that is bad; that man can by art favour the survival of the beautiful and disfavour that of the bad; that weakness forces the weak many to combine against the few strong; that this combination, by promoting mutual happiness, encourages an extension of sympathy from sexual to parental love first; then from parental to tribal; next, from the tribe to the city, from the city to the State, and, last of all, perhaps, from the State to the whole race; that the extension of sympathy and love, which is the most conspicuous beneficent tendency in the scheme of creation, continually nerves man to substitute love in his relations to his fellow-creatures for hate; but that the competitive system which he has unnecessarily adopted is irreconcilable with this substitution; that this irreconcilability has not yet become clear to him because centuries of heredity and education have closed his mind to the possibility of dispensing with it, and because the same centuries of heredity and education have made him so selfish that he is still unfitted to dispense with it; that nevertheless he has been unconsciously set, by the extension of his sympathies, upon a struggle with Nature

which, when analysed, turns out to have a definite though as yet but dimly perceived purpose; that the purpose is to reduce to the utmost possible the effect of natural inequalities upon the happiness of men by substituting, to the utmost possible, co-operation for competition in his social and economic institutions, and so to frame these institutions as to make them serve the happiness of the individual as well as promote the improvement of the race; that in his efforts to accomplish this task he has been assisted by two great principles — the tendency of sympathy to develop and expand, and a faculty of the mind whereby it attributes a divine sanction to this tendency. The former of these is termed morality; the latter religion. Both have been continually at work framing institutions which selfishness has as often succeeded in appropriating to its own use, but on the whole the perpetual necessity of the weak to combine against the strong is gradually preparing man for a deliberate reconstruction of his social system, so that, instead of leaving justice to the accident of the conflict between opposing egotisms, the scope of egotism may be so much reduced that morality will become the rule and egotism the exception.

In the course of our studies we have endeavoured to distinguish the forces in nature which were opposed to us from those that were in our favour, and those which must apparently always be opposed to us from those which we may hope ultimately to overcome. And it has seemed clear that, so far as our present imperfect knowledge can foresee, we can never entirely overcome the consequences upon different men of the inequalities which Nature stamps upon them at their birth. But it has been shown that egotism has appropriated to its use the very devices conceived by man to diminish the inequalities of Nature, — as, for example, the device of

private property, — so as to convert it into the greatest of all sources of inequality and injustice. And it has been shown that so ingrained has become the respect for the “sacredness” of private property, so powerful have become those who have profited by it, and so slow is the human organism to adapt itself to the profound changes which the abandonment of private property would occasion, that the abandonment cannot be effected rapidly without danger to the State. Under these circumstances the difficulty of so ordering our conduct as to do the utmost possible in order to effect the change, and yet not do that utmost so rapidly as to endanger the State, becomes one of extreme perplexity. With a view of throwing some light upon this subject, the following considerations may be submitted:—

In the first place, no Christian can entertain a doubt as to the religious desirability of collectivism. He may doubt its practicability; but that collectivism is the only form of government consistent with the Sermon on the Mount cannot be denied. Commercialism makes Christian life impossible; the attempt to reconcile them can lead to but a single result, — hypocrisy. Undoubtedly there are exceptional conditions in which great wealth permits of great philanthropy; in such case a Christian life may be led by one engaged in commerce. Fortunately, too, there are many occupations in and around the commercial system in which a contented spirit may lead a Christian life; but these are exceptional, nor are they ever secure. At any moment the pressure may come, and then it is “Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost.” The constant pressure of commercialism (and it is this very pressure that Spencersians most approve) perpetually urges men to get the better of one another, and in so doing to violate the fundamental principles of Christ.

Collectivism, on the contrary, makes Christianity possible; moreover, it is the only political system which does. This argument it is difficult to resist. The light may dazzle us as it did Paul on the way to Damascus; we may strive to resist it; but if we do, we shall hear the words of the Master, "It is hard to kick against the pricks."

In the second place, however desirable collectivism may be, it is not immediately realisable.

The arguments against any attempt to introduce collectivism suddenly into our political system founded on science and expedience have been made elsewhere. Moreover, they do not belong to this context. But there are moral grounds against such a course which deserve attention.

The chapter on wealth will have been written in vain if it has not proved that the rich are for the most part as helpless regarding the injustice that prevails as the poor. Undoubtedly there are rich men who deliberately and mercilessly oppress the poor; but the vast majority of them are as little to be blamed for the misery in the world as those who suffer it; and many among them devote both time and money to attempts — for the most part futile — to suppress it. We are like men in a panic-stricken crowd: every one thinks he is being crushed by his neighbour, whereas the neighbour is merely the body through whom the crushing force is transmitted. It is upon this point that Socialists have for the most part erred. They have inflamed the hostility of the unwealthy for the wealthy by describing the rich as "grinding the faces of the poor." But with rare exceptions it will be found that this accusation is not justified; even the "Sweater," who so long figured in the pages of Punch as a gorgeously dressed but brutal Jew with a finely polished new silk hat and massive gold

chain and seal, turns out to be a mere fiction of the brain: he is not a sweater but a sweatee; he is in the garment business not in order to lower wages, but because wages are low; his profit on every garment hardly amounts to a penny, and if the price paid per garment were raised a penny, his profit would disappear. There are a few, a very few, wealthy middlemen in sweated industries. But this is because at the low rate of wages that prevails a few have the skill immensely to extend their business, and are enabled by the largeness of their transactions to make up for the minute profit on every item. Nay, more, the sweater turns out to be a benefit to the community; for if he were to disappear and no better employer were to step in his place (and the competitive system would produce none), the wretches who now live on his wages would be even worse off than they are to-day.

The evil does not reside in the rich, but in the system that produces the rich.

If, then, the rich are not to blame, justice forbids that they should be punished. They are capable of suffering as well as the poor, and, indeed, infinitely more capable of it; for their doom is that, rich though they be, they are but little if any happier. They, too, are victims of the system. The man who labours with his brain is worn out far sooner than he who works with his hands; as long as the work lasts, the latter brings to every meal at least a large and wholesome appetite; whereas the former is driven to eat by exhaustion rather than desire. What would be the consequence of setting these two men down to a common table?¹ Not only

¹ Not that a common table forms part of the proposed plan of collectivism, which, on the contrary, attaches the greatest importance to the preservation and adornment of the home. But a common table would probably form part of any scheme of collectivism that emanated from those now agitating it,

would the brain-worker in the end starve, but he would immediately become useless to the community. It is not his fault that a mistaken system of education has forced upon his brain hours of labour at an age when it was totally unprepared for labour of any kind; and that it has ever since called upon that brain for work accomplished at the expense of every vital organ that he has. Nor is it his fault if a defective digestion, shattered nerves, or a weak heart permit of his remaining useful to the community only on the condition of a well-served table, delicately prepared food, and carefully selected wines. These things no longer give him pleasure; they have become a necessity. To deprive him of them would be as unjust as to deprive a workman of his bread. This may not sound reasonable to a workman: to him these things, far from being a necessity, seem an exorbitant luxury; he little knows the keen enjoyment which a tired brain-worker takes in that first return of appetite that responds to a period of brain rest. He cannot understand the frantic exercise that rich men take — deer-stalking, mountain-climbing, and the rest — merely in order to recover the appetite that can bite with pleasure into a loaf of bread, — the appetite which the workman himself enjoys at every meal; nor can he appreciate the misery which the absence of this appetite brings with it, — the pain of exhaustion, the discouragement, the despair.

On board a Dover packet once I witnessed a scene between a sailor and a millionaire which illustrates the argument. The sailor had been caring for the rich man during the stormy passage; securing him a seat least exposed to spray, covering him with tarpaulins, and rendering him such other services as are needful during that *mauvais quart d'heure*. As we reached port the rich man gave the sailor a sovereign; the sailor's eye

glistered. "What will you do with it?" said the rich man. The sailor — for he was a Frenchman — answered volubly, but the crowning glory of his expected treat was, "*un bon petit dîner avec la bourgeoisie.*" "Ah," said the rich man, sadly, "with ten times that money you could not give me a dinner I could enjoy;" and from the expression of his face I am mistaken if that sailor did not for the first time, perhaps, wonder whether he was not the better off of the two.

If the rich are victims of the competitive system as well as the poor, clearly there is no imperative duty to punish them for its injustice. On the contrary, it is clearly our duty to see that the guiltless among them suffer from a change of institutions the least possible.

We now pass to the third point, which is, perhaps, the most important of the three.

If collectivism, though ultimately desirable, is not realisable at once, what is our moral duty in this connection?

One of the principal objects of this book is to present the difficulties which stand in the way of justice; to show that these difficulties are some of them beyond our reach and, therefore, outside of our responsibility; that our success will depend upon our knowledge of the forces in nature that we can summon to our aid and our ingenuity in the application of these forces to the ends of justice, — in other words, that justice is a matter of morality and intelligence, and not of morality alone. And morality and intelligence combined have been called wisdom.

It is the misfortune of this age that morality and intelligence have been mutually repelling each other in the so-called conflict between science and religion. Science began the conflict quite unintentionally by breaking down the authority of the Catholic Church;

and she aggravated it next by breaking down the authority of the Protestant Bible. The inevitable consequence has been that the religious world has learned to look upon the scientific world with suspicion; and the scientific world has returned the compliment by looking on the religious world with contempt.

In this so-called conflict is illustrated again the fact that men may be driven to fighting one another and yet neither of them be responsible for it. Science did not set to work with a view to breaking down the authority of either Church or Bible; but the effect of her researches was to accomplish both. The religious world, on the other hand, was shocked in its most sacred sentiments by what seemed the rank blasphemy of science; hence a fire was kindled which neither the leaders of science nor the leaders of the Church could extinguish. It is true they did not make much effort to do so; some of them, indeed, did what they could to spread the conflagration. But to-day, though many on both sides are eager to extinguish it, they are to a great extent powerless to do so. Religion has created a habit of mind among its votaries which can only regard the dissent of science with indignation. Most Christians, for example, are so wedded to the doctrine of future punishment that the Church to which they belong would estrange them by abandoning it. And they must not be estranged; they need the support of the Church; it is upon this support that what morality they have depends; no one who understands the temperament of the ignorant could look upon the decay of the Roman Church with any other feeling than that of dismay. Fortunately the human mind is complicated enough to be able to reconcile even the doctrine of hell with the highest intellectual attainments, and we may look with confidence to a long survival in the Roman hierarchy of a

priesthood capable of preaching this doctrine without conscious insincerity. We have therefore to reconcile ourselves to a protracted struggle between the Church on the one hand and science on the other. The human machine is so constructed as to make this conflict not only necessary, but even expedient. Doubtless it will become less and less bitter with the spread of education; doubtless among those Christians who are capable of what are denounced by the others as broad views it has already disappeared altogether. But for those who are ignorant and for those whose education has run into a mould from which they cannot escape, the conflict must continue.

There is one field, however, upon which all can meet, — ignorant and educated; religious and irreligious; sceptic and devout; Romanist and Protestant; broad views and narrow views; orthodox and heterodox; rich and poor, — all can meet and co-operate upon the neutral field of politics. And the duty to do this is, perhaps, to-day the nearest and most imperative duty of all. For never are two or three men gathered together for a political purpose but egotism is somewhere at work to appropriate the result of their action to its own ends. And unless all the morality in the nation is engaged in fighting this egotism, this last will end by prevailing in the future as it has in the past.

But there is probably more morality in the world than the best of us know; we see so much more of the evil that we tend to overlook the good. Even in politics, which we in America are so willing to denounce as corrupt, there is far less iniquity than is imagined. Only a very few political leaders are really bad; most of them are anxious to be as good as circumstances will permit, — not always for the best of motives, but out of respect for the morality in the community which makes

it wise for them to "pander a little to the public will." Our fellow-citizens would be surprised, were they carefully to study our history, to find how often, when a clear moral issue has been raised, the majority has voted on the right side; they would also be surprised were they to collect the excellent laws which public morality has extracted from the worst of legislatures. We are not an immoral people; on the contrary there is perhaps no people in the world more sincerely moral than the people of the United States. It is not our morality that is at fault; it is our wisdom. We often do not understand the issue; we see the evils before us confusedly; we do not know how to overcome them; we stumble in our efforts; and egotism is always watching its opportunity to take advantage of our mistakes.

And wisdom must not be confounded with knowledge, for "knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." We need knowledge too, but knowledge comes in vain if it is not wedded to morality. It is the combination of knowledge and egotism that keeps our institutions bad; it is only a combination of knowledge and morality that can make them good.

Here, then, is the importance of making up our minds what justice is, and, once known, of keeping it before our minds as the mariner does the polar star. For so long as the framing of our institutions are left to the accidental results of perpetual conflicts between opposing egotisms, improvement, though possible and probable in the end, is not only uncertain but may be protracted indefinitely. We are like Mr. Thorndike's cat in the box with a latched door.¹ Eventually, in the frantic movements of the cat to escape, accident will cause some part of its body to move the latch, and it will escape. But our position is still more complicated than

¹ See vol. i., "Justice," pp. 166-168.

this; for we are, as it were, in a labyrinth, and we can never tell whether the door we, by these unreflecting movements, open, will lead us to liberty or, on the contrary, remove us farther from it. We should now no longer allow this question, fraught with such weighty consequences, to depend upon the accident of conflicting selfishness. The method of accident is that of the lower animals. We have already seen how that of man differs from it; animals learn by the slow acquisition of habits; men learn by the immediate flash of intelligence. Let us apply our intellectual methods to politics; let us at last make up our minds what we want to attain; and let us deliberately make our plans to lift the latches that keep us from attaining it one by one, not by hazard, but by design.

And let us above all things possess our souls in patience. Among the vast and stupendous ruins that have survived the decay of Egypt, there is not a single private dwelling or a single palace of a king. They are all temples or tombs; for the Egyptian religion taught that life was a brief span in a long existence, and that the only monuments worth building for a permanence were the temples that prepared the body for the future life and the tombs that preserved it there. So also an Arab tale likens a dwelling to an inn; for no sooner does one man arrive but he leaves, and his place is taken by another.

“’Tis but a Tent where takes his one day’s rest
A Sultán to the realm of Death addrest;
The Sultán rises, and the dark Ferrásah
Strikes, and prepares it for another Guest.”

In this thought will be found the faith which permits men to labour without eagerness; that is content to sow without reaping; and that does the duty which is

nearest without aiming at that which flatters egotism because it seems to be the most heroic. Patience, then, is the hall-mark of political morality.

(d) *Morality and Religion*

The moral view of government would not be complete without some consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of morality and religion; for the differences which characterise them have no small bearing upon the success or failure of our political programme.

The mere fact of association develops in animals qualities specifically different and even opposite to those of animals that lead solitary lives. The large carnivora which are driven by their ferocity to solitude, and fitted by their strength for it, enjoy the greatest liberty or freedom of action; they are stimulated by one motive, — selfishness; they are incapable of obedience or discipline.

Animals, on the other hand, which are driven by their weakness to associate with one another, in order by association to resist the strong, sacrifice a portion of their liberty for the security which the association affords, and are driven by the very fact of association to comply with the law of their society, whatever that law may be, thus acquiring notions of obedience and discipline; and the more intimate the association and the more highly developed, the more selfishness yields to unselfishness. It appears, therefore, that individuals associated in a community derive satisfaction from the benefits they confer upon the entire community, whereas solitary animals derive satisfaction only from the benefit which they confer upon themselves. The explanation afforded by science for the development of unselfishness is that the communities the individuals of which pos-

sessed it most highly developed, were the communities which in the struggle for life survived; it has become a habit which is inherited; and in animals it is termed instinct. It is almost certain that ants have no option as regards their social functions; they perform them automatically, and probably in great part unconsciously. When ants tear a moth apart, instead of devouring the morsels, as dogs would, they carry these morsels immediately to the nest. The instinct of the dog or wolf, even those that hunt in packs, is for each to satisfy his own hunger; the instinct of the ant is to store food for the benefit of the community.

Man has doubtless acquired habits from long social life in much the same way as the ant; but the social qualities which man possesses differ radically from those which ants and all the lower animals possess, in the fact that while the latter do not seem to be free to adopt an alternative course, man is free to do so. In other words, the question how far a man will be selfish and how far he will be unselfish is a matter which is left largely to his determination. He may decide to be selfish; or he may decide to make the necessary effort to be unselfish; or he may satisfy unselfish instincts and be unselfish without effort.

The element of choice or effort distinguishes man's social qualities from that of lower animals and furnishes the characteristic of what is called virtue; in this way the mere instinct of the ant becomes converted into virtue in man through the necessity in man, for the most part, of some effort or sacrifice for its exercise.

Virtue does not always involve either effort or sacrifice, because some men are born with social qualities highly developed, so that they more naturally act unselfishly than selfishly. Others, again, are at birth en-

tirely deficient in social qualities, so that they by nature act selfishly rather than unselfishly. And between the individual born a saint and the individual born a criminal there is every conceivable grade. As language, however, is practically made by "the average sensual man," unselfishness is a virtue for the reason that it does generally involve some effort, and sometimes involves a great deal.

It may be said, therefore, that the social qualities of the lower animals differ from the social qualities of men, in that the former are instinctive, unconscious, undeliberate, and unattended by effort; whereas social qualities in men generally involve some effort, some consciousness, some deliberation, and some sacrifice.

Aristotle's definition of virtue, that it is a habit of the mind, entirely fails to take account of these differences between the social qualities of the lower animals and those of man. The social qualities of the lower animals are truly described as habits; but the social qualities of man are in part habit, and in part deliberate acts of choice. It is because the social qualities of man are generally characterised by effort or sacrifice that they have been specifically given the name of virtue.

There is another difference between the social qualities of man and of the lower animals which for the sake of clearness it may be well not to overlook; the social qualities of all lower animals resolve themselves into habits of the body for the most part, being for the most part unattended by emotion, or hesitation, or consciousness. They are practically automatic. The ant takes his morsel to the nest without conscious or unconscious struggle; it is its nature to do so; it cannot do otherwise. The construction of man is more complicated; he acquires and undoubtedly inherits habits of the body much in the same way as the lower animals do; but he

also acquires and inherits habits of the heart, or of the mind, which are far less certain in their operation and which depend in every individual upon his environment as well as his parentage. It is these last habits of the mind or of the heart which are called conscience. Habits of the body and habits of the heart do not always coincide: as where a man is at heart a murderer, but is prevented from committing murder by the fact that his hand will not respond to his heart; or the inverse case where a man's physical habits lead him to violence, but this violence is perpetually restrained by tenderness of conscience.

It is not, however, necessary for the purpose of this argument to distinguish between the two different habits of heart and body. The man who has highly developed within him both social habits of the body and social habits of the mind that would make him refrain from anti-social acts may be defined generally as a moral man; the man who has these qualities not highly developed or not developed at all may be regarded generally as a non-moral man. Let us now consider how the moral man and the non-moral man are respectively influenced in their conduct by their intelligence. The naturally moral man will find morality justified by the general happiness which results therefrom, and if he be not tempted by the possession of extraordinary intelligence which can set before him the advantages which his extraordinary intelligence gives him for getting the best of his fellow-creatures, his morality and intelligence will combine to enhance his social qualities rather than to diminish them. Prudence, on the other hand, will recommend the non-moral man of average intelligence to make the effort necessary to live in social harmony with his neighbours. But if the non-moral man is possessed of intelligence above the general average,

there will be nothing in him to resist the temptation to use that intelligence for his own advantage at the expense of others. Superior intelligence, therefore, sets all non-moral men to taking advantage of those who are of a lower order of intelligence. There is thus maintained in human society a perpetual conflict between intelligence and morality. The issue of this conflict is uncertain. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether existing conditions are likely to produce more men of both morality and intelligence than men who have equal or even more intelligence and no morality. On the whole, history seems to mark a slow improvement towards morality in the most civilised of our nations; but this improvement is at the same time attended with tendencies towards degeneration, which have been already insisted upon. The only thing that can be stated with certainty is that so long as our institutions are of a character, by the competitive system, to stimulate selfishness, the progress towards unselfishness is likely to be exceedingly slow; and that it is not impossible that the tendency to degeneration may overtake it.

Let us now compare morality in its nature and in its consequences with religion. And first as to its nature. It has been seen that morality is the result of association; that it is developed in the search for happiness; that the question if it will prevail in the community depends upon two things: first, whether the majority of the community is persuaded that most satisfaction can be obtained by every one seeking it for himself, or by every one seeking it for all. And, secondly, upon whether the competition with other communities is of a character, by eliciting unselfishness, to promote morality, or, by eliciting selfishness, to diminish it.

Religion, whatever may be its origin, derives its

morality, not from unconscious social needs, but from a belief in the supernatural. Religion teaches that morality is an order imposed upon us by divine power; that we owe obedience to this power; and there is in religious people an aspiration towards the supernatural which inclines them to adopt its creed. The aim of religion is not happiness, but holiness. Holiness may furnish a satisfaction in one sense of the word, and, therefore, be a form of selfishness, just as the satisfaction derived from benefiting the community may also be regarded as a form of selfishness; but it is the kind of satisfaction that makes the saint and the Sister of Charity. It is not contended that this form of religion, or rather this fundamental basis of all religions, characterises all religious people; because, unfortunately, many people who are termed religious are kept within the pale of the church by mere superstition or fear. It is believed, however, that the above is a description of what is most valuable in all religious creeds and of what underlies them all.

Just as political faith has been defined as the deliberate choice of the political theory which is most conducive to the social perfectibility of man, so religious faith may be defined as the deliberate choice of that moral theory which is most conducive to the individual perfectibility of man. Both have in them the idea of some effort and of some sacrifice.

Religious faith is the subjection of human will and reason to the divine will and the divine reason; and is justified to reason not because reason furnishes evidence amounting to proof of the existence of the divine, for then it would be conviction, not faith, but because there is evidence in favour of the existence of the divine, and not evidence amounting to proof against this existence; and belief in God and submission to

Him is more conducive to the individual perfectibility of man than denial.

The value of religion in social life receives a startling support in the fact that the only communities that have long survived have been religious communities; the Roman Catholic communities, and particularly those engaged in active philanthropic work, as, for example, the orders that minister to the poor and the sick, are among those which have shown most vitality. Noyes has written an interesting history of a large number of the experiments at communal life which were made in America during the first part of the century;¹ and it is a remarkable fact that of all these experiments the only one that has signally succeeded is one that was founded on religion, — the Shakers. Of the rest, most fell to pieces within a few months; and only one or two have maintained an obscure existence. It is not easy to argue about religion; most men and women are too much absorbed in the competition of life to have much time to devote to religion, any more than to politics; nor is the opportunity given to many of them to come into frequent contact with the saints produced in such abundance in Roman Catholic communities. When they do, they are apt to entertain the angel unawares; or if some slight impression be made upon them, the impression is apt to disappear in the dust and turmoil of active life. Religion is unfortunately to-day suffering from the discord produced by different dogmas, and much weighed down by the superstition that results probably more from the ignorance of the people than from the deliberate intention of the Church. If, however, political students could recognise the immense value of religion once rescued from these adventitious impediments to the making of good citizens, they would not be dis-

¹ "History of American Socialisms," by I. H. Noyes.

posed to believe that political problems can be solved without regard to religion; for religion may turn out to be the most powerful factor for solving them.

Not only does religion appeal to the disinterested motives of man, but it confers upon him one gift of priceless value, — the gift of reverence. The morality of the competitive system treats men as Polonius would the players, "according to their deserts;" but the morality of religion would treat them, in the words of Hamlet, "after our own honour and dignity." And in a republic the standard of reverence set by religion is, above all things, precious and essential. Bagehot has explained the utility of the throne in the respect it maintains for government in England. In our country we have no throne, no fountain of honour, no respected tradition; on the contrary, the license of criticism makes our highest public office a mark for contempt, and even besmirches the fairest deeds of army and navy alike, through the degenerate demand for sensational journalism. Had we the sense of our own honour and dignity which religion fosters in the doctrine that every man is or can become a temple of God, we should, by entertaining respect for our governors, make governors worthy of respect possible. To those who desire to increase the scope of government for the benefit of the masses, few obstacles seem so great as the widespread contempt for our governors that prevails in the United States. It is true that our governors have not always commanded respect; but were the angel Gabriel himself to mount the presidential chair, he would not escape calumny. No self-respecting citizen accepts public office but knows beforehand that calumny inevitably awaits him there.

The contempt which the average American feels for his government is a part of that universal contempt which curls the lip of the agnostic. If there is no divine in

the world, there is no room for reverence; for reverence is the fruit of faith.

Here, then, is one of the most priceless gifts of religion; for of all the virtues none brings man nearer to the divine than reverence.

Man, then, is lifted above the lower animals by two distinct moral steps: the first is the step from the instinctive morality of the insect to the deliberate morality of effort; the second is from the interested morality which results from the mere action of social life to the disinterested morality which is ordered by a divine power. To exclude the latter would be to forego the advantages of a superior ground.

What, then, are the conclusions to which we are led by a study of government from the moral point of view?

In the first place, we are led by it to a distinction between mere conviction and faith; and between religious faith and political faith.

Of two theories, one of which asserts the existence and authority of the divine and the other denies it, neither of which is capable of absolute proof or absolute disproof, religious faith adopts the former because most conducive to individual perfectibility.

Of two theories, one of which asserts the power of man by effort to resist the forces in nature hostile to social perfectibility, and the other of which denies or ignores it, political faith adopts the former, because more conducive to social perfectibility.

In the next place, we seem forbidden to shield ourselves behind the curtain of agnosticism; we may not know as much about the supernatural as some churches assert they know, but we do know more about it than the atheist or the agnostic; we know that outside of what we have defined as nature, developed, perhaps, out

of it, but able in great part to control it, is the intelligence and will of man. We know that this intelligence and will, united in the faculty called wisdom, are capable of more and more modifying conditions of nature until they shall have reduced to a minimum the consequences not only of the inequalities imposed upon man by nature, but also of those imposed upon him by his own institutions. This is the end of justice. The attainment of this end should be the deliberate purpose of government.

In the third place, it seems as though the failure to recognise exactly what justice is, and, above all, the limits of its attainment, has given rise to disturbed views of moral responsibility; so that while, under the influence of these disturbed views, we often fail to do our nearest and obvious duty, we are driven by a guilty but misguided conscience to the attempted performance of duties that belong to others and not to ourselves. This has been called the morality of compensation, and it has been pointed out that as long as there was no morality of enlightened justice, the morality of compensation was perhaps better than no morality at all; for it keeps alive a conscience which may eventually put us on the right road.

In the fourth place, we seem to have been kept from the right road by the unfortunate but necessary conflict between science and religion. Science has produced a morality built on selfishness, which, though it might eventually, by the principle of reaction, develop a high order of morality, is likely to do this so slowly as to be possibly overtaken by the tendency towards degeneration which accompanies it.

Religion, on the other hand, proposes a morality founded on divine sanction, unhampered by stimulus to selfishness, and, if rescued from superstition and fear, of

priceless value to both the individual and the social perfectibility of man.

The conflict between science and religion, because some men are more endowed with reason than with conscience, and others more endowed with conscience than with reason, is likely to continue for many generations; but, however long this conflict must continue upon the fields of religion and science respectively, there is a neutral field upon which all men may unite. Upon this field alone the rival claims can be forgotten in the practical work of so framing our institutions as to diminish the injustice and misery in the world. And in this work religion combines with science in two conclusions of vital importance: —

In the first place, religion rebukes the impatience of the egotism which lurks behind eagerness; it points out that there may be as much injustice in too sudden a change of constitution as in too protracted a delay; and that wisdom is bent more in attaining justice in the end than in ourselves figuring prominently in the attainment of it.

In the second place, religion clothes the argument in favour of steering our course towards collectivism with divine sanction, for it is the only course that is consistent with religion. Every gospel that has ever commanded enlightened assent, — the gospels of Confucius, of Buddha, of Plato, of Mohammed, of the Roman law, of our own law, and, above all, the gospel of Christ, — have all taught the same doctrine: "Do unto others as ye would they should do unto you." But ever since the world began we have failed to practise the gospels we have professed because the necessity of self-preservation under the economic institutions which have prevailed have made the practice of this gospel impossible. It is time, at last, that this inconsistency be re-

moved, and that we be rescued, not only from injustice, but from hypocrisy, by framing institutions under which alone we can dispense with both.

§ 4. POLITICAL VIEW OF COLLECTIVISM

All the points of view from which we have heretofore studied problems of government converge in a last, most comprehensive and most important of them all, the political.

It may be contended that, however rational and moral collectivism may be, however prudent its study and practical its ultimate end, all these considerations go for nothing, or for very little, to the statesman, unless it can be shown that collectivism has come within the range of practical politics. Mankind is striving vaguely to attain many ideals of life and conduct with which the statesman, as such, has little or nothing to do, because, desirable as these ideals may be, they are either desired only by a few or not sufficiently desired by all to become the basis of a political programme.

The question whether a particular measure or group of measures comes within the range of practical politics is complicated.

There is little doubt that when Turgot, in 1776, abolished the guilds in France, the time had come when the guilds were no longer fit to exercise the power which they enjoyed. In this sense the measure was opportune; but Turgot did not take sufficient account of the power of the guilds, and the result was that in those cities where they were most powerful and the need of their abolition, therefore, the most urgent, the edict abolishing them was practically disregarded; in this case, though the measure was opportune, the State had not the power to enforce it.

When, on the other hand, Leo the Philosopher put an end to all municipal franchises because, as he said, they no longer had any reason for existence, exactly the opposite conditions are observable. It would be difficult to conceive of a measure more inopportune, for history shows that the advance of civilisation has in large part depended upon the very municipal franchises which Leo thought it useless any longer to maintain; but, however inopportune the measure, the State had at the time the power to enforce it, and municipal development, which turned out later to be the source of all our liberties, was for the time arrested.

When, on the other hand, Alexander put an end to serfdom in Russia, he enacted a measure which was not only opportune, but that he had the power to enforce.

In these three examples we find illustrations of two of the elements which must concur in order to bring a measure within the range of practical politics; it must, in the first place, be opportune, and, in the second place, the State must have power to enforce it.

These are not, however, the only elements which have to be considered in the connection. Statesmen are not always masters of the measures which they would push forward; for an active, small, aggressive minority may often bring before the public measures for which the community is not yet ripe. Indeed, this is the contingency which is likely to occasion statesmen the greatest embarrassment; for, while they themselves may be persuaded of the wisdom of a measure, it may also be clear that the community is not prepared for it; or, on the other hand, while it may be clear that the community desires a measure, it may be equally certain that the measure is not expedient.

An example of this embarrassment is to be found in

recent legislation on Ireland. The action of both the liberal and the conservative parties leaves little reason to doubt that they both long ago recognised the necessity of remedial legislation in Ireland; neither of them, however, seriously undertook legislation upon Irish matters until the Irish members of Parliament, under the leadership of Parnell, constituted a sufficiently important body to hold a balance of power. The Irish question, therefore, was not submitted to the nation through the wisdom of a statesman; it was dragged into the political arena through the political genius of Parnell; and the question of relief to be given to Ireland became not a question of political morality or wisdom, but a factional issue on which various interests, in large part selfish, were arraigned on either side.

This brings us to an important distinction between the conditions under which legislation takes place under more or less absolute monarchy and those under which it takes place in a popular government under the competitive system. Under an absolute monarchy measures which recommend themselves by their morality are more likely to be enacted as such by a just king than under a popular government; because, whatever may be the theory of popular government, practice seems to demonstrate that legislation in the latter depends not so much upon its wisdom as upon the capacity for aggressive political action which those who are urging it possess. Thus the authors of "Industrial Democracy" point out (page 365) that "the factory legislation which each trade has obtained has, during the past twenty years, varied in stringency and effectiveness, not according to the misery of the workers or the profitableness of the enterprise, but almost exactly with the amount of money which the several unions have expended on official and legal assistance."

Not only is this system profoundly bad in principle, inasmuch as it leaves legislation to the initiative of selfishness rather than to that of wisdom, but the effect of it is deplorable, as may be seen by the lack of consistency in the legislation to which it gives rise. The authors of "Industrial Democracy" have collected the cases in which the British Parliament has of late dealt with the question of vested interests, and they show not only a real divergence between the plans adopted in different cases, but an utter lack of any principle which could reconcile this divergence.¹ In our own legislation

¹ "The action of the English legislature in awarding compensation for disturbance of vested interests has, indeed, been capricious in the extreme, depending, perhaps, on the momentary political influence of the class concerned. Thus, no compensation was given to the large class of lottery-keepers and their servants, either for loss of capital or loss of occupation, when private lotteries were, in 1698, suddenly prohibited. The shipowners and merchants who had invested a large capital in specially designed slave-carrying ships received no compensation when the slave trade was abolished in 1807. On the other hand, when, about 1834, the slaves in the British colonies were converted into indentured servants, twenty millions sterling were voted to the owners, though no other country before or after has taken this course. The owners of Irish Parliamentary boroughs were compensated when the Union deprived them of these seats, but the owners of English Parliamentary boroughs, which had equally been recognised sources of income, received nothing when the Reform Bill of 1832 swept them away. In our own day, when a town council sets up its own works, and uses public funds to dispense altogether with its former contractors, it pays them no compensation for loss of capital or livelihood. But if the new workshops so much as darken the view from the contractor's windows, the town must pay damages. Parliament gives public authorities full power to ruin, if they can, the private owners of existing gas-works by setting up public electric lighting works, and even to destroy the business of joint-stock cemeteries by starting public burial-grounds. But the House of Commons has jealously refused to permit any town council to put up gas-works of its own whilst any private gas-works are in the field as opponents; or even to sink its own wells to get a new and entirely different supply of water for the public, without first fully compensating any existing water company, not for taking away any land, works, or water, or infringing any monopoly rights, but simply for loss of income. Whether the holder of an annually granted terminable license to sell

vested interests are protected by a clause in the United States Constitution; but this clause has been interpreted so variously that it is difficult to state positively in advance what the Supreme Court will decide is a vested interest which must be protected, and what an interest which need not be respected. The severest criticism, however, that can be made upon this provision in our Constitution is that in spite of its admitted reasonableness and justice, if any part of our community suffered under the disadvantages under which Ireland has so long laboured, this clause in our Constitution would make it impossible for us to remove them; in other words, the statutes which even the Conservative party in England have thought it right and necessary to enact for the relief of distressed Ireland would in the United States, under this clause, be impossible because unconstitutional.

Volumes might be written regarding the want of any guiding principle in the legislation of our respective States so far as the element of justice is concerned. If the British Parliament, which is supposed to be beyond the reach of corruption, is vacillating as regards vested interests, how much more vacillating must be State legislatures, which are in large part creatures of private corporations.

But it is not the object of this book to attempt to map out a political campaign for any particular country. Its object has been rather to lay down the fundamental principle of government, to establish clearly what justice is, to mark out the limits which nature opposes to political action, the evil forces in nature with which politics are not directly concerned and cannot hope directly to

intoxicating liquors would or would not be equitably entitled to compensation if Parliament decided for the future not to renew it is a hotly contested question."

resist; the evil forces, on the other hand, with which man has already begun an almost unconscious warfare, and which he can, by a sufficiently deliberate effort, in great part subdue; and, lastly, the evil forces which have resulted from man's own blundering methods, and which might, by taking due account of the time necessary therefor, be ultimately disposed of altogether.

In the course of these studies, the selfishness which underlies the competitive system has been shown to be the enemy which appropriates every institution, however high at the outset the ideal upon which it is organised, to its own base use; it has been shown that this selfishness can be removed only under a form of government which would slowly substitute co-operation for the present competitive system; that such a government, however unfitted to man in his present condition of ignorance and self-absorption, might become eventually fitted to him in proportion as ignorance was dissipated and self-absorption yielded to the recognition that the highest happiness is to be obtained, not out of private greed, but rather through the common good. Could any substantial part of the people become persuaded of these things, then it is conceivable that slowly there might rise among statesmen a political standard by which the various measures proposed for enactment could be tested; so that instead of leaving remedial legislation to the selfish aggressiveness which now seems to determine it, and thus becoming a prey, like a rudderless ship, to every wind that blows, we may, on the contrary, have before us definite sailing-orders, — that is to say, a port, however distant, for which we are making, and towards which, however devious our path, we may still, persistently, with deliberation and increasing wisdom, direct ourselves.

It would not be consistent with the general lines of

this work to enter into the particular measures which it would be wisest immediately to adopt with a view to the ultimate realisation of a collectivist form of government. In the first place, this question is not so much one of principle as of detail; in the second place, the conditions presented in every country differ so widely that it would be impossible to propose a general scheme that would be fitted to all. This becomes clear the moment we consider the conditions which present themselves respectively in this connection in England and in the United States. In England the working population is far more homogeneous than in our country; this has enabled large groups of workingmen in England to come to a common understanding regarding their aims and the best methods for securing these aims; whereas in the United States divergencies of opinion following divergencies of temperament and nationality have made this concurrence of opinion far less complete and far less effectual. This must not be understood to imply that there is even in England a complete concurrence of opinion; on the contrary, different trade unions adopt widely different and even inconsistent policies; thus, for example, the policy of the boiler-makers in restricting the trade to those who have served an apprenticeship is diametrically opposed to the policy of the cotton trade unions in keeping the trade open to ten times more applicants than the industry can ultimately support. All that is meant to convey is that very large groups, such as the cotton and mining industries, have succeeded in establishing a common rule, and have done this through an organisation which, though necessarily complicated, is amazing in its efficiency. It has been already pointed out that in so doing they have gone so far towards solving the great political question how best to secure efficient administration and popular

control; and their experience, not only in trade unions, but in co-operation, has contributed to furnish them a valuable education.

If, now, we turn to the United States, we find a totally different condition of things: while there are undoubtedly powerful and well-organised trade unions in our country, there is not one that can relatively compare in magnitude and efficiency to that of the cotton operatives in England. Not only do differences in nationality and temperament tend to make this difficult, but the very size of our country is an obstacle to effectual organisation. A trade union, in order to be efficient, ought to cover the entire field of competition, and this field in the United States often coincides with its entire territory. It is probable, therefore, that although many trade unions in the United States are composed of as efficient and as intelligent workmen as any trade union in Great Britain, the whole mass of the workmen in the United States are less prepared by industrial experience and sagacity for the adoption of measures looking towards collectivism than their brethren in England.

On the other hand, the United States have an immense advantage over England in another respect: the very vastness of the territory, while it renders powerful trade unions difficult, makes ultimate adoption of collectivism far more easy; for, unless the country is driven by military enthusiasm to colonial expansion, it is by its very size and situation entirely self-supporting and therefore outside of the necessity of involving itself in the affairs of other nations.

England, on the other hand, because her power is in great part colonial, and because she is driven by vast possessions beyond the sea to the protection of those possessions against the perpetual envy of her neighbours,

is committed to perpetual conflict; and, as has been already pointed out, the battle of words which characterises diplomacy may in the end be more demoralising to a nation than the battle of lives which characterises the condition of actual war. But the main object of collectivism from a moral point of view is to render our institutions consistent with our professions, so that a man may practise in his life the code of morality which he professes in his home; in other words, its aim is to eliminate battle from the every-day life of every individual in the State, substituting for the selfish conflict of competition the unselfish considerateness of co-operation; it is in the subjective influence of this perpetual appeal to his affections, rather than to his egotism, that collectivism is believed to possess so many advantages over our present system. But if men, while at home engaged in mutually helping one another, are driven by competition outside the border to duplicity, stratagem, and violence, the beneficial effect of collectivism at home will be in great part counteracted by the injurious effect of competition abroad; in other words, one of the chief jewels of collectivism — consistency — will be wanting.

It seems obvious, therefore, that the conditions presented by Great Britain and the United States respectively are so different that no programme fitted to one could be fitted to the other; and that every nation, therefore, adopting the creed of collectivism, must be allowed to work out its own programme for itself.

Again, the measures which will be fitting for a nation in one phase of its existence may be totally unfitted to it in another. Nations pass through moods as various as those of a neurotic subject, who, when the wind is north-northwest, is as mad as a March hare, but, when it is southerly, can tell a hawk from a hand-saw. While

a nation is inflamed by military success into passion for foreign conquest, it would be idle to speak of a collectivist programme at all; or as long as the country is possessed by the notion, however erroneous, that every individual in it can immediately be made rich and prosperous by the free coinage of silver, it would seem vain to propose a programme that only promises prosperity after the lives of many generations. Men anxious to be rich themselves are not willing to entertain a doctrine that offers them only a crumb of comfort and reserves the loaves and fishes for children yet unborn. Indeed, in such a country as the United States the question is not only one of opportuneness, but also one of locality. Measures that might be seriously considered in New York would probably be rejected with contempt in Arizona; and those which might be pushed to the front with enthusiasm in Texas would be regarded as revolutionary in Maine.

And so it will be seen that the character of a collectivist programme will differ in every year for every nation, and in some nations will differ in its different parts.

Nor must it be imagined that a collectivist programme is necessarily a radical one. On the contrary, in some respects, if controlled by wisdom, it would seem to be an extremely conservative one. For example, there are few measures which the radical or popular party in the United States push more persistently and unanimously to the front than the referendum.¹ But the referendum, while of value in certain cases, has been found by some English trade unions to be subversive of the very popular control which its promoters believed it would secure.²

¹ The Populist party, which has always favoured the referendum, has now made it the principal plank in its platform.

² In Switzerland the referendum has sometimes defeated popular measures voted by the legislature.

And yet it would be a task of the greatest magnitude to persuade the popular party in the United States that an unlimited use of the referendum should not immediately form part of the collectivist programme. This cannot but accentuate the importance of a careful study of collectivism, not only by those who seem to have most interest in advocating, but also by those whose interest it may seem to be to resist it. For it may turn out that an intelligent collectivist programme is not only in the end, but even immediately, more conservative and more in the interest of order than the wholesale opposition to all popular measures which characterise the wealthy element in our community to-day.

We have seen that a political programme looking to social improvement is essentially a question of place and time; and that it is not necessarily a radical one, but, on the contrary, must, in order to succeed, be in some respects highly conservative.

Let us now sum up compendiously the general conclusions on this whole subject to which the arguments of this book tend to lead. The political view has been left to the last because it not only comes last in order of logic, but deserves the last word on account of its consummate importance. The one thing we all desire in this world is to secure happiness. It seems probable that nothing within the scope of human effort contributes so much to this end as government; and yet government is probably the last thing of which the vast majority in pursuit of happiness think. It is also probable that nothing within the scope of human effort contributes so much to morality as government; and yet one of the greatest steps in advance believed in the United States to have been made in modern civilisation is the separation of Church from State.

These two considerations alone ought, if true, to

justify the importance of studying what government is, and how it can be made to bear upon the two greatest problems of the race, — the problem of human happiness and the problem of human morality. Of still more importance will this study become if it turns out that both these problems are solved, or can only be solved, through the instrumentality of government. With a view to bringing this home, let us briefly review the conclusions to which from different points of view we have been respectively led.

Government is the law of society.

There are three great branches of knowledge to which we can go for light upon this law: —

We can go to science for instruction as to what human society is, and particularly as to the fundamental and disputed question whether society is an organism or not. Science alone can tell us the law of social development and its relation to the law of natural selection so persistently misunderstood under the name "evolution." Science, too, can tell us how the human machine is constructed so that we may understand the social laws under which it operates.¹

We must go to history in order to learn the actual steps which human society has taken in advancing from barbarism to our present civilisation; for it is history which furnishes us the experience of the race, — the facts from which alone a sound political theory can be drawn.²

¹ This study was made in book ii., entitled "Evolution," of vol. i. p. 53, and was continued in the present volume, book i. ch. iv., "The So-Called Social Mind."

² This study was made in chapter iv., entitled "Human Evolution in its Relation to Government," of book ii. vol. i. (p. 175), and was continued in the present volume, book i. ch. ii., entitled "Individualism in History."

Lastly, we must go to ethics in order to learn what government ought to be, as distinguished from what it has been.¹

A study of government, therefore, includes roughly three different investigations: the scientific investigation, what society in view of the nature of man tends to be; the historical investigation, what society in the experience of man actually has been; and the ethical investigation, what society under the rules of morality ought to be.

These three investigations ought to furnish us with some answer to the practical political question, — what society can be.

It is impossible to study the facts and conclusions regarding sociology, which belong to science, history, and religion, apart; the moment a social influence is isolated, it ceases to operate in the same way as it operates when a part of the social nexus. An effort to study a particular social influence apart from the other influences at work in the social field is something like an effort to study the functioning of a particular organ in a living body; the moment the function is isolated it ceases to operate in a normal manner. In the same way we cannot study religion apart from history, nor history apart from religion, nor political science apart from either. It is, perhaps, because some scientific men and some religious men have endeavoured to do this that they have been condemned to irreconcilable and irresponsible conflict.

And the confusion which arises from this conflict is due to the fact that men not only differ with one another regarding the aims of government, but also regarding the difficulties in the way of attaining our respective

¹ This has been attempted in the chapters on Justice (vol. i. book iii. ch. iii. p. 275), and Collectivism (vol. ii. book ii.).

aims. For example, religion sets up holiness as the aim of human life, and holiness involves absolute justice; science responds that the real aim of humanity is happiness; that the struggle for happiness in social life has resulted in morality, and this struggle can be depended upon to develop sentiments of morality so that injustice will eventually disappear. According to the philosophy of science, therefore, as interpreted by Herbert Spencer, all we have to do is to allow selfishness to operate, and the general tendency of selfishness enlightened by intelligence will be to substitute for the selfishness which seeks happiness at the expense of others what we have called the unselfishness which seeks happiness only through the happiness of others. Science also points out that there are natural obstacles in the way of perfect justice which religion makes a mistake in ignoring.

There is therefore at the very outset a fundamental difference of opinion between science and religion as to the aim of government.

If, now, we look at the difficulties which stand in the way both of the morality taught by science and of that ordered by religion, we find again not only a radical difference of opinion between science and religion, but a still more radical difference of opinion between different groups in the religious world. It is not, however, easy to state just what religion regards as the difficulties in the way of human perfection, because different creeds attach different importance to different factors in the problem. With some it is absence of faith; with others it is absence of good works; while with others it is absence of grace: all the difficulties dwelt upon by religion being in some way connected with the operation of the divine power on the human heart. Science takes a radically opposite view of the difficul-

ties in the way of justice: it studies the constitution of man as a fact, and the history of man far back into the incalculable recesses of geologic time; it studies the human body as it is now constructed,—the human brain; its habits, and the laws under which it operates; it studies, above all, the environment with which nature furnished man at the outset, and the environment which man has made for himself.

From this point of view the divine element is eliminated altogether. Science ignores the source whence man derives his life and power, and studies merely the laws of his life and the laws of his power. And as to the operation of these laws, scientific men radically differ; some regarding man as the necessary result of a natural environment over which he has practically no control, and the other regarding him as consciously capable of creating a human environment opposite in its character to that furnished by nature and over which he may eventually have an almost complete control. The conclusions arrived at by these two schools are diametrically opposed to one another, as they logically should be. The first school believes in the *laissez faire* principle, and in leaving evolution to do of itself the work of improvement, regardless of the possible risk of degeneration, and, trusting in the overpowering supremacy of natural laws over human interference, demand that this interference be the least possible, — that is to say, maintain that the best government is the government that governs least. The other school, on the contrary, claims that the first err in the statement of facts; that the human environment is not identical with the natural environment; that man, ever since he emerged from the caves of the Dordogne, has been ceaselessly engaged in modifying his environment, and has now so modified it that in many respects it is diametrically oppo-

site to that which was originally furnished him by nature. This school admits that morality has been slowly developed by the social life of man, and that this morality shows hopeful signs of further development; but it also points out that the artificial environment created by man has in its interference with nature been not altogether wise; that while it has created a developing morality it has at the same time created conditions under which degeneration may take place at a more rapid rate than improvement. It insists that so long as moral development is left in the charge of selfishness it is likely to be hopelessly slow; that there is no longer any reason why it should be left to this treacherous principle; that, on the contrary, man is capable, by wisely directed effort, of framing his institutions in such a manner as to diminish the operation of selfishness instead of stimulating it.

Upon the choice between these two schools depends the fundamental question whether government shall undertake deliberately to create a wholesome environment, or whether, according to the Spencerian method, government shall, by effacing itself to the utmost possible, leave the development of morality to the uncontrolled action of human selfishness. An attempt has been made in this book to show that the real enemies of human justice are the very inequalities of nature upon which Spencer depends for the agony through which, according to him, human development is slowly to take place. These natural inequalities man has clearly already combated by taking the control of the government out of the hands of the muscularly strong but intellectually weak, and bestowing it upon those who are intellectually strong but muscularly weak. In the process of effecting this change man has created a new inequality unknown to nature, — that is to say, the

one that separates the rich from the poor. This new inequality, which results from the institution of private property, though a necessary phase through which humanity had apparently to pass, has given a character to the human environment which has a deplorable effect upon type. Both scientific schools admit the influence of environment upon type; that if the environment is noble the type will be noble, whereas if the environment is base the type will be base. It seems difficult for any one to deny that the pursuit of wealth tends to produce a sordid type, nor does any scientific man deny that the existing struggle for life as determined by the pursuit of wealth tends to create infertility in the intellectual type and a fertility of despair in the type which is unintellectual. Science without a dissenting voice recognises the immense slowness with which function adapts itself to environment, the destruction which tends to accompany rapid changes, and the necessity, therefore, of patience in any modification of environment which depends for its success upon the slow modification of type thereto.

At this point history can be advantageously invoked for the light it throws on human development, on the extreme slowness with which this development advances, and the rapidity with which it disappears. There is not a page in the whole of human history which does not illustrate the perpetual tendency of selfishness to drag down high ideals of government and to appropriate them to the use of a selfish minority. This subject has been already once recapitulated; it seems unnecessary, therefore, to do more than merely recall its conclusions in support of the general argument of science. We have seen how humanity has stumbled round a vicious circle from the tyranny of one group to the tyranny of

another while civilisation after civilisation has passed away. The disappearance of the Assyrian, Egyptian, and Roman Empires ought to be warning enough to us that no civilisation is beyond the possibility of decay. If a note of warning may, in view of the immense development of social progress, seem groundless now, it may not be unwise to consider the mockery which would have greeted a prophet in the reign of Rameses who should have foretold that the body of this mighty conqueror would not for ever remain in the imperishable dwelling prepared for it, but would one day be exposed in a glass case to the idle curiosity of Cook tourists in a modern museum; or a later seer who should foretell that the mighty palace of Augustus was destined to disappear, and that the very record of it and of his empire would be saved only through the industry of the despised Nazarenes. This would have seemed as improbable then as it may seem improbable now that our civilisation, planted upon such wide and solid foundations as the results of science during this century, should ever share the fate of the Egyptian and the Roman empires; and yet, when we see things as they are rather than as we want them to be, it is certainly an impressive fact that the whole tendency of civilisation since the beginning of the century has been to group the employers together in gigantic monopolies and trusts, and the employees together in equally formidable trade unions. We cannot afford to neglect the fact that the unwealthy, though recognised and believed to compose about four-fifths of our entire population, have never in the United States yet gone together to the polls. Whenever a popular issue has been raised that might have united them, they have been disunited by a false financial theory. The presidential election of 1896, instead of uniting the workingmen under the banner of

Bryan, profoundly divided them; for silver legislation, which would have relieved the farmer of a part of the burden upon his land, would correspondingly have diminished the wages of the workingman; and the latter learned this before election day. The immense vote, nevertheless, polled by Bryan, notwithstanding the alienation of the Eastern workingman, ought to be some measure to us of the power of the popular vote if not disunited by a dividing financial doctrine. If, for example, the popular party were to take up with the same enthusiasm as was evinced at the presidential election of 1896 such a single issue as the nationalisation of railroads, monopolies, and trusts, — issues upon which they need not be divided, — is there any doubt but that they would carry the country with an overwhelming majority? And if they did so carry the country, is there not ground for fear that such a revolution would be attended by serious consequences to the State?

In England, political students seem to be persuaded that workingmen are so divided between the two political parties that there is no danger of their uniting on a political programme. It seems possible, however, that they undervalue the effect of such a strike as that of the engineers during the winter of 1897-98; the workmen were beaten, and this defeat was regarded by some as a victory for capital. But this victory may turn out to be more dangerous to capital than a defeat; there are already indications that the workingmen, having been defeated in this strike, are beginning to lose their confidence in trade unions as the exclusive method for maintaining wages, and are being driven by this conclusion to the only alternative, — politics.¹ If once this idea

¹ Since 1898, Trade Union Congresses have twice applauded collectivism, whereas prior to 1898 collectivism was distinctly out of favour with them.

takes hold of workingmen's minds, it may seize upon one of the parties as uncontrollably as the silver craze possessed the Democratic party in the United States in 1896, with a result that may be formidable to British institutions.

One thing, however, seems certain, if the workingmen once succeed in securing the reins of power and attempt to introduce a socialist form of government, the experiment will be left in the hands of those who have the greatest selfish interest in the change; in other words, it will tend to be a repetition of what we have already seen occurring over and over again, — that is to say, of a high moral and social theory pushed to the front, not because of its morality, but because it serves the interest of those engaged in pushing it; and if logic or experience have any value we are bound to conclude from the lessons drawn from the past, as well as the necessary consequences of the working of observed laws, that the experiment is under such circumstances likely to prove a failure.

If, on the other hand, the experiment were attempted, not for the immediate purpose of benefiting a particular class, but for the ultimate purpose of benefiting all alike, and with the patience and deliberateness that both science and religion unite in recommending, then it is conceivable that by slow steps humanity may be gradually adapted to a form of government that will not only in itself be just, but will permit of justice in the individual relations of man to man.

The lessons to be derived from the moral view of government have too recently been recapitulated for it to be necessary to enlarge upon them here. We may confine ourselves, therefore, to some of the most important conclusions derivable therefrom.

We have heretofore gone to science for our physical

improvement, our sanitation, our physical comforts; for medicine and surgery, for nutritious foods, and for all that contributes to eliminate physical pain. For our moral improvement we have gone for the most part to religion; we have sought it at the altar and the confessional, from the lips of the priest or the word of the gospel. But for our political improvement we have gone to neither science nor religion. We have left political changes practically to the mercy of human selfishness. No political measure is enacted into law unless it has behind it the organised effort of a part of the voting population sufficient to force it upon the attention of the legislature. It sometimes happens that the very iniquity of political conditions creates a sufficient reaction on the morality of the mass to arouse it to the necessary political effort. We see this operating in the abolition of slavery, in the improvement of our ballot laws, and in the mitigation of the horrors of war through the slow development of public international law. But this beneficent action is comparatively rare, whereas the action of selfishness in politics is constant. As has been already remarked, even in the British Parliament, where no reasonable man believes that the corrupt use of money is to any extent possible, only those measures for improving the condition of the workmen have been enacted which had behind them the largest political fund; and if this be so in the British Parliament, how should it be otherwise in State legislatures, which are for the most part elected through the distribution of campaign funds collected from the corporations which have an interest in controlling them?

Under these conditions it seems unlikely that any reasonable improvement can take place within a reasonable time until the enactment of our laws is guided by some better principle than egotism.

When, however, we go to science for assistance, we have to recognise that there is a tendency, through what is believed to be an error of one of its most important schools, to discourage human effort by destroying human hope. For if the laws of nature are to be allowed full play; if justice involves, as claimed, the rewarding of men according to their deeds rather than according to their needs; if the most crafty are always to prosper at the expense of the rest; if man is practically powerless by the side of the overmastering supremacy of such laws as that of natural selection, — then effort is vain.

On the other hand there is a tendency in religion also to discourage effort by exaggerating the rôle of Providence in the world. Nothing, for example, is more calculated to discourage it than the theory that man can be saved only by divine grace; or that we must depend upon Providence and not upon ourselves for our advancement. It is not necessary to deny Providence in order to enhance the importance of human effort; but it is, above all things, necessary to keep human effort alive by not exaggerating the rôle of Providence.

This must not be construed as an attack upon the theories of science and religion in their own respective fields: let science continue to develop its theory of natural selection in the realm of nature, and let religion continue to dwell upon the power of the supernatural within its own sphere. So far as the individual conduct of man is concerned, religion is still called upon to perform a task of priceless value by keeping every individual man up to a high standard of morality. What is asked of both science and religion is that in the neutral field of politics the obvious facts which have been given in this book be recognised, and that both science and religion help to persuade men that the great obstacle to human happiness is selfishness; that our

present institutions stimulate selfishness so as to constitute a perpetual obstacle to happiness; that so long as our institutions oblige every man to seek satisfaction for himself, they are bound to keep alive in every man the very selfishness which makes happiness impossible. Science amply demonstrates the limits within which man can, by effort wisely directed, diminish the consequence of natural inequalities and at the same time eliminate the necessity for conflict by substituting co-operation for competition in our social and industrial system. And what science shows can be done, religion has, ever since the beginning of the world, been ordering us to do; and it is because our institutions have made it impossible to obey the orders of religion that the voice of religion remains to-day in great part ineffectual. It is time that religion and science join hands to show us the true principles of government; science contributing knowledge and religion self-control. Then shall our institutions be founded on neither selfishness, folly, nor craft, but on the combination of knowledge and morality which we have called wisdom; and then shall we be rescued from the evolution of nature by the effort of man.

§ 5. CONCLUSION

For the purpose of defining the conclusions to which we have been led, let us now revert to the four different points of view from which at the opening it was stated that government could best be studied:—

The Historical — or what it has been.

The Morphological — or what it is.

The Physiological — or what it does.

The Teleological — or what is its purpose or aim.

§ 1. *History* demonstrates that government has for

the most part been the rule of collective conduct which, under the operation of the natural law of competition, the crafty minority has in its own interests imposed upon the less crafty multitude. At rare intervals a non-natural motive, taking the form of the Church one day or Chivalry the next, has sought to take the framing of government out of the hands of selfishness. But the effectual action of this non-natural motive has been intermittent, whereas the effectual action of selfishness in consequence of the competitive character of our industrial system has been continuous. Every effort of this non-natural motive, therefore, to improve conditions tends sooner or later to be captured by craft and made to serve the interests of egotism. This must continue to be the case so long as industrial conditions are such as to force all of us into the demoralising scramble for wealth.

The scramble for wealth, too, has been shown to be prejudicial to type.

§ 2. *Morphologically*, government is the rule of social conduct which prevails in every community. An extended study of government from the morphological point of view would involve that of constitutional law, which is foreign to the main purpose of this book.

§ 3. *Physiologically*, the rule of social conduct adopted by every community performs the function of equalisation, — that is to say, of reducing the inequalities of nature so that the violence which prevails in nature no longer prevails in civilised communities. But the function works badly; for although it has dragged down the violent man, it has lifted in his place, not the moral man, but the man of craft; and in levelling natural inequalities of muscular strength it has created artificial inequalities through the institution of private property, which is responsible for pauperism and prostitution, and in great part for crime.

§ 4. *Teleologically*, whereas the purpose or aim of government has been to attain justice, it has in fact worked injustice.

Justice has been found to include two things, — the *virtue* of justice, which consists in an attitude of mind towards social relations, and the *act* of justice, which consists in a rule of conduct as regards social relations.

This rule of conduct has been defined to be a perpetual effort to diminish the inequalities of nature with a view to making the community serve the interests of the individual rather than the individual serve the interests of the community, and to perpetuate a noble type rather than a base one.

The virtue of justice, if the preceding definition of the act of justice be adopted, will include a habit, a desire, and a resolve to make the effort therein defined.

This effort has encountered throughout history the opposition of selfishness and intelligence, which, when united, have been denominated craft. Craft has intrenched itself in the notion of private property, and has been helped in so doing by the undoubted fact that the institution of private property was a phase through which man had to pass in order to develop out of the fierce individualism of the carnivora in nature.

But property is of three kinds: —

- I. Property of the male in the female, recognised in the institution of marriage.
- II. Property of a privileged class in political office recognised in the so-called rights of the king, the nobility, and the Church to the functions respectively usurped by them, and to-day maintained through the self-constituted authority of political machines.
- III. Property of a minority in wealth.

Of these, the first — property of the male in the female — has yielded to a notion of mutual and lifelong loyalty which, if maintained, would make every family a school of social and political as well as individual improvement.

The second — property in political office — has in popular governments disappeared in theory, though not in fact. The Reformation destroyed it to a great extent for the Church, and the Revolution has destroyed it for the king and noble. The usurpation of political office by the political machine is to-day being limited by civil-service reform and the exercise, when intelligent, of the independent vote.

The third — private property in wealth — still controls our social, industrial, and political institutions. But the power of the majority which it condemns to comparative want is increasing rapidly; it is organising in trade unions and compelling counter-organisation by capital in trusts and protective associations. The two forces, instead of being diffused and dissipated throughout the social structure as in the beginning of the century, are to-day massed and intrenched face to face with every omen of impending conflict.

It has been argued that such a conflict would be dangerous to civilisation, inconsistent with our religious professions, and is, in view of the ultimate feasibility of a more or less partial collectivism, unnecessary.

It has been argued that such a conflict can only be averted provided the morality and intelligence — that is to say, the wisdom — of the community rescue the making of our institutions and laws from the hands of folly and craft. Political wisdom involves an alliance of science and religion upon the field of politics. Its first duty is to frame a programme which will have for effect, by steps that are each of them slow and practical, to fit men

for a collectivist State, — the only one in which the element of selfishness is reduced to a minimum.

The attainment of justice is the main purpose of government. But it has been shown that there are occasions for inequality and unhappiness in nature which no wisdom which we now have can remove. No purely political change can secure happiness for man. Where political wisdom breaks down, moral wisdom or enlightened religion may step in. With the rôle of religion over our individual lives, this book does not undertake to deal. But the rôle of religion over our collective conduct is an essential part of every political scheme. It is in great part because politics have been divorced from religion that the making of our laws has been left to the war of opposing interests. The morality which, unsatisfied by ecclesiastical ritual, has been dissipating itself in ineffectual schemes of private philanthropy will find its true mission in effectual schemes of State philanthropy. The evils and dangers which confront us are beyond the reach of private effort; they can be successfully overcome only by the collective power of the State. They consist in great part in defects in our State constitution, in our State laws, and in our commercial system. It is only by changes in our institutions, then, that they can be made consistent with the morality we profess. We are all being driven by the same relentless goad, — *omnes eodem cogimur*. It is useless to oppose militarism and expansion, when over-production leaves us no option but either to create new markets or to shut down our factories. It is useless to attempt to relieve the poor so long as social conditions are grinding them out faster than we can relieve them. It is useless for employers to rail against organised labour now that organised labour has acquired the intelligence and self-restraint necessary for effectual collec-

tive action. Labour organisations indeed have attained that momentous coign of vantage that they are likely in their conflicts with capital to gain even more by defeat than by victory. For while victory will serve only to strengthen them in the industrial field, defeat will drive them, with all their collective strength, into the field of politics; and here their action, if united, will be irresistible.

We are like dwellers by an encroaching sea of which Walt Whitman wrote, —

“Surely some right withheld.”

Dare we any longer withhold this right? And if we dare, ought we any longer to withhold it?

The progress of man has not been straight, but, like a stream, it has at one time wound deviously through pleasant places; at others, been dashed headlong between jagged cliffs. But at all times, whether in Assyria and Egypt man is driven in hordes by instinct or habit, blindly following the lead of a military chief; whether, inspired by a fierce individualism, he is creating the city republics of the Greeks; whether excess of individualism exposes him to conquest by the Macedonian horde again, or with a higher collective ideal he recreates a greater republic in Rome; whether he lapses once more by sheer degeneration into empire and suffers the price of degeneration in the riot and darkness of the Middle Ages, only once more to reassert his individualism in the Reformation of the sixteenth century and the Revolution of the centuries that followed; whether in political declaration of rights or in industrial cries for freedom of contract; whether in the making of guilds to protect the collective idea, or the destroying of guilds to renew that of individualism; whether at last, in the organisa-

tion of trade unions, he reaffirms the necessity of collective action in the ranks of labour or in the organisation of trusts, protective associations, and Birmingham alliances, — he is brought back to the necessity of association in the ranks of capital. Man is slowly learning the lesson that he can attain the highest happiness only by lifting himself out of the instinct and competition that characterise nature, into the wisdom and the self-restraint that distinguish him from all other animals. He may yet have to swing many a time from the extreme of individualism to that of solidarity, and back from that of solidarity to that of individualism; but if he is to escape degeneration he can do so only in one way, — by the enhancement of the faculty of individual and social self-control.

Collectivism is the ideal form of government to which a high faculty of individual and social self-restraint is essential, and in which will be found the highest happiness.

At present collectivism is a creed rather than a programme. But it is a practical creed, — one we can take into politics with us as well as into church.

The question that every nation, every State, every city, has next to solve is what is the first political step that will move most effectually towards this distant goal?

APPENDIX

TRUSTS

THE aspect presented by trusts differs according to the point of view; politically and socially regarded they seem an unmitigated evil, for they tend to destroy individual initiative, and they present an occasion, a necessity, and a power for political corruption unexampled in history. From a purely economic point of view, on the other hand, and upon the assumption that the competitive system is a sound one, they seem an unqualified good; for they represent to the highest conceivable degree the glorification of the survival of the fittest,¹ upon which the competitive system is based; they attain the maximum of economy both in production and in distribution; and they secure the advantages of competition in tending to keep prices reasonable and regular without the disadvantages which attend competition, such as irregular employment, fluctuating prices, and last, but not least, the anxiety and want that attend bankruptcy of employer and non-employment of employee.

This Appendix is written for the purpose of pointing out the facts elicited by the late Industrial Commission, which emphasise the *economic* advantages of Trusts; and in the course of the argument light will be thrown upon several points which have been incompletely treated in this volume for the reason that at the time it was written the facts in question were not easily accessible.

The evidence taken by the Industrial Commission has elicited facts that tend to the following conclusions:—

¹ Witnesses to the prosperity of trusts are continually justifying them on the principle of the Survival of the Fittest. See the testimony of Messrs. Boyle (p. 486) and Archbold (p. 568) in the Report of the Industrial Commission.

1. Over-production is so constant an attendant of competitive production as to seem a necessary feature of it.

2. Over-production is the principal cause of trusts.

3. Competition is needlessly wasteful.

4. Industry is driven towards the trust system by over-production; it is also drawn towards it by economy. The maximum of economy can be obtained only through the minimum of competition, or economy increases inversely with competition.

5. Combination, even under competitive conditions, secures the benefits of competition without its evils: it substitutes order for disorder; it adjusts supply to demand, thereby checking over-production and waste. In the international struggle for the market, therefore, the industry in which combination is most highly developed is the industry which because it is the most orderly and economical will in the end prevail.

It would seem, therefore, that industry is driven by international as well as by intranational competition to develop more and more along trust lines; or, in other words,—

Trusts are likely, under the competitive system, to increase rather than to diminish in number and in strength.

The evidence taken before the Industrial Commission has re-enforced two arguments attempted in the foregoing pages. First, that over-production and the misery that attends it are constant features of the competitive system; and, secondly, that an enormous economy results from combination. Now, combination is a step towards collectivism in production and distribution. And over-production and waste are the two principal economic disadvantages that attend competition. These, therefore, are the points to which attention will be first directed.

I. OVER-PRODUCTION.

Over-production has given rise to considerable difference of opinion. Early writers were much concerned with the possibility of a "universal glut;" that is to say, of over-production extending over the whole field of industry and tending to result in a general industrial paralysis. J. B. Say was the first to

point out that under-production was as much to be feared as over-production, the reasons for over-production of a particular commodity being "*either that it has been produced in excessive abundance, or that the production of other commodities has fallen short.*" In other words, over-production often takes place in one industry because there has been under-production in others. The evil in such cases is one of proportion that easily rights itself. This view, which is undoubtedly sound so far as it goes, has given rise, however, to a false security; for although there cannot be said to be even in Mexico the "indisposition to consume" of which Malthus in this connection wrote, there is at times an *inability to consume*, due to irregularity of employment, which is quite as serious in its consequences upon human happiness. Again, many economists have, since Say's lucid exposition of the subject, put over-production out of sight almost entirely, forgetting that although Say attributed it in part to under-production, he by no means failed to recognise that it could take place quite independently of under-production. Say's words are that over-production of a particular commodity takes place because "*either it has been produced in excessive abundance, or the production of other commodities has fallen short.*" This is a plain recognition that over-production can precede under-production and can take place independently of it. There is a school of modern economists which persistently belittles the extent of over-production and the evil that results from it. With a view, therefore, to demonstrating that over-production is an evil which we cannot afford to neglect, a few instances of it have been collected from the history of our largest trusts. It would seem from these instances that over-production is far more the parent of trusts than the tariff; for though the tariff may tend to stimulate over-production, over-production will be found in practically every industry that has given rise to trusts whether protected by a tariff or not. And with a view to making this clear the first industry quoted will be that of anthracite, to which no tariff applies.¹

¹ As regards the Anthracite Trust, see Mr. Q. O. Virtue's article entitled "The Anthracite Combinations," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, April, 1896.

The history of the production of anthracite is interesting from many different points of view to show the unhappiness that results from the present competitive system. When anthracite was first worked it was found relatively near the surface; and villages sprang up around every centre of production. When, however, larger beds were discovered at greater depth, requiring larger capital for exploitation, the villages which had sprung up at the places where the surface beds were worked disappeared, and families were ruined and scattered.

In the 'sixties the workmen employed in the large anthracite mines were for the most part American, and were strongly organized in trade unions. When the inevitable tendency of all large exploitation to produce the utmost, in order to pay interest on capital and on plant, occasioned a larger production of anthracite than the country could at remunerative prices consume, the mine-owners, driven to reducing cost, reduced it at the only point where cost can in such cases be reduced; that is to say, they reduced it by lowering wages. The workmen struck; but the strike was of a peculiar character; they did not strike for the purpose of compelling their employers to pay them a higher wage than the Market could afford. They struck in order, by stopping over-production, to restore the Market to a condition which would enable the employers to pay the previous wage. For this purpose the workmen decided to stop working an entire month; their calculation turned out to be sound; an end was put to the glut which had reduced prices, and at the end of the month they returned to work at the old wages.

The mine-owners, however, did not care to have the question of production determined by their workmen; they therefore substituted for American workmen foreigners who were carefully recruited at the emigrant stations and even in Hungary and other European centres. This broke down the strength of the trade union and threw the question of production back into the hands of the mine-owners, with the usual result, — over-production.

There then followed a series of agreements between mine-owners to diminish production, the principal of which were

those of 1869, of 1872, of 1877, and of 1885, each of these agreements being in turn violated and leading in turn to rupture until over-production became so intolerable again that another agreement became necessary. Nothing is more clear than that every mine-owner throughout this period was driven by competition to make his production as large as possible, so as to make small profits on large transactions compensate for the larger profit on smaller transactions which competition no longer rendered possible.

The tendency of every mine-owner to produce to the utmost was encouraged by competing railroads, which had an interest in carrying the largest amount of anthracite possible and offered rebates to the largest shippers; inasmuch as anthracite is bulky, and freight enters very largely into the cost of anthracite at seaports, transportation forms an important feature in the economic conditions affecting it. In 1892 Mr. McLeod, President of the Reading Railroad, sought to effect, by a combination between the roads that carried anthracite, what the mine-owners had theretofore been unable to effect; under his plan the railroads were to control the mines and were to agree to keep down over-production and divide the traffic. The McLeod combination had immediately for effect by lowering production to raise the price of coal, stove size, at Eastern ports from \$4.09 to \$4.19. But the Reading Road was not strong enough to carry the burden it had undertaken; with its bankruptcy in that year came an immediate fall to \$3.60 in Eastern ports in 1894 and to \$3.08 in 1895. The over-production became so great that instead of working the normal ten hours a day during six days of the week, the Reading men in 1895 worked only eight hours a day for three or four days in the week. Over-production having to a certain extent been controlled by this process, in 1896 the working hours were increased to nine a day for five days in the week; but even under these conditions over-production was still the rule. The American Market was at that time capable of purchasing forty million tons of anthracite coal while the mines were producing forty-six million tons, or six million tons more than the Market could take. This condition of things gave rise to another agreement

in 1896 under which the Reading Company agreed to reduce its production to eight million tons, or one fifth of the total production.

Since 1896 a complete reorganisation of the Reading Road has led to a still stronger control of production, which has resulted in the present high prices.

The history of the steel trust is similar to that of anthracite. It began with numerous pooling arrangements to limit production, every pooling arrangement resulting in higher prices, but eventually in rupture and a subsequent reduction of prices. The difficulty of keeping the parties to the agreements made compelled Messrs. Carnegie and Rockefeller to effect the combination which has now brought the mines of Lake Superior into the same combination that produces steel at Pittsburgh. Doubtless, economy of production is one of the great advantages secured by this combination; but it is interesting to note that the first cause which led to the pooling arrangements that preceded the trust was over-production.

The same thing is true as regards sugar. The first pool of sugar-refiners was the result of a strike in New York, and in this respect the sugar trust resembles the anthracite trust. Before the strike there had been a cut-throat competition between refiners which had caused refined sugar to be sold at a price below cost. When, however, the workmen in New York struck, the refiners who had theretofore been bitter enemies combined so as to enable the refineries of Boston, Philadelphia, and other Eastern seaport towns to supply the demand for refined sugar, notwithstanding the cessation of work in New York; the profits upon all the sugar manufactured being divided proportionately among all the refineries, including New York. Refiners, having once got together on this basis, remained together, and were driven by anti-trust legislation into organising in a more and more compact form, until to-day it has taken the shape of a corporation which is probably beyond the reach of anti-trust legislation altogether. It is important, however, to note the extent to which over-production was an essential factor in the organisation of this trust. The refining of sugar requires large capital; sugar, being

easily kept, can be stored in large quantities for considerable periods without injury; the fact that the amount of capital invested is large pushes refiners to producing the utmost possible; and the fact that sugar can be stored encourages large production by enabling refiners to hold over for a better market. Over-production under these conditions became so excessive that out of forty refiners eighteen became bankrupt just prior to the organisation of the first sugar trust. Of the twenty-two that remained eighteen combined. Of these eighteen, eleven refineries were closed, leaving seven to do profitably the work which had previously been done unprofitably by forty.

The history of the whiskey trust shows over-production to a still more aggravated degree. Before the organisation of the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company, several agreements were entered into by the majority of the distillers; under one of them they agreed to reduce production to forty per cent of what it at that time was; under a subsequent agreement they agreed to reduce still further to twenty-eight per cent; and out of eighty of the principal distillers who organised the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company, sixty-eight were closed, leaving only twelve distilleries operating.

The same succession of events is to be found in the history of the American Steel & Wire Company, and indeed of practically all American trusts, and it may be laid down as a general rule that, in the first place, competition tends to produce over-production; in the second place, over-production reduces prices to a ruinous degree; in the third place, high prices are restored in one of four ways:—

1. The low prices oblige a reduction of wages; the reduction of wages occasions strikes; and the cessation of production occasioned by strikes, by putting an end to the glut that lowered prices, restores the proper relation of demand to supply. Or,—

2. Prices become so low as to cause the bankruptcy of the weakest competitors; this bankruptcy causes the shutting down of some of the mills, and thereby relieves the over-production and restores prices. Or,—

3. Foreign trade¹ relieves the domestic market. Or,—

4. Combination upon the trust plan applies intelligence to the adjustment of production to demand.

¹ The Industrial Commission has furnished some remarkable examples of the extent to which over-production compels the conquest of markets abroad.

At one period prior to the organisation of the whiskey trust, distillers agreed that an assessment should be levied which each distiller should pay upon each bushel of corn mashed, in order to export the goods at a loss, and thus, by relieving the home Market of the surplus, make sufficient provision for selling the domestic production at a remunerative price (Jenks, Trust Problem, p. 108). Another of the pools formed, under the name of the Western Exporters' Association, prior to the organisation of the first whiskey trust, determined the producing capacity of each distillery and divided among them the producing capacity of the country pro rata. Distillers producing in excess were required to export at their own cost, while any surplus arising fortuitously was exported at the expense of the Association, the loss being met by assessment. (Testimony of Messrs. McNulta (p. 200) and Clarke (pp. 168, 169) in the Report of the Industrial Commission.)

At a time when the American trade was paying \$28 a ton for steel rails, the same steel rails were being sold to Japan at \$20. (Monde Economique, Feb. 20, 1897.) When the pooling arrangement under which this export of steel rails at a lower price in Japan than prevailed in America was broken up, the price of steel went down to \$15, and this resulted in 1897 in enormous orders abroad, 25,000 tons being ordered in England and 15,000 tons in Japan; and three weeks afterwards another sudden reduction in price brought about orders abroad of 1,500,000 tons at a value of 150,000,000 francs. Mr. Guthrie, President of the American Steel Hoop Company, testifies:—

"American manufacturers, too, sometimes follow the practice of exporting a surplus product at a price less than the average cost of the entire output—considerably less than the price in this country. The Carnegie Company thus at one time proposed to sell a large quantity of steel abroad at twenty per cent less than the domestic price in order to 'keep things moving and bring gold back to this country.'" (Report of the Industrial Commission, p. 193.)

Mr. Gates, President of the American Steel and Wire Company, testifies:—

"The price at which the American Steel and Wire Company is selling in foreign markets at present is less than the domestic price. The reason for this is that by working up a permanent foreign business the company can assure the constant operation of its mills and thus make goods cheaper, and can make profits from maintaining foreign prices at times when there

It is interesting to note that of these four escapes from the evils of over-production, the first two are automatic, or, as some economists would say, natural, and involve great misery without permanent benefit; the third is automatic with a dash of intelligence in it; whereas the fourth is wholly deliberate and intelligent, or, as some economists would say, artificial, and results in lasting economy.

II. ECONOMY

There is an economy which results from all concentration of capital, such as the manufacture of waste products. This economy is sometimes of startling importance. The managers of the Standard Oil trust testify that among the waste products capable of being utilised in sufficiently large refineries are gasoline, paraffine, lubricating oil, vaseline, naphtha, aniline dyes, and no less than two hundred drugs, and that the total value of these waste products is actually as great as that of the oil itself.¹

But it is not the economy which attends mere concentration of capital which particularly interests us. The economies is a decline in the home price. By manufacturing perhaps 200,000 tons of wire per annum for export the entire cost of manufacture can be materially cheapened, and in the long run the domestic consumer will receive a lower price." (Report of the Industrial Commission, p. 205.)

Mr. Gary, President of the Federal Steel Company, testifies: "Steel has also been shipped recently to Japan at a price below the domestic price." (Report of the Industrial Commission, p. 199.)

Mr. J. W. Lee, President of the three independent pipe-line organisations, testifies that prior to 1895 "export oil was sold in New York below the cost of crude at the refinery." (Report of Industrial Commission, p. 121.)

The representatives of most of the trust combinations pointed out the enormous increase in the export trade due to these combinations; and those of the Standard Oil Company claimed that this trade could not have been secured without the expenditure of large sums of money such as only a great combination can control. (Report of the Industrial Commission, p. 22, and witnesses cited.) In other words, a trust possesses the means and the information to use foreign trade as a resource, whereas competition reduces small manufacturers to resort to it as an extremity.

The above illustrations are cited in aid of the contention that over-production stimulates and compels the conquest of foreign trade.

¹ Testimony of Mr. Archbold (pp. 570, 571) in the Report of the Industrial Commission.

which particularly interest students of trusts are those that result from the combination of many factories under one management. These economies may be divided into two classes:

- (a) Economies in production; and
- (b) Economies in distribution.

1. ECONOMIES IN PRODUCTION

(a) *Economy Occasioned by Working Factories at Maximum Efficiency*

Under the system of free competition every factory is subject to variations of demand: at one season the factory is overworked; at another it is not enough worked to occupy its employees. A factory is working at the maximum profit when it is working at its highest efficiency; every factory, therefore, has an interest in working at the highest efficiency. This hardly ever takes place under the régime of free competition except at seasons of extraordinary prosperity. When, however, many factories combine under one management, most of them can be run at maximum efficiency, and the variation in demand can be concentrated upon comparatively few factories. In the case of the sugar trust, of the seven refineries which are maintained, six work without interruption at maximum efficiency, and the entire variation is made to fall upon a single refinery, — the one in New York.

An incidental economy resulting from this plan is to be found in the fact that the adjustment of the work of a factory to a fluctuating demand is the most difficult part of a manager's task, and the task being difficult it is high priced; in other words, if the seven refineries now constituting the sugar trust were working under the system of free competition upon their own account they would have to pay high prices for this expensive management. By combining these seven factories under one management, the expensive management is confined to a single refinery.

We should underestimate the economy resulting from this head were we to consider only the seven refineries now consti-

tuting the sugar trust; it must be remembered that before the sugar trust was organised the number of refineries operating was not seven, but forty; so that under the system of free competition forty factories were all working under expensive management and at great disadvantage, whereas now the same work is being done by seven refineries of which six are working at maximum efficiency under the best conditions and without expensive management, and only one is now subjected to the disadvantageous circumstances and expensive management that prior to the combination diminished the profits of every one of the forty competitors. It has been estimated that the saving to the sugar trust arising from this advantage alone is as high at times as one-eighth of a cent per pound, or \$2.50 per ton. The sugar trust refines about 1,800,000 tons per annum, thus making from this source alone an economy, if maintained throughout the year, of about \$4,500,000 per annum.

*(b) Economy of Time in Manufacturing Only
One Dimension*

In the manufacturing of steel hoops eighty-five different sizes have to be made. When every factory is called upon to fill an order comprising many sizes, much time is lost in changing the rolling-machinery for different sizes. Mr. Guthrie, the President of the American Steel Hoop Company, testifies that by specialising products in different plants an economy of \$1 to \$1.50 per ton is effected.¹ A similar economy is made in the manufacture of shoes and many other articles of different dimensions.

2. ECONOMY OF DISTRIBUTION

(a) Cross-Freights

A refiner of crude petroleum in the Eastern States, in competing with a refiner in Chicago for Western trade, is at a disadvantage owing to the necessity of paying cross-freights; that is to say, he has to pay the cost of transporting crude oil from

¹ Report of the Industrial Commission, pp. 953-957.

the wells to New York, and then the cost of carrying the refined oil back over practically the same ground to the West. When, however, factories in Chicago and New York are put under one management as in the Standard Oil trust, these cross-freights are avoided, the crude oil taken to New York is refined for the Eastern market alone, and the Western market is provided with oil refined in Chicago. The salt and the tin-plate trusts also effect a great economy by the elimination of cross-freights.

(b) "*Getting the Market*"

The expression "getting the Market" is used to cover all the expenses attending the bringing of goods to the attention of the public, and they may be roughly divided into two principal categories,—advertising and commercial travellers. The public little appreciates the enormous cost which, under the system of free competition, attends the work of finding a purchaser. Mr. Bradley, after a careful calculation, estimates that "somewhere between the distiller and the consumer in this country forty millions of dollars are lost; this goes primarily to the attempt to secure trade."¹ He testifies that the combination of Kentucky distillers was able to dismiss three hundred salesmen; the Steel and Wire trust dismissed two hundred salesmen. Mr. Dowe,² the President of the Commercial Travellers' National League, testifies that thirty-five thousand salesmen have been thrown out of employment by the organisation of trusts, and twenty-five thousand reduced to two-thirds of their previous salaries. This would represent a loss of \$60,000,000 in salaries on a basis of \$1,200 each. He cites, as instances of trusts that have dismissed salesmen, the baking powder, bicycle, chair, paper-bag, rubber, tin-plate, steel and rod, sugar, coffee, thread, and type-founders' combinations. Not only do trusts dismiss salesmen, but they substitute for salesmen who prior to the organisation of the trust had been earning \$4,000 to \$5,000 a year, cheaper salesmen who receive

¹ Report of the Industrial Commission, pp. 829-831.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 27-36.

\$18 a week. He also estimates that the dismissal of commercial travellers means a loss to railways of about \$2.50 per day for 240 days in the year, in all \$27,000,000. The loss to hotels is about as much, and "many hotels are likely to become bankrupt if any more travellers are taken off." To Mr. Dowe and the organisation he represents the dismissal of commercial travellers is of course a disaster; but from a purely economic point of view, assuming the competitive system to be a sound one, what is a disaster to the Commercial Travellers' National League is a benefit to the industry and to the nation at large, for it represents so much economy realised. This question admirably illustrates how the competitive system sets one group of men in conflict with others without offering any satisfactory solution for the misery which this conflict occasions.

The subject of trusts presents an insoluble problem when studied from the point of view of human happiness; but it is full of valuable lessons when studied from the point of view of the collectivist, for it furnishes not only demonstrative proof of the fact that competition is necessarily attended by over-production and waste, but also figures showing the extent of the evil in both cases.

3. PRICES

The principal advantage claimed by individualists for competition in industry is that it tends automatically to keep prices at a reasonable figure. It is not contended that competition keeps prices constant; the fluctuation of prices is too obvious to permit of such a contention; but it is claimed that under the salutary influence of competition, though prices may occasionally go far above a reasonable figure and even fall below cost, there is a tendency to return to what is called a normal price. By normal price is generally understood a price that will cover cost of production and a reasonable profit. Classical economists call this "natural" price, because it is the price towards which fluctuations naturally tend. Professor Clark¹ prefers to call this price "static." He describes the industrial

¹ The Distribution of Wealth, by Professor John Bates Clark, p. vi.

world as in a perpetual state of "change and progress." Because of this state of change and progress, standards of wages and of interest and of profits vary. "But there are normal standards to-day. In the midst of all changes there are at work forces that fix rates to which, at any one moment, wages and interest tend to conform. However stormy may be the ocean, there is an ideal level surface projecting itself through the waves, and the actual surface of the turbulent water fluctuates about it. There are likewise static standards with which, in the most turbulent markets, actual values, wages, and interest tend to coincide."

Professor Clark assumes that the industrial sea must continue always to be swept by hurricanes, and its shores strewn with wrecks of bankruptcy and victims of irregular employment; and although he does not in terms say it, the competitive system is silently recognised to constitute the "cave of the winds" which lashes our industrial sea with conflicting gales, tornadoes, and typhoons.

It is by no means sure, however, that competition in the aggravated form now in operation is a necessary element even of the competitive system; it is conceivable that its capacity for mischief may be much diminished by the application to economic conditions of intelligence and art. There are two methods under which the evils attending competition can be diminished or eliminated: one is purely economic; the other is partly economic and partly political. It is with the first of these two that we have to deal in studying trusts, for an examination of the effect of trusts upon prices will lead to the conclusion that, once the trust is firmly established, it produces a lull in the industrial storm; it may be that the lull is a temporary one, but lull it is; and a method by which such a lull is secured deserves the careful attention of social economists.

Professor Jenks prepared for the Industrial Commission a table of the prices of articles which had given rise to trusts, showing the fluctuations of these prices from month to month. These charts are reproduced by Professor Jenks in his book on the trust problem. The principal lines in these charts are

three: the highest line indicates the price of the manufactured article, the line next below indicates the price of the raw material, and the lowest line of all indicates the difference between the price of the raw material and the price of the manufactured article, and marks, therefore, at every month, the cost of manufacture plus profits realised at the prices reigning during the month. These tables constitute a record of the influence the trusts have had upon prices, upon cost of production, and upon profits realised.

The first impression produced by a glance at these tables is that in every case prices have on the whole gone down. This lowering of prices in connection with all articles controlled by trusts cannot, however, be put to the credit of trusts; the prices of articles controlled by trusts have gone down because all prices have gone down, probably owing to the demonetisation of silver and the consequent appreciation of currency. But the important conclusion to be drawn from the lowering of prices in articles controlled by trusts, even though it be explained by the appreciation of currency, is that trusts have been unable to resist the general effect of the appreciation of currency upon general prices; in other words, articles manufactured by trusts have obeyed the general law; trusts have not been strong enough to resist the application of the general law. So far, therefore, as the general trend towards lower prices which characterises the last quarter of the last century is concerned, trusts have been powerless to resist it; to this extent, therefore, trusts have not dictated prices.

The table of American prices of sugar shows also the fluctuations in the prices of sugar in England and Germany; it is interesting to observe that every fluctuation in the lines of European prices is reproduced in the lines showing American prices. When the raw material in Europe goes down, the raw material in America goes down; and with the reduction of the raw material in America follows a reduction in the refined article; so that all the lines, whether of refined or of raw sugar in America, or whether of refined or of raw sugar in Germany and England, move up and down, with negligible variations, together. The conclusion to be

drawn from this is that here again the trusts are unable materially to affect the fluctuations determined by the world's production. Mr. Post, commission-merchant in sugar, testifies that the production of beet-root sugar in Europe chiefly determines the price (Industrial Commission, pp. 153-158); and against this dominating influence the trust is powerless. Here again is evidence that tends to show how untrue it is that trusts can dictate prices.

A more analytical inquiry into these tables of prices shows a still more important fact; namely, that competition exercises a wholesome influence over trusts, even in cases where actual competition is practically nil. It exerts this influence potentially; it is a perpetual menace to the trust; and prosperous trusts have learned the lesson that they can remain prosperous only on the condition of keeping prices reasonable. A brief examination of three of these tables will serve to illustrate this fact: the sugar trust was organised at the close of 1887 after a period of low prices which had put into bankruptcy eighteen out of forty refineries. During 1888 and 1889 prices of sugar went up, but they went up in Europe relatively almost as high as in America, the rise in the prices being determined mainly by the shortage in the sugar crop; in other words, it was the raw material that advanced more than the manufactured article. Nevertheless, the absence of competition enabled the sugar trust to manufacture at remunerative prices, and the profits made during 1888 and 1889 were undoubtedly large, as can be seen by reference to the third line, which indicates the difference between the cost of the raw article and that of the refined. The result of the high profits made in 1888 and 1889 was to encourage competition. Spreckels became an active competitor in Philadelphia, and for two years he fought the trust. Prices went down, but they went down in great part owing to a reduction in the price of raw sugar. Here again we must have recourse to the third line, showing the difference between the cost of the raw sugar and of the refined, in order to determine the influence of competition upon profits. It will be seen by reference to these lines that profits very nearly disappeared during this period, and this will prepare us to under-

stand why in 1892 Spreckels sold out to the trust. This resulted in an immediate rise in profits, and this rise was maintained from 1892 to 1898. In 1898 Doscher set up an independent refinery, and Arbuckle Brothers, who had a patent for putting up packages which they had applied up to that time to coffee alone, went into the sugar business because they could apply this patented process to the packing of sugar also.¹ Since that time these competitors have remained in the field, and the cost of manufacture has gone down and remained for eight months at a time as low as it was during 1895, when eighteen out of forty refineries failed. It is interesting to observe that, notwithstanding this decline, the sugar trust declared last year a dividend of twelve per cent. It would seem, therefore, that prices that cause ruin under a *régime* of free competition permit of the payment of twelve per cent dividends under the *régime* of such combinations as the sugar trust.

The lessons to be drawn from this examination of the table of prices of sugar are twofold: —

1. That although trusts may eliminate the waste that attends competition they nevertheless remain subject to the salutary influence of competition *in posse* if not *in esse*.

2. That with the economy effected as above explained the sugar trust can manufacture at a profit, though prices fall to a point which involved bankruptcy under the system of free competition.

If we want a startling illustration how ineffectual combinations are to maintain prices high above a reasonable figure, we may turn to the table of prices of spirits and corn; that is to say, to the prices that prevailed under the auspices of the whiskey trust. The original organisers of combinations in this article were men of more audacity than prudence; they conceived that they had found through the instrumentality of combination a system by means of which they could raise prices far beyond a reasonable figure and maintain them there. The result proved disastrous. We have but to glance at the tables to see how disastrous. Prices are pushed up in 1882 and 1883

¹ Report of Industrial Commission, testimony of Mr. Jarvis, 138-142.

only to fall fifty per cent in 1884; they are pushed up by a new reorganisation at the close of 1884 to the same figure as in 1883, to fall once more fifty per cent in 1885; they are pushed up by another combination in the early part of 1887 only to fall fifty per cent at the close of the year; they are pushed up in 1888 only to fall more than fifty per cent in 1889. Fluctuations of this extravagant character continue until the organisation of the American Spirits Manufacturing Company in 1895, when the business came into the hands of directors who had learned that prices could not by combination be maintained immoderately above a reasonable profit. Since then exaggerated fluctuations have disappeared, and the trust has become continuously prosperous.

As regards the Standard Oil trust, the Moloch among trusts, whose power as regards prices is deemed to be such that it is commonly stated that the directors meet every morning to fix, according to their caprice, the price that is to rule over the entire civilised world, — if we glance over the table of prices of crude and refined oil we shall find exactly the same forces operating as have been already pointed out in connection with the other trusts. There is the general decline of prices; there is the first loose combination of 1872 raising prices momentarily, but these prices decline in consequence of the opening of the Butler County oil wells in 1873 and 1874. Again in 1891 and 1892 we find high prices opening up the Macdonald field, and the exceptionally high prices of 1895 bring the competition of the Pure Oil Company into the field, — a competition which exists at the present day.

Trusts may keep actual competition down, may rid competition of its worst features in the shape of over-production, bankruptcy, and irregularity of employment; but they have heretofore always operated under the menace of competition, and this menace seems up to the present day to have kept prices from permanently becoming extortionate. Whether potential competition can continue to do this will be considered in the summary with which this Appendix closes.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It has been already pointed out in this volume that the anarchy which attended the decay of the Roman empire came to an end, not through the sword of Charlemagne or the genius of Hildebrand, but through the combinations of industrious artisans who profited by the quarrels of Church and Crown to organise themselves into combinations, guilds, and corporations. These combinations were the application of intelligence and art to industry. They undertook to adjust production to demand by limiting the persons admitted to every trade; and they undertook also to secure a high standard of excellence by the careful education of every candidate for admission. Unrestricted competition was by this system eliminated and confined within the limits which every guild determined for itself. The prosperity which attended the great guilds of the Middle Ages, and the control they acquired of municipal government, bear witness not only to the judgment of the men who governed these guilds, but to the guild principle itself; that is to say, to the application of intelligence to the adjustment of production to demand. It has also been shown how the guilds abused their power, so that the tyranny of the corporation became as intolerable as that of the throne.

The close of the eighteenth century is marked by a revolt against economic as well as against political despotism. The obvious remedy for economic despotism was liberty of contract; liberty of contract was preached by the physiocrats, received the weighty support of Adam Smith in England, and became the fetich of the Manchester School. But no sooner had the Assemblée Nationale in France enacted a law not only suppressing guilds, but actually forbidding all associations of persons in the same employment, and even punishing such associations by imprisonment, than we see such associations, notwithstanding, springing up all over France. These associations took the form in France of associations of employers in the same trade for the purpose of protecting the interests of the trade; and as these employers' associations

put the employers at a great advantage over the employees, employers' associations gave rise to employees' associations, which took the form of benefit societies, though in fact they were organised for the purpose of resistance.

In England the opposite takes place, — that is to say, it is the workmen who combine first to resist the Iron Law; and the employers, having more or less successfully at first used Parliament to prevent trade unions, but at last failed, were bound to organise themselves in order successfully to resist the growing power of the unions. Thus in England we see daily growing in power employers' associations confronted by trade unions until at last the two combine in a common agreement, the employers not to employ any workmen save those forming part of the trade unions, and the workmen agreeing not to work for any employer save those who belong to the employers' association. These combinations of employer and employee are known as Trade Alliances in Birmingham, and have succeeded in crushing out competition as effectually and practically as the mediæval guild; and so after a century of so-called progress industry has returned to the point from which it started.

Liberty of contract seems therefore to be impossible under the competitive system. Free competition drives the weak to combine against the strong; and combination of one element in the industrial field obliges combination of the element against which the first combination is made. Moreover, the principle of the survival of the fittest, upon which the competitive system is based, favours these combinations, for in the struggle it is the combination most intelligently adapted to its end which survives.

Now in the economic field competition sets two elements of society against one another: the effort of the purchaser is to get most goods for least money, whereas it is the interest of the producer to give least goods for most money; competition, however, is on the side of the purchaser, and tends to force the producer to give more and more for less and less. This perpetual tendency can be successfully met only by reducing the cost of production to the utmost; and cost of production can

be diminished only by eliminating competition through such combinations as we are here studying under the name of trusts.

Unless the foregoing study of trusts is altogether wrong, the extent to which combination prevails in a country is a direct measure of its intelligence and art. It is because competition is more keen and intelligent in France than in Spain that we see in France the combinations that are known under the name of "comptoirs;" it is because competition is still more keen and intelligent in Germany than in France that we have combinations still more prevalent in Germany under the name of "kartels;" it is because competition is equally keen and intelligent in England that we have such organisations as the Borax Consolidated, The Yorkshire Wool Combers, Bradford Dyers' Association, Calico Printers' Association, etc.;¹ and it is because competition is more intelligent and more keen in the United States than in any country in the world that we have combination brought to its highest expression in the trusts that we are here examining.

But we have up to this point examined trusts only in their intranational aspect, — that is to say, as to their working within the nation; we have not considered the effect of trusts upon international relations, — that is to say, as to their working beyond national limits. Here, perhaps, we have to encounter a grave danger.

Competition is no longer confined within national lines; the United States and England compete as consciously and deliberately in such industries as the building of railroads, bridges, ships, and engines, as the "Bon Marché" and the "Louvre" in Paris, Whiteley's and Peter Robinson in London, and Macy and Wanamaker in New York. And in the struggle for business it is the national industry which is organised in a manner to produce with the greatest economy that must in the end prevail. It is because production of iron and steel in the United States is better organised than in England that, in spite of

¹ An article by Robert Donald in the "Review of Reviews" for November, 1900, gives an excellent account of the extent to which combination is replacing competition in British industry.

higher wages in America, the United States can successfully compete with England in the markets of the world. So long as international as well as intranational competition, whether *in esse* or *in posse*, stands guard to prevent prices from rising beyond reasonable limits, it is reasonable to suppose that not only do trusts eliminate the waste of competition without the public losing its advantages, but the necessary forces at work in the economic field seem of a character to promote the organisation of trusts with a view to producing a maximum of efficiency over the whole industrial field, or over that part of it to which such combinations as trusts are applicable.

Unfortunately the public is not protected by the assurance that international competition will always stand guard over its interests, for trusts have already stretched beyond national boundaries to organise international combinations as to the danger of which the public cannot too soon become alive.

In order properly to appreciate this danger it will be necessary to examine more critically just what this potential competition is that constitutes a public safeguard against high prices.

We have seen that it is twofold; namely, competition within national boundaries, and competition without national boundaries. As regards the first it has been shown that, so far in the United States, competition, whether actual or potential, has succeeded in preventing permanently high prices. But it does not follow that it will always hereafter be as successful; or that because it has been successful in the United States it will be equally successful in other countries. Competition against such accumulated and organised forces as present themselves in trusts requires great courage — nay, audacity — as well as judgment and perseverance. These qualities so combined are rare. The United States so far has found them when occasion offered; but it may not always find them; indeed, the tendency of trusts to destroy individual initiative is likely to make these qualities more and more rare. Again, while these qualities so combined have been found in the United States, it is by no means sure that they are likely to be found in other countries. In France notably there is a reaction to-day against great commercial enterprises. The failure of the Panama Canal pro-

ject, failure, too, in late attempts to open mines, have created in France a strong indisposition to commercial undertakings that are attended by heavy risk. For example, although the Anglo-American syndicate that controls copper has pushed the price of copper to an extremely profitable figure, financiers in France, though clearly alive to the large profits offered to the openers of new mines, for the most part decline to undertake the struggle with the syndicate which they think such opening would involve. It is true that the absence of the enterprise necessary to fight trusts probably involves also an absence of the enterprise necessary to create them. "Comptoirs" exist in France in but few industries, and then only in such as particularly lend themselves to such combinations. But the absence of the enterprise in France necessary to fight trusts may have a bearing on the trust problem in America when we study the second class of competition which has heretofore constituted a safeguard against high prices; namely, competition abroad.

Foreign competition has doubtless exercised a powerful influence in preventing permanent high prices in the United States. Intranational competition, such as that of the Pure Oil Company, doubtless exerts a salutary influence on Standard Oil prices, but its influence can probably be neglected by the side of the competition of Bakou. The sugar trust is doubtless protected by a high tariff, but at any rate the tariff represents a limit to prices beyond which the sugar trust cannot go so long as it has to compete with the refineries of Europe. What, however, would happen were the Standard Oil to combine with the oil-producers of Bakou? And should our government, convinced by the probably erroneous theory that the tariff is the parent of trusts, in obedience to the present outcry against trusts, suppress the tariff on sugar, would such suppression not inevitably lead to a combination of American with European refiners by the side of which the present sugar trust would in power be as a child? There are no insurmountable difficulties in the way of such a combination. The petroleum business of Europe is practically in the hands of two firms; an understanding between three men—

Rockefeller, Nobel, and Rothschild — would put an end to international competition in petroleum. The same is true, though in a less degree, of sugar; in France, Germany, and England, prices of refined sugar are determined by comparatively few men. Nor are we to-day without examples of international trusts, as, for example, the Anglo-American Cotton-Thread trust and the Anglo-American syndicate which practically controls the production of copper throughout the entire world.

The power, social and political, which such international trusts would wield, would be unexampled in history. Already the millionaires who endow our universities are exerting their influence on higher education. They cannot be expected to look with favour on professors who recommend their overthrow; many resignations have therefore of late been demanded, and one of the most distinguished of our economists kept his chair only by demonstrating that his teaching deprecated socialism rather than encouraged it. And if millionaires already have laid their hands on our higher education, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they will next turn their attention to our public schools; if not to destroy education as once the Church did, at least to pervert it as do the Jesuits to-day.

It is not necessary to indulge at once in needless alarm on this subject. The day is probably far off when trusts will be powerful enough to attack our public-school system. But the measures suggested as a remedy for trust abuses may be the very ones to accelerate the coming of the evil day. Undoubtedly the most obvious and perhaps at the present time the most reasonable remedy proposed is publicity and surveillance. Unfortunately neither can be enforced except through the government. Our legislatures must pass laws requiring them, and officials must administer the laws when enacted. The effect of the present demand for publicity and surveillance can be stated beforehand: it will compel the trust to control the government. How easily it can do this was illustrated in the United States Senate during Cleveland's administration; and it is important to note that corruption, as commonly understood, had little to do with this control. The Senate voted measures favourable to the sugar trust because it was com-

posed of men who were affiliated socially as well as financially with the trust managers; because a turn could be made on the stock market by patriotic protection of an American industry; because the money power which endows churches, hospitals, and universities must be held up; because intelligence, culture, refinement, and the highest conceptions of "social justice" are leagued against the principles of disorder preached by the selfish and discontented opposition.¹ And then, if there be required a more substantial argument, if there be a needy senator still unconvinced, a single trust—the Standard Oil Company—is in possession of a fund for convincing him, of \$48,000,000 a year!² And if these things are done in the green tree, what will be done in the dry, — when international trusts will be as much more powerful than the Standard Oil Company to-day, as the Standard Oil Company to-day is more powerful than Rockefeller, Andrews, and Teacher in 1870, with a puny capital of \$1,000,000, and a pitiful production of 600 barrels a day?

It is very much to be feared that the more government attempts to control trusts, the more powerful trusts will become, for the attempt will leave trusts no alternative but to control the government. It is interesting to observe that the more trusts have been attacked, the more they have been compelled by these attacks to consolidate, and every step in consolidation has been an advance in strength. The first combination of sugar-refineries was the one that gave rise to the name of trust; it did not involve loss of identity for the refiners in the combination; but when the system of creating a voting trust was declared illegal by the courts they were driven to reorganise, and by successive steps have at last abandoned the principle of maintaining the identity of the combining refineries and assumed in fact as well as in form

¹ Read on this subject the unqualified approval of the competitive system expressed by Dr. Willoughby in his recent book on Social Justice, p. 304.

² The Standard Oil Company declared a dividend of thirty per cent on a stock capital of \$100,000,000 in 1898, of thirty-three per cent in 1899, and of forty-eight per cent in 1900.

the organisation of a single corporation. Such, too, has been the effect of anti-trust legislation. Every attack has compelled trusts to become more formidable.

What, then, is the last word to be said about trusts? Trusts and trade alliances furnish evidence to show that men are too clearly alive to the evils that attend competition any longer to tolerate these evils. Trade alliances are not likely to survive; they involve the exercise of too much self-control in the presence of too great a temptation. Already the bedstead combination—the classic instance of trade alliances—has broken up. The very necessity, however, which tends to break up trade alliances tends to promote trusts—the necessity of economical production. International competition will favour the national industry which is the most economically organised. Trusts tend, therefore, to become more and more powerful through international competition until at last they take the final step, and, by overstepping national boundaries, destroy the international safeguard against high prices. The power which highly organised international trusts would exercise cannot to-day be named or even, perhaps, imagined. It may be far off, but development has lately been of startling rapidity. The first combination effected by Rockefeller in 1870 had a capital of \$1,000,000; the Standard Oil Company to-day is paying a dividend of forty-eight per cent on \$100,000,000. Every effort by government to control trusts will compel trusts to own the government. Humanity has decided to escape from the evils of competition. It can do so in one of two ways,—economically through trusts, or politically through collectivism.

“Under which king, Byzantine?”

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
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
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[Index completed by Miss NANCY BAILEY, 5 Great College Street,
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the 1990s, the number of people with a mental health problem has increased by 50% (Mental Health Foundation 1999). The prevalence of mental health problems has increased in the general population, and the incidence of mental health problems has increased in the prison population.

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the mental health needs of prisoners. The Department of Health (1999) has published a strategy for mental health care in the community, which includes a commitment to improve the mental health of prisoners. The Department of Health (2000) has published a strategy for mental health care in the prison system, which includes a commitment to improve the mental health of prisoners. The Department of Health (2001) has published a strategy for mental health care in the prison system, which includes a commitment to improve the mental health of prisoners.

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